Sven Ove Hansson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Sven Ove Hansson has a total of 63 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Karin Edvardsson Björnberg
Division of Philosophy, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Teknikringen 76, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
4 shared publications - Neelke Doorn
Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands
4 shared publications - Dennis Eriksson
Department of Plant Breeding, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Sweden
3 shared publications Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn
Institute for Environmental Decisions, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich, Switzerland
3 shared publications- Jale Tosun
Heidelberg University
3 shared publications Joachim Schiemann
Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology, Julius Kühn-Institut (JKI), 06484 Quedlinburg, Germany
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental Management
- Vol. 76 (10) , 341
Rationality Criteria for Complex Goal Systems: The case of the EU Water Framework Directive
We extend a previous list of four rationality criteria for the setting of a single goal to a list of six rationality criteria for the construction of large goal systems, such as those commonly established for sustainability policies. These criteria are applied to the European Union’s Water Framework Directive (WFD). For each of the six criteria we find deficiencies that should preferably be redressed in future revisions of the framework. Based on this example, we argue that in the future, complex goal systems should be carefully analysed from the viewpoint of goal-setting rationality before they are adopted.
- 10 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental Management
- Vol. 76 (10) , 341
Open AccessRationality Criteria for Complex Goal Systems: The case of the EU Water Framework Directive
We extend a previous list of four rationality criteria for the setting of a single goal to a list of six rationality criteria for the construction of large goal systems, such as those commonly established for sustainability policies. These criteria are applied to the European Union’s Water Framework Directive (WFD). For each of the six criteria we find deficiencies that should preferably be redressed in future revisions of the framework. Based on this example, we argue that in the future, complex goal systems should be carefully analysed from the viewpoint of goal-setting rationality before they are adopted.
- Open Access
- 22 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 208 (4) , 176
Does capitalist risk-taking justify profits?
The profits collected by owners of companies are commonly taken to be a just and rightful compensation for the economic risks that they take. However, in the last two-and-a-half centuries, the risk-taking that follows with ownership has been drastically reduced as a consequence of legal and organizational changes, including incorporation, limited liability, and diversified investment. Investing money in companies is no longer per se a particularly risky activity. Therefore, the argument that profits are justified as a rightful reward for the investor’s risk-taking has lost its bite and should be laid to rest. Furthermore, limited liability should be reconsidered and possibly reformed since it encourages socially irresponsible risk-taking.
- 22 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 208 (4) , 176
Open AccessDoes capitalist risk-taking justify profits?
The profits collected by owners of companies are commonly taken to be a just and rightful compensation for the economic risks that they take. However, in the last two-and-a-half centuries, the risk-taking that follows with ownership has been drastically reduced as a consequence of legal and organizational changes, including incorporation, limited liability, and diversified investment. Investing money in companies is no longer per se a particularly risky activity. Therefore, the argument that profits are justified as a rightful reward for the investor’s risk-taking has lost its bite and should be laid to rest. Furthermore, limited liability should be reconsidered and possibly reformed since it encourages socially irresponsible risk-taking.
- Open Access
- 22 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 208 (4) , 177
Gate-keeping or fence-breaking? How to defend science against pseudoscience
A gate is an object used to limit and control passage. Previous uses of the term “gate-keeping” as a metaphor align closely with the concrete functioning of a gate. The metaphor refers either to the exclusion of persons from something desirable or to limitations in the flow of information. These connotations make the gate-keeping metaphor unsuitable for strivings to improve the relation between science and the surrounding society. The term “fence-breaking” is much better suited to this purpose. It is strongly connected with a long tradition of popular defence of common lands. Like the common lands, science should be freely available to all. In particular, the fences around corporate science that prevent access to important information about public health, safety and the environment should be torn down.
- 22 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 208 (4) , 177
Open AccessGate-keeping or fence-breaking? How to defend science against pseudoscience
A gate is an object used to limit and control passage. Previous uses of the term “gate-keeping” as a metaphor align closely with the concrete functioning of a gate. The metaphor refers either to the exclusion of persons from something desirable or to limitations in the flow of information. These connotations make the gate-keeping metaphor unsuitable for strivings to improve the relation between science and the surrounding society. The term “fence-breaking” is much better suited to this purpose. It is strongly connected with a long tradition of popular defence of common lands. Like the common lands, science should be freely available to all. In particular, the fences around corporate science that prevent access to important information about public health, safety and the environment should be torn down.
- Open Access
- 6 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- p. 1-22
Delineating the Legitimate Role of Values in Science
Previous philosophical discussions of values in science have mainly been devoted to showing that non-epistemic values can have a legitimate influence on the evidential requirements for accepting a scientific claim. There is a lack of credible explanations of how the influence of such values can be – and usually is – adequately restricted so that science still provides us with sufficiently reliable information. The importance of this problem has increased due to the current onslaught of science denial. We show how it can be solved with decision-theoretical tools, the most important of which is the distinction between lowering and raising evidential requirements. Lowering the evidential requirements for treating a claim as scientifically established is usually inadvisable since it increases the risk of adopting badly supported – and therefore often incorrect – full beliefs. In such cases, a distinction should instead be drawn between the criteria for accepting a claim and those for acting as if it is true. In contrast, value-based raising of the evidential requirements for accepting a claim does not involve any risk of making the set of factual full beliefs less reliable. This type of value influence seems to have a considerable role in areas of science that have extensive practical applications. The influence of values in science may therefore be larger than what has often been assumed.
- 6 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- p. 1-22
Open AccessDelineating the Legitimate Role of Values in Science
Previous philosophical discussions of values in science have mainly been devoted to showing that non-epistemic values can have a legitimate influence on the evidential requirements for accepting a scientific claim. There is a lack of credible explanations of how the influence of such values can be – and usually is – adequately restricted so that science still provides us with sufficiently reliable information. The importance of this problem has increased due to the current onslaught of science denial. We show how it can be solved with decision-theoretical tools, the most important of which is the distinction between lowering and raising evidential requirements. Lowering the evidential requirements for treating a claim as scientifically established is usually inadvisable since it increases the risk of adopting badly supported – and therefore often incorrect – full beliefs. In such cases, a distinction should instead be drawn between the criteria for accepting a claim and those for acting as if it is true. In contrast, value-based raising of the evidential requirements for accepting a claim does not involve any risk of making the set of factual full beliefs less reliable. This type of value influence seems to have a considerable role in areas of science that have extensive practical applications. The influence of values in science may therefore be larger than what has often been assumed.