RTRebekah Tromble

Rebekah Tromble

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Rebekah Tromble has a total of 75 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Untrustworthy sources on Facebook and Instagram in 2020: Concentrated exposure but no attitudinal effects

    by Olivier Bergeron-Boutin, Brendan Nyhan, Jaime Settle, Emily Thorson, Magdalena Wojcieszak, Taylor Brown, Adriana Crespo-Tenorio, Carlos Velasco Rivera, Hunt Allcott, Pablo Barberá, et al.

    Despite concern about exposure to content from untrustworthy sources on social media, little is known about the frequency or effects of exposure to their content. We examine 2020 data from all active US adults on Facebook and Instagram to measure exposure to content from Pages, groups, and web domains on Facebook and public accounts on Instagram that repeatedly publish misinformation. We find that average users saw relatively little content in their feeds from these untrustworthy sources; exposure was highly concentrated. A multimonth field experiment during the 2020 election among consenting users reduced feed-based exposure to content from untrustworthy sources by approximately 70% on both platforms but had no measurable effects on numerous preregistered outcomes, even among participants with high pretreatment exposure. Our results demonstrate that a feasible platform intervention can successfully reduce exposure to content from untrustworthy sources but suggest that these changes are unlikely to have immediate effects on attitudes and beliefs.


  • The effects of political advertising on Facebook and Instagram before the 2020 US election

    by Hunt Allcott, Matthew Gentzkow, Ro’EE Levy, Adriana Crespo-Tenorio, Natasha Dumas, Winter Mason, Devra Moehler, Pablo Barberá, Taylor Brown, Juan Carlos Cisneros, et al.

    We study the effects of social media political advertising by randomizing subsets of 36,906 Facebook users and 25,925 Instagram users to have political ads removed from their news feeds for 6 weeks before the 2020 US presidential election. We show that most presidential ads were targeted towards parties’ own supporters and that fundraising ads were the most common. On both Facebook and Instagram, we found no detectable effects of removing political ads on political knowledge, polarization, perceived legitimacy of the election, political participation (including campaign contributions), candidate favourability and turnout. This was true overall and for both Democrats and Republicans separately.


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    The effects of Facebook and Instagram on the 2020 election: A deactivation experiment

    by Hunt Allcott, Matthew Gentzkow, Winter Mason, Arjun Wilkins, Pablo Barberá, Taylor Brown, Juan Carlos Cisneros, Adriana Crespo-Tenorio, Drew Dimmery, Deen Freelon, et al.

    We study the effect of Facebook and Instagram access on political beliefs, attitudes, and behavior by randomizing a subset of 19,857 Facebook users and 15,585 Instagram users to deactivate their accounts for 6 wk before the 2020 U.S. election. We report four key findings. First, both Facebook and Instagram deactivation reduced an index of political participation (driven mainly by reduced participation online). Second, Facebook deactivation had no significant effect on an index of knowledge, but secondary analyses suggest that it reduced knowledge of general news while possibly also decreasing belief in misinformation circulating online. Third, Facebook deactivation may have reduced self-reported net votes for Trump, though this effect does not meet our preregistered significance threshold. Finally, the effects of both Facebook and Instagram deactivation on affective and issue polarization, perceived legitimacy of the election, candidate favorability, and voter turnout were all precisely estimated and close to zero.


  • Open Access

    “Keep Your Heads Held High Boys!”: Examining the Relationship between the Proud Boys’ Online Discourse and Offline Activities

    by Catie Snow Bailard, Rebekah Tromble, Wei Zhong, Federico Bianchi, Pedram Hosseini, David Broniatowski

    This study examines the relationship between online communication by the Proud Boys and their offline activities. We use a supervised machine learning model to analyze a novel dataset of Proud Boys Telegram messages, merged with US Crisis Monitor data of violent and nonviolent events in which group members participated over a 31-month period. Our analysis finds that intensifying expressions of grievances online predict participation in offline violence, whereas motivational appeals to group pride, morale, or solidarity share a reciprocal relationship with participation in offline events. This suggests a potential online messaging–offline action cycle, in which (a) nonviolent offline protests predict an increasing proportion of motivational messaging and (b) increases in the frequency and proportion of motivational appeals online, in turn, predict subsequent violent offline activities. Our findings offer useful theoretical insights for understanding the relationship between online speech and offline behavior.


  • Open Access

    Combating Hateful Attitudes and Online Browsing Behavior: The Case of Antisemitism

    by Catie Snow Bailard, Matthew H. Graham, Kimberly Gross, Ethan Porter, Rebekah Tromble

    This study adds to the analogic perspective-taking literature by examining whether an online perspective-taking intervention affects both antisemitic attitudes and behaviors – in particular, engagement with antisemitic websites. Subjects who were randomly assigned to the treatment viewed a 90-s video of a college student describing an experience with antisemitism and reflected on its similarity to their own experiences. In a survey, treated subjects reported greater feelings of sympathy (+29 p.p.), more positive feelings toward Jews, a greater sense that Jews are discriminated against, and more support for policy solutions (+2–4 p.p.). However, these effects did not persist after 14 days. Examining our subjects’ web browsing data, we find a 5% reduction in time spent viewing antisemitic content during the posttreatment period and some limited, suggestive evidence of effects on the number of site visits. These findings provide the first evidence that perspective-taking interventions may affect online browsing behavior.


  • Open Access

    Author Correction: Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing

    by Brendan Nyhan, Jaime Settle, Emily Thorson, Magdalena Wojcieszak, Pablo Barberá, Annie Y. Chen, Hunt Allcott, Taylor Brown, Adriana Crespo-Tenorio, Drew Dimmery, et al.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Asymmetric ideological segregation in exposure to political news on Facebook

    by Sandra González-Bailón, David Lazer, Pablo Barberá, Meiqing Zhang, Hunt Allcott, Taylor Brown, Adriana Crespo-Tenorio, Deen Freelon, Matthew Gentzkow, Andrew M. Guess, et al.

    Does Facebook enable ideological segregation in political news consumption? We analyzed exposure to news during the US 2020 election using aggregated data for 208 million US Facebook users. We compared the inventory of all political news that users could have seen in their feeds with the information that they saw (after algorithmic curation) and the information with which they engaged. We show that (i) ideological segregation is high and increases as we shift from potential exposure to actual exposure to engagement; (ii) there is an asymmetry between conservative and liberal audiences, with a substantial corner of the news ecosystem consumed exclusively by conservatives; and (iii) most misinformation, as identified by Meta’s Third-Party Fact-Checking Program, exists within this homogeneously conservative corner, which has no equivalent on the liberal side. Sources favored by conservative audiences were more prevalent on Facebook’s news ecosystem than those favored by liberals.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Reshares on social media amplify political news but do not detectably affect beliefs or opinions

    by Andrew M. Guess, Neil Malhotra, Jennifer Pan, Pablo Barberá, Hunt Allcott, Taylor Brown, Adriana Crespo-Tenorio, Drew Dimmery, Deen Freelon, Matthew Gentzkow, et al.

    We studied the effects of exposure to reshared content on Facebook during the 2020 US election by assigning a random set of consenting, US-based users to feeds that did not contain any reshares over a 3-month period. We find that removing reshared content substantially decreases the amount of political news, including content from untrustworthy sources, to which users are exposed; decreases overall clicks and reactions; and reduces partisan news clicks. Further, we observe that removing reshared content produces clear decreases in news knowledge within the sample, although there is some uncertainty about how this would generalize to all users. Contrary to expectations, the treatment does not significantly affect political polarization or any measure of individual-level political attitudes.


  • Top Cited Papers

    How do social media feed algorithms affect attitudes and behavior in an election campaign?

    by Andrew M. Guess, Neil Malhotra, Jennifer Pan, Pablo Barberá, Hunt Allcott, Taylor Brown, Adriana Crespo-Tenorio, Drew Dimmery, Deen Freelon, Matthew Gentzkow, et al.

    We investigated the effects of Facebook’s and Instagram’s feed algorithms during the 2020 US election. We assigned a sample of consenting users to reverse-chronologically-ordered feeds instead of the default algorithms. Moving users out of algorithmic feeds substantially decreased the time they spent on the platforms and their activity. The chronological feed also affected exposure to content: The amount of political and untrustworthy content they saw increased on both platforms, the amount of content classified as uncivil or containing slur words they saw decreased on Facebook, and the amount of content from moderate friends and sources with ideologically mixed audiences they saw increased on Facebook. Despite these substantial changes in users’ on-platform experience, the chronological feed did not significantly alter levels of issue polarization, affective polarization, political knowledge, or other key attitudes during the 3-month study period.


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing

    by Brendan Nyhan, Jaime Settle, Emily Thorson, Magdalena Wojcieszak, Pablo Barberá, Annie Y. Chen, Hunt Allcott, Taylor Brown, Adriana Crespo-Tenorio, Drew Dimmery, et al.

    Many critics raise concerns about the prevalence of ‘echo chambers’ on social media and their potential role in increasing political polarization. However, the lack of available data and the challenges of conducting large-scale field experiments have made it difficult to assess the scope of the problem1,2. Here we present data from 2020 for the entire population of active adult Facebook users in the USA showing that content from ‘like-minded’ sources constitutes the majority of what people see on the platform, although political information and news represent only a small fraction of these exposures. To evaluate a potential response to concerns about the effects of echo chambers, we conducted a multi-wave field experiment on Facebook among 23,377 users for whom we reduced exposure to content from like-minded sources during the 2020 US presidential election by about one-third. We found that the intervention increased their exposure to content from cross-cutting sources and decreased exposure to uncivil language, but had no measurable effects on eight preregistered attitudinal measures such as affective polarization, ideological extremity, candidate evaluations and belief in false claims. These precisely estimated results suggest that although exposure to content from like-minded sources on social media is common, reducing its prevalence during the 2020 US presidential election did not correspondingly reduce polarization in beliefs or attitudes.