Mireille Hildebrandt
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Mireille Hildebrandt has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Serge Gutwirth
Vrije Universiteit Brussels
2 shared publications Arno De Bois
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
1 shared publication- Bernhard Anrig
Bern University of Applied Sciences
1 shared publication Carla Sieburgh
1 shared publicationCorjo Jansen
1 shared publication- Paul Verbruggen
Department of Private, Business and Labour Law, Tilburg Law School, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, the
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 June 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Legal personhood in the context of agentic AI
In this chapter, Hildebrandt builds on a post-phenomenological philosophy of technology to update speech act theory in the context of law. She contends that speech act theory has been focused on orality, with little attention to the constitutive nature of the technologies of text for modern positive law and the Rule of Law. The latter define the foundational legal concepts of notably legal subjectivity and legal effect, which - in terms of speech act theory - is a performative effect. The notion of performative effect must be distinguished from both logical and causal effects, highlighting that legal subjectivity is an institutional fact. In that light, Hildebrandt develops a non-utilitarian, consequentialist understanding of legal personhood, aligned with pragmatism and an updated speech act theory. The emerging transition of modern positive law towards computational law requires keen attention to potential transformations of such foundational concepts and the impact of their transformation on the Rule of Law. Computing systems operate in terms of logic and/or correlations; they do not attribute legal effect, even though we may attribute legal effect to their output model or output behaviours. The chapter will argue that attributing legal personhood to agentic AI systems will not necessarily solve the problems presented by these systems, while raising numerous new problems about their identification, definition, representation and about the accountability of those who develop, provide and/or deploy them. One of the most interesting questions will be whether we could give standing to agentic AI systems without requiring representation, accepting the output of their models as computational speech acts with potentially performative effect. The point of this chapter is not to answer that question, instead offering an architecture to trace the implications of attributing performative effect to the output of agentic AI systems.
- 22 June 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessLegal personhood in the context of agentic AI
In this chapter, Hildebrandt builds on a post-phenomenological philosophy of technology to update speech act theory in the context of law. She contends that speech act theory has been focused on orality, with little attention to the constitutive nature of the technologies of text for modern positive law and the Rule of Law. The latter define the foundational legal concepts of notably legal subjectivity and legal effect, which - in terms of speech act theory - is a performative effect. The notion of performative effect must be distinguished from both logical and causal effects, highlighting that legal subjectivity is an institutional fact. In that light, Hildebrandt develops a non-utilitarian, consequentialist understanding of legal personhood, aligned with pragmatism and an updated speech act theory. The emerging transition of modern positive law towards computational law requires keen attention to potential transformations of such foundational concepts and the impact of their transformation on the Rule of Law. Computing systems operate in terms of logic and/or correlations; they do not attribute legal effect, even though we may attribute legal effect to their output model or output behaviours. The chapter will argue that attributing legal personhood to agentic AI systems will not necessarily solve the problems presented by these systems, while raising numerous new problems about their identification, definition, representation and about the accountability of those who develop, provide and/or deploy them. One of the most interesting questions will be whether we could give standing to agentic AI systems without requiring representation, accepting the output of their models as computational speech acts with potentially performative effect. The point of this chapter is not to answer that question, instead offering an architecture to trace the implications of attributing performative effect to the output of agentic AI systems.
- Open Access
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
The Reinvention of Legal Method
This is the English version of a short article that is forthcoming in the Italian legal review Questione Giustizia. The article starts with the work of one of the founding fathers of the digital humanities, Franco Moretti, the Italian literary historian who applied data-driven technologies to large text corpora in order to unearth patterns not visible to the naked human eye. He called the use of data analytics on literaty text 'distant reading', as opposed to 'close reading'. I discuss how the legal method of law-as-we-know-it has been grounded in close reading, demonstrating how the practice of text interpretation is constitutive for legal method and explains both the rise of modern positive law and the Rule of Law. This explanation is not a matter of technological determinism. Instead, it builds on the affordances of different ICT infrastructures, notably those of orality, the hand-written manuscript and the printing press. As we cannot assume that the affordances of code- or data-driven systems are similer to those of printed text, we will have to actively and deliberately assess the integration of different AI tools in law, paying keen attention to their design, provision and deployment. In that light I briefly present the 'Typology of Legal Technologies' as a method and mindset that should help legal practitioners and legal scholars to understand the normative implications of technical design decisions. Finally, I discuss a set of recent global and European guidelines for the use of AI by courts, law firms and other legal practitioners, Though these guidelines are well aware of the critical challenges of safeguarding the checks and balances of the Rule of Law, they seem to miss the point that deploying AI will reconfigure legal method. I call upon lawyers and legal scholars to 'get their act together' and make sure such checks and balances are built into the software layers that enable 'distant reading'. This is what, in other words, I have called 'legal protection by design'.
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessThe Reinvention of Legal Method
This is the English version of a short article that is forthcoming in the Italian legal review Questione Giustizia. The article starts with the work of one of the founding fathers of the digital humanities, Franco Moretti, the Italian literary historian who applied data-driven technologies to large text corpora in order to unearth patterns not visible to the naked human eye. He called the use of data analytics on literaty text 'distant reading', as opposed to 'close reading'. I discuss how the legal method of law-as-we-know-it has been grounded in close reading, demonstrating how the practice of text interpretation is constitutive for legal method and explains both the rise of modern positive law and the Rule of Law. This explanation is not a matter of technological determinism. Instead, it builds on the affordances of different ICT infrastructures, notably those of orality, the hand-written manuscript and the printing press. As we cannot assume that the affordances of code- or data-driven systems are similer to those of printed text, we will have to actively and deliberately assess the integration of different AI tools in law, paying keen attention to their design, provision and deployment. In that light I briefly present the 'Typology of Legal Technologies' as a method and mindset that should help legal practitioners and legal scholars to understand the normative implications of technical design decisions. Finally, I discuss a set of recent global and European guidelines for the use of AI by courts, law firms and other legal practitioners, Though these guidelines are well aware of the critical challenges of safeguarding the checks and balances of the Rule of Law, they seem to miss the point that deploying AI will reconfigure legal method. I call upon lawyers and legal scholars to 'get their act together' and make sure such checks and balances are built into the software layers that enable 'distant reading'. This is what, in other words, I have called 'legal protection by design'.
- Open Access
- 8 November 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Geo-economics, Data Protection and AI
In this contribution, based on my Keynote at the Opening Night of CPDP2025, I briefly discuss how law institutes economic markets, how national law depends on international law and where geo-economics matters. I will then investigate how AI infrastructure’s need for massive amounts of electricity, water and rare earth minerals is transforming the playing field of international law, noting that the consolidation of Big Tech corporations has already impacted the political economy of law. Finally, I will discuss the ideology of artificial general intelligence (AGI), and propose that the European approach to legislating, governing and judging artificial intelligence (AI) as ‘a normal technology’ is a viable though contested alternative that must be consolidated, defended and further developed to survive geopolitical power grabs by the US, Russia and China.
- 8 November 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessGeo-economics, Data Protection and AI
In this contribution, based on my Keynote at the Opening Night of CPDP2025, I briefly discuss how law institutes economic markets, how national law depends on international law and where geo-economics matters. I will then investigate how AI infrastructure’s need for massive amounts of electricity, water and rare earth minerals is transforming the playing field of international law, noting that the consolidation of Big Tech corporations has already impacted the political economy of law. Finally, I will discuss the ideology of artificial general intelligence (AGI), and propose that the European approach to legislating, governing and judging artificial intelligence (AI) as ‘a normal technology’ is a viable though contested alternative that must be consolidated, defended and further developed to survive geopolitical power grabs by the US, Russia and China.
- Open Access
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
LLMs, legal contestability and scientific falsifiability
In this chapter Hildebrandt investigates the link between the contestability that is key to constitutional democracies on the one hand and the falsifiability of scientific theories on the other hand, with regard to large language models (LLMs). Legally relevant decision-making that is based on the deployment of applications that involve LLMs must be contestable in a court of law. The current flavour of such contestability is focused on transparency, usually framed in terms of the explainability of the model (explainable AI). In the long run, however, the fairness and reliability of these models should be tested in a more scientific manner, based on the falsifiability of the theoretical framework that should underpin the model. This requires that researchers in the domain of LLMs learn to abduct theoretical frameworks, based on the output models of LLMs and the real world patterns they imply, while this abduction should be such that the theory can be inductively tested in a way that allows for falsification. On top of that, researchers need to conduct empirical research to enable such inductive testing. The chapter thus argues that the contestability required under the Rule of Law, should move beyond explanations of how the model generates its output, to whether the real world patterns represented in the model output can falsify the theoretical framework that should inform the model.
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessLLMs, legal contestability and scientific falsifiability
In this chapter Hildebrandt investigates the link between the contestability that is key to constitutional democracies on the one hand and the falsifiability of scientific theories on the other hand, with regard to large language models (LLMs). Legally relevant decision-making that is based on the deployment of applications that involve LLMs must be contestable in a court of law. The current flavour of such contestability is focused on transparency, usually framed in terms of the explainability of the model (explainable AI). In the long run, however, the fairness and reliability of these models should be tested in a more scientific manner, based on the falsifiability of the theoretical framework that should underpin the model. This requires that researchers in the domain of LLMs learn to abduct theoretical frameworks, based on the output models of LLMs and the real world patterns they imply, while this abduction should be such that the theory can be inductively tested in a way that allows for falsification. On top of that, researchers need to conduct empirical research to enable such inductive testing. The chapter thus argues that the contestability required under the Rule of Law, should move beyond explanations of how the model generates its output, to whether the real world patterns represented in the model output can falsify the theoretical framework that should inform the model.
- 21 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 367-391
Abduction in Real World Navigation. The Issue of Proxies in Recommender Systems
- 21 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 367-391
Abduction in Real World Navigation. The Issue of Proxies in Recommender Systems
- Open Access
- 11 June 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Grounding Computational ‘Law’ in Legal Education and Professional Legal Training
In this chapter I address the challenges presented by computational technologies when used to enact, search and decide the law. While investigating the ‘traditional’ way of studying and practising law, I explain that and how the practice and the study of law depend on a particular technological infrastructure, grounded in the technologies of the word (script and printing press). I then investigate what computational legal technologies are claimed to accomplish and to what extent these claims can be substantiated. This results in a set of learning objectives and teaching approaches meant to contribute to a critical engagement with these technologies. Finally, I call for effective scrutiny of computational tools in legal practice and legal research, proposing a new hermeneutics of computational ‘law’ to reverse both naïve endorsement and uninformed rejection of such ‘law’.
- 11 June 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessGrounding Computational ‘Law’ in Legal Education and Professional Legal Training
In this chapter I address the challenges presented by computational technologies when used to enact, search and decide the law. While investigating the ‘traditional’ way of studying and practising law, I explain that and how the practice and the study of law depend on a particular technological infrastructure, grounded in the technologies of the word (script and printing press). I then investigate what computational legal technologies are claimed to accomplish and to what extent these claims can be substantiated. This results in a set of learning objectives and teaching approaches meant to contribute to a critical engagement with these technologies. Finally, I call for effective scrutiny of computational tools in legal practice and legal research, proposing a new hermeneutics of computational ‘law’ to reverse both naïve endorsement and uninformed rejection of such ‘law’.
- Open Access
- 12 January 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Ground-Truthing in the European Health Data Space
In this position paper I discuss the use of health-related training data for medical research, in light of the European Health Data Space. If such data is deployed as a proxy for 'the truth on the ground', we need to address the issue of proxies. Ground truth in machine learning is the pragmatic stand-in or proxy for whatever is considered to be the case or should be the case. Developing a ground truth dataset requires curation, i.e. a number of translations, constructions and cleansing. What if the resulting proxies misrepresent what they stand for and what if the imposed interoperability of health data across the EU affects the quality of the data and/or their relationship to what they stand for? I argue that ground-truthing is an act rather than a given, that this act is key to machine learning and assert that this act can have potentially fatal implications for the reliability of the output. Deciding on the ground truth is what philosophers may call a speech act with performative effects. Emphasising these effects will allow us to better address the constructive nature of the datasets used in medical informatics and should help the EU legislature to take a precautionary approach to medical informatics.
- 12 January 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessGround-Truthing in the European Health Data Space
In this position paper I discuss the use of health-related training data for medical research, in light of the European Health Data Space. If such data is deployed as a proxy for 'the truth on the ground', we need to address the issue of proxies. Ground truth in machine learning is the pragmatic stand-in or proxy for whatever is considered to be the case or should be the case. Developing a ground truth dataset requires curation, i.e. a number of translations, constructions and cleansing. What if the resulting proxies misrepresent what they stand for and what if the imposed interoperability of health data across the EU affects the quality of the data and/or their relationship to what they stand for? I argue that ground-truthing is an act rather than a given, that this act is key to machine learning and assert that this act can have potentially fatal implications for the reliability of the output. Deciding on the ground truth is what philosophers may call a speech act with performative effects. Emphasising these effects will allow us to better address the constructive nature of the datasets used in medical informatics and should help the EU legislature to take a precautionary approach to medical informatics.
- Open Access
- 10 February 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Global competition and convergence of AI Law
This paper is a draft entry for an encyclopedia. It aims to provide an overview rather than an in-depth discussion. To begin with, we need to come to terms with the question of what is meant with AI, avoiding both over- and underinclusive definitions. In section II, I first explore the definitional conundrum within the research domain of AI, followed by an account of how various public bodies that prepare AI legislation aim to define the scope of their object. In section III, I provide a brief overview of the different approaches to dedicated AI legislation by the OECD, the US, China and the EU. Finally, in section IV, I discuss the Brussels effect of the EU’s AI Act that may diffuse the EU approach across a variety of jurisdictions whose corporations wish to compete on the internal market of the EU.
- 10 February 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessGlobal competition and convergence of AI Law
This paper is a draft entry for an encyclopedia. It aims to provide an overview rather than an in-depth discussion. To begin with, we need to come to terms with the question of what is meant with AI, avoiding both over- and underinclusive definitions. In section II, I first explore the definitional conundrum within the research domain of AI, followed by an account of how various public bodies that prepare AI legislation aim to define the scope of their object. In section III, I provide a brief overview of the different approaches to dedicated AI legislation by the OECD, the US, China and the EU. Finally, in section IV, I discuss the Brussels effect of the EU’s AI Act that may diffuse the EU approach across a variety of jurisdictions whose corporations wish to compete on the internal market of the EU.
- Open Access
- 4 October 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
The Issue of Proxies and Choice Architectures. Why EU law matters for recommender systems
Recommendations are meant to increase sales or ad revenue, as these are the first priority of those who pay for them. As recommender systems match their recommendations with inferred preferences, we should not be surprised if the algorithm optimises for lucrative preferences and thus co-produces the preferences they mine. This relates to the well-known problem of feedback loops, filter bubbles and echo chambers. In this article, I discuss the implications of the fact that computing systems necessarily work with proxies when inferring recommendations and raise a number of questions about whether recommender systems actually do what they are claimed to do, while also analysing the often-perverse economic incentive structures that have a major impact on relevant design decisions. Next, I will explain how the choice architectures for data controllers and providers of AI systems as foreseen in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the proposed EU Digital Services Act (DSA) and the proposed EU AI Act will help to break through various vicious circles, by constraining how people may be targeted (GDPR, DSA) and by requiring documented evidence of the robustness, resilience, reliability and the responsible design and deployment of high-risk recommender systems (AI Act). Finally, I will discuss how the Brussels Effect of the EU legal framework may help build constraints that favour recommendations that serve individual agency instead of corrupting it.
- 4 October 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessThe Issue of Proxies and Choice Architectures. Why EU law matters for recommender systems
Recommendations are meant to increase sales or ad revenue, as these are the first priority of those who pay for them. As recommender systems match their recommendations with inferred preferences, we should not be surprised if the algorithm optimises for lucrative preferences and thus co-produces the preferences they mine. This relates to the well-known problem of feedback loops, filter bubbles and echo chambers. In this article, I discuss the implications of the fact that computing systems necessarily work with proxies when inferring recommendations and raise a number of questions about whether recommender systems actually do what they are claimed to do, while also analysing the often-perverse economic incentive structures that have a major impact on relevant design decisions. Next, I will explain how the choice architectures for data controllers and providers of AI systems as foreseen in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the proposed EU Digital Services Act (DSA) and the proposed EU AI Act will help to break through various vicious circles, by constraining how people may be targeted (GDPR, DSA) and by requiring documented evidence of the robustness, resilience, reliability and the responsible design and deployment of high-risk recommender systems (AI Act). Finally, I will discuss how the Brussels Effect of the EU legal framework may help build constraints that favour recommendations that serve individual agency instead of corrupting it.