Juan Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Juan Wang has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Dan Shao
Department of PET Center, Guangdong Provincial People's Hospital (Guangdong Academy of Medical Sciences), Southern Medical University, Guangzhou, Guangdong, China
1 shared publication - Erping Xiao
Hangzhou Normal University
1 shared publication - Jiangnan Zhu
Department of Politics and Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
1 shared publication Jijia Zhang
1 shared publication- Jung Eun Kim
Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany
1 shared publication Kaixiao Liu
Ph.D. Student, Department of Government Harvard University Cambridge Massachusetts USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 September 2024
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 69 (4) , 1420-1434
Authoritarian cue effect of state repression
State repression in autocracies has long been assumed to elicit explicit or implicit disapproval from citizens. Recent studies suggest that authoritarian governments can garner support for repressive policies through active information manipulation or exploiting social cleavages. However, is it possible for citizens to support repression even without government manipulation? We propose the “authoritarian cue effect,” arguing that citizens’ attitudes toward state repression can be endogenously shaped by instances of state repression, which may be interpreted as cueing messages signaling the regime's disapproval of the punished behaviors. Using a novel belief correction survey experiment, we empirically demonstrate that state repression can induce the public to pick up on cues and automatically adopt the state's stance, perceiving repressed behavior as having more negative externalities and supporting state repression more. This cue effect suggests that authoritarian state repression can self‐legitimize and evade public opinion backlash in a less costly manner than previously presumed.
- 20 September 2024
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 69 (4) , 1420-1434
Open AccessAuthoritarian cue effect of state repression
State repression in autocracies has long been assumed to elicit explicit or implicit disapproval from citizens. Recent studies suggest that authoritarian governments can garner support for repressive policies through active information manipulation or exploiting social cleavages. However, is it possible for citizens to support repression even without government manipulation? We propose the “authoritarian cue effect,” arguing that citizens’ attitudes toward state repression can be endogenously shaped by instances of state repression, which may be interpreted as cueing messages signaling the regime's disapproval of the punished behaviors. Using a novel belief correction survey experiment, we empirically demonstrate that state repression can induce the public to pick up on cues and automatically adopt the state's stance, perceiving repressed behavior as having more negative externalities and supporting state repression more. This cue effect suggests that authoritarian state repression can self‐legitimize and evade public opinion backlash in a less costly manner than previously presumed.
- 21 September 2023
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 417-428
Judicial relations in local China
This chapter reviews the extant literature that examines (the lack of) judicial independence in China and its socio-economic consequences at the local level. While the extant literature takes on a power perspective on how political and administrative institutions control the judiciary at the local level, discussions in this chapter invite more attention towards the agency of the judiciary through the analytical angle of bureaucratic practices. In other words, courts operate as bureaucratic organizations, and their everyday practices can be viewed as incremental solutions to the problems they identify. Problem-solving rationalities allow for innovation to take place in judicial practices. The chapter concludes by suggesting a sociological approach to judicial relations that takes a broader view of the political-legal system where courts are but one actor that navigates the system and interacts with the police, the procuracy, and the political-legal committees of the Communist Party of China.
- 21 September 2023
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 417-428
Judicial relations in local China
This chapter reviews the extant literature that examines (the lack of) judicial independence in China and its socio-economic consequences at the local level. While the extant literature takes on a power perspective on how political and administrative institutions control the judiciary at the local level, discussions in this chapter invite more attention towards the agency of the judiciary through the analytical angle of bureaucratic practices. In other words, courts operate as bureaucratic organizations, and their everyday practices can be viewed as incremental solutions to the problems they identify. Problem-solving rationalities allow for innovation to take place in judicial practices. The chapter concludes by suggesting a sociological approach to judicial relations that takes a broader view of the political-legal system where courts are but one actor that navigates the system and interacts with the police, the procuracy, and the political-legal committees of the Communist Party of China.
- Open Access
- 3 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of East Asian Studies
- Vol. 23 (2) , 185-203
Categorizing People in the New States: A Comparative Study of Communist China and North Korea
What motivates states’ choice of social classification? Existing explanations highlight scientific beliefs of modern states or social engineering by ideological regimes. Focusing on the initial state-building period of two Communist regimes, China and North Korea, this article complements the existing literature and suggests that social classification reflects three missions of political leaders: regime distinction, governance, and power consolidation. Population categories are created to distinguish the new government from the old, to selectively provide welfare, and to attack political opponents. The varying weight of the missions and their manifestation in social classification depend on new ruling elites’ cohesion and past experiences. This comparative historical analysis sheds light on the rise of political chaos in China and the personalistic dictatorship in North Korea in the 1970s.
- 3 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of East Asian Studies
- Vol. 23 (2) , 185-203
Open AccessCategorizing People in the New States: A Comparative Study of Communist China and North Korea
What motivates states’ choice of social classification? Existing explanations highlight scientific beliefs of modern states or social engineering by ideological regimes. Focusing on the initial state-building period of two Communist regimes, China and North Korea, this article complements the existing literature and suggests that social classification reflects three missions of political leaders: regime distinction, governance, and power consolidation. Population categories are created to distinguish the new government from the old, to selectively provide welfare, and to attack political opponents. The varying weight of the missions and their manifestation in social classification depend on new ruling elites’ cohesion and past experiences. This comparative historical analysis sheds light on the rise of political chaos in China and the personalistic dictatorship in North Korea in the 1970s.
- Open Access
- 12 October 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 248 (S1) , 181-199
The Paradigm Shift in the Disciplining of Village Cadres in China: From Mao to Xi
Village cadres are important agents for the state yet disciplining them has been difficult. There are few disciplinary tools that can easily hold them to account. Prior to 2018, Party discipline did not apply to non-Party cadres. Legislation was ambiguous in relation to these grassroots agents and had to rely heavily on legal interpretation. The impact of the cadre evaluation system on village cadres, who are not considered to be public servants on the state payroll, was limited. This situation has changed since 2018. The party-state has consolidated and institutionalized ways in which grassroots cadres are checked and disciplined. Instead of relying on policy regulation, which had been the dominant disciplinary method since 1949, village cadres are now fully subject to Party rules and state laws. These changes have been accomplished through the application of three measures. First, village Party secretaries are to serve concurrently as village heads, and members of village and Party committees are to overlap, thereby making them subject to Party discipline. Second, village cadres are now considered to be “public agents” and are on an equal legal footing with other state agents. Finally, a campaign waged by the criminal justice apparatus cleaned up village administration and prepared it for upcoming village elections in a new era.
- 12 October 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 248 (S1) , 181-199
Open AccessThe Paradigm Shift in the Disciplining of Village Cadres in China: From Mao to Xi
Village cadres are important agents for the state yet disciplining them has been difficult. There are few disciplinary tools that can easily hold them to account. Prior to 2018, Party discipline did not apply to non-Party cadres. Legislation was ambiguous in relation to these grassroots agents and had to rely heavily on legal interpretation. The impact of the cadre evaluation system on village cadres, who are not considered to be public servants on the state payroll, was limited. This situation has changed since 2018. The party-state has consolidated and institutionalized ways in which grassroots cadres are checked and disciplined. Instead of relying on policy regulation, which had been the dominant disciplinary method since 1949, village cadres are now fully subject to Party rules and state laws. These changes have been accomplished through the application of three measures. First, village Party secretaries are to serve concurrently as village heads, and members of village and Party committees are to overlap, thereby making them subject to Party discipline. Second, village cadres are now considered to be “public agents” and are on an equal legal footing with other state agents. Finally, a campaign waged by the criminal justice apparatus cleaned up village administration and prepared it for upcoming village elections in a new era.
- Open Access
- 20 May 2021
- Published by Atlantis Press SARL
- p. 1070-1073
Research on Innovation and Entrepreneurship Education and Professional Education Quality of Higher Vocational Teachers under the Background of Engineering
- 20 May 2021
- Published by Atlantis Press SARL
- p. 1070-1073
Open AccessResearch on Innovation and Entrepreneurship Education and Professional Education Quality of Higher Vocational Teachers under the Background of Engineering
- 4 May 2021
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 35 (2) , 633-649
Institutional proximity and judicial corruption: A spatial approach
This article develops a relational explanation for judicial corruption, namely, a spatial theory of institutional proximity, to complement existing behavioral and institutional approaches. Institutional proximity refers to the spatial proximity between adjacent political or social institutions, including courts. This proximity can be a result of political or administrative regulations, workplace interactions, or the mobility of individual actors between them. Linking ecologies and space travelers are two key spatial mechanisms through which institutional proximity enables judicial corruption. They pave the pathways of judicial corruption, that is, how corrupt transactions and related social interactions are facilitated by and communicated through institutions adjacent to the court. The theory is operationalized in the context of Chinese courts and the various pathways of judicial corruption are exemplified through a number of publicly reported cases in China.
- 4 May 2021
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 35 (2) , 633-649
Institutional proximity and judicial corruption: A spatial approach
This article develops a relational explanation for judicial corruption, namely, a spatial theory of institutional proximity, to complement existing behavioral and institutional approaches. Institutional proximity refers to the spatial proximity between adjacent political or social institutions, including courts. This proximity can be a result of political or administrative regulations, workplace interactions, or the mobility of individual actors between them. Linking ecologies and space travelers are two key spatial mechanisms through which institutional proximity enables judicial corruption. They pave the pathways of judicial corruption, that is, how corrupt transactions and related social interactions are facilitated by and communicated through institutions adjacent to the court. The theory is operationalized in the context of Chinese courts and the various pathways of judicial corruption are exemplified through a number of publicly reported cases in China.
- Open Access
- 23 January 2021
- Published by Atlantis Press SARL
- p. 262-266
Discussion on Laboratory Computer Management and Maintenance of Computer Course
- 23 January 2021
- Published by Atlantis Press SARL
- p. 262-266
Open AccessDiscussion on Laboratory Computer Management and Maintenance of Computer Course
- 7 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Problems of Post-Communism
- Vol. 68 (3) , 202-215
Law for What? Ideas and Social Control in China and Vietnam
What explains varying legislative outcomes in authoritarian regimes? On issues related to regime legitimacy or political stability, legislative outcomes have been attributed to power division or social threat. The article complements the literature by examining two single-party regimes, China and Vietnam. China promulgated an assembly law in 1989 and Vietnam has not to date. Primarily based on original materials, including political memoirs, historical archives, and materials published by the legislature and public security organs, we show how contested ideas held by political elites about the function of law define the discursive premises of legislative deliberation and thereby shaping legislative outcomes.
- 7 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Problems of Post-Communism
- Vol. 68 (3) , 202-215
Law for What? Ideas and Social Control in China and Vietnam
What explains varying legislative outcomes in authoritarian regimes? On issues related to regime legitimacy or political stability, legislative outcomes have been attributed to power division or social threat. The article complements the literature by examining two single-party regimes, China and Vietnam. China promulgated an assembly law in 1989 and Vietnam has not to date. Primarily based on original materials, including political memoirs, historical archives, and materials published by the legislature and public security organs, we show how contested ideas held by political elites about the function of law define the discursive premises of legislative deliberation and thereby shaping legislative outcomes.
- 29 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Chinese Political Science
- Vol. 25 (1) , 165-166
Kwai Hang Ng and Xin He, Embedded Courts: Judicial Decision-Making in China
- 29 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Chinese Political Science
- Vol. 25 (1) , 165-166
Kwai Hang Ng and Xin He, Embedded Courts: Judicial Decision-Making in China