CKCamilla Kronqvist

Camilla Kronqvist

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Camilla Kronqvist has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Point of Wittgenstein’s Religious Point of View

    by Camilla Kronqvist

    It has become commonplace to mention that Wittgenstein’s philosophy has an ethical point, and to consider how this contributes to his conception of philosophical method. Less attention has been given to how his admission to not being able to “help seeing every problem from a religious point of view” permeates his understanding of philosophy. Although there are ways in which the ethical and religious dimensions of Wittgenstein’s thought intersect, most notably in the way he illuminates absolute uses of ethical language by turning to religious experience in the “Lecture on Ethics”, I argue that the religious elements of his thought cannot be reduced to considering the ethical questions it raises. In the first part, I consider what it might mean to speak about, first, the point and, then, the ethical point of a practice, and how this shows in the importance, rather than the purpose, of what we see ourselves as doing. I then turn to the religious point of view and suggest that although it appears from a point, as it were, out of time, it should not be considered to reside outside of space. Rather, it involves a way of placing myself within the midst of my life, and considering my surrounding context, from a position from which I am able to think of myself as absolutely safe.

  • Open Access

    “Tap-dancing around the conversation”: difficulties in an intimate deep moral disagreement

    by Ryan Manhire, Camilla Kronqvist

    We relate recent accounts of Wittgenstein-inspired deep disagreement to polarised understandings of sex and gender, considering their strengths and limitations in clarifying clashes that may sometimes appear in our most intimate sexual relationships. Our starting point is a heated and deeply disruptive argument between a man and a woman in a heterosexual relationship, presented in the lyrics and music video for Kendrick Lamar and Taylour Paige’s song ‘We Cry Together’. We use this example to bring out some of the fixed assumptions about the nature of deep disagreements, seen in Robert J. Fogelin’s account of forms of life, David M. Godden and William H. Brenner’s account of concept determination, Duncan Pritchard’s account of hinge commitments, and Victoria Lavorerio’s account of pictures. Though we find much of the discussion present in these accounts promising, we argue that none are able to grasp the messy, unpredictable, and constantly shifting nature of the (quite ordinary) disagreement in our example. This offers support to scholars who caution against making a priori claims about which topics (e.g. abortion) necessarily evoke deep disagreements, and suggests that we resist attempts to establish, a priori, what deep disagreements must look like, and how they must be resolved. This enables us to bring out the ways in which pig-headedness and self-righteousness, in our example, do not provide reasons to reject this particular disagreement as “genuinely” deep, but provide a picture of an emotional dynamic on which the depth of this particular deep moral disagreement seems to hinge.


  • ‘Not enough’: Certainty and Doubt in Exploring the Grammar of ‘Woman’

    by Camilla Kronqvist

    Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Constantine Sandis have suggested that our sense of being ‘women’ (and ‘men’) can be elucidated by thinking of it as an animal certainty. The suggestion is helpful in resisting the notion that ‘being woman’ can be modelled either on the idea of indubitable first-person knowledge of one’s inner self or of a third person’s unquestionable knowledge of one’s body. One’s being woman is manifested in one’s ways of acting and reacting; it constitutes a mode of being, which cannot be given further justification. Nevertheless, I argue that the emphasis on certainty may render the possible doubts an individual may entertain about being a woman at different stages and in different contexts of their life opaque. It may also obscure the philosophical analysis of what thinking of certainty with Wittgenstein may offer to the understanding of ‘woman’, since for him the exploration of meaningful and impossible forms of doubt always ran parallel to his thinking on certainty. Considering everyday examples of certainty and doubts in being a woman, I therefore discuss the dialectic between certainty and doubt in the constitution of being ‘a woman’, giving special attention to the significance of second person assertions and comments for the first person’s experience of being or not being a woman or not being ‘woman enough’.

  • Open Access

    Dumbfounded by the Facts? Understanding the Moral Psychology of Sexual Relationships

    by Camilla Kronqvist, Natan Elgabsi

    One of the standard examples in contemporary moral psychology originates in the works of social psychologist Jonathan Haidt. He treats people's responses to the story of Julie and Mark, two siblings who decide to have casual, consensual, protected sex, as facts of human morality, providing evidence for his social intuitionist approach to moral judgements. We argue that Haidt's description of the facts of the story and the reactions of the respondents as ‘morally dumbfounded’ presupposes a view about moral reasoning that is more substantial than he acknowledges. Drawing on the philosophical work by Iris Murdoch and Cora Diamond, we explore how different descriptions of human morality, sexuality, and family relations engage us in evaluations about distinctive features of human life and language that go deeper than Haidt envisages. Thus, we show the need to attend to the concepts used to describe the facts of human moral psychology and the pictures of morality these concepts reveal about the researcher's own understanding of moral experience. This points to the particular responsibility any researcher into human moral psychology has for ensuring that the descriptions they offer are attuned to the complexities of the lives of those they form theories about and that these do not appear conceptually confounding.


  • “The Frightening Thing Is the Uncertainty”

    by Camilla Kronqvist

    Discussions of moral certainty often focus on analysing rule-like statements aimed at prohibiting wrongdoing. Choosing instead to focus on what can be perceived as good and virtuous in our attitudes to others and to life, I address how a form of existential uncertainty and doubt can contribute to our understanding of what is morally certain in the context of love. Considering Wittgenstein's own difficulties in confronting the facts of his life and love for Ben Richards, I discuss how they relate to what Lars Hertzberg (1983) calls “the indeterminacy of the mental”, and how this indeterminacy contributes to what role courage, trust, and faith may have in gaining knowledge of oneself and another in a loving relationship. Connecting Wittgenstein's ways of despairing about the meaning of his own or Richards's words to some of his explicit remarks on certainty and love in the context of religious faith, I then consider how “the certainty of this ‘taking-for-true’” relates to the certainties discussed in On Certainty and in connection with moral certainty. I point out one important difference. Where On Certainty brings out unquestioned features of life at the background of our common action, the certainty sought in religion and love often concerns the individual's ability to seize conceptual possibilities at the forefront of their thought.