Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Igor V. Erovenko has a total of 34 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    A Game-Theoretic Analysis of COVID-19 Dynamics with Self-Isolation and Vaccination Behavior

    by Folashade B. Agusto, Igor V. Erovenko, Gleb Gribovskii

    Standard epidemiological models often treat human behavior as static, failing to capture the dynamic feedback loops that shape epidemic waves. To address this, we developed a compartmental model of COVID-19 that couples the disease dynamics with two co-evolving behavioral games governed by imitation dynamics: an altruistic self-isolation game for infected individuals and a self-interested vaccination game for susceptible individuals. Our simulations reveal a fundamental behavioral paradox: strong adherence to self-isolation, while effective at reducing peak infections, diminishes the perceived risk of disease, thereby undermining the incentive to vaccinate. This dynamic highlights a critical trade-off between managing acute crises through non-pharmaceutical interventions and achieving long-term population immunity. We conclude that vaccination has a powerful stabilizing effect that can prevent the recurrent waves often driven by behavioral responses to non-pharmaceutical interventions. Public health policy must therefore navigate the tension between encouraging short-term mitigation behaviors and communicating the long-term benefits of vaccination to ensure lasting population resilience.


  • A game-theoretical model of optimal condom usage to prevent chlamydia infection

    by Gleb Gribovskii, Igor V. Erovenko

    Chlamydia trachomatis is one of the most common sexually transmitted infections worldwide, often asymptomatic and leading to severe reproductive health complications if untreated. In this work, we construct a game-theoretic model to investigate individual decisions regarding condom usage as a preventive measure against chlamydia infection. We consider two behavioral scenarios: non-discriminating and discriminating populations. In the first scenario, condom usage rates are independent of observed chlamydia symptoms. In the second scenario, individuals always utilize condoms upon recognizing chlamydia symptoms. Our findings demonstrate that the optimal population condom usage remains below the herd immunity threshold in both scenarios if the cost of condom usage is not negligible. The optimal condom usage is closer to herd immunity level in a non-discriminating population if the cost of condom usage relative to the cost of infection is close to zero. We performed uncertainty and sensitivity analyses to establish the robustness of our conclusions with respect to the uncertainty in the epidemiological model parameters. These results emphasize the critical role of reducing the perceived and actual costs of condom use in preventing chlamydia infections.


  • Open Access

    Optimal Vaccination Strategies to Reduce Endemic Levels of Meningitis in Africa

    by Alfredo Martinez, Jonathan Machado, Eric Sanchez, Igor V. Erovenko

    Meningococcal meningitis is a deadly acute bacterial infection caused by the Neisseria meningitidis bacterium that affects the membrane covering the brain and spinal cord. The World Health Organization launched the “Defeating bacterial meningitis by 2030” initiative in 2018, which relies on recent discoveries of cheap and effective vaccines. Here, we consider one important factor—human behavior—which is often neglected by immunization campaigns. We constructed a game-theoretic model of meningitis in the meningitis belt, where individuals make selfish rational decisions whether to vaccinate based on the assumed costs and the vaccination decisions of the entire population. We identified conditions when individuals should vaccinate, and we found the optimal (equilibrium) population vaccination rate. We conclude that voluntary compliance significantly reduces the endemic levels of meningitis if the cost of vaccination relative to the cost of the disease is sufficiently low, but it does not eliminate the disease. We also performed uncertainty and sensitivity analysis on our model.


  • Open Access

    A Game-Theoretic Model of Optimal Clean Equipment Usage to Prevent Hepatitis C Among Injecting Drug Users

    by Kristen Scheckelhoff, Ayesha Ejaz, Igor V. Erovenko

    Hepatitis C is an infectious liver disease which contributes to an estimated 400,000 deaths each year. The disease is caused by the hepatitis C virus (HCV) and is spread by direct blood contact between infected and susceptible individuals. While the magnitude of its impact on human populations has prompted a growing body of scientific work, the current epidemiological models of HCV transmission among injecting drug users treat risk behaviors as fixed parameters rather than as outcomes of a dynamic, decision-making process. Our study addresses this gap by constructing a game-theoretic model to investigate the implications of voluntary participation in clean needle exchange programs on the spread of HCV among this high-risk population. Individual drug users weigh the (perceived) cost of clean equipment usage relative to the (perceived) cost of infection, as well as the strategies adopted by the rest of the population, and look for a selfishly optimal level of protection. We find that the spread of HCV in this population can theoretically be eliminated if individuals use sterile equipment approximately two-thirds of the time. Achieving this level of compliance, however, requires that the real and perceived costs of obtaining sterile equipment are essentially zero. Our study demonstrates a robust method for integrating game theory with epidemiological models to analyze voluntary health interventions. It provides a quantitative justification for public health policies that eliminate all barriers—both monetary and social—to comprehensive harm-reduction services.


  • Open Access

    Signals Concealing Positive Information Can Coexist in the General Beer-and-Quiche Type Games

    by Shan Sun, Igor V. Erovenko, Jan Rychtář, Dewey Taylor

    The beer-quiche game has been used to study interactions involving bluffing. In this paper, we use a four-by-four strategic-form representation of the beer-quiche game to demonstrate five Nash equilibria of three different kinds, including pooling and hybrid equilibria. Our results show how receiver response strategies can maintain bluffing signals within communication systems. Critically, we identify a novel pooling equilibrium in which all senders use a single signal, effectively concealing positive information about themselves. This provides a plausible explanation for the strategic concealment of quality. Our findings suggest that signals conveying concealed information can exist in a wide range of interactive situations with asymmetric information, contributing to a broader understanding of signalling beyond traditional costly signalling models.

  • Open Access

    Network topology and movement cost, not updating mechanism, determine the evolution of cooperation in mobile structured populations

    by Diogo L. Pires, Igor Erovenko, Mark Broom

    Evolutionary models are used to study the self-organisation of collective action, often incorporating population structure due to its ubiquitous presence and long-known impact on emerging phenomena. We investigate the evolution of multiplayer cooperation in mobile structured populations, where individuals move strategically on networks and interact with those they meet in groups of variable size. We find that the evolution of multiplayer cooperation primarily depends on the network topology and movement cost while using different stochastic update rules seldom influences evolutionary outcomes. Cooperation robustly co-evolves with movement on complete networks and structure has a partially detrimental effect on it. These findings contrast an established wisdom in evolutionary graph theory that cooperation can only emerge under some update rules and if the average degree is low. We find that group-dependent movement erases the locality of interactions, suppresses the impact of evolutionary structural viscosity on the fitness of individuals, and leads to assortative behaviour that is much more powerful than viscosity in promoting cooperation. We analyse the differences remaining between update rules through a comparison of evolutionary outcomes and fixation probabilities.

  • Open Access

    The Evolution of Cooperation in Two-Dimensional Mobile Populations with Random and Strategic Dispersal

    by Kyle Weishaar, Igor V. Erovenko

    We investigate the effect of the environment dimensionality and different dispersal strategies on the evolution of cooperation in a finite structured population of mobile individuals. We consider a population consisting of cooperators and free-riders residing on a two-dimensional lattice with periodic boundaries. Individuals explore the environment according to one of the four dispersal strategies and interact with each other via a public goods game. The population evolves according to a birth–death–birth process with the fitness of the individuals deriving from the game-induced payouts. We found that the outcomes of the strategic dispersal strategies in the two-dimensional setting are identical to the outcomes in the one-dimensional setting. The random dispersal strategy, not surprisingly, resulted in the worst outcome for cooperators.


  • Open Access

    Optimal Voluntary Vaccination of Adults and Adolescents Can Help Eradicate Hepatitis B in China

    by Kristen Scheckelhoff, Ayesha Ejaz, Igor V. Erovenko, Jan Rychtář, Dewey Taylor

    Hepatitis B (HBV) is one of the most common infectious diseases, with a worldwide annual incidence of over 250 million people. About one-third of the cases are in China. While China made significant efforts to implement a nationwide HBV vaccination program for newborns, a significant number of susceptible adults and teens remain. In this paper, we analyze a game-theoretical model of HBV dynamics that incorporates government-provided vaccination at birth coupled with voluntary vaccinations of susceptible adults and teens. We show that the optimal voluntary vaccination brings the disease incidence to very low levels. This result is robust and, in particular, due to a high HBV treatment cost, essentially independent from the vaccine cost.