Tyler Marghetis
Tyler Marghetis has a total of 762 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
David Landy
Netflix
6 shared publications- Adil S. Al Busaidi
Innovation and Technology Transfer Center, Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat, Oman
2 shared publications - Agata Gasiorowska
SWPS University
2 shared publications Aidas Masiliunas
School of Economics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
2 shared publications- Alberto Antonietti
Affiliations Blue Brain Project, École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Campus Biotech, Geneva, Switzerland, Department of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering, Politecnico di MilanoMilano, Italy
2 shared publications - Alessandro Tacconelli
Center for Law and Economics, ETH Zurich, Zürich, Switzerland
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Gestural relativity of spatial cognition: Gesture can express and transmit the spatial frames of reference that structure thinking
When people think spatially, they adopt a frame of reference (egocentric or allocentric). People within a community often rely on the same frame of reference, but there is considerable variation between communities. How are these norms of spatial thinking transmitted? Linguistic relativity posits that they are transmitted through language; evidence for this account is mixed. We investigate a complementary mechanism, gestural relativity, whereby norms of spatial thinking are transmitted by gestures that express spatial information. Experiment 1 (N = 62 US Americans) tested whether exposure to a norm favoring a particular frame of reference causes people to adopt that frame of reference in their gestures. Experiment 2 (N = 70) tested whether observing such gestures causes people to adopt that frame of reference in their spatial reasoning. We find evidence for both effects. Gesture can thus express and transmit spatial frames of reference, establishing gesture as a viable mechanism of cultural transmission.
- 22 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessGestural relativity of spatial cognition: Gesture can express and transmit the spatial frames of reference that structure thinking
When people think spatially, they adopt a frame of reference (egocentric or allocentric). People within a community often rely on the same frame of reference, but there is considerable variation between communities. How are these norms of spatial thinking transmitted? Linguistic relativity posits that they are transmitted through language; evidence for this account is mixed. We investigate a complementary mechanism, gestural relativity, whereby norms of spatial thinking are transmitted by gestures that express spatial information. Experiment 1 (N = 62 US Americans) tested whether exposure to a norm favoring a particular frame of reference causes people to adopt that frame of reference in their gestures. Experiment 2 (N = 70) tested whether observing such gestures causes people to adopt that frame of reference in their spatial reasoning. We find evidence for both effects. Gesture can thus express and transmit spatial frames of reference, establishing gesture as a viable mechanism of cultural transmission.
- Open Access
- 6 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Electoral systems shape the entry and entrenchment of extremist parties
Representative democracies aspire to represent voters’ viewpoints through their elected officials. At the same time, they may try to minimize extremist viewpoints that can destabilize democracy itself. Here we show that electoral systems navigate this tension by trading off between two vulnerabilities: extremist entry and extremist entrenchment. Using computational models, we investigate how electoral systems respond to the emergence of ideological extremism arising either through the introduction of a new party or through the gradual radicalization of an established party. Systems that more accurately represent public opinion are more permissive to new parties, including extremist ones. Conversely, systems that suppress extremist entry can also protect incumbent parties as they drift toward increasingly extreme and unrepresentative positions. Electoral systems therefore differ not only in how well they represent voters or how many parties they sustain, but in the vulnerabilities they create: institutional openness increases the risk of extremist entry, while institutional inertia increases the risk of extremist entrenchment. Democracies thus face a fundamental design challenge: The same institutional features that protect a democracy from one extremist risk also expose it to another.
- 6 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessElectoral systems shape the entry and entrenchment of extremist parties
Representative democracies aspire to represent voters’ viewpoints through their elected officials. At the same time, they may try to minimize extremist viewpoints that can destabilize democracy itself. Here we show that electoral systems navigate this tension by trading off between two vulnerabilities: extremist entry and extremist entrenchment. Using computational models, we investigate how electoral systems respond to the emergence of ideological extremism arising either through the introduction of a new party or through the gradual radicalization of an established party. Systems that more accurately represent public opinion are more permissive to new parties, including extremist ones. Conversely, systems that suppress extremist entry can also protect incumbent parties as they drift toward increasingly extreme and unrepresentative positions. Electoral systems therefore differ not only in how well they represent voters or how many parties they sustain, but in the vulnerabilities they create: institutional openness increases the risk of extremist entry, while institutional inertia increases the risk of extremist entrenchment. Democracies thus face a fundamental design challenge: The same institutional features that protect a democracy from one extremist risk also expose it to another.
- Open Access
- 9 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Eye-tracking reveals the perceptual basis of algebraic expertise
Algebra exemplifies the human capacity for abstract, structural reasoning. How do people reason algebraically? One possibility is that algebraic expertise is partly visual: Experts learn to move their eyes strategically in ways that reflect the hierarchical structure of written equations. Alternatively, the structure of written equations might scaffold novice reasoning but matter less for experts. We tested these accounts by tracking eye movements of U.S. undergraduates (N = 60) as they viewed algebraic equations. Greater expertise predicted better performance. When reasoning algebraically, participants’ eye movements mirrored the expressions’ hierarchical structure; critically, this pattern increased with algebraic expertise. Moreover, the link between expertise and performance was explained by whether participants’ eye movements tracked expressions’ hierarchical structure. Thus, despite its highly conceptual and abstract content, algebraic reasoning involves perceptual skill. These results highlight the perceptual and situated aspects of mathematical reasoning, with implications for mathematics education and theories of abstract reasoning.
- 9 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessEye-tracking reveals the perceptual basis of algebraic expertise
Algebra exemplifies the human capacity for abstract, structural reasoning. How do people reason algebraically? One possibility is that algebraic expertise is partly visual: Experts learn to move their eyes strategically in ways that reflect the hierarchical structure of written equations. Alternatively, the structure of written equations might scaffold novice reasoning but matter less for experts. We tested these accounts by tracking eye movements of U.S. undergraduates (N = 60) as they viewed algebraic equations. Greater expertise predicted better performance. When reasoning algebraically, participants’ eye movements mirrored the expressions’ hierarchical structure; critically, this pattern increased with algebraic expertise. Moreover, the link between expertise and performance was explained by whether participants’ eye movements tracked expressions’ hierarchical structure. Thus, despite its highly conceptual and abstract content, algebraic reasoning involves perceptual skill. These results highlight the perceptual and situated aspects of mathematical reasoning, with implications for mathematics education and theories of abstract reasoning.
- Open Access
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
An unusual cycle of literary translations reveals distinct mechanisms of cultural evolution
How do stories change as they cross linguistic and cultural boundaries? Many theories of cultural evolution emphasize the influence of repeated transmission, but in real-world cross-cultural dissemination, transmission is typically confounded with large-scale changes in cultural context. This makes it difficult to identify mechanisms of cultural stability and change. Here, to unravel this theoretical tangle, we leverage an unusual translation cycle: a story first published in English was translated into Russian by novelist Leo Tolstoy, misattributed to Tolstoy, translated into French, and finally translated back into English --- with the first and final versions published in the same language, city (Chicago, USA), and time period (mid-1890s). This unusual 'translation cycle' offers a unique opportunity to separate the cumulative effects of iterated transmission from the influences of the broader cultural context. Using a novel computational method that represents stories as high-dimensional semantic trajectories, we show that each translation introduced cumulative distortions. Strikingly, when the story was translated back into its original cultural context, its semantic trajectory shifted toward the original version, despite the final translator having no knowledge of the original, consistent with a regularizing influence of the shared cultural context. Our findings reveal how the broader cultural context can act as a stabilizing force in cultural evolution, constraining variation introduced by repeated transmission.
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessAn unusual cycle of literary translations reveals distinct mechanisms of cultural evolution
How do stories change as they cross linguistic and cultural boundaries? Many theories of cultural evolution emphasize the influence of repeated transmission, but in real-world cross-cultural dissemination, transmission is typically confounded with large-scale changes in cultural context. This makes it difficult to identify mechanisms of cultural stability and change. Here, to unravel this theoretical tangle, we leverage an unusual translation cycle: a story first published in English was translated into Russian by novelist Leo Tolstoy, misattributed to Tolstoy, translated into French, and finally translated back into English --- with the first and final versions published in the same language, city (Chicago, USA), and time period (mid-1890s). This unusual 'translation cycle' offers a unique opportunity to separate the cumulative effects of iterated transmission from the influences of the broader cultural context. Using a novel computational method that represents stories as high-dimensional semantic trajectories, we show that each translation introduced cumulative distortions. Strikingly, when the story was translated back into its original cultural context, its semantic trajectory shifted toward the original version, despite the final translator having no knowledge of the original, consistent with a regularizing influence of the shared cultural context. Our findings reveal how the broader cultural context can act as a stabilizing force in cultural evolution, constraining variation introduced by repeated transmission.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 652 (8108) , 135-142
Investigating the analytical robustness of the social and behavioural sciences
The same dataset can be analysed in different justifiable ways to answer the same research question, potentially challenging the robustness of empirical science1-3. In this crowd initiative, we investigated the degree to which research findings in the social and behavioural sciences are contingent on analysts' choices. We examined a stratified random sample of 100 studies published between 2009 and 2018, in which, for one claim per study, at least five reanalysts independently reanalysed the original data. The statistical appropriateness of the reanalyses was assessed in peer evaluations, and the robustness indicators were inspected along a range of research characteristics and study designs. We found that 34% of the independent reanalyses yielded the same result (within a tolerance region of ±0.05 Cohen's d) as the original report; with a four times broader tolerance region, this indicator increased to 57%. Of the reanalyses conducted, 74% reached the same conclusion as the original investigation, 24% yielded no effects or inconclusive results and 2% reported the opposite effect. This exploratory study indicates that the common single-path analyses in social and behavioural research should not be simply assumed to be robust to alternative analyses4. Therefore, we recommend the development and use of practices to explore and communicate this neglected source of uncertainty.
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 652 (8108) , 135-142
Top Cited PapersInvestigating the analytical robustness of the social and behavioural sciences
The same dataset can be analysed in different justifiable ways to answer the same research question, potentially challenging the robustness of empirical science1-3. In this crowd initiative, we investigated the degree to which research findings in the social and behavioural sciences are contingent on analysts' choices. We examined a stratified random sample of 100 studies published between 2009 and 2018, in which, for one claim per study, at least five reanalysts independently reanalysed the original data. The statistical appropriateness of the reanalyses was assessed in peer evaluations, and the robustness indicators were inspected along a range of research characteristics and study designs. We found that 34% of the independent reanalyses yielded the same result (within a tolerance region of ±0.05 Cohen's d) as the original report; with a four times broader tolerance region, this indicator increased to 57%. Of the reanalyses conducted, 74% reached the same conclusion as the original investigation, 24% yielded no effects or inconclusive results and 2% reported the opposite effect. This exploratory study indicates that the common single-path analyses in social and behavioural research should not be simply assumed to be robust to alternative analyses4. Therefore, we recommend the development and use of practices to explore and communicate this neglected source of uncertainty.
- Open Access
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in MetaArXiv
Investigating the analytical robustness of the social and behavioural sciences
The same dataset can be analysed in different justifiable ways to answer the same research question, potentially challenging the robustness of empirical science1–3. In this crowd initiative, we investigated the degree to which research findings in the social and behavioural sciences are contingent on analysts’ choices. We examined a stratified random sample of 100 studies published between 2009 and 2018, where for one claim per study, at least five re-analysts independently re-analysed the original data. The statistical appropriateness of the re-analyses was assessed in peer evaluations, and the robustness indicators were inspected along a range of research characteristics and study designs. We found that 34% of the independent re-analyses yielded the same result (within a tolerance region of +/- 0.05 Cohen’s d) as the original report; with a four times broader tolerance region, this indicator rose to 57%. Regarding the conclusions drawn, 74% of analyses were reported to arrive at the same conclusion as in the original investigation; 24% to no effects/inconclusive result, and 2% to the opposite effect as in the original investigation. This exploratory study suggests that the common single-path analyses in social and behavioural research should not simply be assumed to be robust to alternative analyses4. Therefore, we recommend the development and use of practices to explore and communicate this neglected source of uncertainty.
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in MetaArXiv
Open AccessInvestigating the analytical robustness of the social and behavioural sciences
The same dataset can be analysed in different justifiable ways to answer the same research question, potentially challenging the robustness of empirical science1–3. In this crowd initiative, we investigated the degree to which research findings in the social and behavioural sciences are contingent on analysts’ choices. We examined a stratified random sample of 100 studies published between 2009 and 2018, where for one claim per study, at least five re-analysts independently re-analysed the original data. The statistical appropriateness of the re-analyses was assessed in peer evaluations, and the robustness indicators were inspected along a range of research characteristics and study designs. We found that 34% of the independent re-analyses yielded the same result (within a tolerance region of +/- 0.05 Cohen’s d) as the original report; with a four times broader tolerance region, this indicator rose to 57%. Regarding the conclusions drawn, 74% of analyses were reported to arrive at the same conclusion as in the original investigation; 24% to no effects/inconclusive result, and 2% to the opposite effect as in the original investigation. This exploratory study suggests that the common single-path analyses in social and behavioural research should not simply be assumed to be robust to alternative analyses4. Therefore, we recommend the development and use of practices to explore and communicate this neglected source of uncertainty.
- Open Access
- 24 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Speed-Quality Tradeoffs Shape the Structure of Decision-Making Collectives
Many human groups employ hierarchical decision-making, in which only a few individuals hold the power to make decisions for the collective. A common explanation for the prevalence of hierarchical decision-making is that it provides group-level benefits by speeding up the decision-making process. However, groups can often do better by taking more time to explore a problem space or generate ideas. These contrasting accounts suggest that hierarchical or egalitarian decision structures may emerge under different circumstances. To more clearly distinguish between these circumstances, we studied an evolutionary model of group decision-making that includes both intra-group and inter-group dynamics. We show that the emergent social structure depends critically on the trade-off between speed and decision quality: scenarios that demand rapid decisions favor the evolution of skewed, hierarchical structures, while scenarios that reward extended deliberation favor the evolution of flat, egalitarian structures. Our results suggest that, instead of inevitably becoming centralized and hierarchical, groups and organizations are likely to evolve social structures that reflect the relationship between the speed and the quality of decisions they collectively make.
- 24 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessSpeed-Quality Tradeoffs Shape the Structure of Decision-Making Collectives
Many human groups employ hierarchical decision-making, in which only a few individuals hold the power to make decisions for the collective. A common explanation for the prevalence of hierarchical decision-making is that it provides group-level benefits by speeding up the decision-making process. However, groups can often do better by taking more time to explore a problem space or generate ideas. These contrasting accounts suggest that hierarchical or egalitarian decision structures may emerge under different circumstances. To more clearly distinguish between these circumstances, we studied an evolutionary model of group decision-making that includes both intra-group and inter-group dynamics. We show that the emergent social structure depends critically on the trade-off between speed and decision quality: scenarios that demand rapid decisions favor the evolution of skewed, hierarchical structures, while scenarios that reward extended deliberation favor the evolution of flat, egalitarian structures. Our results suggest that, instead of inevitably becoming centralized and hierarchical, groups and organizations are likely to evolve social structures that reflect the relationship between the speed and the quality of decisions they collectively make.
- Open Access
- 23 February 2026
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 123 (9)
Reply to Kardosh and Sklar: Prioritizing domain-general explanations of misperception
- 23 February 2026
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 123 (9)
Open AccessReply to Kardosh and Sklar: Prioritizing domain-general explanations of misperception
- Open Access
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Musical improvisation reveals the fine-grained foraging dynamics of collective innovation
Collective innovation is key to the global success of the human species. However, the moment-to-moment details of how creative innovation is accomplished by a collective remain unclear. One challenge is that while creative products (e.g., scientific breakthroughs, technological inventions, rehearsed performances) may be public, the creative processes that generated those products are often private. Here we introduce collective musical improvisation as a model system for the fine-grained study of in vivo collective innovation. In free jazz improvisation, the creative product is the creative process, offering a unique real-time window into the creative process. Using a corpus of free jazz recordings, we embedded each track as a trajectory through a high-dimensional “sonic space” and then analyzed the strategies by which musicians moved collectively through this space of sonic possibility. Despite the cognitive sophistication and cultural richness of musical improvisation, we find that musical ensembles spontaneously adopt a search strategy, Area Restricted Search, with deep evolutionary roots, previously identified in animal foraging. This convergence between behavioral ecology, cognition, and culture suggests deep evolutionary origins of the human capacity for collective innovation.
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessMusical improvisation reveals the fine-grained foraging dynamics of collective innovation
Collective innovation is key to the global success of the human species. However, the moment-to-moment details of how creative innovation is accomplished by a collective remain unclear. One challenge is that while creative products (e.g., scientific breakthroughs, technological inventions, rehearsed performances) may be public, the creative processes that generated those products are often private. Here we introduce collective musical improvisation as a model system for the fine-grained study of in vivo collective innovation. In free jazz improvisation, the creative product is the creative process, offering a unique real-time window into the creative process. Using a corpus of free jazz recordings, we embedded each track as a trajectory through a high-dimensional “sonic space” and then analyzed the strategies by which musicians moved collectively through this space of sonic possibility. Despite the cognitive sophistication and cultural richness of musical improvisation, we find that musical ensembles spontaneously adopt a search strategy, Area Restricted Search, with deep evolutionary roots, previously identified in animal foraging. This convergence between behavioral ecology, cognition, and culture suggests deep evolutionary origins of the human capacity for collective innovation.
- Open Access
- 22 September 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Network structure explains intellectual discourse across human history
The production of knowledge is a collective endeavor. Scientific discovery, for instance, reflects not only the insights of individual scientists but also interactions among scientists. This is often taken to reflect social influences on collective epistemic vitality, the capacity to generate and synthesize new ideas. However, in science, it is difficult to separate intellectual influence from access to material resources, such as equipment and grant funding, since networks of collaboration influence the circulation of both intellectual and non-intellectual resources. Here, as a strict test of how social structure shapes intellectual discourse, we use the three-thousand-year history of a human debate in communities that relied on intellectual argumentation (rather than, say, empirical experiments). Building on the work of historians and sociologists, we digitized and quantified the time-evolving network structure of interaction among intellectuals (N = 3187), broadly construed, from religious debate in ancient India (c. 800 BCE) to 20th century debates about the logical foundations of mathematics in Europe and North America. We find that the production or preservation of knowledge by a community is explained by its network structure but not with overall levels of antagonism, suggesting that how communities are organized matters more for intellectual progress than how contentious they are. Extending tools from collective intelligence to intellectual history, we call for an integration of the science of science, the philosophy of science, and the history of ideas to forge a comprehensive understanding of the social dynamics of knowledge.
- 22 September 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessNetwork structure explains intellectual discourse across human history
The production of knowledge is a collective endeavor. Scientific discovery, for instance, reflects not only the insights of individual scientists but also interactions among scientists. This is often taken to reflect social influences on collective epistemic vitality, the capacity to generate and synthesize new ideas. However, in science, it is difficult to separate intellectual influence from access to material resources, such as equipment and grant funding, since networks of collaboration influence the circulation of both intellectual and non-intellectual resources. Here, as a strict test of how social structure shapes intellectual discourse, we use the three-thousand-year history of a human debate in communities that relied on intellectual argumentation (rather than, say, empirical experiments). Building on the work of historians and sociologists, we digitized and quantified the time-evolving network structure of interaction among intellectuals (N = 3187), broadly construed, from religious debate in ancient India (c. 800 BCE) to 20th century debates about the logical foundations of mathematics in Europe and North America. We find that the production or preservation of knowledge by a community is explained by its network structure but not with overall levels of antagonism, suggesting that how communities are organized matters more for intellectual progress than how contentious they are. Extending tools from collective intelligence to intellectual history, we call for an integration of the science of science, the philosophy of science, and the history of ideas to forge a comprehensive understanding of the social dynamics of knowledge.