Stephen John
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Stephen John has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Emma J. Curran
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
2 shared publications - Chloe Thomas
Sheffield Centre for Health and Related Research (SCHARR), School of Medicine and Population Health, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
1 shared publication - Eli Y. Adashi
Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA
1 shared publication - Grant D. Stewart
Department of Surgery, University of Cambridge, Cambridge Biomedical Campus, Cambridge, UK
1 shared publication - Hannah Harrison
Department of Public Health and Primary Care, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
1 shared publication - Joseph H. Wu
Department of Psychiatry, Mass General Brigham, Boston, MA, USA; Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
CRISPR, APGAR and Cancer Screening: Public Engagement, Controversy and Misaligned Values
There are many calls for public engagement in decision‐making around controversial technologies, but far fewer calls for public engagement in deliberation around less controversial interventions. We think the public should be involved in discussing CRISPR, but not in discussing APGAR. Drawing on the case of debates over cancer screening, this paper argues we have things the wrong way around. Given the complex entanglement of fact and value, it is very hard to have high‐quality public deliberation over novel technologies. By contrast, it is easier to have deliberation over more mundane technologies. There is, then, good reason to think we should engage in more public deliberation over mundane technologies. The results of this deliberation can then be used in more high‐profile cases.
Open AccessCRISPR, APGAR and Cancer Screening: Public Engagement, Controversy and Misaligned Values
There are many calls for public engagement in decision‐making around controversial technologies, but far fewer calls for public engagement in deliberation around less controversial interventions. We think the public should be involved in discussing CRISPR, but not in discussing APGAR. Drawing on the case of debates over cancer screening, this paper argues we have things the wrong way around. Given the complex entanglement of fact and value, it is very hard to have high‐quality public deliberation over novel technologies. By contrast, it is easier to have deliberation over more mundane technologies. There is, then, good reason to think we should engage in more public deliberation over mundane technologies. The results of this deliberation can then be used in more high‐profile cases.
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 175-186
Transparency in Science
Many authors argue for the importance of greater transparency in science. This chapter outlines some of these claims, and some of the dangers of transparency, paying particular attention to debates over the proper role of non-epistemic values in science. The first section of this chapter provides a taxonomy of forms of transparency, their benefits and costs. The second section of this chapter discusses the relationship between transparency and worries that “value-laden science” threatens autonomy. The third section of this chapter discusses various aspects of the relationship between transparency and trust. Readers may be interested in these Handbook chapters as well: Justin B. Biddle, “Artificial Intelligence: Values, Governance, and Policy”; Bennett Holman and T. Y. Branch, “Reflecting on Responses to the New Demarcation Problem”; Kristina Rolin, “Values in Research Ethics Education.”
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 175-186
Transparency in Science
Many authors argue for the importance of greater transparency in science. This chapter outlines some of these claims, and some of the dangers of transparency, paying particular attention to debates over the proper role of non-epistemic values in science. The first section of this chapter provides a taxonomy of forms of transparency, their benefits and costs. The second section of this chapter discusses the relationship between transparency and worries that “value-laden science” threatens autonomy. The third section of this chapter discusses various aspects of the relationship between transparency and trust. Readers may be interested in these Handbook chapters as well: Justin B. Biddle, “Artificial Intelligence: Values, Governance, and Policy”; Bennett Holman and T. Y. Branch, “Reflecting on Responses to the New Demarcation Problem”; Kristina Rolin, “Values in Research Ethics Education.”
- Open Access
- 26 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 15 (4) , 1-19
Against alignment: the value of non-democratic science
The claim that science is value-laden raises concerns that reliance on science, both by individuals or policymakers, might be incompatible with respect for autonomy or democratic principles. This article explores one response to this problem, that, when appealing to non-epistemic values in scientific contexts, scientists ought to use the “democratic” values which their audiences would agree upon. Ultimately, it argues that this “Democratic Alignment Demand” should be rejected. Section 1 articulates why the “Democratic Alignment Demand” may seem appealing. Section 2 suggests a problem with the demand: that it seems implausible in the analogous case of artistic production. Section 3 draws on this analogy to argue that the demand is far weaker than it seems. Section 4 adds a further argument against the demand: that it confuses a sufficient condition for legitimacy with a necessary condition.
- 26 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 15 (4) , 1-19
Open AccessAgainst alignment: the value of non-democratic science
The claim that science is value-laden raises concerns that reliance on science, both by individuals or policymakers, might be incompatible with respect for autonomy or democratic principles. This article explores one response to this problem, that, when appealing to non-epistemic values in scientific contexts, scientists ought to use the “democratic” values which their audiences would agree upon. Ultimately, it argues that this “Democratic Alignment Demand” should be rejected. Section 1 articulates why the “Democratic Alignment Demand” may seem appealing. Section 2 suggests a problem with the demand: that it seems implausible in the analogous case of artistic production. Section 3 draws on this analogy to argue that the demand is far weaker than it seems. Section 4 adds a further argument against the demand: that it confuses a sufficient condition for legitimacy with a necessary condition.
- Open Access
Framing, Filtering and Fixing: The Ethics of Risk Communication
There are many puzzles about whether and how to communicate risk information, particularly in public health and medical settings. This paper does three things. First, it suggests a model for whether and how to communicate risk which balances concerns about autonomy and concerns about beneficence. Second, it argues that in the case of risk communication, there are also difficult questions, stemming from the reference class problem, about what risks to communicate. Third, it uses the Justified Misalignments framework developed in the first part of the paper to address these puzzles.
Open AccessFraming, Filtering and Fixing: The Ethics of Risk Communication
There are many puzzles about whether and how to communicate risk information, particularly in public health and medical settings. This paper does three things. First, it suggests a model for whether and how to communicate risk which balances concerns about autonomy and concerns about beneficence. Second, it argues that in the case of risk communication, there are also difficult questions, stemming from the reference class problem, about what risks to communicate. Third, it uses the Justified Misalignments framework developed in the first part of the paper to address these puzzles.
- 5 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 96, 186-187
Book Forum
- 5 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 96, 186-187
Book Forum
- 7 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Metascience
- Vol. 31 (3) , 369-372
The limits of moral imagination
- 7 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Metascience
- Vol. 31 (3) , 369-372
The limits of moral imagination
- Open Access
- 26 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 39 (4) , 682-697
Must We Vaccinate the Most Vulnerable? Efficiency, Priority, and Equality in the Distribution of Vaccines
In this article, we aim to map out the complexities which characterise debates about the ethics of vaccine distribution, particularly those surrounding the distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine. In doing so, we distinguish three general principles which might be used to distribute goods and two ambiguities in how one might wish to spell them out. We then argue that we can understand actual debates around the COVID-19 vaccine - including those over prioritising vaccinating the most vulnerable - as reflecting disagreements over these principles. Finally, we shift our attention away from traditional discussions of distributive justice, highlighting the importance of concerns about risk imposition, special duties, and social roles in explaining debates over the COVID-19 vaccine. We conclude that the normative complexity this article highlights deepens the need for decision-making bodies to be sensitive to public input.
- 26 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 39 (4) , 682-697
Open AccessMust We Vaccinate the Most Vulnerable? Efficiency, Priority, and Equality in the Distribution of Vaccines
In this article, we aim to map out the complexities which characterise debates about the ethics of vaccine distribution, particularly those surrounding the distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine. In doing so, we distinguish three general principles which might be used to distribute goods and two ambiguities in how one might wish to spell them out. We then argue that we can understand actual debates around the COVID-19 vaccine - including those over prioritising vaccinating the most vulnerable - as reflecting disagreements over these principles. Finally, we shift our attention away from traditional discussions of distributive justice, highlighting the importance of concerns about risk imposition, special duties, and social roles in explaining debates over the COVID-19 vaccine. We conclude that the normative complexity this article highlights deepens the need for decision-making bodies to be sensitive to public input.
- Open Access
- 8 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Health Expectations
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1789-1806
A community jury study exploring the public acceptability of using risk stratification to determine eligibility for cancer screening
Introduction: Using risk stratification to determine eligibility for cancer screening is likely to improve the efficiency of screening programmes by targeting resources towards those most likely to benefit. We aimed to explore the implications of this approach from a societal perspective by understanding public views on the most acceptable stratification strategies.Methods: We conducted three online community juries with 9 or 10 participants in each. Participants were purposefully sampled by age (40–79 years), sex, ethnicity, social grade and English region. On the first day, participants were informed of the potential benefits and harms of cancer screening and the implications of different ways of introducing stratification using scenarios based on phenotypic and genetic risk scores. On the second day, participants deliberated to reach a verdict on the research question, ‘Which approach(es) to inviting people to screening are acceptable, and under what circumstances?’ Deliberations and feedback were recorded and analysed using thematic analysis.Results: Across the juries, the principle of risk stratification was generally considered to be an acceptable approach for determining eligibility for screening. Disregarding increasing capacity, the participants considered it to enable efficient resource allocation to high‐risk individuals and could see how it might help to save lives. However, there were concerns regarding fair implementation, particularly how the risk assessment would be performed at scale and how people at low risk would be managed. Some favoured using the most accurate risk prediction model whereas others thought that certain risk factors should be prioritized (particularly factors considered as non‐modifiable and relatively stable, such as genetics and family history). Transparently justifying the programme and public education about cancer risk emerged as important contributors to acceptability.Conclusion: Using risk stratification to determine eligibility for cancer screening was acceptable to informed members of the public, particularly if it included risk factors they considered fair and when communicated transparently.Patient or Public Contribution: Two patient and public involvement representatives were involved throughout this study. They were not involved in synthesizing the results but contributed to producing study materials, co‐facilitated the community juries and commented on the interpretation of the findings and final report.
- 8 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Health Expectations
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1789-1806
Open AccessA community jury study exploring the public acceptability of using risk stratification to determine eligibility for cancer screening
Introduction: Using risk stratification to determine eligibility for cancer screening is likely to improve the efficiency of screening programmes by targeting resources towards those most likely to benefit. We aimed to explore the implications of this approach from a societal perspective by understanding public views on the most acceptable stratification strategies.Methods: We conducted three online community juries with 9 or 10 participants in each. Participants were purposefully sampled by age (40–79 years), sex, ethnicity, social grade and English region. On the first day, participants were informed of the potential benefits and harms of cancer screening and the implications of different ways of introducing stratification using scenarios based on phenotypic and genetic risk scores. On the second day, participants deliberated to reach a verdict on the research question, ‘Which approach(es) to inviting people to screening are acceptable, and under what circumstances?’ Deliberations and feedback were recorded and analysed using thematic analysis.Results: Across the juries, the principle of risk stratification was generally considered to be an acceptable approach for determining eligibility for screening. Disregarding increasing capacity, the participants considered it to enable efficient resource allocation to high‐risk individuals and could see how it might help to save lives. However, there were concerns regarding fair implementation, particularly how the risk assessment would be performed at scale and how people at low risk would be managed. Some favoured using the most accurate risk prediction model whereas others thought that certain risk factors should be prioritized (particularly factors considered as non‐modifiable and relatively stable, such as genetics and family history). Transparently justifying the programme and public education about cancer risk emerged as important contributors to acceptability.Conclusion: Using risk stratification to determine eligibility for cancer screening was acceptable to informed members of the public, particularly if it included risk factors they considered fair and when communicated transparently.Patient or Public Contribution: Two patient and public involvement representatives were involved throughout this study. They were not involved in synthesizing the results but contributed to producing study materials, co‐facilitated the community juries and commented on the interpretation of the findings and final report.
- Open Access
- 11 March 2022
- Published by University Library System, University of Pittsburgh in Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 3 (1)
Death Sentences
There are many analogies between medical and judicial practice. This article explores one such analogy, between “medicalization” and “criminalization.” Specifically, drawing on an analogy between a judge’s speech act of delivering a verdict and a physician’s speech act of giving a diagnosis, it suggests a novel account of the phenomenon of “overdiagnosis.” Using this approach, we can make some headway in understanding debates over the early detection of cancer. The final section outlines the relationship between this approach and familiar debates in philosophy of medicine on the nature of disease and in philosophy of science on the “value-free ideal.”
- 11 March 2022
- Published by University Library System, University of Pittsburgh in Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 3 (1)
Open AccessDeath Sentences
There are many analogies between medical and judicial practice. This article explores one such analogy, between “medicalization” and “criminalization.” Specifically, drawing on an analogy between a judge’s speech act of delivering a verdict and a physician’s speech act of giving a diagnosis, it suggests a novel account of the phenomenon of “overdiagnosis.” Using this approach, we can make some headway in understanding debates over the early detection of cancer. The final section outlines the relationship between this approach and familiar debates in philosophy of medicine on the nature of disease and in philosophy of science on the “value-free ideal.”
- Open Access
- 11 March 2022
- Published by University Library System, University of Pittsburgh in Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 3 (1)
Death Sentences
There are many analogies between medical and judicial practice. This article explores one such analogy, between “medicalization” and “criminalization.” Specifically, drawing on an analogy between a judge’s speech act of delivering a verdict and a physician’s speech act of giving a diagnosis, it suggests a novel account of the phenomenon of “overdiagnosis.” Using this approach, we can make some headway in understanding debates over the early detection of cancer. The final section outlines the relationship between this approach and familiar debates in philosophy of medicine on the nature of disease and in philosophy of science on the “value-free ideal.”
- 11 March 2022
- Published by University Library System, University of Pittsburgh in Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 3 (1)
Open AccessDeath Sentences
There are many analogies between medical and judicial practice. This article explores one such analogy, between “medicalization” and “criminalization.” Specifically, drawing on an analogy between a judge’s speech act of delivering a verdict and a physician’s speech act of giving a diagnosis, it suggests a novel account of the phenomenon of “overdiagnosis.” Using this approach, we can make some headway in understanding debates over the early detection of cancer. The final section outlines the relationship between this approach and familiar debates in philosophy of medicine on the nature of disease and in philosophy of science on the “value-free ideal.”