Ludovic Tangpi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ludovic Tangpi has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michael Kupper
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz, Germany
5 shared publications - Daniel Bartl
Department of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
4 shared publications - Dylan Possamaï
Department of Mathematics, ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland
4 shared publications - Olivier Menoukeu Pamen
Institute for Financial and Actuarial Mathematics (IFAM), Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Liverpool , Liverpool
4 shared publications - Shichun Wang
Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, USA
4 shared publications - Khaled Bahlali
Université de Toulon, IMATH, EA 2134, 83957 La Garde Cedex, France
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Conditional McKean-Vlasov control
Conditional McKean-Vlasov control problems involve controlling McKean-Vlasov diffusions where the interaction occurs through the law of the state process conditionally on it staying in a domain. Introduced by Lions in his 2016 lectures at the Collège de France, these problems have notable applications, particularly in systemic risk. We establish well-posedness and provide a general characterization of optimal controls using a new Pontryagin maximum principle in the probabilistic weak formulation. Unlike the classical approach based on forward-backward systems, our results connect the control problem to a generalized McKean-Vlasov backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). We illustrate our framework with two applications: a version of the Schrödinger problem with killing, and a construction of equilibria in potential mean field games via McKean-Vlasov control.
Open AccessConditional McKean-Vlasov control
Conditional McKean-Vlasov control problems involve controlling McKean-Vlasov diffusions where the interaction occurs through the law of the state process conditionally on it staying in a domain. Introduced by Lions in his 2016 lectures at the Collège de France, these problems have notable applications, particularly in systemic risk. We establish well-posedness and provide a general characterization of optimal controls using a new Pontryagin maximum principle in the probabilistic weak formulation. Unlike the classical approach based on forward-backward systems, our results connect the control problem to a generalized McKean-Vlasov backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). We illustrate our framework with two applications: a version of the Schrödinger problem with killing, and a construction of equilibria in potential mean field games via McKean-Vlasov control.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 11 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Applied Mathematics & Optimization
- Vol. 91 (3) , 1-73
Non-asymptotic Convergence Rates for Mean-Field Games: Weak Formulation and McKean–Vlasov BSDEs
This work is mainly concerned with the so-called limit theory for mean-field games. Adopting the weak formulation paradigm put forward by Carmona and Lacker (Ann Appl Probab 25(3):1189–1231, 2015), we consider a fully non-Markovian setting allowing for drift control and interactions through the joint distribution of players’ states and controls. We provide first a characterisation of mean-field equilibria as arising from solutions to a novel kind of McKean–Vlasov backward stochastic differential equations, for which we provide a well-posedness theory. We incidentally obtain there unusual existence and uniqueness results for mean-field equilibria, which do not require short-time horizon, separability assumptions on the coefficients, nor Lasry and Lions’s monotonicity conditions, but rather smallness—or alternatively regularity—conditions on the terminal reward and a dissipativity condition on the drift. We then take advantage of this characterisation to provide non-asymptotic rates of convergence for the value functions and the Nash-equilibria of the N-player version to their mean-field counterparts, for general open-loop equilibria. An appropriate reformulation of our approach also allows us to treat closed-loop equilibria, and to obtain convergence results for the master equation associated to the problem.
- 11 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Applied Mathematics & Optimization
- Vol. 91 (3) , 1-73
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessNon-asymptotic Convergence Rates for Mean-Field Games: Weak Formulation and McKean–Vlasov BSDEs
This work is mainly concerned with the so-called limit theory for mean-field games. Adopting the weak formulation paradigm put forward by Carmona and Lacker (Ann Appl Probab 25(3):1189–1231, 2015), we consider a fully non-Markovian setting allowing for drift control and interactions through the joint distribution of players’ states and controls. We provide first a characterisation of mean-field equilibria as arising from solutions to a novel kind of McKean–Vlasov backward stochastic differential equations, for which we provide a well-posedness theory. We incidentally obtain there unusual existence and uniqueness results for mean-field equilibria, which do not require short-time horizon, separability assumptions on the coefficients, nor Lasry and Lions’s monotonicity conditions, but rather smallness—or alternatively regularity—conditions on the terminal reward and a dissipativity condition on the drift. We then take advantage of this characterisation to provide non-asymptotic rates of convergence for the value functions and the Nash-equilibria of the N-player version to their mean-field counterparts, for general open-loop equilibria. An appropriate reformulation of our approach also allows us to treat closed-loop equilibria, and to obtain convergence results for the master equation associated to the problem.
- 13 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Finance and Stochastics
- Vol. 29 (2) , 343-398
Optimal bubble riding: a mean field game with varying entry times
- 13 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Finance and Stochastics
- Vol. 29 (2) , 343-398
Optimal bubble riding: a mean field game with varying entry times
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Institute of Mathematical Statistics in Electronic Communications in Probability
- Vol. 30 (none) , 1-14
Mean field games with common noise via Malliavin calculus
We present a simpler proof of the existence of equilibria for a class of mean field games with common noise, where players interact through the conditional law given the current value of the common noise rather than its entire path. By extending a compactness criterion for Malliavin-differentiable random variables to processes, we establish existence of strong equilibria, where the conditional law and optimal control are adapted to the common noise filtration and defined on the original probability space. Notably, our approach only requires measurability of the drift and cost functionals with respect to the state variable.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Institute of Mathematical Statistics in Electronic Communications in Probability
- Vol. 30 (none) , 1-14
Mean field games with common noise via Malliavin calculus
We present a simpler proof of the existence of equilibria for a class of mean field games with common noise, where players interact through the conditional law given the current value of the common noise rather than its entire path. By extending a compactness criterion for Malliavin-differentiable random variables to processes, we establish existence of strong equilibria, where the conditional law and optimal control are adapted to the common noise filtration and defined on the original probability space. Notably, our approach only requires measurability of the drift and cost functionals with respect to the state variable.
- Open Access
Pasting of Equilibria and Donsker-type Results for Mean Field Games
This paper studies the relation between equilibria in single-period, discrete-time and continuous-time mean field game models. First, for single-period mean field games, we establish the existence of equilibria and then prove the propagation of the Lasry-Lions monotonicity to the optimal equilibrium value, as a function of the realization of the initial condition and its distribution. Secondly, we prove a pasting property for equilibria; that is, we construct equilibria to multi-period discrete-time mean field games by recursively pasting the equilibria of suitably initialized single-period games. Then, we show that any sequence of equilibria of discrete-time mean field games with discretized noise converges (up to a subsequence) to some equilibrium of the continuous-time mean field game as the mesh size of the discretization tends to zero. When the cost functions of the game satisfy the Lasry-Lions monotonicity property, we strengthen this convergence result by providing a sharp convergence rate.
Open AccessPasting of Equilibria and Donsker-type Results for Mean Field Games
This paper studies the relation between equilibria in single-period, discrete-time and continuous-time mean field game models. First, for single-period mean field games, we establish the existence of equilibria and then prove the propagation of the Lasry-Lions monotonicity to the optimal equilibrium value, as a function of the realization of the initial condition and its distribution. Secondly, we prove a pasting property for equilibria; that is, we construct equilibria to multi-period discrete-time mean field games by recursively pasting the equilibria of suitably initialized single-period games. Then, we show that any sequence of equilibria of discrete-time mean field games with discretized noise converges (up to a subsequence) to some equilibrium of the continuous-time mean field game as the mesh size of the discretization tends to zero. When the cost functions of the game satisfy the Lasry-Lions monotonicity property, we strengthen this convergence result by providing a sharp convergence rate.
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 49 (4) , 2527-2564
Quantitative Convergence for Displacement Monotone Mean Field Games with Controlled Volatility
We study the convergence problem for mean field games with common noise and controlled volatility. We adopt the strategy recently put forth by Laurière and the second author, using the maximum principle to recast the convergence problem as a question of “forward-backward propagation of chaos” (i.e., (conditional) propagation of chaos for systems of particles evolving forward and backward in time). Our main results show that displacement monotonicity can be used to obtain this propagation of chaos, which leads to quantitative convergence results for open-loop Nash equilibria for a class of mean field games. Our results seem to be the first (quantitative or qualitative) that apply to games in which the common noise is controlled. The proofs are relatively simple and rely on a well-known technique for proving wellposedness of forward-backward stochastic differential equations, which is combined with displacement monotonicity in a novel way. To demonstrate the flexibility of the approach, we also use the same arguments to obtain convergence results for a class of infinite horizon discounted mean field games. Funding: J. Jackson is supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant DGE1610403]. L. Tangpi is partially supported by the National Science Foundation [Grants DMS-2005832 and DMS-2143861].
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 49 (4) , 2527-2564
Quantitative Convergence for Displacement Monotone Mean Field Games with Controlled Volatility
We study the convergence problem for mean field games with common noise and controlled volatility. We adopt the strategy recently put forth by Laurière and the second author, using the maximum principle to recast the convergence problem as a question of “forward-backward propagation of chaos” (i.e., (conditional) propagation of chaos for systems of particles evolving forward and backward in time). Our main results show that displacement monotonicity can be used to obtain this propagation of chaos, which leads to quantitative convergence results for open-loop Nash equilibria for a class of mean field games. Our results seem to be the first (quantitative or qualitative) that apply to games in which the common noise is controlled. The proofs are relatively simple and rely on a well-known technique for proving wellposedness of forward-backward stochastic differential equations, which is combined with displacement monotonicity in a novel way. To demonstrate the flexibility of the approach, we also use the same arguments to obtain convergence results for a class of infinite horizon discounted mean field games. Funding: J. Jackson is supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant DGE1610403]. L. Tangpi is partially supported by the National Science Foundation [Grants DMS-2005832 and DMS-2143861].
- Open Access
Interacting particle systems on sparse $W$-random graphs
We consider a general interacting particle system with interactions on a random graph, and study the large population limit of this system. When the sequence of underlying graphs converges to a graphon, we show convergence of the interacting particle system to a so called graphon stochastic differential equation. This is a system of uncountable many SDEs of McKean-Vlasov type driven by a continuum of Brownian motions. We make sense of this equation in a way that retains joint measurability and essentially pairwise independence of the driving Brownian motions of the system by using the framework of Fubini extension. The convergence results are general enough to cover nonlinear interactions, as well as various examples of sparse graphs. A crucial idea is to work with unbounded graphons and use the $L^p$ theory of sparse graph convergence.Open AccessInteracting particle systems on sparse $W$-random graphs
We consider a general interacting particle system with interactions on a random graph, and study the large population limit of this system. When the sequence of underlying graphs converges to a graphon, we show convergence of the interacting particle system to a so called graphon stochastic differential equation. This is a system of uncountable many SDEs of McKean-Vlasov type driven by a continuum of Brownian motions. We make sense of this equation in a way that retains joint measurability and essentially pairwise independence of the driving Brownian motions of the system by using the framework of Fubini extension. The convergence results are general enough to cover nonlinear interactions, as well as various examples of sparse graphs. A crucial idea is to work with unbounded graphons and use the $L^p$ theory of sparse graph convergence. - Open Access
A policy iteration algorithm for non-Markovian control problems
In this paper, we propose a new policy iteration algorithm to compute the value function and the optimal controls of continuous time stochastic control problems. The algorithm relies on successive approximations using linear-quadratic control problems which can all be solved explicitly, and only require to solve recursively linear PDEs in the Markovian case. Though our procedure fails in general to produce a non-decreasing sequence like the standard algorithm, it can be made arbitrarily close to being monotone. More importantly, we recover the standard exponential speed of convergence for both the value and the controls, through purely probabilistic arguments which are significantly simpler than in the classical case. Our proof also accommodates non-Markovian dynamics as well as volatility control, allowing us to obtain the first convergence results in the latter case for a state process in multi-dimensions.
Open AccessA policy iteration algorithm for non-Markovian control problems
In this paper, we propose a new policy iteration algorithm to compute the value function and the optimal controls of continuous time stochastic control problems. The algorithm relies on successive approximations using linear-quadratic control problems which can all be solved explicitly, and only require to solve recursively linear PDEs in the Markovian case. Though our procedure fails in general to produce a non-decreasing sequence like the standard algorithm, it can be made arbitrarily close to being monotone. More importantly, we recover the standard exponential speed of convergence for both the value and the controls, through purely probabilistic arguments which are significantly simpler than in the classical case. Our proof also accommodates non-Markovian dynamics as well as volatility control, allowing us to obtain the first convergence results in the latter case for a state process in multi-dimensions.
- Open Access
A Deep Learning Method for Optimal Investment Under Relative Performance Criteria Among Heterogeneous Agents
Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.
Open AccessA Deep Learning Method for Optimal Investment Under Relative Performance Criteria Among Heterogeneous Agents
Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.
- 27 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematics and Financial Economics
- Vol. 18 (2-3) , 275-312
Optimal bubble riding with price-dependent entry: a mean field game of controls with common noise
- 27 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematics and Financial Economics
- Vol. 18 (2-3) , 275-312
Optimal bubble riding with price-dependent entry: a mean field game of controls with common noise