Berkant Ustaoglu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Berkant Ustaoglu has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alfred Menezes
University of Waterloo
7 shared publications- Atsushi Fujioka
Kanagawa University
4 shared publications Koutarou Suzuki
NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratories, NTT Corporation
4 shared publications- Mark Manulis
Universität der Bundeswehr München
3 shared publications Sanjit Chatterjee
Indian Institute of Science
3 shared publicationsDouglas Stebila
Queensland University of Technology
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Advances in Mathematics of Communications
- Vol. 14 (2) , 177-205
Malleability and ownership of proxy signatures: Towards a stronger definition and its limitations
Proxy signature is a cryptographic primitive that allows an entity to delegate singing rights to another entity. Noticing the ad-hoc nature of security analysis prevalent in the existing literature, Boldyreva, Palacio and Warinschi proposed a formal security model for proxy signature. We revisit their proposed security definition in the context of the most natural construction of proxy signature – delegation-by-certificate. Our analysis indicates certain limitations of their definition that arise due to malleability of proxy signature as well as signature ownership in the context of standard signature. We propose a stronger definition of proxy signature to address these issues. However, we observe that the natural reductionist security argument of the delegation-by certificate proxy signature construction under this definition seems to require a rather unnatural security property for a standard signature.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Advances in Mathematics of Communications
- Vol. 14 (2) , 177-205
Open AccessMalleability and ownership of proxy signatures: Towards a stronger definition and its limitations
Proxy signature is a cryptographic primitive that allows an entity to delegate singing rights to another entity. Noticing the ad-hoc nature of security analysis prevalent in the existing literature, Boldyreva, Palacio and Warinschi proposed a formal security model for proxy signature. We revisit their proposed security definition in the context of the most natural construction of proxy signature – delegation-by-certificate. Our analysis indicates certain limitations of their definition that arise due to malleability of proxy signature as well as signature ownership in the context of standard signature. We propose a stronger definition of proxy signature to address these issues. However, we observe that the natural reductionist security argument of the delegation-by certificate proxy signature construction under this definition seems to require a rather unnatural security property for a standard signature.
- 26 July 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Information Security
- Vol. 15 (4) , 335-360
A practical privacy-preserving targeted advertising scheme for IPTV users
- 26 July 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Information Security
- Vol. 15 (4) , 335-360
A practical privacy-preserving targeted advertising scheme for IPTV users
- Open Access
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 136-154
Quantum Key Distribution in the Classical Authenticated Key Exchange Framework
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 136-154
Open AccessQuantum Key Distribution in the Classical Authenticated Key Exchange Framework
- Open Access
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E96.A (1) , 101-110
Modeling Leakage of Ephemeral Secrets in Tripartite/Group Key Exchange
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E96.A (1) , 101-110
Open AccessModeling Leakage of Ephemeral Secrets in Tripartite/Group Key Exchange
- Open Access
- 14 January 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
- Vol. 67 (2) , 245-269
Anonymity and one-way authentication in key exchange protocols
- 14 January 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
- Vol. 67 (2) , 245-269
Open AccessAnonymity and one-way authentication in key exchange protocols
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 15-28
Sufficient Condition for Ephemeral Key-Leakage Resilient Tripartite Key Exchange
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 15-28
Open AccessSufficient Condition for Ephemeral Key-Leakage Resilient Tripartite Key Exchange
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E95-A (1) , 29-39
Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange without NAXOS' Approach under Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
LaMacchia, Lamer and Mityagin [19] proposed a novel security definition for authenticate key exchange (AKE) that gives an adversary the power to obtain ephemeral information regarding a target test session. To demonstrate feasibility of secure protocols in the new definition, henceforth called eCK, the authors described a protocol called NAXOS. NAXOS combines an ephemeral private key x with a static private key a to generate an ephemeral public key X (more precisely in what we call the NAXOS' approach X = g(H(x,a))). Thus no one is able to query the discrete logarithm of X without knowing both the ephemeral and static private keys. This idea is crucial in the security argument to guard against leaked ephemeral secrets belonging to the test session. Another important assumption is the gap assumption that allows the protocol to remain secure even in the presence of malicious insiders. Both ideas have been successfully used in creating various protocols secure in the eCK model. In this paper, we construct two eCK-secure protocols without the above mentioned ideas. KFU1 is secure under the GDH assumption without using the NAXOS' approach. KFU2 builds upon KFU1 and drops the gap requirement, thus it is secure under the CDH assumption. Efficiency and security of the proposed protocols are comparable to the well-known HMQV [15] protocol. Furthermore, unlike HMQV and NAXOS the use of the random oracle in KFU1 and KFU2 is restricted to the key derivation function making them more suitable for practical applications
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E95-A (1) , 29-39
Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange without NAXOS' Approach under Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
LaMacchia, Lamer and Mityagin [19] proposed a novel security definition for authenticate key exchange (AKE) that gives an adversary the power to obtain ephemeral information regarding a target test session. To demonstrate feasibility of secure protocols in the new definition, henceforth called eCK, the authors described a protocol called NAXOS. NAXOS combines an ephemeral private key x with a static private key a to generate an ephemeral public key X (more precisely in what we call the NAXOS' approach X = g(H(x,a))). Thus no one is able to query the discrete logarithm of X without knowing both the ephemeral and static private keys. This idea is crucial in the security argument to guard against leaked ephemeral secrets belonging to the test session. Another important assumption is the gap assumption that allows the protocol to remain secure even in the presence of malicious insiders. Both ideas have been successfully used in creating various protocols secure in the eCK model. In this paper, we construct two eCK-secure protocols without the above mentioned ideas. KFU1 is secure under the GDH assumption without using the NAXOS' approach. KFU2 builds upon KFU1 and drops the gap requirement, thus it is secure under the CDH assumption. Efficiency and security of the proposed protocols are comparable to the well-known HMQV [15] protocol. Furthermore, unlike HMQV and NAXOS the use of the random oracle in KFU1 and KFU2 is restricted to the key derivation function making them more suitable for practical applications
- Open Access
- 28 May 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Information Security
- Vol. 10 (4) , 201-212
Integrating identity-based and certificate-based authenticated key exchange protocols
- 28 May 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Information Security
- Vol. 10 (4) , 201-212
Open AccessIntegrating identity-based and certificate-based authenticated key exchange protocols
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 353-370
A Generic Variant of NIST’s KAS2 Key Agreement Protocol
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 353-370
A Generic Variant of NIST’s KAS2 Key Agreement Protocol
- Open Access
- 1 January 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 16-33
Modeling Leakage of Ephemeral Secrets in Tripartite/Group Key Exchange
- 1 January 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 16-33
Open AccessModeling Leakage of Ephemeral Secrets in Tripartite/Group Key Exchange