Christian Kietzmann
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Christian Kietzmann has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alice Crary
1 shared publication- Andrea K. Kern
Natural History Museum Vienna, Geological–Paleontological Department, Burgring 7, 1010 Vienna, Austria
1 shared publication Anna Braungart
1 shared publicationChristina Pinsdorf
1 shared publication- Dieter Sturma
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
1 shared publication Elif Özmen
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 23 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie
- Vol. 7 (2) , 361-377
Metaethical constructivism and the capacity of practical reason
- 23 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie
- Vol. 7 (2) , 361-377
Metaethical constructivism and the capacity of practical reason
- Open Access
- 2 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (5) , 1-15
Why reasons and reasoning don’t come apart
In recent years several philosophers have proposed what has come to be called the Reasoning View of normative reasons, according to which normative reasons are premises of sound reasoning. The reasoning view has come under some criticism, which chiefly consists in counterexamples that purport to show that something can be a premise of sound reasoning without intuitively being a normative reason, or can be a normative reason without being a premise of sound reasoning. I here consider and reject three examples that were recently put forward. Discussing them will allow me to clarify the Reasoning View in important respects.
- 2 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (5) , 1-15
Open AccessWhy reasons and reasoning don’t come apart
In recent years several philosophers have proposed what has come to be called the Reasoning View of normative reasons, according to which normative reasons are premises of sound reasoning. The reasoning view has come under some criticism, which chiefly consists in counterexamples that purport to show that something can be a premise of sound reasoning without intuitively being a normative reason, or can be a normative reason without being a premise of sound reasoning. I here consider and reject three examples that were recently put forward. Discussing them will allow me to clarify the Reasoning View in important respects.
- Open Access
- 5 October 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
- Vol. 107 (3) , 373-405
What Does Aristotle’s Craftsperson Understand?
I argue for the claim that for Aristotle, the content of productive understanding primarily concerns the nature of the object a craftsperson aims to bring into existence as well as its material requirements, and only derivatively things she might do with a view to producing that object. I explain why technê is a form of understanding, by considering what it shares with and how it differs from its practical and theoretical cousins. I give four arguments for my claim. The analogy of craft and nature suggests that a craftsperson understands the nature of their product and the material necessities required by the product’s existence. Further evidence comes from some of Aristotle’s remarks on the practical syllogism, from considerations concerning capacities for change in general, and from his views on why it is a two-way capacity. I end by mentioning several respects in which technê goes beyond productive understanding.
- 5 October 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
- Vol. 107 (3) , 373-405
Open AccessWhat Does Aristotle’s Craftsperson Understand?
I argue for the claim that for Aristotle, the content of productive understanding primarily concerns the nature of the object a craftsperson aims to bring into existence as well as its material requirements, and only derivatively things she might do with a view to producing that object. I explain why technê is a form of understanding, by considering what it shares with and how it differs from its practical and theoretical cousins. I give four arguments for my claim. The analogy of craft and nature suggests that a craftsperson understands the nature of their product and the material necessities required by the product’s existence. Further evidence comes from some of Aristotle’s remarks on the practical syllogism, from considerations concerning capacities for change in general, and from his views on why it is a two-way capacity. I end by mentioning several respects in which technê goes beyond productive understanding.
- 27 February 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Explorations
- Vol. 25 (2) , 159-169
Can realists reason with reasons?
I argue that realism about reasons is incompatible with the possibility of reasoning with reasons, because realists are committed to the claim that we are aware of reasons by way of ordinary beliefs, whereas a proper understanding of reasoning excludes that our awareness of reasons consists in beliefs. In the first three sections, I set forth five claims that realists standardly make, explain some assumptions I make concerning reasoning, and show why realism, so understood, cannot accommodate the truism that we reason with reasons. I then consider two proposals for how to avoid the problem.
- 27 February 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Explorations
- Vol. 25 (2) , 159-169
Can realists reason with reasons?
I argue that realism about reasons is incompatible with the possibility of reasoning with reasons, because realists are committed to the claim that we are aware of reasons by way of ordinary beliefs, whereas a proper understanding of reasoning excludes that our awareness of reasons consists in beliefs. In the first three sections, I set forth five claims that realists standardly make, explain some assumptions I make concerning reasoning, and show why realism, so understood, cannot accommodate the truism that we reason with reasons. I then consider two proposals for how to avoid the problem.
- 27 October 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 100 (3) , 539-549
Inference Is Not a Process
Inference, understood as a form of conscious and active belief-revision, has recently attracted much interest among philosophers of mind. Many writings on the topic depict inference as a kind of process. However, this assumption is, to my knowledge, nowhere explicitly justified or even reflected upon. In this paper, I argue that the assumption is wrong: while processes take time, it is not possible that inferences take time. Both claims are conceptual observations. It is therefore conceptually impossible that the mental act of inferring is a process.
- 27 October 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 100 (3) , 539-549
Inference Is Not a Process
Inference, understood as a form of conscious and active belief-revision, has recently attracted much interest among philosophers of mind. Many writings on the topic depict inference as a kind of process. However, this assumption is, to my knowledge, nowhere explicitly justified or even reflected upon. In this paper, I argue that the assumption is wrong: while processes take time, it is not possible that inferences take time. Both claims are conceptual observations. It is therefore conceptually impossible that the mental act of inferring is a process.
- Open Access
- 22 September 2020
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 103 (3) , 586-606
Practical knowledge and error in action
G.E.M. Anscombe’s account of practical knowledge raises a puzzle for cases of practical error, i.e. cases where, due to a mistake of mine, I am not in fact doing what I mean to be doing. It can seem that in such cases, we must both affirm and deny the presence of practical knowledge. It must be present, because practical error presupposes that there is an intentional action in which the mistake occurs, which in turn presupposes practical knowledge as a formal‐causal condition. At the same time, practical knowledge can’t be present, because I am not doing what I think I am doing, and therefore can’t have knowledge of what I am doing. I discuss and reject various attempts to deal with the problem. The solution I propose and defend against objections relies on applying the Aristotelian‐Thomistic conceptual framework of form and matter to intentional action.
- 22 September 2020
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 103 (3) , 586-606
Open AccessPractical knowledge and error in action
G.E.M. Anscombe’s account of practical knowledge raises a puzzle for cases of practical error, i.e. cases where, due to a mistake of mine, I am not in fact doing what I mean to be doing. It can seem that in such cases, we must both affirm and deny the presence of practical knowledge. It must be present, because practical error presupposes that there is an intentional action in which the mistake occurs, which in turn presupposes practical knowledge as a formal‐causal condition. At the same time, practical knowledge can’t be present, because I am not doing what I think I am doing, and therefore can’t have knowledge of what I am doing. I discuss and reject various attempts to deal with the problem. The solution I propose and defend against objections relies on applying the Aristotelian‐Thomistic conceptual framework of form and matter to intentional action.
- 5 June 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Die Natur der Lebensform
"Die Natur der Lebensform" published on 30 Mar 2020 by mentis.
- 5 June 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Die Natur der Lebensform
"Die Natur der Lebensform" published on 30 Mar 2020 by mentis.
- 12 October 2018
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in SATS
- Vol. 19 (2) , 161-181
Bratman on shared intention
In work that spans almost four decades, Michael Bratman has developed a rich account of human agency. At the centre of this account lies an understanding of intentions as individual planning states. A significant strand in this enterprise has been his work on shared agency, culminating in his 2014 monograph, which aims to extend his account of individual agency to cover cases of what he calls “modest sociality”, i.e. simple cases of acting together. Central to this endeavour is Bratman’s analysis of shared intention, which for him is not asui generisphenomenon, but can be understood in terms of his concept of individual agency, as the main components of his account of shared intention are already available in his account of the intentions of a single person.In this paper, I want to critically examine Bratman’s approach to shared intention. I will proceed as follows: In Section 1, I will describe the analytic strategy that guides Bratman’s analysis. Section 2 will introduce his central claim that the fulfilment of a list of conditions suffices for a shared intention to be present. In Sections 3 to 5, I will discuss and criticise some of these conditions. In Section 6, I will draw some positive conclusions from my critical arguments.
- 12 October 2018
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in SATS
- Vol. 19 (2) , 161-181
Bratman on shared intention
In work that spans almost four decades, Michael Bratman has developed a rich account of human agency. At the centre of this account lies an understanding of intentions as individual planning states. A significant strand in this enterprise has been his work on shared agency, culminating in his 2014 monograph, which aims to extend his account of individual agency to cover cases of what he calls “modest sociality”, i.e. simple cases of acting together. Central to this endeavour is Bratman’s analysis of shared intention, which for him is not asui generisphenomenon, but can be understood in terms of his concept of individual agency, as the main components of his account of shared intention are already available in his account of the intentions of a single person.In this paper, I want to critically examine Bratman’s approach to shared intention. I will proceed as follows: In Section 1, I will describe the analytic strategy that guides Bratman’s analysis. Section 2 will introduce his central claim that the fulfilment of a list of conditions suffices for a shared intention to be present. In Sections 3 to 5, I will discuss and criticise some of these conditions. In Section 6, I will draw some positive conclusions from my critical arguments.
- 8 October 2018
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 27 (2) , 426-440
Does intention involve belief?
Cognitivists think that intention necessarily involves belief; noncognitivists deny this claim. I argue that both sides of the debate have so far overlooked that the beliefs involved in intention are first‐personal beliefs and therefore relevantly different from ordinary beliefs that stand in need of justification through evidence. This move substantially changes the cognitivist thesis, and in such a way that the noncognitivist objections can be avoided. In Section 2, I lay out the intuitions behind cognitivism and the arguments against it that motivate noncognitivist positions. Section 3 discusses and dismisses Velleman's cognitivist response to these arguments. In Section 4, I introduce the distinction between “ordinary” and “first‐personal beliefs.” In Section 5, I argue that intention invariably involves a first‐personal belief that one will do what one intends to do. Finally, in Section 6, I return to the noncognitivist objections and show how my proposal answers them.
- 8 October 2018
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 27 (2) , 426-440
Does intention involve belief?
Cognitivists think that intention necessarily involves belief; noncognitivists deny this claim. I argue that both sides of the debate have so far overlooked that the beliefs involved in intention are first‐personal beliefs and therefore relevantly different from ordinary beliefs that stand in need of justification through evidence. This move substantially changes the cognitivist thesis, and in such a way that the noncognitivist objections can be avoided. In Section 2, I lay out the intuitions behind cognitivism and the arguments against it that motivate noncognitivist positions. Section 3 discusses and dismisses Velleman's cognitivist response to these arguments. In Section 4, I introduce the distinction between “ordinary” and “first‐personal beliefs.” In Section 5, I argue that intention invariably involves a first‐personal belief that one will do what one intends to do. Finally, in Section 6, I return to the noncognitivist objections and show how my proposal answers them.