Hartmut Leuthold

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper, we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions.

Risk permeates decision making because choice outcomes are often uncertain. When basing decisions on prior experience, previous research suggests that the prospects of gain and loss differentially produce subjective inflation and deflation of risk-associated values, respectively. These effects have been explained in terms of an “extreme-outcome rule”, which posits that valuations of risky options are biased towards the best/worst possible outcome. However, prior studies typically examined risky choices only at the 50% level, and it was unclear whether the risk-preferences predicted by the “extreme outcome rule” would generalize to other probabilities. Furthermore, the cognitive processes underlying risk preferences remained unclear. We addressed these questions through three pre-registered experiments where the critical condition involved decisions between equivaluable safe and risky options across three probabilities (20%, 50%, 80%) with the goals of either maximizing gains or minimizing losses. We found that probability and risk context mutually influenced choice-behavior: low probabilities were particularly subjectively inflated, leading to a strong preference for rare, risky options when seeking gains and a strong aversion when mitigating losses. We also found that decisions involving risk require more cognitive resources, as indicated by longer decision times. Additionally, a risk-sensitive reinforcement model showed that risk-seeking/averse individuals tended to overweight positive/negative outcomes. This study highlights that outcome uncertainty, the range of possible outcomes a given choice option could yield, is a critical component in probability distortion and that subjective probability distortions may drive risk attitudes.

There has been an increasing interest in uncovering the mechanisms underpinning how people decide which task to perform at a given time. Many studies suggest that task representations are crucial in guiding such voluntary task selection behavior, which is primarily reflected in a bias to select task repetitions over task switches. However, it is not yet clear whether the task-specific motor effectors are also a crucial component of task representations when deciding to switch tasks. Across three experiments using different voluntary task switching (VTS) procedures, we show that a greater overlap in task representations with a task-to-finger mapping than task-to-hand mapping increases participants' switching behavior (Exp. 1 and Exp. 2), but not when they were instructed to randomly select tasks (Exp. 3). Thus, task-specific stimulus-response associations can change the way people mentally represent tasks and influence switching behavior, suggesting that motor effectors should be considered as a component of task representations in biasing cognitive flexibility.

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlies processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions.

Conflict tasks are commonly used to investigate control processes under situations of relevant and irrelevant sources of information. In addition to compatibility effects at a mean behavioral level, delta plot analyses of reaction time distributions reveal that the compatibility effect generally increases with time (i.e., positive delta plot slopes) across most conflict-like tasks. Critically, the underlying causes of the increasing delta plot slopes with different types of distractors are still poorly understood. The present study tested whether the relative onset of target-to-distractor processing affects the delta plot slope. Specifically, we manipulated the temporal order of relevant and irrelevant dimensions within an Eriksen flanker task (Experiment [Exp.] 1), an Arrow-Simon task (Exp. 2), and a manual Stroop task (Exp. 3a/3b). The results of the Eriksen flanker task and Arrow-Simon task revealed that the delta plots slopes were less increasing (and instead rather decreasing) when the irrelevant dimension appears first (IR condition) compared to the reversed order (RI condition)-consistent with the idea that the underlying mechanism driving the slope of the delta plot is the temporal overlap of activation between the relevant and irrelevant dimensions. In contrast, for the Stroop task, the delta plots in the RI condition were not more increasing than the ones for the IR condition. Overall, these results suggest that the temporal properties strongly influence delta plot shape, but that the temporal dynamics operating in the flanker task and the Arrow-Simon task differs from the Stroop task, at least under conditions where relevant and irrelevant information is presented sequentially. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The counting process can only be fully understood when taking into account the visual characteristics of the sets counted. Comparing behavioral data as well as event-related brain potentials (ERPs) evoked by different task-irrelevant arrangements of dots during an exact enumeration task, we aimed to investigate the effect of illusory contour detection on the counting process while other grouping cues like proximity were controlled and dot sparsity did not provide a cue to the numerosity of sets. Adult participants (N = 37) enumerated dots (8–12) in irregular and two different types of regular arrangements which differed in the shape of their illusory dot lattices. Enumeration speed was affected by both arrangement and magnitude. The type of arrangement influenced an early ERP negativity peaking at about 270 ms after stimulus onset, whereas numerosity only affected later ERP components (> 300 ms). We also observed that without perceptual cues, magnitude was constructed at a later stage of cognitive processing. We suggest that chunking is a prerequisite for more fluent counting which influences automatic processing (< 300 ms) during enumeration. We conclude that the procedure of exact enumeration depends on the interaction of several perceptual and numerical processes that are influenced by magnitude and arrangement.

We combined behavioral measures with electrophysiological measures of motor activation (i.e., lateralized readiness potentials, LRPs) to disentangle the relative contribution of premotor and motor processes to multitasking interference in the prioritized processing paradigm. Specifically, we presented stimuli of two tasks (primary and background task) in each trial, but participants were instructed to perform the background task only if the primary task required no response. As expected, task performance was substantially influenced by a task probability manipulation: Background task responses were faster, psychological refractory period effects were smaller, and interference from the second task (i.e., backward compatibility effects) was larger when there was a larger probability that this task required a response. Critically, stimulus‐locked and response‐locked LRP analyses indicate that these behavioral effects of parallel processing were not driven by background task motor processing (e.g., motoric response activation) taking place during primary task processing. Instead, the LRP results suggest that these effects were exclusively localized during premotor stages of processing (e.g., response selection). Thus, the present results generally provide evidence for multitasking accounts allowing parallel task processing during response selection, whereas the task‐specific motor responses are activated in a serial manner. One plausible account is that multiple task information sources can be processed in parallel, with sharing of limited cognitive resources depending on task relevance, but a primary and still active task goal prevents motor activation related to the goals of other tasks in order to avoid outcome conflict.

Research in perception in the visual and auditory domains has traditionally focused on investigating highly controlled artificial stimulus material. However, a key feature of our perceptual system is the ease with which the input of a wide set of naturalistic co‐occurring information is dealt with. This study investigated whether, during perception of real‐world surface material, a conceptual representation is built that has the potential to interact with a linguistic description of the material directly. Short sentences were presented (e.g., This surface is smooth) followed by a matching or mismatching picture of a real‐world surface material. The results showed early cross‐modal integration effects during material surface perception in an N400‐like potential, originating approximately 280 ms after stimulus presentation. Overall, these findings suggest a rather early influence of linguistic information on material perception, suggesting that in line with object representation, real‐world materials are represented in the brain in a format that allows interaction with non‐visual information.

Experimental studies using fictional moral dilemmas indicate that both automatic emotional processes and controlled cognitive processes contribute to moral judgments. However, not much is known about how people process socio-normative violations that are more common to their everyday life nor the time-course of these processes. Thus, we recorded participants’ electrical brain activity while they were reading vignettes that either contained morally acceptable vs unacceptable information or text materials that contained information which was either consistent or inconsistent with their general world knowledge. A first event-related brain potential (ERP) positivity peaking at ∼200 ms after critical word onset (P200) was larger when this word involved a socio-normative or knowledge-based violation. Subsequently, knowledge-inconsistent words triggered a larger centroparietal ERP negativity at ∼320 ms (N400), indicating an influence on meaning construction. In contrast, a larger ERP positivity (larger late positivity), which also started at ∼320 ms after critical word onset, was elicited by morally unacceptable compared with acceptable words. We take this ERP positivity to reflect an implicit evaluative (good–bad) categorization process that is engaged during the online processing of moral transgressions.