Qi-Qing Song
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Qi-Qing Song has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Lai-Sheng Wang
China Agricultural University
3 shared publications Guoqiang Tang
College of Science , Guilin University of Technology , Guilin , Guangxi , China
2 shared publications- Hua-Zhou Chen
Guilin University of Technology
2 shared publications Wei-Li Zhang
School of Management Science and Engineering , Dongbei University of Finance and Economics , Dalian 116025, China
2 shared publicationsYi-Rong Jiang
College of Science , Guilin University of Technology , Guilin 541004, China
2 shared publications- Yirong Jiang
School of Mathematical Science, Guangxi Minzu University, Nanning, People’s Republic of China
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (4) , 829-852
The existence of $\alpha$-core for general cooperative games with infinite or finite players- 2 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (4) , 829-852
The existence of $\alpha$-core for general cooperative games with infinite or finite players- Open Access
Rationality Levels in a Heterogeneous Dynamic Price Game
The Bertrand game is one of the basic game models in modern microeconomics. In some behavior experiments with game theory, it was shown that agents have different bounded rationality levels. In order to check the effect of bounded rationality levels on the stability of the equilibrium points in Bertrand games, this study establishes a new dynamic price game with a parameter to show the rationality levels. An exact geometrical characterization of the stable region of the dynamic system is firstly proposed, from which the critical points of the bifurcation of the system can be deduced. It is shown that allowing various bounded rationalities is conducive to enlarging the stable region of the equilibrium point of the price system. With increasing rationality level, the stable region expands. Numerical examples are provided to show the main results.
Open AccessRationality Levels in a Heterogeneous Dynamic Price Game
The Bertrand game is one of the basic game models in modern microeconomics. In some behavior experiments with game theory, it was shown that agents have different bounded rationality levels. In order to check the effect of bounded rationality levels on the stability of the equilibrium points in Bertrand games, this study establishes a new dynamic price game with a parameter to show the rationality levels. An exact geometrical characterization of the stable region of the dynamic system is firstly proposed, from which the critical points of the bifurcation of the system can be deduced. It is shown that allowing various bounded rationalities is conducive to enlarging the stable region of the equilibrium point of the price system. With increasing rationality level, the stable region expands. Numerical examples are provided to show the main results.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Dynamics and Games
Dynamic games with heterogeneous $ N $ competitors and $ K $-level price discriminationThis study constructs a dynamic game with $ K $-level price discrimination and $ N $ competitors in a market. The adjustment process of the dynamic is based on marginal profits of competitors. For a market with heterogenous competitors, we show that the static Nash equilibrium of the game is stable for the dynamic regardless of the number $ N $ of competitors and the level $ K $ of price discrimination. For a market with heterogenous competitors, a sufficient condition is proposed in which the static Nash equilibrium remains stable for the dynamic. The condition is exactly computable and is validated by numerical simulation. We show through simulation that an increasing number of heterogeneous competitors cannot decrease the stability of the static Nash equilibrium of the game, and the increasing number of homogeneous competitors will delay the occurrence of bifurcations.- 1 January 2025
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Dynamics and Games
Dynamic games with heterogeneous $ N $ competitors and $ K $-level price discriminationThis study constructs a dynamic game with $ K $-level price discrimination and $ N $ competitors in a market. The adjustment process of the dynamic is based on marginal profits of competitors. For a market with heterogenous competitors, we show that the static Nash equilibrium of the game is stable for the dynamic regardless of the number $ N $ of competitors and the level $ K $ of price discrimination. For a market with heterogenous competitors, a sufficient condition is proposed in which the static Nash equilibrium remains stable for the dynamic. The condition is exactly computable and is validated by numerical simulation. We show through simulation that an increasing number of heterogeneous competitors cannot decrease the stability of the static Nash equilibrium of the game, and the increasing number of homogeneous competitors will delay the occurrence of bifurcations.- 1 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Fractional Calculus and Applied Analysis
- Vol. 26 (3) , 1104-1144
Sensitivity analysis for optimal control problems governed by Hilfer fractional differential hemivariational inequalities
- 1 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Fractional Calculus and Applied Analysis
- Vol. 26 (3) , 1104-1144
Sensitivity analysis for optimal control problems governed by Hilfer fractional differential hemivariational inequalities
- 4 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 53 (1) , 105-125
On the structure of core solutions of discontinuous general cooperative games
- 4 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 53 (1) , 105-125
On the structure of core solutions of discontinuous general cooperative games
- 1 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 189 (2) , 646-665
Uniqueness and Hyers-Ulam Stability of Random Differential Variational Inequalities with Nonlocal Boundary Conditions
- 1 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 189 (2) , 646-665
Uniqueness and Hyers-Ulam Stability of Random Differential Variational Inequalities with Nonlocal Boundary Conditions
- 18 December 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics
- Vol. 26 (2) , 287-311
The effect of price discrimination on dynamic duopoly games with bounded rationality
In a homogenous product market, customers’ different demand elasticities may lead to different prices. This study examined price discrimination’s effect on equilibrium points in Cournot duopoly games by assuming that each firm charges K prices and adjusts its strategies based on bounded rationality. In consideration of price discrimination, two discrete dynamic game systems with 2K variables were introduced for players with homogenous or heterogenous expectations. The stability of the Nash equilibrium point was found to be independent of price discrimination. Given price discrimination, the stability of boundary stationary points for the system with homogenous players is different from that for the system with heterogenous players. Numerical simulations verified the critical point for the system with homogenous players from being stable to its bifurcation.
- 18 December 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics
- Vol. 26 (2) , 287-311
The effect of price discrimination on dynamic duopoly games with bounded rationality
In a homogenous product market, customers’ different demand elasticities may lead to different prices. This study examined price discrimination’s effect on equilibrium points in Cournot duopoly games by assuming that each firm charges K prices and adjusts its strategies based on bounded rationality. In consideration of price discrimination, two discrete dynamic game systems with 2K variables were introduced for players with homogenous or heterogenous expectations. The stability of the Nash equilibrium point was found to be independent of price discrimination. Given price discrimination, the stability of boundary stationary points for the system with homogenous players is different from that for the system with heterogenous players. Numerical simulations verified the critical point for the system with homogenous players from being stable to its bifurcation.
- Open Access
- 25 June 2019
- Published by Wiley in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
- Vol. 2019, 1-8
Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition
This paper introduces a new Cournot duopoly game and gives an applied study for price discrimination in a market by dynamic methods. One of two oligopolies has two different prices for a homogeneous product, while the other charges one kind of price. It is found that there is only one stable equilibrium for the discrete dynamic system, and a corresponding stable condition is given. Using a discriminative price is not always beneficial to a firm in equilibrium. If both oligopolies carry out price discrimination, the market’s average price is lower than when only one oligopoly does it. The results are verified by numerical simulations.
- 25 June 2019
- Published by Wiley in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
- Vol. 2019, 1-8
Open AccessPrice Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition
This paper introduces a new Cournot duopoly game and gives an applied study for price discrimination in a market by dynamic methods. One of two oligopolies has two different prices for a homogeneous product, while the other charges one kind of price. It is found that there is only one stable equilibrium for the discrete dynamic system, and a corresponding stable condition is given. Using a discriminative price is not always beneficial to a firm in equilibrium. If both oligopolies carry out price discrimination, the market’s average price is lower than when only one oligopoly does it. The results are verified by numerical simulations.
- 15 June 2019
- Published by International Scientific Research Publications in Journal of Nonlinear Sciences and Applications
- Vol. 12 (11) , 699-710
On stable fixed points under several kinds of strong perturbations
This gives new results on stable fixed points related to several kinds of strong perturbations in references. It is shown that a strong stable set of fixed points has a robust stable property. For a robust stable fixed point set of a correspondence, in its neighborhood, there is a strong stable set for any small perturbation of the correspondence. There exists a robust stable set for a correspondence, if there is at least one fixed point for the correspondence. These generalize the corresponding results in recent references and give an application in the existence of strong stable economy equilibria.
- 15 June 2019
- Published by International Scientific Research Publications in Journal of Nonlinear Sciences and Applications
- Vol. 12 (11) , 699-710
On stable fixed points under several kinds of strong perturbations
This gives new results on stable fixed points related to several kinds of strong perturbations in references. It is shown that a strong stable set of fixed points has a robust stable property. For a robust stable fixed point set of a correspondence, in its neighborhood, there is a strong stable set for any small perturbation of the correspondence. There exists a robust stable set for a correspondence, if there is at least one fixed point for the correspondence. These generalize the corresponding results in recent references and give an application in the existence of strong stable economy equilibria.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 490, 1251-1258
Group learning versus local learning: Which is prefer for public cooperation?
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 490, 1251-1258
Group learning versus local learning: Which is prefer for public cooperation?