VTVera Tolz

Vera Tolz

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Vera Tolz has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    From Moscow to Cologne and across the Atlantic: Newspaper science and the global origins of Soviet mass communication

    by Vera Tolz, Alexandr Voronovici

    This article situates early Soviet studies of the press, a specific academic field called gazetovedenie , within the global history of mass communication research. While scholarship often portrays Soviet media theory as entirely subordinate to agitational practice, this situation only became established by 1930, when well-known Soviet orthodoxies on the nature and role of propaganda fully solidified. In the 1920s, Soviet press scholars actively engaged with contemporary global debates about the press’s role in mass society, how propaganda functioned, and why it often failed. Far from working in isolation, they drew upon thinkers such as Karl Bücher, Grant Hyde, and Walter Lippmann, while developing distinctive approaches, including applying Formalist methods to media texts, that resonated internationally. Viewing this intellectual activity as part of a global exchange redefines the origins of propaganda studies, not as a Cold War divide, but as diverging, yet deeply entangled, responses to modernity, war, and mass politics.

  • Open Access

    Kremlin Proxies and the Post-RT Western Media Landscape: An EU Elections Case Study

    by Stephen Hutchings, Alexandr Voronovici, Vera Tolz, Neil Sadler, Maxim Alyukov, Sofia Tipaldou

    In this report, we assess the extent, purpose, and impact of online Russia-sponsored news proxies in the context of the EU2024 elections. Focusing on the recent EU2024 elections, the report offers findings and policy recommendations based on analysis of the output of five outlets with confirmed Kremlin sponsorship (Reliable Recent News; Berliner Tageszeitung; Voice of Europe; France et EU; and Pravda). Our analysis confirms other studies suggesting the existence of a Kremlin strategy to infiltrate, disrupt and influence Western media spaces. The initiators of these operations tend to be part of the sprawling Russian state apparatus which extends into the grey zone of actors. The report concludes that the content of the examined output is highly parasitic and that editorial approaches vary significantly. Much of the overall output during the monitoring period in June 2024 consisted of factual and often neutral reporting. EU2024 election-specific coverage content related to the EU2024 elections generally indicates no central coordination. At the same, time non-election coverage focused on divisive issues, featuring much publicity for right-wing and nationalist themes. The audience traction and wider spread of the content posted by the proxies appears to be minimal. Output seems to have found its way into conservative, far-right, and far-left media. There is very limited evidence of any influence on more mainstream media. The report concludes with a series of policy recommendations. Among others, we suggest that policy responses to current Russian influence operations should balance the need to address the actual threats they pose with the danger that overinflating their efficacy may give them the oxygen of publicity they demonstrably seek.


  • Open Access

    Shifting Academic Paradigms in Response to Global Crises: Opportunities and Pitfalls

    by Vera Tolz

    Academic knowledge develops through paradigm shifts, which can be facilitated by world-changing events. I am writing this piece thinking about my own research on an earlier shift, spearheaded by scholars from Eastern and Central Europe a hundred years ago, when old certainties were productively questioned in a range of academic fields. 1 Some epistemological issues that are raised today echo what was said in the early twentieth century, when Euro-/West-centric understandings of cultures began to be creatively critiqued. 2 World War I facilitated imperial disintegrations and early Soviet actors used decolonization discourse to describe the demise of the tsarist empire. 3 During the 1928–31 Soviet ‘cultural revolution’ decolonization discourse reached its peak, while also acquiring destructive forms under intense political pressure. Notably, it is not only under totalitarianism that ideologically charged campaigns can affect academic research. I remember how the heightened politicization of what used to be called Soviet Studies played out in Western academia in my lifetime. This contradictory history informs my response to the article by Byford, Doak and Hutchings in relation to the three main issues it raises: the relationship between political activism and academic research, what ‘Russian Studies’ is and the field’s relationship to the ‘decolonization agenda’, which is salient again.


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Truth with a Z: disinformation, war in Ukraine, and Russia’s contradictory discourse of imperial identity

    by Vera Tolz, Stephen Hutchings

    This article offers a qualitative analysis of how, by adopting identity-related discourses whose meanings resonate within a given culture, Russian state propaganda strives to bolster “the truth status” of its Ukraine war claims. These discourses, we argue, have long historical lineages and thus are expected to be familiar to audiences. We identify three such discourses common in many contexts but with specific resonances in Russia, those of colonialism/decolonization, imperialism, and the imaginary West. The article demonstrates that these same discourses also inform war-related coverage in Russophone oppositional media. Russian state-affiliated and oppositional actors further share “floating signifiers,” particularly “the Russian people,” “historical Russia,” “the Russian world,” “Ukraine,” “fascism/Nazism,” and “genocide,” while according them radically different meanings. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of studying how state propaganda works at the level of discourses, and the acutely dialogical processes by which disinformation and counter-disinformation efforts are produced and consumed.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Broadcasting agitainment: a new media strategy of Putin’s third presidency

    by Vera Tolz, Yuri Teper

    This article argues that accounts of the Russian media system that tend to view the time from Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 2000 as a single homogenous period do not capture major qualitative shifts in state-controlled media coverage. By analyzing the output of Russia’s two main television channels during Putin’s third presidential term, we identify a range of distinctly new features that amount to a new media strategy. This involves a significant increase in the coverage of political issues through the replacement of infotainment with what we term agitainment—an ideologically inflected content that, through adapting global media formats to local needs, attempts to appeal to less engaged and even sceptical viewers. Despite the tightening of political control over the media following the annexation of Crimea, the new strategy paradoxically has strengthened the constitutive role played by the state-controlled broadcasters in the articulation of official discourse.


  • Open Access

    From a threatening “Muslim migrant” back to the conspiring “West:” race, religion, and nationhood on Russian television during Putin's third presidency

    by Vera Tolz

    This article analyzes official discourse of the nation during Vladimir Putin's third presidency, as reflected in Russian television coverage of Islam and migration. It argues that the replacement of earlier deliberately ambiguous definitions of Russian nationhood with clearly framed exclusive visions reflects the change in the regime's legitimation strategy from one based on economic performance to one based on its security record. In this context, the systematic promotion of Russian ethnonationalism for the purpose of achieving the regime's general stability began not at the time of Crimea's annexation, as it is often assumed, but at the time of Putin's reelection amidst public protests in 2012. The goal of representing the authorities as attentive to public grievances in a society where opinion polls register high levels of xenophobia has prompted state-controlled broadcasters to use ethnoracial definitions of the nation that they had previously avoided. The media campaigns analyzed here also reflect abrupt changes in the precise identity of Russia's main Others. Such instrumentally adopted sharp discursive swings are unlikely to constitute an appropriate tool for societal consensus management and for the achievement of political stability in the long term.


  • Open Access

    From “Compatriots” to “Aliens”: The Changing Coverage of Migration on Russian Television

    by Vera Tolz, Sue‐Ann Harding

    This article analyzes an anti‐immigration campaign evident in 2012 and 2013 on the two main Russian state‐aligned television channels, Channel 1 and Rossiia. This campaign marked a significant departure from the earlier coverage of migration‐related issues by these broadcasters and, surprisingly, contradicted the federal government's position on migration and on “the national question”, which was authorised by Vladimir Putin during his presidential election campaign. Most significantly, in contrast to earlier approaches to covering migration, during the campaign, Islam was identified in news reports as the main marker of the migrant identity and a threat to Russian and European cultures and societies. The article explores what facilitated this shift in reporting and what this campaign tells us about the relationship between the Kremlin, state‐aligned broadcasters and the public, as well as about the fluctuations in the official narratives of Russian nationhood, during Putin's third presidential term. The article argues that several factors converged to trigger this campaign, including the radicalisation of a tendency to unite Russian society around the government through the dissemination of frightening images of external and internal “enemies”; the authorities' greater attentiveness to public concerns; and the perceived need to mainstream and co‐opt Russian ethnonationalism. We further demonstrate that the anti‐immigration campaign was part and parcel of the construction of a new ideologically charged narrative about Russia as Europe's last bastion of traditional, conservative values. The article concludes that public intellectuals and television personalities, rather than the Kremlin, were the main agents in the construction of this narrative. It, therefore, appears that, in the first eighteen months of Putin's third presidency, contrary to what one would expect, a greater responsibility than before for the ideological directions of the regime was ceded to prominent media figures.


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Nation, Ethnicity and Race on Russian Television

    by Stephen Hutchings, Vera Tolz

    Russia, one of the most ethno-culturally diverse countries in the world, provides a rich case study on how globalisation and associated international trends are disrupting, and causing the radical rethinking of approaches to, inter-ethnic cohesion. The book highlights the importance of television broadcasting in shaping national discourse and the place of ethno-cultural diversity within it. It argues that television’s role here has been reinforced, rather than diminished, by the rise of new media technologies. Through an analysis of a wide range of news and other television programmes, the book shows how the covert meanings of discourse on a particular issue can diverge from the overt significance attributed to it, just as the impact of that discourse may not conform with the original aims of the broadcasters. The book discusses the tension between the imperative to maintain security through centralised government and overall national cohesion that Russia shares with other European states, and the need to remain sensitive to, and to accommodate, the needs and perspectives of ethnic minorities and labour migrants. It compares the increasingly isolationist popular ethnonationalism in Russia, which harks back to "old-fashioned" values, with the similar rise of the Tea Party in the United States and the UK Independence Party in Britain. Throughout, this extremely rich, well-argued book complicates and challenges received wisdom on Russia’s recent descent into authoritarianism. It points to a regime struggling to negotiate the dilemmas it faces, given its Soviet legacy of ethnic particularism, weak civil society, large native Muslim population and overbearing, yet far from entirely effective, state control of the media.