Carlos G. Correa
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Carlos G. Correa has a total of 34 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Frederick Callaway
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, USA
3 shared publications- Thomas L. Griffiths
Princeton University
3 shared publications - Mark K. Ho
Princeton University
2 shared publications Nathaniel D. Daw
Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, USA; Department of Psychology, Princeton University, USA
2 shared publicationsAdam Pines
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University, 401 Quarry Road, Stanford, CA, United States
1 shared publicationAndrea N. Goldstein-Piekarski
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University, 401 Quarry Road, Stanford, CA, United States; MIRECC VISN21, Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System, 3801 Miranda Avenue, Palo Alto, CA, United States
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Program-Based Strategy Induction for Reinforcement Learning
Typical models of learning assume incremental estimation of continuously-varying decision variables like expected rewards. However, this class of models fails to capture more idiosyncratic, discrete heuristics and strategies that people and animals appear to exhibit. Despite recent advances in strategy discovery using tools like recurrent networks that generalize the classic models, the resulting strategies are often onerous to interpret, making connections to cognition difficult to establish. We use Bayesian program induction to discover strategies implemented by programs, letting the simplicity of strategies trade off against their effectiveness. Focusing on bandit tasks, we find strategies that are difficult or unexpected with classical incremental learning, like asymmetric learning from rewarded and unrewarded trials, adaptive horizon-dependent random exploration, and discrete state switching.
Open AccessProgram-Based Strategy Induction for Reinforcement Learning
Typical models of learning assume incremental estimation of continuously-varying decision variables like expected rewards. However, this class of models fails to capture more idiosyncratic, discrete heuristics and strategies that people and animals appear to exhibit. Despite recent advances in strategy discovery using tools like recurrent networks that generalize the classic models, the resulting strategies are often onerous to interpret, making connections to cognition difficult to establish. We use Bayesian program induction to discover strategies implemented by programs, letting the simplicity of strategies trade off against their effectiveness. Focusing on bandit tasks, we find strategies that are difficult or unexpected with classical incremental learning, like asymmetric learning from rewarded and unrewarded trials, adaptive horizon-dependent random exploration, and discrete state switching.
- Open Access
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Computational Biology
- Vol. 19 (6) , e1011087
Humans decompose tasks by trading off utility and computational cost
Human behavior emerges from planning over elaborate decompositions of tasks into goals, subgoals, and low-level actions. How are these decompositions created and used? Here, we propose and evaluate a normative framework for task decomposition based on the simple idea that people decompose tasks to reduce the overall cost of planning while maintaining task performance. Analyzing 11,117 distinct graph-structured planning tasks, we find that our framework justifies several existing heuristics for task decomposition and makes predictions that can be distinguished from two alternative normative accounts. We report a behavioral study of task decomposition (N = 806) that uses 30 randomly sampled graphs, a larger and more diverse set than that of any previous behavioral study on this topic. We find that human responses are more consistent with our framework for task decomposition than alternative normative accounts and are most consistent with a heuristic—betweenness centrality—that is justified by our approach. Taken together, our results suggest the computational cost of planning is a key principle guiding the intelligent structuring of goal-directed behavior.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Computational Biology
- Vol. 19 (6) , e1011087
Open AccessHumans decompose tasks by trading off utility and computational cost
Human behavior emerges from planning over elaborate decompositions of tasks into goals, subgoals, and low-level actions. How are these decompositions created and used? Here, we propose and evaluate a normative framework for task decomposition based on the simple idea that people decompose tasks to reduce the overall cost of planning while maintaining task performance. Analyzing 11,117 distinct graph-structured planning tasks, we find that our framework justifies several existing heuristics for task decomposition and makes predictions that can be distinguished from two alternative normative accounts. We report a behavioral study of task decomposition (N = 806) that uses 30 randomly sampled graphs, a larger and more diverse set than that of any previous behavioral study on this topic. We find that human responses are more consistent with our framework for task decomposition than alternative normative accounts and are most consistent with a heuristic—betweenness centrality—that is justified by our approach. Taken together, our results suggest the computational cost of planning is a key principle guiding the intelligent structuring of goal-directed behavior.
- Open Access
Humans decompose tasks by trading off utility and computational cost
Human behavior emerges from planning over elaborate decompositions of tasks into goals, subgoals, and low-level actions. How are these decompositions created and used? Here, we propose and evaluate a normative framework for task decomposition based on the simple idea that people decompose tasks to reduce the overall cost of planning while maintaining task performance. Analyzing 11,117 distinct graph-structured planning tasks, we find that our framework justifies several existing heuristics for task decomposition and makes predictions that can be distinguished from two alternative normative accounts. We report a behavioral study of task decomposition ($N=806$) that uses 30 randomly sampled graphs, a larger and more diverse set than that of any previous behavioral study on this topic. We find that human responses are more consistent with our framework for task decomposition than alternative normative accounts and are most consistent with a heuristic -- betweenness centrality -- that is justified by our approach. Taken together, our results provide new theoretical insight into the computational principles underlying the intelligent structuring of goal-directed behavior.
Open AccessHumans decompose tasks by trading off utility and computational cost
Human behavior emerges from planning over elaborate decompositions of tasks into goals, subgoals, and low-level actions. How are these decompositions created and used? Here, we propose and evaluate a normative framework for task decomposition based on the simple idea that people decompose tasks to reduce the overall cost of planning while maintaining task performance. Analyzing 11,117 distinct graph-structured planning tasks, we find that our framework justifies several existing heuristics for task decomposition and makes predictions that can be distinguished from two alternative normative accounts. We report a behavioral study of task decomposition ($N=806$) that uses 30 randomly sampled graphs, a larger and more diverse set than that of any previous behavioral study on this topic. We find that human responses are more consistent with our framework for task decomposition than alternative normative accounts and are most consistent with a heuristic -- betweenness centrality -- that is justified by our approach. Taken together, our results provide new theoretical insight into the computational principles underlying the intelligent structuring of goal-directed behavior.
- Top Cited Papers
- 19 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 606 (7912) , 129-136
People construct simplified mental representations to plan
One of the most striking features of human cognition is the ability to plan. Two aspects of human planning stand out—its efficiency and flexibility. Efficiency is especially impressive because plans must often be made in complex environments, and yet people successfully plan solutions to many everyday problems despite having limited cognitive resources1,2,3. Standard accounts in psychology, economics and artificial intelligence have suggested that human planning succeeds because people have a complete representation of a task and then use heuristics to plan future actions in that representation4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11. However, this approach generally assumes that task representations are fixed. Here we propose that task representations can be controlled and that such control provides opportunities to quickly simplify problems and more easily reason about them. We propose a computational account of this simplification process and, in a series of preregistered behavioural experiments, show that it is subject to online cognitive control12,13,14 and that people optimally balance the complexity of a task representation and its utility for planning and acting. These results demonstrate how strategically perceiving and conceiving problems facilitates the effective use of limited cognitive resources.
- 19 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 606 (7912) , 129-136
Top Cited PapersPeople construct simplified mental representations to plan
One of the most striking features of human cognition is the ability to plan. Two aspects of human planning stand out—its efficiency and flexibility. Efficiency is especially impressive because plans must often be made in complex environments, and yet people successfully plan solutions to many everyday problems despite having limited cognitive resources1,2,3. Standard accounts in psychology, economics and artificial intelligence have suggested that human planning succeeds because people have a complete representation of a task and then use heuristics to plan future actions in that representation4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11. However, this approach generally assumes that task representations are fixed. Here we propose that task representations can be controlled and that such control provides opportunities to quickly simplify problems and more easily reason about them. We propose a computational account of this simplification process and, in a series of preregistered behavioural experiments, show that it is subject to online cognitive control12,13,14 and that people optimally balance the complexity of a task representation and its utility for planning and acting. These results demonstrate how strategically perceiving and conceiving problems facilitates the effective use of limited cognitive resources.