FQFederico Quartieri

Federico Quartieri

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Federico Quartieri has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    A characterization of subgame perfect equilibria in single-leader multi-follower games

    by Francesco Caruso, Maria Carmela Ceparano, Federico Quartieri

    Single-leader multi-follower games model the sequential strategic interactions between one player who chooses first, the leader, and other players, the followers, who respond simultaneously after observing the choice of the leader. In this paper we focus on the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE for short) in single-leader multi-follower games when the followers are involved in a generalized game and have a non-unique joint best response for each choice of the leader. We first show the connections between the concept of an SPE and those of a pessimistic and optimistic equilibrium, which are usually adopted and extensively studied in this framework. We then prove an existence result for SPEs and a characterization of the set of SPE-outcomes. Specifically, an action profile is shown to be an SPE-outcome if and only if the joint response of the followers to the leader is rational and the leader’s payoff lies between the payoffs achievable in a pessimistic equilibrium and in an optimistic equilibrium. Finally, moving to the broader framework of multi-leader-follower games, we show the existence of SPEs and we identify a subset of SPE-outcomes for a class of multi-leader-follower games where the game played by the leaders involves a generalized weighted potential structure.

  • Open Access

    Vessel sharing agreements under nonlinear costs

    by Francesco Caruso, Maria Carmela Ceparano, Federico Quartieri

    We examine a game-theoretic model of vessel sharing agreements in industries endowed with a general class of price functions and classes of convex cost functions. We study the equilibrium structure thereof—in particular, the existence of a unique equilibrium global aggregate as well as the existence of a unique equilibrium—and we provide a comparative statics analysis of consumer welfare with respect to an ordinal measure of concentration of the industry. We show that the a “high degree" of convexity of the cost functions can generate anti-competitive effects. In the presence of linear costs, the model satisfies a weak aggregative form in the sense of aggregative games. By allowing for the nonlinearity of variable cost functions, we further weaken the aggregative nature of the games considered. We provide a refined technique for treating these games in which both the equilibrium structure and the comparative statics analysis are based on the comparison of the equilibrium conditions of the players who strictly decrease their equilibrium strategies within the groups that strictly decrease the group’s equilibrium aggregate from an equilibrium with a smaller global aggregate associated with a less concentrated industry to an equilibrium with a (weakly) larger global aggregate associated with a more concentrated (but possibly identical) industry.


  • Open Access

    Undominated Maximals: General Definition and Characterizations

    by Federico Quartieri

    This paper proposes a general definition of an undominated maximal of a relation on a constraint set. No specific requirement is imposed on either the asymmetry of the objective relation or the constraint set (which might, or might not, coincide with the ground set of the objective relation). Several characterizations are formulated that express undominated maximals of an objective relation as maximals of some trace associated with that objective relation. By means of some of these characterizations, the structure of the entire set of undominated maximals is examined in the particular case of relations induced by open and closed convex cones—among them, the weak and strong Pareto dominance—and, in the case of semiorders, that admit certain types of representability. The results of the last part of the examination allow the construction of many examples of relations whose entire sets of maximals and undominated maximals are completely identifiable in an elementary way.


  • Open Access

    On the Existence of Greatest Elements and Maximizers

    by Federico Quartieri

    We obtain several characterizations of the existence of greatest elements of a total preorder. The characterizations pertain to the existence of unconstrained greatest elements of a total preorder and to the existence of constrained greatest elements of a total preorder on every nonempty compact subset of its ground set. The necessary and sufficient conditions are purely topological and, in the case of constrained greatest elements, are formulated by making use of a preorder relation on the set of all topologies that can be defined on the ground set of the objective relation. Observing that every function into a totally ordered set can be naturally conceived as a total preorder, we then reformulate the mentioned characterizations in the more restrictive case of an objective function with a totally ordered codomain. The reformulations are expressed in terms of upper semi- and pseudo-continuity by showing a topological connection between the two notions of generalized continuity.


  • Open Access

    On $C$-Pareto dominance in decomposably $C$-antichain-convex sets

    by Maria Carmela Ceparano, Federico Quartieri

    This paper shows that---under suitable conditions on a cone $C$---any element in the convex hull of a decomposably $C$-antichain-convex set $Y$ is $C$-Pareto dominated by some element of $Y$. Building on this, the paper proves the disjointness of the convex hulls of two disjoint decomposably $C$-antichain-convex sets whenever one of latter is $C$-upward. These findings are used to obtain several consequences on the structure of the $C$-Pareto optima of decomposably $C$-antichain-convex sets, on the separation of decomposably $C$-antichain-convex sets and on the convexity of the set of maximals of $C$-antichain-convex relations and of the set of maximizers of $C$-antichain-quasiconcave functions. Special emphasis is placed on the invariance of the solution set of a problem after its "convexification".

  • Open Access

    Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information

    by Christian Ewerhart, Federico Quartieri

    Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of incomplete information admits a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In particular, provided that all players have positive budgets in all states of the world, existence requires only the usual concavity and convexity assumptions. Information structures that satisfy our conditions for uniqueness include independent private valuations, correlated private values, pure common values, and examples of interdependent valuations. The results allow dealing with inactive types, asymmetric equilibria, population uncertainty, and the possibility of resale. It is also shown that any player that is active with positive probability ends up with a positive net rent.