Elay Shech
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Elay Shech has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michael Tamir
Tubi, San Francisco, CA, USA
4 shared publications - Kyle B. Heine
Department of Biological Sciences Auburn University Auburn Alabama
2 shared publications - Alison Springle
University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA
1 shared publication - Deborah G. Mayo
Virginia Tech
1 shared publication Insa Lawler
1 shared publicationKareem Khalifa
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- p. 1-29
Bias, machine learning, and conceptual engineering
Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT reflect, and can potentially perpetuate, social biases in language use. Conceptual engineering aims to revise our concepts to eliminate such bias. We show how machine learning and conceptual engineering can be fruitfully brought together to offer new insights to both conceptual engineers and LLM designers. Specifically, we suggest that LLMs can be used to detect and expose bias in the prototypes associated with concepts, and that LLM de-biasing can serve conceptual engineering projects that aim to revise such conceptual prototypes. At present, these de-biasing techniques primarily involve approaches requiring bespoke interventions based on choices of the algorithm’s designers. Thus, conceptual engineering through de-biasing will include making choices about what kind of normative training an LLM should receive, especially with respect to different notions of bias. This offers a new perspective on what conceptual engineering involves and how it can be implemented. And our conceptual engineering approach also offers insight, to those engaged in LLM de-biasing, into the normative distinctions that are needed for that work.
- 18 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- p. 1-29
Open AccessBias, machine learning, and conceptual engineering
Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT reflect, and can potentially perpetuate, social biases in language use. Conceptual engineering aims to revise our concepts to eliminate such bias. We show how machine learning and conceptual engineering can be fruitfully brought together to offer new insights to both conceptual engineers and LLM designers. Specifically, we suggest that LLMs can be used to detect and expose bias in the prototypes associated with concepts, and that LLM de-biasing can serve conceptual engineering projects that aim to revise such conceptual prototypes. At present, these de-biasing techniques primarily involve approaches requiring bespoke interventions based on choices of the algorithm’s designers. Thus, conceptual engineering through de-biasing will include making choices about what kind of normative training an LLM should receive, especially with respect to different notions of bias. This offers a new perspective on what conceptual engineering involves and how it can be implemented. And our conceptual engineering approach also offers insight, to those engaged in LLM de-biasing, into the normative distinctions that are needed for that work.
- Open Access
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 90 (8) , 3767-3781
The Curve Fitting Problem, Data Validation, and Inductive Generalization in Machine Learning
Aris Spanos and Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical approach to statistical modeling and inference adopts the reliability of inductive inference as a primary criterion for statistical model and estimator selection (e.g., curve fitting). In this paper, we expand the error-statistical approach’s adoption of reliable inductive inference by scrutinizing the epistemic legitimacy of contemporary techniques leveraged in data science. We argue that data validation and testing potentially provides a direct, measurable method of evaluating evidence for reliable inductive inferences in cases where the error-statistical approach is not easily applied, and conclude with an exploration of core methodological foils to the reliability of inductive inference revealed by this argument.
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 90 (8) , 3767-3781
Open AccessThe Curve Fitting Problem, Data Validation, and Inductive Generalization in Machine Learning
Aris Spanos and Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical approach to statistical modeling and inference adopts the reliability of inductive inference as a primary criterion for statistical model and estimator selection (e.g., curve fitting). In this paper, we expand the error-statistical approach’s adoption of reliable inductive inference by scrutinizing the epistemic legitimacy of contemporary techniques leveraged in data science. We argue that data validation and testing potentially provides a direct, measurable method of evaluating evidence for reliable inductive inferences in cases where the error-statistical approach is not easily applied, and conclude with an exploration of core methodological foils to the reliability of inductive inference revealed by this argument.
- Open Access
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 92 (1) , 59-81
The Mitonuclear Compatibility Species Concept, Intrinsic Essentialism, and Natural Kinds
This essay introduces, develops, and appraises the mitonuclear compatibility species concept (MCSC), identifying advantages and limitations with respect to alternative species concepts. While the consensus amongst most philosophers of biology is that (kind) essentialism about species is mistaken, and that species at most have relational essences, we appeal to the MCSC to defend thoroughgoing intrinsic essentialism. Namely, the doctrine that species have fully intrinsic essences and, thus, are natural kinds (of sorts), while allowing that species aren’t categorically distinct.
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 92 (1) , 59-81
Open AccessThe Mitonuclear Compatibility Species Concept, Intrinsic Essentialism, and Natural Kinds
This essay introduces, develops, and appraises the mitonuclear compatibility species concept (MCSC), identifying advantages and limitations with respect to alternative species concepts. While the consensus amongst most philosophers of biology is that (kind) essentialism about species is mistaken, and that species at most have relational essences, we appeal to the MCSC to defend thoroughgoing intrinsic essentialism. Namely, the doctrine that species have fully intrinsic essences and, thus, are natural kinds (of sorts), while allowing that species aren’t categorically distinct.
- 12 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (5) , 1-16
Inductive neutrality and scientific representation
- 12 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (5) , 1-16
Inductive neutrality and scientific representation
- 13 April 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 91 (1) , 264-268
Review of Robert W. Batterman’s A Middle Way: A Non-Fundamental Approach to Many-Body Physics - Robert W. Batterman, A Middle Way: A Non-Fundamental Approach to Many-Body Physics. New York: Oxford University Press (2021), 174 pp. $74 (hardcover).
- 13 April 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 91 (1) , 264-268
Review of Robert W. Batterman’s A Middle Way: A Non-Fundamental Approach to Many-Body Physics - Robert W. Batterman, A Middle Way: A Non-Fundamental Approach to Many-Body Physics. New York: Oxford University Press (2021), 174 pp. $74 (hardcover).
- Open Access
- 23 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (4) , 1-5
Introduction to recent issues in philosophy of statistics: evidence, testing, and applications
- 23 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (4) , 1-5
Open AccessIntroduction to recent issues in philosophy of statistics: evidence, testing, and applications
- Open Access
- 30 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (2) , 1-27
Machine understanding and deep learning representation
Practical ability manifested through robust and reliable task performance, as well as information relevance and well-structured representation, are key factors indicative of understanding in the philosophical literature. We explore these factors in the context of deep learning, identifying prominent patterns in how the results of these algorithms represent information. While the estimation applications of modern neural networks do not qualify as the mental activity of persons, we argue that coupling analyses from philosophical accounts with the empirical and theoretical basis for identifying these factors in deep learning representations provides a framework for discussing and critically evaluating potential machine understanding given the continually improving task performance enabled by such algorithms.
- 30 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (2) , 1-27
Open AccessMachine understanding and deep learning representation
Practical ability manifested through robust and reliable task performance, as well as information relevance and well-structured representation, are key factors indicative of understanding in the philosophical literature. We explore these factors in the context of deep learning, identifying prominent patterns in how the results of these algorithms represent information. While the estimation applications of modern neural networks do not qualify as the mental activity of persons, we argue that coupling analyses from philosophical accounts with the empirical and theoretical basis for identifying these factors in deep learning representations provides a framework for discussing and critically evaluating potential machine understanding given the continually improving task performance enabled by such algorithms.
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 323-340
Understanding from Deep Learning Models in Context
This chapter places into context how the term model in machine learning (ML) contrasts with traditional usages of scientific models for understanding and we show how the direct analysis of an estimator’s learned transformations (specifically, the hidden layers of a deep learning model) can improve understanding of the target phenomenon and reveal how the model organizes relevant information. Specifically, three modes of understanding will be identified: the difference between implementation irrelevance and functionally approximate irrelevance will be disambiguated, and how this distinction impacts potential understanding with these models will be explored. In addition, by distinguishing between empirical link failures and representational ones, an ambiguity in the concept of link uncertainty will be addressed, thus clarifying the role played by scientific background knowledge in enabling understanding with ML.
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 323-340
Understanding from Deep Learning Models in Context
This chapter places into context how the term model in machine learning (ML) contrasts with traditional usages of scientific models for understanding and we show how the direct analysis of an estimator’s learned transformations (specifically, the hidden layers of a deep learning model) can improve understanding of the target phenomenon and reveal how the model organizes relevant information. Specifically, three modes of understanding will be identified: the difference between implementation irrelevance and functionally approximate irrelevance will be disambiguated, and how this distinction impacts potential understanding with these models will be explored. In addition, by distinguishing between empirical link failures and representational ones, an ambiguity in the concept of link uncertainty will be addressed, thus clarifying the role played by scientific background knowledge in enabling understanding with ML.
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-13
Introduction
This chapter gives an overview of the various themes and issues discussed in the volume. It includes summaries of all chapters and places the contributions, some of which are part of a critical conversation format, in the context of the larger literature and debates.
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-13
Introduction
This chapter gives an overview of the various themes and issues discussed in the volume. It includes summaries of all chapters and places the contributions, some of which are part of a critical conversation format, in the context of the larger literature and debates.
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 346-350
Expecting Too Much from Our Machine Learning Models
This chapter responds to Emily Sullivan’s chapter “How Values Shape the Machine Learning Opacity Problem” in this volume.
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 346-350
Expecting Too Much from Our Machine Learning Models
This chapter responds to Emily Sullivan’s chapter “How Values Shape the Machine Learning Opacity Problem” in this volume.