BLBrett Ashley Leeds

Brett Ashley Leeds

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Brett Ashley Leeds has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    What Does It Mean to Be a Reliable Ally?

    by Daina Chiba, Jesse C Johnson, Brett Ashley Leeds

    The value of military alliances is closely tied to whether alliance members will uphold their commitment if the treaty is invoked. Doubt about the reliability of an alliance can encourage aggression from rivals and, potentially, leave a state abandoned and fighting alone. Leveraging historical data on alliances and war, scholars have produced a variety of estimates of the reliability of alliances over time. We collect updated data on alliance reliability, highlighting some of the critical definitions and coding rules that impact assessments of reliability. We produce several different estimates of reliability at two levels of analysis (the alliance and the ally) using different data sources. We estimate that about two-thirds of the alliances invoked by war over a 200-year period were fulfilled, and about one-third violated. We note, however, that in the post-WWII period, alliance reliability, particularly among multilateral alliances, is lower than in prior eras. The lower estimate for multilateral alliance reliability after 1945 is driven by a small number of closely related cases, but still raises many questions for future research about potential changes in alliances and war that lead to different patterns in observed reliability.

  • Open Access

    The Future of Global Governance and World Order

    by Brett Ashley Leeds, Layna Mosley, B. Peter Rosendorff, Ayşe Zarakol

    This special issue of International Organization is composed of fifteen short essays that consider how longer-term trends (including the rise of China, the anti-globalization backlash, the rise of populism, the emergence of new technologies, the slowing or reversal of democratization in many countries, and the existential threat of climate change), along with recent developments in US foreign policy, are likely to affect the future of global governance and world order. The contributors consider a variety of different issue areas, as well as cross-cutting trends. Some contributors anticipate significant change; others predict incremental change; and still others expect mostly continuity. The collection suggests a future research agenda focused on the impact of long-term trends and immediate shocks on local, regional, and global equilibria.


  • Alliances and Civil War Intervention

    by Jesse C Johnson, Brett Ashley Leeds, Burcu Savun

    Governments have a number of structural advantages over rebel groups in civil wars, one of which is their greater ability to make credible international commitments. Governments can use foreign policy commitments to incentivize other states to provide them military support or deny support to their rebel groups. We analyze international intervention in civil conflicts between 1975 and 2017 and find that some kinds of alliances are associated with pro-government intervention, but all alliances are not equal. Alliances with consultation commitments are associated with interventions that provide materiel, training, intelligence, and/or other forms of non-troop support, while defense pacts are associated with both troop and non-troop support. Members of nonaggression and neutrality pacts are not more likely to intervene to support the government but are less likely to provide support to anti-government forces. We argue that alliances are not simply proxies for common interests; they sometimes involve specific bargains designed to aid a government in defeating rebels. Our evidence suggests that these agreements are successful at incentivizing the intended behavior. Governments use international security policy to protect the status quo domestically as well as internationally, and this affects our understanding both of civil wars and of alliance politics.


  • Threats at Home and Abroad: Interstate War, Civil War, and Alliance Formation

    by Jessica Edry, Jesse C. Johnson, Brett Ashley Leeds

    In the current era, many of the military threats that state leaders face come from domestic and transnational nonstate actors. Military alliances are recognized as an important policy strategy to counter military threats, but existing research has primarily been focused on threats from other states and has difficulty uncovering a consistent relationship between external threat and alliance formation. We argue that this discrepancy arises from the failure to recognize that many threats are not external to the state. We contend that alliance formation is motivated both by external threats from other states and by internal threats that make civil conflict more likely. Moreover, we argue that leaders design alliance obligations differently when faced with internal threats. An empirical analysis of alliance formation from 1946 to 2009 shows that while external threats motivate the formation of defense pacts, internal threats encourage the formation of consultation pacts. Internal threats with the greatest potential for internationalization also encourage the formation of neutrality/nonaggression pacts. This research deepens our understanding of how states design security policies to deal with the threats posed by nonstate actors, a salient concern of leaders in the twenty-first century, and helps us to understand the variety of alliance obligations that we observe.


  • Measuring change in source of leader support

    by Michaela Mattes, Brett Ashley Leeds, Naoko Matsumura

    This article introduces the CHISOLS (Change in Source of Leader Support) dataset, which identifies which leadership changes within countries bring to power a new leader whose primary support is drawn from different societal groups than those who supported her predecessor. The dataset covers all countries of the world with populations greater than 500,000 from 1919 to 2008. We discuss the underlying rationale of our data collection, provide some brief information about the coding rules and procedures, and share some descriptive statistics. We find that changes in sources of leader support are more common in democracies than non-democracies, but also that changes in sources of leader support often occur without irregular leader transitions or large institutional changes, even within non-democracies. CHISOLS can be productively combined with other datasets like POLITY, Archigos, and DPI that provide information about political institutions, modes of leader transition, and placement on a left–right policy continuum, but CHISOLS also provides something new that was not previously available. These data allow researchers to study the extent to which different types of policy change are associated with all leader transitions, with changes in political institutions, or with changes in the set of interests that leaders most closely represent; CHISOLS facilitates comparing the effect of leaders, interests, and institutions on policy change across a wide spatial temporal domain.


  • Careful Commitments: Democratic States and Alliance Design

    by Daina Chiba, Jesse C. Johnson, Brett Ashley Leeds

    © 2015 Southern Political Science Association. Evidence suggests that leaders of democratic states experience high costs from violating past commitments. We argue that because democratic leaders foresee the costs of violation, they are careful to design agreements they expect to have a high probability of fulfilling. This may cause democratic leaders to prefer flexible or limited commitments. We evaluate our argument by analyzing the design of alliance treaties signed by countries of the world between 1815 and 2003. We find that alliances formed among democratic states are more likely to include obligations for future consultation rather than precommitting leaders to active conflict, and defense pacts formed among democratic states are more likely to specify limits to the conditions under which member states must join their partners in conflict. This research suggests that separating screening effects and constraining effects of international agreements is even more difficult than previously believed. States with the greatest likelihood of being constrained are more carefully screened


  • Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence

    by Jesse C. Johnson, Brett Ashley Leeds, Ahra Wu

    Deterrence theory suggests that extended general deterrent threats are likely to be more effective when a potential challenger views them as capable and credible. When states sign formal defense pacts, they are making explicit extended general deterrent threats. Thus, the population of defense pacts allows us an opportunity to judge the efficacy of extended deterrent threats with different characteristics. We find that defense pacts with more capability and more credibility reduce the probability that a member state will be a target of a militarized dispute. We also find that states can affect the capability and credibility of their extended deterrent threats through alliance design. Members of defense pacts that include higher levels of peacetime military coordination are less likely to be attacked. This analysis provides support for deterrence theory in the context of extended general deterrence. It also provides evidence that should aid policymakers in designing security structures to meet their goals.


  • To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances

    by Songying Fang, Jesse C. Johnson, Brett Ashley Leeds

    Creating institutions that effectively manage interstate conflict is a priority for policy-makers. In this article we demonstrate that military allies are well positioned to influence the crisis-bargaining behavior of both challengers and targets in ways that often lead to peace. Through a three-player game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that a target's alliances not only have an effect on the demand that the challenger makes, but also on the behavior of the target. When a target values an alliance highly, an ally's recommendation for settlement can encourage the target to concede to demands without further escalation. Our statistical analysis provides evidence in support of the theoretical finding. Allies can both deter challengers and restrain partners, and as a result, can encourage peaceful behavior not only from adversaries, but from member states as well. Our study thus sheds new light on the role of military alliances as potential conflict management devices.