Kevin D. Hoover
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Kevin D. Hoover has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
James R Wible
18 shared publications- James R. Wible
University of New Hampshire
2 shared publications Mark V. Siegler
Department of Economics , California State University , Sacramento, CA
2 shared publications- Selva Demiralp
Koc University
2 shared publications - Stephen J. Perez
California State University, Sacramento
2 shared publications Katarina Juselius
University of Copenhagen
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 181-206
Ricardian Inference
This chapter aims to resolve the puzzle of what Peirce meant in several fragmentary texts by Ricardian inference. A famous economist, Ricardo knew little formal mathematics, yet Peirce regarded him as the paradigmatic mathematical economist. He flagged Ricardian inference as an important part of logic. The chapter explores two options. First, Peirce associates Ricardo with the “primipostnumeral syllogism,” which is a generalization to uncountably infinite sets of what he calls Fermatian inference (also known as mathematical induction). Second, he associates Ricardo with the “Analytic method,” his name for a hybrid form of inference connecting analogy, abduction, and induction. The chapter shows that, on either option, economics plays a larger and more fundamental role in Peirce’s philosophy of science than is generally understood. It offers an interpretation of Ricardian inference in which the two options are complementary and relates them to modern views on scientific modeling.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 181-206
Ricardian Inference
This chapter aims to resolve the puzzle of what Peirce meant in several fragmentary texts by Ricardian inference. A famous economist, Ricardo knew little formal mathematics, yet Peirce regarded him as the paradigmatic mathematical economist. He flagged Ricardian inference as an important part of logic. The chapter explores two options. First, Peirce associates Ricardo with the “primipostnumeral syllogism,” which is a generalization to uncountably infinite sets of what he calls Fermatian inference (also known as mathematical induction). Second, he associates Ricardo with the “Analytic method,” his name for a hybrid form of inference connecting analogy, abduction, and induction. The chapter shows that, on either option, economics plays a larger and more fundamental role in Peirce’s philosophy of science than is generally understood. It offers an interpretation of Ricardian inference in which the two options are complementary and relates them to modern views on scientific modeling.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 1-28
The Economics of an American Aristotle
Chapter 1 introduces Peirce, documenting his general knowledge of economics, sketching his biography, discussing his broad conception of economics in relation to science, ethics, and pragmatism. It presents the origin story in which Peirce’s serious engagement with economics starts with his reading and criticizing Cournot’s seminal treatise on mathematical economics, demonstrating how he became a lifelong student of economics. It documents his advocacy of scientific economics and his rejection of ethical positions commonly adopted by 19th-century economists. In place of Bentham’s utilitarianism and social Darwinism, Peirce offers agapism, a doctrine grounded in Christian ethics—but also similar to Adam Smith’s ethical Theory of Moral Sentiments—that he sees reflected in evolutionary biology and in an evolutionary theory of knowledge. Finally, the chapter locates Peirce’s economics in its harmonious relationship to his pragmatist philosophy.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 1-28
The Economics of an American Aristotle
Chapter 1 introduces Peirce, documenting his general knowledge of economics, sketching his biography, discussing his broad conception of economics in relation to science, ethics, and pragmatism. It presents the origin story in which Peirce’s serious engagement with economics starts with his reading and criticizing Cournot’s seminal treatise on mathematical economics, demonstrating how he became a lifelong student of economics. It documents his advocacy of scientific economics and his rejection of ethical positions commonly adopted by 19th-century economists. In place of Bentham’s utilitarianism and social Darwinism, Peirce offers agapism, a doctrine grounded in Christian ethics—but also similar to Adam Smith’s ethical Theory of Moral Sentiments—that he sees reflected in evolutionary biology and in an evolutionary theory of knowledge. Finally, the chapter locates Peirce’s economics in its harmonious relationship to his pragmatist philosophy.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
List of Abbreviations
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 29-58
“This is all in Cournot”
This chapter traces Peirce’s early engagement with mathematical economics in his study and criticism of Cournot’s Recherches sur les principes mathematiques de la théorie des richesses (1838). Although Cournot’s mathematical economics was generally neglected until the mid-1870s, he was taken up and carefully studied by the Scientific Club of Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1871, even before his later “discovery” by Walras and Jevons. The episode is reconstructed from letters and fragmentary manuscripts. In these, Peirce displayed a deep understanding of Cournot. On the one hand, he defended Cournot against the confusions of Newcomb over the conditions for the existence of a supply curve. On the other hand, in correspondence with his father, the mathematician Benjamin Peirce, he criticized Cournot’s theory of oligopoly, developing an alternative account that anticipated Bertrand’s theory by more than a decade. The chapter exposits the key features of Cournot’s economics and reconstructs and evaluates Peirce’s arguments.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 29-58
“This is all in Cournot”
This chapter traces Peirce’s early engagement with mathematical economics in his study and criticism of Cournot’s Recherches sur les principes mathematiques de la théorie des richesses (1838). Although Cournot’s mathematical economics was generally neglected until the mid-1870s, he was taken up and carefully studied by the Scientific Club of Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1871, even before his later “discovery” by Walras and Jevons. The episode is reconstructed from letters and fragmentary manuscripts. In these, Peirce displayed a deep understanding of Cournot. On the one hand, he defended Cournot against the confusions of Newcomb over the conditions for the existence of a supply curve. On the other hand, in correspondence with his father, the mathematician Benjamin Peirce, he criticized Cournot’s theory of oligopoly, developing an alternative account that anticipated Bertrand’s theory by more than a decade. The chapter exposits the key features of Cournot’s economics and reconstructs and evaluates Peirce’s arguments.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 59-75
The Spanish Treaty
Chapter 3 addresses Peirce’s foray into applied political economy in a multiround debate with the editors of the political magazine The Nation over the Sugar Treaty of 1884 with Spain—signed but never ratified. The Sugar Treaty concerned Spain’s Cuban and Puerto Rican colonies. The chapter presents the political context with regard to tariff policy in the aftermath of the American Civil War and the effort of economic liberals to pursue free trade through reciprocity treaties. While the debate in The Nation was conducted entirely verbally, the chapter reconstructs the mathematical underpinnings of Peirce’s intervention that are evident in light of his unpublished writing on Cournot and his broad knowledge of economics, especially of the work of Ricardo. The debate is reconstructed and related carefully both to Peirce’s understanding of mathematical economics and to his philosophy of science.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 59-75
The Spanish Treaty
Chapter 3 addresses Peirce’s foray into applied political economy in a multiround debate with the editors of the political magazine The Nation over the Sugar Treaty of 1884 with Spain—signed but never ratified. The Sugar Treaty concerned Spain’s Cuban and Puerto Rican colonies. The chapter presents the political context with regard to tariff policy in the aftermath of the American Civil War and the effort of economic liberals to pursue free trade through reciprocity treaties. While the debate in The Nation was conducted entirely verbally, the chapter reconstructs the mathematical underpinnings of Peirce’s intervention that are evident in light of his unpublished writing on Cournot and his broad knowledge of economics, especially of the work of Ricardo. The debate is reconstructed and related carefully both to Peirce’s understanding of mathematical economics and to his philosophy of science.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
List of Tables
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Dedication
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 154-180
Pebbles on a Beach
This chapter presents a systematic account of Peirce’s logic in relation to scientific method. He sees logic in contrast to mathematics as a normative science and scientific methodology as fundamentally the economic approach to inquiry that values inferential tools in proportion to their reliability in leading to true conclusions. The chapter lays out Peirce’s conceptions of belief, doubt, truth, and fallibilism. It presents his tripartite division of logic into deduction, induction, and abduction and his account of the validity of each type. It explores Peirce’s cardinal rule of scientific ethics, “Do not block the way of inquiry,” as well specific roadblocks. And it presents his account of probabilistic and qualitative inference.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 154-180
Pebbles on a Beach
This chapter presents a systematic account of Peirce’s logic in relation to scientific method. He sees logic in contrast to mathematics as a normative science and scientific methodology as fundamentally the economic approach to inquiry that values inferential tools in proportion to their reliability in leading to true conclusions. The chapter lays out Peirce’s conceptions of belief, doubt, truth, and fallibilism. It presents his tripartite division of logic into deduction, induction, and abduction and his account of the validity of each type. It explores Peirce’s cardinal rule of scientific ethics, “Do not block the way of inquiry,” as well specific roadblocks. And it presents his account of probabilistic and qualitative inference.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Preface
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
OXFORD STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMICS
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
OXFORD STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMICS