Jorge Navas
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Jorge Navas has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jesús Marín-Solano
Departament de Matemàtica Econòmica , 16724 Financera i Actuarial and BEAT, Universitat de Barcelona , Avinguda Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona , Spain
11 shared publications Albert De-Paz
3 shared publications- Lijue Lu
Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
2 shared publications - Oriol Roch
Department of Economic, Financial and Actuarial Mathematics University of Barcelona Barcelona Spain
2 shared publications - Carles MaÑÓ-Cabello
Department of Economics , KU Leuven , Leuven , Belgium
1 shared publication - Julia de Frutos Cachorro
Departament de Matemàtica Econòmica , 16724 Financera i Actuarial and BEAT, Universitat de Barcelona , Avinguda Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona , Spain
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 September 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 9 (18) , 2205
A Resource Extraction Model with Technology Adoption under Time Inconsistent Preferences
A two-stage non-standard optimal control problem with time inconsistent preferences is studied. In an infinite horizon setting, a time consistent (sophisticated) decision maker chooses the time of switching between two consecutive regimes. The second regime corresponds to the implementation of a new technology, and a cost must be paid at the switching time. Although the problem is formulated for a general discount function, special attention is devoted to models with nonconstant discounting and heterogeneous discounting. The problem is solved by transforming it into a problem in a finite horizon and free terminal time. The corresponding dynamic programming equations are presented, and conditions for the derivation of the switching time by decision makers with different degrees of sophistication are studied. A resource extraction model with technology adoption is solved in detail. Effects of the adoption of different discount functions are illustrated numerically.
- 8 September 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 9 (18) , 2205
Open AccessA Resource Extraction Model with Technology Adoption under Time Inconsistent Preferences
A two-stage non-standard optimal control problem with time inconsistent preferences is studied. In an infinite horizon setting, a time consistent (sophisticated) decision maker chooses the time of switching between two consecutive regimes. The second regime corresponds to the implementation of a new technology, and a cost must be paid at the switching time. Although the problem is formulated for a general discount function, special attention is devoted to models with nonconstant discounting and heterogeneous discounting. The problem is solved by transforming it into a problem in a finite horizon and free terminal time. The corresponding dynamic programming equations are presented, and conditions for the derivation of the switching time by decision makers with different degrees of sophistication are studied. A resource extraction model with technology adoption is solved in detail. Effects of the adoption of different discount functions are illustrated numerically.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Water Resources and Economics
- Vol. 33
Competition between different groundwater uses under water scarcity
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Water Resources and Economics
- Vol. 33
Competition between different groundwater uses under water scarcity
- Open Access
- 6 November 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Operational Research Society
- Vol. 73 (2) , 244-260
Lanchester duopoly model revisited: Advertising competition under time inconsistent preferences
In this paper, we study a finite time horizon advertising dynamic game under the assumption of time-inconsistent preferences. Specifically, we consider two types of discounting, heterogeneous discounting and hyperbolic discounting. In the case of heterogeneous discounting, the relative importance of the final function will increase/decrease as the end of the planning horizon approaches compared with current payoffs. Whereas when agents discount future payoffs hyperbolically, their discount rates diminish rapidly in earlier stages and then slowly in the long term. We compute time-inconsistent and time-consistent feedback Nash equilibrium strategies, and compare them with those of the standard discounting case. Our results reveal that heterogeneous discounting would lead to some last-minute changes, i.e., some adapting behaviours in the last years in accordance with their increasing/decreasing valuations of the final state. Under some circumstances, the change can be so radical that the pre-commitment solution takes the contrary path of time-consistent strategies. Concerning the competition under hyperbolic discounting, the temporal evolution of advertising efforts show a quite different nature. Different strategies exhibit disparity in the beginning, and encounter in the neighbourhood in the end, which is contrary to the heterogeneous discounting. Besides, a strong commitment power might induce over investment.
- 6 November 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Operational Research Society
- Vol. 73 (2) , 244-260
Open AccessLanchester duopoly model revisited: Advertising competition under time inconsistent preferences
In this paper, we study a finite time horizon advertising dynamic game under the assumption of time-inconsistent preferences. Specifically, we consider two types of discounting, heterogeneous discounting and hyperbolic discounting. In the case of heterogeneous discounting, the relative importance of the final function will increase/decrease as the end of the planning horizon approaches compared with current payoffs. Whereas when agents discount future payoffs hyperbolically, their discount rates diminish rapidly in earlier stages and then slowly in the long term. We compute time-inconsistent and time-consistent feedback Nash equilibrium strategies, and compare them with those of the standard discounting case. Our results reveal that heterogeneous discounting would lead to some last-minute changes, i.e., some adapting behaviours in the last years in accordance with their increasing/decreasing valuations of the final state. Under some circumstances, the change can be so radical that the pre-commitment solution takes the contrary path of time-consistent strategies. Concerning the competition under hyperbolic discounting, the temporal evolution of advertising efforts show a quite different nature. Different strategies exhibit disparity in the beginning, and encounter in the neighbourhood in the end, which is contrary to the heterogeneous discounting. Besides, a strong commitment power might induce over investment.
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 279 (1) , 211-224
An analysis of efficiency of time-consistent coordination mechanisms in a model of supply chain management
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 279 (1) , 211-224
An analysis of efficiency of time-consistent coordination mechanisms in a model of supply chain management
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Insurance: Mathematics and Economics
- Vol. 54, 66-75
Consumption, investment and life insurance strategies with heterogeneous discounting
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Insurance: Mathematics and Economics
- Vol. 54, 66-75
Open AccessConsumption, investment and life insurance strategies with heterogeneous discounting
- 1 November 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 66 (3) , 221-232
A consumption–investment problem with heterogeneous discounting
- 1 November 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 66 (3) , 221-232
A consumption–investment problem with heterogeneous discounting
- 1 May 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 119 (2) , 186-190
Non-constant discounting and consumption, portfolio and life insurance rules
- 1 May 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 119 (2) , 186-190
Non-constant discounting and consumption, portfolio and life insurance rules
- 16 September 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental Modeling & Assessment
- Vol. 18 (2) , 171-184
Time-Consistent Equilibria in Common Access Resource Games with Asymmetric Players Under Partial Cooperation
- 16 September 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental Modeling & Assessment
- Vol. 18 (2) , 171-184
Time-Consistent Equilibria in Common Access Resource Games with Asymmetric Players Under Partial Cooperation
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 201 (3) , 860-872
Consumption and portfolio rules for time-inconsistent investors
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 201 (3) , 860-872
Consumption and portfolio rules for time-inconsistent investors
- Open Access
- 1 March 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 33 (3) , 666-675
Non-constant discounting in finite horizon: The free terminal time case
- 1 March 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 33 (3) , 666-675
Open AccessNon-constant discounting in finite horizon: The free terminal time case