Alexandre Billon
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Alexandre Billon has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Metaphilosophy
- Vol. 55 (1) , 3-30
The psychopathology of metaphysics: Depersonalization and the problem of reality
According to a common philosophical intuition, the deep nature of things is hidden from us, and the world as we know it through perception and science is, just like a dream, shadows, or a computer simulation, somehow shallow and lacking in reality. This “intuition of unreality” clashes with a strong, but perhaps more naive, intuition to the effect that the world as we know it seems perfectly real. Shadows, dreams, or informational structures appear too unreal to be identical to the world as we know it! This clash between the two intuitions forms the basis of the “problem of reality.” In the late nineteenth century psychiatrists encountered patients they referred to as “metaphysician doubters” who constantly questioned the reality of the world. This essay draws on studies of these patients in order to reject, and indeed diagnose, the intuition of unreality and recent metaphysical doctrines drawing on it, such as structuralism, digitalism, and virtual realism.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Metaphilosophy
- Vol. 55 (1) , 3-30
Open AccessThe psychopathology of metaphysics: Depersonalization and the problem of reality
According to a common philosophical intuition, the deep nature of things is hidden from us, and the world as we know it through perception and science is, just like a dream, shadows, or a computer simulation, somehow shallow and lacking in reality. This “intuition of unreality” clashes with a strong, but perhaps more naive, intuition to the effect that the world as we know it seems perfectly real. Shadows, dreams, or informational structures appear too unreal to be identical to the world as we know it! This clash between the two intuitions forms the basis of the “problem of reality.” In the late nineteenth century psychiatrists encountered patients they referred to as “metaphysician doubters” who constantly questioned the reality of the world. This essay draws on studies of these patients in order to reject, and indeed diagnose, the intuition of unreality and recent metaphysical doctrines drawing on it, such as structuralism, digitalism, and virtual realism.
- 2 February 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 314-342
What Is It Like to Lack Mineness?
Patients suffering from depersonalization complain of feeling detached from their body, their mental states, and actions or even from themselves. In this chapter, I argue that depersonalization consists in the lack of a phenomenal feature that marks my experiences as mine, which is usually called “mineness,” and that the study of depersonalization constitutes a neglected yet incomparable probe to assess empirically the scope, role, and even the nature of mineness. Here is how I will proceed. After describing depersonalization (§2) and arguing that it involves a lack of mineness (§3) I will confront a series of objections (§4). I will then spell out what depersonalization can teach us about the scope of mineness (§5), about its role and psychological function (§6) and even about its nature (§7).
- 2 February 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 314-342
What Is It Like to Lack Mineness?
Patients suffering from depersonalization complain of feeling detached from their body, their mental states, and actions or even from themselves. In this chapter, I argue that depersonalization consists in the lack of a phenomenal feature that marks my experiences as mine, which is usually called “mineness,” and that the study of depersonalization constitutes a neglected yet incomparable probe to assess empirically the scope, role, and even the nature of mineness. Here is how I will proceed. After describing depersonalization (§2) and arguing that it involves a lack of mineness (§3) I will confront a series of objections (§4). I will then spell out what depersonalization can teach us about the scope of mineness (§5), about its role and psychological function (§6) and even about its nature (§7).
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Verein philosophie.ch in Dialectica
- Vol. 77 (4) , 459-504
A Recipe for Non-wellfounded but Complete Chains of Explanations (and Other Determination Relations)
A Recipe for Non-wellfounded but Complete Chains of Explanations (and Other Determination Relations)
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Verein philosophie.ch in Dialectica
- Vol. 77 (4) , 459-504
Open AccessA Recipe for Non-wellfounded but Complete Chains of Explanations (and Other Determination Relations)
A Recipe for Non-wellfounded but Complete Chains of Explanations (and Other Determination Relations)
- Open Access
- 6 December 2022
- Published by Société de Philosophie des Sciences in Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences
- Vol. 9 (1) , 23-27
Conscience et scientisme
Recension du livre de François Kammerer, Conscience et Matière, Éditions matériologiques, 2019
- 6 December 2022
- Published by Société de Philosophie des Sciences in Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences
- Vol. 9 (1) , 23-27
Open AccessConscience et scientisme
Recension du livre de François Kammerer, Conscience et Matière, Éditions matériologiques, 2019
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Verein philosophie.ch in Dialectica
- Vol. 76 (1) , 119-162
What is the Point of Persistent Disputes?
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Verein philosophie.ch in Dialectica
- Vol. 76 (1) , 119-162
Open AccessWhat is the Point of Persistent Disputes?
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 9, 1806-1848
The Sense of Existence
If I see, hear, or touch a sparrow, the sparrow seems real to me. Unlike Bigfoot or Santa Claus, it seems to exist; I will therefore judge that it does indeed exist. The “sense of existence” refers to the kind of awareness that typically grounds such ordinary judgments of existence or “reality.” The sense of existence has been invoked by Humeans, Kantians, Ideologists, and the phenomenological tradition to make substantial philosophical claims. However, it is extremely controversial; its very existence has been called into question. This paper aims to clarify the nature and reality of the sense of existence by studying a psychiatric condition in which the sense appears to be disrupted: depersonalization disorder (DPD).
- 1 January 2022
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 9, 1806-1848
Open AccessThe Sense of Existence
If I see, hear, or touch a sparrow, the sparrow seems real to me. Unlike Bigfoot or Santa Claus, it seems to exist; I will therefore judge that it does indeed exist. The “sense of existence” refers to the kind of awareness that typically grounds such ordinary judgments of existence or “reality.” The sense of existence has been invoked by Humeans, Kantians, Ideologists, and the phenomenological tradition to make substantial philosophical claims. However, it is extremely controversial; its very existence has been called into question. This paper aims to clarify the nature and reality of the sense of existence by studying a psychiatric condition in which the sense appears to be disrupted: depersonalization disorder (DPD).
- 31 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 88 (5) , 1935-1954
Are Infinite Explanations Self-Explanatory?
- 31 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 88 (5) , 1935-1954
Are Infinite Explanations Self-Explanatory?
- 11 June 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 10 (2) , 257-261
Editorial: Schizophrenia and Other Pathologies of Self-Awareness Widening the Focus
- 11 June 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 10 (2) , 257-261
Editorial: Schizophrenia and Other Pathologies of Self-Awareness Widening the Focus
- 16 February 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 196 (12) , 5205-5229
Paradoxical hypodoxes
- 16 February 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 196 (12) , 5205-5229
Paradoxical hypodoxes
- Open Access
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
- Vol. 11 (1) , 1-27
Irrationality and Happiness: A (Neo)-Schopenhaurian Argument for Rational Pessimism
There is a long tradition in philosophy of blaming passions for our unhappiness. If only we were more rational, it is claimed, we would live happier lives. I argue that such optimism is misguided and that, paradoxically, people with desires, like us, cannot be both happy and rational. More precisely, if someone rational has desires he will not be fully happy, and if he has some desires that are rational and—in a yet-to-be-specified sense—demanding, he will be frankly unhappy. Call this claim Rational Pessimism. The argument for Rational Pessimism can be considered as a variation on a Schopenhauerian argument that bluntly claims that, because desires involve lack and suffering, desiring souls like us cannot be happy. I argue that, even if Schopenhauer’s argument escapes most attacks that have been targeted against it, it faces decisive empirical objections. I argue that Schopenhauer’s argument can, however, be rescued if it is assumed that we are rational.
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
- Vol. 11 (1) , 1-27
Open AccessIrrationality and Happiness: A (Neo)-Schopenhaurian Argument for Rational Pessimism
There is a long tradition in philosophy of blaming passions for our unhappiness. If only we were more rational, it is claimed, we would live happier lives. I argue that such optimism is misguided and that, paradoxically, people with desires, like us, cannot be both happy and rational. More precisely, if someone rational has desires he will not be fully happy, and if he has some desires that are rational and—in a yet-to-be-specified sense—demanding, he will be frankly unhappy. Call this claim Rational Pessimism. The argument for Rational Pessimism can be considered as a variation on a Schopenhauerian argument that bluntly claims that, because desires involve lack and suffering, desiring souls like us cannot be happy. I argue that, even if Schopenhauer’s argument escapes most attacks that have been targeted against it, it faces decisive empirical objections. I argue that Schopenhauer’s argument can, however, be rescued if it is assumed that we are rational.