Kieron Meagher
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Kieron Meagher has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrew Wait
School of Economics, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
5 shared publications - Klaus G. Zauner
Department of Economics City University London London UK
4 shared publications Timothy Van Zandt
INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
3 shared publicationsArghya Ghosh
UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics
2 shared publications- Arghya Ghosh
University of New South Wales
2 shared publications Ernie G. S. Teo
IBM Research
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Women with Children Prefer not to Work Exclusively from Home
We collect stated-preference data on preferred work location using a three-category choice set: Office, Hybrid and Home. The distinction is particularly informative when examining the interaction between gender and children. Among the four gender-by-children groups, women with children have the lowest predicted probabilities of preferring either home-or office-based work. Instead, women show a particularly strong preference for hybrid work. Their preferences contrast with the more evenly distributed preferences of men and of women without children.
- 13 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWomen with Children Prefer not to Work Exclusively from Home
We collect stated-preference data on preferred work location using a three-category choice set: Office, Hybrid and Home. The distinction is particularly informative when examining the interaction between gender and children. Among the four gender-by-children groups, women with children have the lowest predicted probabilities of preferring either home-or office-based work. Instead, women show a particularly strong preference for hybrid work. Their preferences contrast with the more evenly distributed preferences of men and of women without children.
- 8 November 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Instructions and Incentives in Organizations
We propose a different perspective on organizations, emphasizing the role of instructions in providing incentives. In our framework, there is a conflict of interest between a principal and an agent over the course of action. When preferences are aligned over executing a course, the principal can selectively instruct the agent on a preferred course to steer the agent toward it. Because less able (less confident) agents are more responsive to instructions, hiring these types of agents can be beneficial. This steering role of instructions toward a course of action helps us understand why and when firms are reluctant to hire overqualified (high-ability) workers, how worker risk aversion can be valuable to an organization, why instructions, although more likely to be used, are less intense, in more uncertain environments, and why instruction-giving and incentive pay go hand-in-hand. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
- 8 November 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Instructions and Incentives in Organizations
We propose a different perspective on organizations, emphasizing the role of instructions in providing incentives. In our framework, there is a conflict of interest between a principal and an agent over the course of action. When preferences are aligned over executing a course, the principal can selectively instruct the agent on a preferred course to steer the agent toward it. Because less able (less confident) agents are more responsive to instructions, hiring these types of agents can be beneficial. This steering role of instructions toward a course of action helps us understand why and when firms are reluctant to hire overqualified (high-ability) workers, how worker risk aversion can be valuable to an organization, why instructions, although more likely to be used, are less intense, in more uncertain environments, and why instruction-giving and incentive pay go hand-in-hand. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Market Contingent Managerial Hierarchies
We present a formal model of how the size of a firm’s administrative staff depends on the environment in which it operates. We consider a monopolist that introduces a new product in the face of market uncertainty. In a model that incorporates an information processing view of the managerial hierarchies into a product choice problem, we relate optimal size of organizations to the speed of change in market conditions and to more standard parameters of demand. We show that faster-changing environments lead to smaller management structures, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence of both flattening and decentralization by firms in response to faster-changing consumer tastes. When the environment is changing more quickly, it is better to aggregate less information to reduce the inexorable delay that occurs even when information processing is decentralized. This occurs both for positive managerial wages and in a benchmark model of zero managerial wages. An improvement of information technology, which we take to be an increase in the speed at which each manager can process information, has a similar effect, though it is more subtle. On the one hand, such a speedup is like a decrease in the speed of change of the environment, so that the firm processes more information. On the other hand, any fixed amount of information can be processed with fewer “person hours” and hence with fewer managers. When the managerial wage is zero, these two effects exactly cancel each other, so that management size does not depend on information technology. However, when the managerial wage is positive, the firm chooses to economize on managers when they become more productive, so that an improvement in information technology leads to a shrinking of the management size. In other results, we show that the change in the optimal size of the organization is non-monotonic in both the dispersion of consumer preferences and the “transport cost” parameter, while the optimal size increases as the consumers’ value of the product increases.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMarket Contingent Managerial Hierarchies
We present a formal model of how the size of a firm’s administrative staff depends on the environment in which it operates. We consider a monopolist that introduces a new product in the face of market uncertainty. In a model that incorporates an information processing view of the managerial hierarchies into a product choice problem, we relate optimal size of organizations to the speed of change in market conditions and to more standard parameters of demand. We show that faster-changing environments lead to smaller management structures, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence of both flattening and decentralization by firms in response to faster-changing consumer tastes. When the environment is changing more quickly, it is better to aggregate less information to reduce the inexorable delay that occurs even when information processing is decentralized. This occurs both for positive managerial wages and in a benchmark model of zero managerial wages. An improvement of information technology, which we take to be an increase in the speed at which each manager can process information, has a similar effect, though it is more subtle. On the one hand, such a speedup is like a decrease in the speed of change of the environment, so that the firm processes more information. On the other hand, any fixed amount of information can be processed with fewer “person hours” and hence with fewer managers. When the managerial wage is zero, these two effects exactly cancel each other, so that management size does not depend on information technology. However, when the managerial wage is positive, the firm chooses to economize on managers when they become more productive, so that an improvement in information technology leads to a shrinking of the management size. In other results, we show that the change in the optimal size of the organization is non-monotonic in both the dispersion of consumer preferences and the “transport cost” parameter, while the optimal size increases as the consumers’ value of the product increases.
- 20 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 204, 89-106
Market conditions and firm morality: Employee trust in the honesty of their managers
- 20 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 204, 89-106
Market conditions and firm morality: Employee trust in the honesty of their managers
- Open Access
- 27 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Case for Excellence in Management: A Comment on The Effects of Management Practices on Productivity
It is well established that management practices have on average a significant and large impact on firm output after controling for a range of standard factors such as other inputs, industry etc. We investigate non-linearities in the impact of management practices on firm performance using Gaussian process and a continuous piece-wise linear approach with probabilistically smoothed endogenous breaks. In all cases we find significant evidence of a U-shaped relationship: the impact of better management practices are 40% smaller than previously thought for the majority of the population but between 3 and 7 times larger for firms in the top tail.
- 27 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Case for Excellence in Management: A Comment on The Effects of Management Practices on Productivity
It is well established that management practices have on average a significant and large impact on firm output after controling for a range of standard factors such as other inputs, industry etc. We investigate non-linearities in the impact of management practices on firm performance using Gaussian process and a continuous piece-wise linear approach with probabilistically smoothed endogenous breaks. In all cases we find significant evidence of a U-shaped relationship: the impact of better management practices are 40% smaller than previously thought for the majority of the population but between 3 and 7 times larger for firms in the top tail.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 177, 589-600
A competitive analysis of fail fast: Shakeout and uncertainty about consumer tastes
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 177, 589-600
A competitive analysis of fail fast: Shakeout and uncertainty about consumer tastes
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 155, 315-348
Authority and communication in firms
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 155, 315-348
Authority and communication in firms
- Open Access
- 12 July 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Trust and the Delegation of Real Authority
Using a unique employee-establishment matched survey, we find a causal relationship between an individual employee’s trust of management and the delegation of real authority. We utilize both fixed effects and instrumental variables to control for unobserved factors: establishment-level fixed effects control for management quality, practices, culture and other characteristics; our instruments of inherited trust in management and employee disability address the possible endogeneity of employee trust. Across all specifications, we find that delegation of real authority is more likely if an employee trusts management. Our results are consistent with the theoretical literature on delegation; in particular, when contracts are incomplete trust between a principal and an agent can sustain delegation when it would not otherwise be possible.
- 12 July 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTrust and the Delegation of Real Authority
Using a unique employee-establishment matched survey, we find a causal relationship between an individual employee’s trust of management and the delegation of real authority. We utilize both fixed effects and instrumental variables to control for unobserved factors: establishment-level fixed effects control for management quality, practices, culture and other characteristics; our instruments of inherited trust in management and employee disability address the possible endogeneity of employee trust. Across all specifications, we find that delegation of real authority is more likely if an employee trusts management. Our results are consistent with the theoretical literature on delegation; in particular, when contracts are incomplete trust between a principal and an agent can sustain delegation when it would not otherwise be possible.
- 24 November 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Money & Management
- Vol. 37 (1) , 31-38
Doing more with less: productivity or starvation? The Intellectual Asset Health Check
The recent wave of savings in public service expenditure comes at the risk of creating starved workplaces, depleted of intellectual assets. This paper examines the perils of starved workplaces and how to avoid them. Organizations that nurture their intellectual assets were found to outperform their peers with 13.3% higher productivity. These organizations created a ‘win–win situation’, achieving both productivity targets while sustaining high stocks of emotional and human capital.
- 24 November 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Money & Management
- Vol. 37 (1) , 31-38
Doing more with less: productivity or starvation? The Intellectual Asset Health Check
The recent wave of savings in public service expenditure comes at the risk of creating starved workplaces, depleted of intellectual assets. This paper examines the perils of starved workplaces and how to avoid them. Organizations that nurture their intellectual assets were found to outperform their peers with 13.3% higher productivity. These organizations created a ‘win–win situation’, achieving both productivity targets while sustaining high stocks of emotional and human capital.
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 129, 1-17
Career concerns and team talent
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 129, 1-17
Career concerns and team talent