Ned Block
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Ned Block has a total of 68 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Rachel N. Denison
Boston University
5 shared publications - David L. Barack
Department of Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
3 shared publications Edgar Y. Walker
Department of Neurobiology and Biophysics, Computational Neuroscience Center, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
3 shared publicationsJennifer Lee
Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY, USA
3 shared publications- Biyu J. He
Department of Neuroscience, New York University Grossman School of Medicine, New York, NY 10016, USA
2 shared publications - Florent Meyniel
Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin center
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 17 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e322
A speculative argument against consciousness in AI (and perhaps some invertebrates)
Brain waves driven by electrochemical processing may be necessary for consciousness, and if so, that will challenge consciousness in artificial intelligence (AI) and perhaps in some invertebrates.
- 17 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e322
A speculative argument against consciousness in AI (and perhaps some invertebrates)
Brain waves driven by electrochemical processing may be necessary for consciousness, and if so, that will challenge consciousness in artificial intelligence (AI) and perhaps in some invertebrates.
- 3 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Reviews Neuroscience
- Vol. 27 (9) , 653-654
Reply to ‘Boundary issues for multidimensional frameworks of representation’
- 3 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Reviews Neuroscience
- Vol. 27 (9) , 653-654
Reply to ‘Boundary issues for multidimensional frameworks of representation’
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e169
Formation versus vulcanization of perception
The target article maintains that consciousness emerged only when slow perceptual processing would be useful. But the formation of a conscious percept could be fast even if the vulcanization of that percept is slow. And fast formation may be too fast for a higher-order pointer to form.
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e169
Formation versus vulcanization of perception
The target article maintains that consciousness emerged only when slow perceptual processing would be useful. But the formation of a conscious percept could be fast even if the vulcanization of that percept is slow. And fast formation may be too fast for a higher-order pointer to form.
- Top Cited Papers
- 20 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Reviews Neuroscience
- Vol. 27 (5) , 357-372
Clarifying the conceptual dimensions of representation in neuroscience
Despite the centrality of the notion of representation in neuroscience, the field lacks a unified framework for the concepts used to characterize representation, leading to disparate use of both terminology and the measures associated with it. To offer clarification, we propose a core set of conceptual dimensions that characterize representations in neuroscience. These dimensions describe relations between a neural response, features that may be represented and downstream effects of the neural response. A neural response may be shown to be sensitive or specific to a feature, invariant to other features or functional (it is used downstream in the brain). We use information-theoretic measures to illustrate these conceptual dimensions and explain how they relate to data analysis methods such as correlational analyses, decoding and encoding models, representational similarity analysis, and tests of statistical dependence or adaptation. We consider several canonical examples, including models of the representation of orientation, numerosity and spatial location, which illustrate how the evidence put forth in support or criticism of these models is systematized by our framework. By offering a unified conceptual framework to characterize representation in neuroscience, we hope to aid the comparison and integration of results across studies and research groups and to help to determine when evidence for a neural representation is strong.
- 20 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Reviews Neuroscience
- Vol. 27 (5) , 357-372
Top Cited PapersClarifying the conceptual dimensions of representation in neuroscience
Despite the centrality of the notion of representation in neuroscience, the field lacks a unified framework for the concepts used to characterize representation, leading to disparate use of both terminology and the measures associated with it. To offer clarification, we propose a core set of conceptual dimensions that characterize representations in neuroscience. These dimensions describe relations between a neural response, features that may be represented and downstream effects of the neural response. A neural response may be shown to be sensitive or specific to a feature, invariant to other features or functional (it is used downstream in the brain). We use information-theoretic measures to illustrate these conceptual dimensions and explain how they relate to data analysis methods such as correlational analyses, decoding and encoding models, representational similarity analysis, and tests of statistical dependence or adaptation. We consider several canonical examples, including models of the representation of orientation, numerosity and spatial location, which illustrate how the evidence put forth in support or criticism of these models is systematized by our framework. By offering a unified conceptual framework to characterize representation in neuroscience, we hope to aid the comparison and integration of results across studies and research groups and to help to determine when evidence for a neural representation is strong.
- Top Cited Papers
- 7 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 30 (4) , 298-308
Can only meat machines be conscious?
- 7 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 30 (4) , 298-308
Top Cited PapersCan only meat machines be conscious?
- Open Access
When awareness outstrips performance: critical tests of subjective inflation under inattention
Visual experience can sometimes depart from visual performance, providing a powerful lens into the mechanisms generating conscious perception. In one proposed dissociation—subjective inflation—unattended locations in the periphery appear stronger than attended ones despite equated performance. Subjective inflation has played a central role in motivating theories of consciousness that reject the sufficiency of sensory signals for conscious perception. Yet the empirical basis for subjective inflation is limited. Here, in a large-scale adversarial collaboration, we conducted four simultaneously-replicated experiments testing the strength, character, and extent of subjective inflation under inattention. We used a new analytic approach to quantify inattentional inflation over full psychometric functions, beyond single matched-performance levels. We found robust inattentional inflation for contrast-dependent and texture-based perception, at and above the visual threshold. However at suprathreshold, we found inattentional inflation for the overall stimulus but not the specific feature relevant for performance. Finally, we establish the unifying principle that inattentional inflation occurs if and only if attention reduces performance thresholds more than visibility thresholds. Thus what we think we see may regularly exceed what we can visually discriminate, placing constraints on theories of conscious perception.
Open AccessWhen awareness outstrips performance: critical tests of subjective inflation under inattention
Visual experience can sometimes depart from visual performance, providing a powerful lens into the mechanisms generating conscious perception. In one proposed dissociation—subjective inflation—unattended locations in the periphery appear stronger than attended ones despite equated performance. Subjective inflation has played a central role in motivating theories of consciousness that reject the sufficiency of sensory signals for conscious perception. Yet the empirical basis for subjective inflation is limited. Here, in a large-scale adversarial collaboration, we conducted four simultaneously-replicated experiments testing the strength, character, and extent of subjective inflation under inattention. We used a new analytic approach to quantify inattentional inflation over full psychometric functions, beyond single matched-performance levels. We found robust inattentional inflation for contrast-dependent and texture-based perception, at and above the visual threshold. However at suprathreshold, we found inattentional inflation for the overall stimulus but not the specific feature relevant for performance. Finally, we establish the unifying principle that inattentional inflation occurs if and only if attention reduces performance thresholds more than visibility thresholds. Thus what we think we see may regularly exceed what we can visually discriminate, placing constraints on theories of conscious perception.
- 18 December 2024
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 110 (1) , 325-357
Responses to critics
- 18 December 2024
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 110 (1) , 325-357
Responses to critics
- 18 December 2024
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 110 (1) , 273-283
Précis of The Border between Seeing and Thinking
- 18 December 2024
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 110 (1) , 273-283
Précis of The Border between Seeing and Thinking
- Open Access
- 3 September 2024
- Published by Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology (ARVO) in Journal of Vision
- Vol. 24 (9) , 8
Memory representations during slow change blindness
Classic change blindness is the phenomenon where seemingly obvious changes that coincide with visual disruptions (such as blinks or brief blanks) go unnoticed by an attentive observer. Some early work into the causes of classic change blindness suggested that any pre-change stimulus representation is overwritten by a representation of the altered post-change stimulus, preventing change detection. However, recent work revealed that, even when observers do maintain memory representations of both the pre- and post-change stimulus states, they can still miss the change, suggesting that change blindness can also arise from a failure to compare the stored representations. Here, we studied slow change blindness, a related phenomenon that occurs even in the absence of visual disruptions when the change occurs sufficiently slowly, to determine whether it could be explained by conclusions from classic change blindness. Across three different slow change blindness experiments we found that observers who consistently failed to notice the change had access to at least two memory representations of the changing display. One representation was precise but short lived: a detailed representation of the more recent stimulus states, but fragile. The other representation lasted longer but was fairly general: stable but too coarse to differentiate the various stages of the change. These findings suggest that, although multiple representations are formed, the failure to compare hypotheses might not explain slow change blindness; even if a comparison were made, the representations would be too sparse (longer term stores) or too fragile (short-lived stores) for such comparison to inform about the change.
- 3 September 2024
- Published by Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology (ARVO) in Journal of Vision
- Vol. 24 (9) , 8
Open AccessMemory representations during slow change blindness
Classic change blindness is the phenomenon where seemingly obvious changes that coincide with visual disruptions (such as blinks or brief blanks) go unnoticed by an attentive observer. Some early work into the causes of classic change blindness suggested that any pre-change stimulus representation is overwritten by a representation of the altered post-change stimulus, preventing change detection. However, recent work revealed that, even when observers do maintain memory representations of both the pre- and post-change stimulus states, they can still miss the change, suggesting that change blindness can also arise from a failure to compare the stored representations. Here, we studied slow change blindness, a related phenomenon that occurs even in the absence of visual disruptions when the change occurs sufficiently slowly, to determine whether it could be explained by conclusions from classic change blindness. Across three different slow change blindness experiments we found that observers who consistently failed to notice the change had access to at least two memory representations of the changing display. One representation was precise but short lived: a detailed representation of the more recent stimulus states, but fragile. The other representation lasted longer but was fairly general: stable but too coarse to differentiate the various stages of the change. These findings suggest that, although multiple representations are formed, the failure to compare hypotheses might not explain slow change blindness; even if a comparison were made, the representations would be too sparse (longer term stores) or too fragile (short-lived stores) for such comparison to inform about the change.
- 10 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 28 (9) , 804-813
What does decoding from the PFC reveal about consciousness?
- 10 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 28 (9) , 804-813
What does decoding from the PFC reveal about consciousness?