Michael S. Pangburn
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Michael S. Pangburn has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Eren Başar Çil
Lundquist College of Business, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, USA
4 shared publications Euthemia Stavrulaki
4 shared publications- Monire Jalili
Management Department, Bentley University, Waltham, MA, USA
4 shared publications - Alireza Yazdani
Department of Technology and Operations Management, College of Business Administration, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, California 91768
3 shared publications Anantaram Balakrishnan
McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712
3 shared publicationsElliot Rabinovich
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 21 September 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
Launching “what” versus “when”: Pacing successive new product releases
We consider a monopolist that over time offers its customers new versions of an evolving product. Given uncertainty in the rate of product development over time, we consider the alternatives of planning new-product releases based on time intervals versus development increments, that is, performance targets. These policy regimes are referred to in the literature as event pacing versus time pacing. With uncertainty and strategic consumers, we prove that the time paced regime optimally engenders a faster rate of product releases, yielding both strictly higher revenues for the seller and surplus for consumers. The revenue gains from time paced releases stem from two drivers that we refer to as innovation option-value and duration risk. The former reflects that, unlike event pacing which releases upon reaching development goals, time pacing continues R&D over its planned time interval, yielding potential upside development increments across release epochs. Time pacing’s duration-risk benefit is that it allows consumers to accurately assess the decision of whether to purchase a given release, knowing not only the quality of the product but also the timeframe before it will be superseded. Event paced releases, in contrast, benefit the seller in managing cost risk. That cost-risk benefit stems from not committing to launch potentially costly releases during times with lackluster development improvements. We show that this benefit of event pacing results in higher profits when fixed or variable costs are high. We also show that a dynamic hybrid policy that can switch between the two release regimes generates only small gains, given the underlying regimes’ already-strong performance when costs are either low or high. We also analyze a generalized setting with new-customer arrivals with heterogeneity in outside options, as well as customer attrition over time. We prove that when serving heterogeneous consumers, the firm’s release pacing and pricing optimally accommodate “version skipping” by consumers, over a wide range of heterogeneity levels. Collectively, our findings provide a theoretical basis for contrasting the time versus event paced release regimes for multi-generational products and explain the prevalence of these strategies in practice.
- 21 September 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
Launching “what” versus “when”: Pacing successive new product releases
We consider a monopolist that over time offers its customers new versions of an evolving product. Given uncertainty in the rate of product development over time, we consider the alternatives of planning new-product releases based on time intervals versus development increments, that is, performance targets. These policy regimes are referred to in the literature as event pacing versus time pacing. With uncertainty and strategic consumers, we prove that the time paced regime optimally engenders a faster rate of product releases, yielding both strictly higher revenues for the seller and surplus for consumers. The revenue gains from time paced releases stem from two drivers that we refer to as innovation option-value and duration risk. The former reflects that, unlike event pacing which releases upon reaching development goals, time pacing continues R&D over its planned time interval, yielding potential upside development increments across release epochs. Time pacing’s duration-risk benefit is that it allows consumers to accurately assess the decision of whether to purchase a given release, knowing not only the quality of the product but also the timeframe before it will be superseded. Event paced releases, in contrast, benefit the seller in managing cost risk. That cost-risk benefit stems from not committing to launch potentially costly releases during times with lackluster development improvements. We show that this benefit of event pacing results in higher profits when fixed or variable costs are high. We also show that a dynamic hybrid policy that can switch between the two release regimes generates only small gains, given the underlying regimes’ already-strong performance when costs are either low or high. We also analyze a generalized setting with new-customer arrivals with heterogeneity in outside options, as well as customer attrition over time. We prove that when serving heterogeneous consumers, the firm’s release pacing and pricing optimally accommodate “version skipping” by consumers, over a wide range of heterogeneity levels. Collectively, our findings provide a theoretical basis for contrasting the time versus event paced release regimes for multi-generational products and explain the prevalence of these strategies in practice.
- 30 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 324 (2) , 538-554
Sequential product launches with post-sale updates
- 30 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 324 (2) , 538-554
Sequential product launches with post-sale updates
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (5) , 1643-1659
Retail Sample Boxes: Counteracting the Adverse Effect of Accelerated Learning via Future Credit
Problem definition: Consumers often try a few varieties of an experience product before establishing a shopping routine. In retailing, a sample box typically refers to a package of multiple trial-sized varieties within a product category. Sample boxes potentially create value by helping consumers resolve their uncertainties regarding these varieties earlier and at a lower cost. In this paper, we study how firms and consumers share this added value under different market scenarios. We also derive the optimal pricing of sample boxes in product categories for which consumers make ongoing purchases over time. Academic/practical relevance: We thus extend the literature by proposing a framework that integrates sequential search and seller-induced learning. Methodology: We analyze a firm’s pricing decisions when consumers either purchase full-sized options sequentially or bypass that process via a sample box. We use dynamic programming to analyze consumers’ search problem (in the absence of a sample box) and nonlinear optimization to analyze the firm’s problem. Results: As anticipated, the informational value of a sample box yields an optimal price premium relative to the prices of individual products. Despite this price premium, we show that the firm’s expected profit may decrease because a sample box accelerates consumer learning, and thus, it may help consumers settle upon an outside option earlier. We establish that a firm can reverse the potential adverse profit impact of selling sample boxes by introducing an optimally specified future credit. Managerial implications: Offering sample boxes is a common practice in retailing. Contrasting the resulting expected profits with and without the sample box option, our results highlight that managers may be ill-advised to offer a sample box in the absence of the future credit mechanism. This study is the first to address the pricing of sample boxes and show the optimality of offering credit toward a subsequent purchase. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1206 .
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (5) , 1643-1659
Retail Sample Boxes: Counteracting the Adverse Effect of Accelerated Learning via Future Credit
Problem definition: Consumers often try a few varieties of an experience product before establishing a shopping routine. In retailing, a sample box typically refers to a package of multiple trial-sized varieties within a product category. Sample boxes potentially create value by helping consumers resolve their uncertainties regarding these varieties earlier and at a lower cost. In this paper, we study how firms and consumers share this added value under different market scenarios. We also derive the optimal pricing of sample boxes in product categories for which consumers make ongoing purchases over time. Academic/practical relevance: We thus extend the literature by proposing a framework that integrates sequential search and seller-induced learning. Methodology: We analyze a firm’s pricing decisions when consumers either purchase full-sized options sequentially or bypass that process via a sample box. We use dynamic programming to analyze consumers’ search problem (in the absence of a sample box) and nonlinear optimization to analyze the firm’s problem. Results: As anticipated, the informational value of a sample box yields an optimal price premium relative to the prices of individual products. Despite this price premium, we show that the firm’s expected profit may decrease because a sample box accelerates consumer learning, and thus, it may help consumers settle upon an outside option earlier. We establish that a firm can reverse the potential adverse profit impact of selling sample boxes by introducing an optimally specified future credit. Managerial implications: Offering sample boxes is a common practice in retailing. Contrasting the resulting expected profits with and without the sample box option, our results highlight that managers may be ill-advised to offer a sample box in the absence of the future credit mechanism. This study is the first to address the pricing of sample boxes and show the optimality of offering credit toward a subsequent purchase. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1206 .
- 20 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 312 (2) , 668-683
Pricing and structuring product trials: Separate versus mixed wine tastings
- 20 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 312 (2) , 668-683
Pricing and structuring product trials: Separate versus mixed wine tastings
- Open Access
- 12 April 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 14 (8) , 4594
From Used to New: Committing to Product Refresh Services
In practice, we see examples of firms offering product refresh services across different industries. Refresh services promote sustainable reuse and are distinct from typical refurbished-product sales which imply a change in ownership. This study is the first to use an analytic model to derive optimal prices and quantities for a firm offering product-refresh services in tandem with new products. Using a two-period framework, we establish that a firm can use a refresh service to align its second-period decisions with its overall profitability objective. We show that by committing to offering a refresh service at a pre-established price, the firm can enjoy higher selling prices in the first period. Thus, we find that even if the direct profit contribution of refresh-service sales is negative, it is possible for their overall impact on profits to be positive. Therefore, managers must view the contribution of product refresh services holistically, considering indirect price effects, to account for their full potential value.
- 12 April 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 14 (8) , 4594
Open AccessFrom Used to New: Committing to Product Refresh Services
In practice, we see examples of firms offering product refresh services across different industries. Refresh services promote sustainable reuse and are distinct from typical refurbished-product sales which imply a change in ownership. This study is the first to use an analytic model to derive optimal prices and quantities for a firm offering product-refresh services in tandem with new products. Using a two-period framework, we establish that a firm can use a refresh service to align its second-period decisions with its overall profitability objective. We show that by committing to offering a refresh service at a pre-established price, the firm can enjoy higher selling prices in the first period. Thus, we find that even if the direct profit contribution of refresh-service sales is negative, it is possible for their overall impact on profits to be positive. Therefore, managers must view the contribution of product refresh services holistically, considering indirect price effects, to account for their full potential value.
- 28 July 2020
- Published by Wiley in Decision Sciences
- Vol. 52 (4) , 952-985
Understanding the Value of Delayed Discounts in Retail Rewards Programs
In practice, it is not uncommon for a retailer to incentivize consumers to purchase its products by instituting a standing “rewards program” across its product line. These rewards often take the form of earned credit, calculated based on current spending, applicable toward a future purchase. In this article, we show that despite their euphemistic “rewards” label, the future‐credit promotion structure is often advantageous for the retailer, even given customers who behave rationally. By analyzing a retailer who sells distinct products to heterogeneous consumers with stochastic demands, we find that a time‐lagged discount increases the number of resulting net‐price states, thus expanding the set of rational shopping behaviors and segmentation. We also prove that even while delayed rewards generally yield higher discount levels (relative to immediate discounts), they can generate higher expected profits. We also consider the impact of imposing a spending‐level threshold for customers to earn rewards, and analyze the impact of the distinct shopping behaviors, which then emerge. By proving the efficacy of such delayed‐reward promotion structures, relative to the alternative of immediate discounts, we establish a theoretical basis for explaining why rewards programs are common in retail practice.
- 28 July 2020
- Published by Wiley in Decision Sciences
- Vol. 52 (4) , 952-985
Understanding the Value of Delayed Discounts in Retail Rewards Programs
In practice, it is not uncommon for a retailer to incentivize consumers to purchase its products by instituting a standing “rewards program” across its product line. These rewards often take the form of earned credit, calculated based on current spending, applicable toward a future purchase. In this article, we show that despite their euphemistic “rewards” label, the future‐credit promotion structure is often advantageous for the retailer, even given customers who behave rationally. By analyzing a retailer who sells distinct products to heterogeneous consumers with stochastic demands, we find that a time‐lagged discount increases the number of resulting net‐price states, thus expanding the set of rational shopping behaviors and segmentation. We also prove that even while delayed rewards generally yield higher discount levels (relative to immediate discounts), they can generate higher expected profits. We also consider the impact of imposing a spending‐level threshold for customers to earn rewards, and analyze the impact of the distinct shopping behaviors, which then emerge. By proving the efficacy of such delayed‐reward promotion structures, relative to the alternative of immediate discounts, we establish a theoretical basis for explaining why rewards programs are common in retail practice.
- 13 July 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 29 (12) , 2679-2695
Pricing Joint Sales and Rentals: When are Purchase Conversion Discounts Optimal?
Product sales and rentals often occur in parallel, allowing customers to choose their preferred option. In settings where consumers face significant value uncertainty, rentals also provide a mechanism for consumers to discover whether they like a product. For some products, such as movies and books, the rental option may yield a significant proportion of the utility associated with ownership. The convenience of renting products in digital forms (e.g., e‐books) makes the managerial challenge of jointly pricing rentals and sales increasingly relevant. Rental and sales prices are interdependent not only because consumers can choose between the two options, but also because a customer may rent before purchasing. Given these considerations, and allowing for consumer uncertainty, we analyze the optimal joint pricing of product rentals and sales. We show that when consumers have a relatively high probability of liking a product, and will experience a significant drop in their post‐rental residual utility, then the practice of allowing a portion of the rental price to apply to a future purchase is optimal.
- 13 July 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 29 (12) , 2679-2695
Pricing Joint Sales and Rentals: When are Purchase Conversion Discounts Optimal?
Product sales and rentals often occur in parallel, allowing customers to choose their preferred option. In settings where consumers face significant value uncertainty, rentals also provide a mechanism for consumers to discover whether they like a product. For some products, such as movies and books, the rental option may yield a significant proportion of the utility associated with ownership. The convenience of renting products in digital forms (e.g., e‐books) makes the managerial challenge of jointly pricing rentals and sales increasingly relevant. Rental and sales prices are interdependent not only because consumers can choose between the two options, but also because a customer may rent before purchasing. Given these considerations, and allowing for consumer uncertainty, we analyze the optimal joint pricing of product rentals and sales. We show that when consumers have a relatively high probability of liking a product, and will experience a significant drop in their post‐rental residual utility, then the practice of allowing a portion of the rental price to apply to a future purchase is optimal.
- 8 April 2020
- Published by Wiley in Decision Sciences
- Vol. 51 (2) , 395-422
What if Hotelling's Firms Can Mass Customize?
Mass customization provides a mechanism by which firms can better target a broad scope of consumer preferences and thus, in so doing, potentially increase their profits. We study product‐design and price competition between two mass‐customizing firms that serve consumers with varying tastes and finite reservation prices. Mass customization has recently received notable attention in both industry and academia, but yet there have been few studies concerning its impact in competitive settings. We contribute to this sparse literature by analyzing a two‐stage non‐cooperative game between two firms serving a Hotelling linear city. By comparing symmetric equilibrium results in settings with and without mass customization, we find that customization changes the nature of competition. More specifically, we show that with customization, a symmetric equilibrium emerges only if the firms' customization cost lies below a threshold, however, the magnitude of that cost does not influence product design decisions in equilibrium. We find that the equilibrium with customizing firms will not sustain cost levels above that threshold. Furthermore, we show that mass customizers earn higher equilibrium profits when consumers' fit sensitivity either significantly or only slightly exceeds the product valuation. On the contrary, traditional firms are better off when facing moderate fit sensitivity. We also establish that competition with mass customization may lead to lower profits and consumer surplus.
- 8 April 2020
- Published by Wiley in Decision Sciences
- Vol. 51 (2) , 395-422
What if Hotelling's Firms Can Mass Customize?
Mass customization provides a mechanism by which firms can better target a broad scope of consumer preferences and thus, in so doing, potentially increase their profits. We study product‐design and price competition between two mass‐customizing firms that serve consumers with varying tastes and finite reservation prices. Mass customization has recently received notable attention in both industry and academia, but yet there have been few studies concerning its impact in competitive settings. We contribute to this sparse literature by analyzing a two‐stage non‐cooperative game between two firms serving a Hotelling linear city. By comparing symmetric equilibrium results in settings with and without mass customization, we find that customization changes the nature of competition. More specifically, we show that with customization, a symmetric equilibrium emerges only if the firms' customization cost lies below a threshold, however, the magnitude of that cost does not influence product design decisions in equilibrium. We find that the equilibrium with customizing firms will not sustain cost levels above that threshold. Furthermore, we show that mass customizers earn higher equilibrium profits when consumers' fit sensitivity either significantly or only slightly exceeds the product valuation. On the contrary, traditional firms are better off when facing moderate fit sensitivity. We also establish that competition with mass customization may lead to lower profits and consumer surplus.
- Open Access
- 13 December 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
What If Hotelling's Firms Can Mass Customize?
Mass customization provides a mechanism by which firms can better target a broad scope of consumer preferences and thus, in so doing, potentially extract consumer surplus. Perhaps for these reasons, the adoption of mass customization has become a common business practice. We study product-design and price competition between firms with mass customization capability. We examine the duopoly competition between two mass-customizing firms that serve consumers with varying tastes and finite reservation prices. By carefully addressing the dynamics in such a setting, our analyses shed light on how the availability of a mass customization technology affects the nature of competition. We also compare the equilibrium results against a baseline case without mass customization, and prove that both the firms and consumers may be worse off. Thus, we show that customization technology may ultimately induce competitors to make product portfolio and pricing decisions that are detrimental to all parties in the market.
- 13 December 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhat If Hotelling's Firms Can Mass Customize?
Mass customization provides a mechanism by which firms can better target a broad scope of consumer preferences and thus, in so doing, potentially extract consumer surplus. Perhaps for these reasons, the adoption of mass customization has become a common business practice. We study product-design and price competition between firms with mass customization capability. We examine the duopoly competition between two mass-customizing firms that serve consumers with varying tastes and finite reservation prices. By carefully addressing the dynamics in such a setting, our analyses shed light on how the availability of a mass customization technology affects the nature of competition. We also compare the equilibrium results against a baseline case without mass customization, and prove that both the firms and consumers may be worse off. Thus, we show that customization technology may ultimately induce competitors to make product portfolio and pricing decisions that are detrimental to all parties in the market.
- 1 September 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 26 (9) , 1728-1745
Mass Customization and Guardrails: “You Can Not Be All Things to All People”
A mass customization strategy enables a firm to match its product designs to unique consumer tastes. In a classic horizontal product‐differentiation framework, a consumer's utility is a decreasing function of the distance between their ideal taste and the taste defined by the most closely aligned product the firm offers. A consumer thus considers the taste mismatch associated with their purchased product, but otherwise the positioning of the firm's product portfolio (or, “brand image”) is immaterial. In contrast, self‐congruency theory suggests that consumers assess how well both the purchased product and its overall brand image match with their ideal taste. Therefore, we incorporate within the consumer utility function both product‐specific and brand‐level components. Mass customization has the potential to improve taste alignment with regard to a specific purchased product, but at the risk of increasing brand dilution. Absent brand dilution concerns, a firm will optimally serve all consumers’ ideal tastes at a single price. In contrast, by endogenizing dilution costs within the consumer utility model, we prove that a mass‐customizing firm optimally uses differential pricing. Moreover, we show that the firm offers reduced prices to consumers with extreme tastes (to stimulate consumer “travel”), with a higher and fixed price being offered to those consumers having more central (mainstream) tastes. Given that a continuous spectrum of prices will likely not be practical in application, we also consider the more pragmatic approach of augmenting the uniformly priced mass customization range with preset (non‐customized) outlying designs, which serve customers at the taste extremes. We prove this practical approach performs close to optimal.
- 1 September 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 26 (9) , 1728-1745
Mass Customization and Guardrails: “You Can Not Be All Things to All People”
A mass customization strategy enables a firm to match its product designs to unique consumer tastes. In a classic horizontal product‐differentiation framework, a consumer's utility is a decreasing function of the distance between their ideal taste and the taste defined by the most closely aligned product the firm offers. A consumer thus considers the taste mismatch associated with their purchased product, but otherwise the positioning of the firm's product portfolio (or, “brand image”) is immaterial. In contrast, self‐congruency theory suggests that consumers assess how well both the purchased product and its overall brand image match with their ideal taste. Therefore, we incorporate within the consumer utility function both product‐specific and brand‐level components. Mass customization has the potential to improve taste alignment with regard to a specific purchased product, but at the risk of increasing brand dilution. Absent brand dilution concerns, a firm will optimally serve all consumers’ ideal tastes at a single price. In contrast, by endogenizing dilution costs within the consumer utility model, we prove that a mass‐customizing firm optimally uses differential pricing. Moreover, we show that the firm offers reduced prices to consumers with extreme tastes (to stimulate consumer “travel”), with a higher and fixed price being offered to those consumers having more central (mainstream) tastes. Given that a continuous spectrum of prices will likely not be practical in application, we also consider the more pragmatic approach of augmenting the uniformly priced mass customization range with preset (non‐customized) outlying designs, which serve customers at the taste extremes. We prove this practical approach performs close to optimal.