Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Stefan Rass has a total of 270 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Methods for Uncertainty Representation in Risk Management: A Comparative Review and Decision-Oriented Framework

    by Albert Kutej, Stefan Rass

    The consideration of uncertainty is a central but frequently inadequately addressed component of risk management. A systematic treatment of uncertainty is essential for ensuring the quality and traceability of decision-making processes, particularly in complex and safety-critical environments. This review systematically analyzes how established risk management approaches conceptualize and represent uncertainty in both their theoretical foundations and practical applications. Based on a systematic literature review of 370 publications, the identified approaches are classified into five methodological families. These include probabilistic methods, evidence-based and fuzzy-logic approaches, qualitative elicitation techniques, graphical and visual representations and hybrid frameworks. The analysis shows that probabilistic methods remain predominant due to their quantitative rigor, whereas fuzzy and evidence-based approaches are particularly suited to addressing vagueness and epistemic uncertainty. Qualitative and graphical approaches are found to enhance interpretive understanding and support the transparent communication of uncertainty. Despite these developments, the analysis indicates that the practical integration of these approaches into operational risk management remains limited in many domains. The findings highlight the need for more structured guidance in method selection and suggest that future research would benefit from further development of hybrid approaches and visualization techniques.

  • Towards Cybersecurity Superintelligence

    by Víctor Mayoral Vilches, Stefan Rass, Martin Pinzger, Endika Gil-Uriarte, Unai Ayucar-Carbajo, Jon Ander Ruiz-Alcalde, Maite del Mundo de Torres, María Sanz-Gómez, Francesco Balassone, Cristóbal R. J. Veas Chavez, et al.

    Cybersecurity superintelligence--artificial intelligence exceeding the best human capability in both speed and strategic reasoning--represents the next frontier in security. This article will present the emergence of such capability through three of our major contributions that have helped pioneered the field of AI Security and are being used in the Cyber Battlefield today. First, PentestGPT (2023) established LLM-guided penetration testing, achieving 228.6% improvement over baseline models through an architecture that externalizes security expertise into natural language guidance. Second, Cybersecurity AI (CAI, 2025) demonstrated automated expert-level performance, operating 3,600× faster than humans while reducing costs 156-fold, validated through #1 rankings at international competitions including the $50,000 Neurogrid CTF prize. Third, Generative Cut-the-Rope (G-CTR, 2026) introduces a neurosymbolic architecture embedding game-theoretic reasoning into LLM-based agents: symbolic equilibrium computation augments neural inference, doubling success rates while reducing behavioral variance 5.2× and achieving 2:1 advantage over non-strategic AI in Attack & Defense scenarios. Together, these advances establish a clear progression from AI-guided humans to human-guided game-theoretic cybersecurity superintelligence.

  • Open Access

    Are We Ready for the Next Attack? Empirical Findings on Cybersecurity Awareness and Training

    by Sonja Spitzer, Stefan Schauer, Stefan Rass, Christine Schuster-Himmel

    This paper examines how cybersecurity training and awareness building contribute to organizational preparedness against cyberattacks, particularly in organizations where cyber-physical and supply-chain interdependencies amplify cascading impacts. Building on the evolving threat landscape reported by ENISA and CrowdStrike and policy drivers such as the EU NIS2 Directive, we report findings from a representative empirical study of $n = 1014$ employees in Austrian companies. The results show that basic technical safeguards (e.g., antivirus, firewalls, access control) are widely implemented, while organizational preparedness remains uneven as emergency plans and clear incident procedures are often missing or unknown to staff. Cyber threat knowledge is largely limited to common terms (e.g., phishing), and awareness of supply-chain cybersecurity is particularly underdeveloped. Training is not systematic, since only about half participated in trainings over the last 12 months, and content retention declines sharply if it has been over one year since the training took place. We discuss implications for preparedness and recommend recurring, practical training cycles, including tabletop and simulation-based exercises that make incident response and supply-chain dependencies actionable for employees.

  • Open Access

    Security Incentivization: An Empirical Study of how Micropayments Impact Code Security

    by Stefan Rass, Martin Pinzger, Rainer W. Alexandrowicz, Georg Sengstbratl, Johann Glock, Alexander Lercher, Fabian Oraze, Christoph Wedenig

    Security often receives insufficient developer attention because it does not directly generate visible value, leading to underinvestment in practice. We evaluate a countermeasure by team-level incentives tied to measurable security improvements over time. Our semi-automated mechanism aggregates static analysis findings from Bearer, Detekt, and mobsfscan, computes security issue density, and rewards teams based on the relative improvement ratio across sprints, enabling repeatable, scriptable reporting at scale. In a controlled course experiment with 84 students across 14 teams, we compared a security-incentivized condition, in which bonus points were linked to security scanner results, against a control condition with an otherwise identical grading scheme. The treatment group achieved significantly lower security issue density overall (beta regression: $β= -0.396, p = 0.0342$), indicating improved measurable security under incentivization. After controlling for platform, we observed a marked front-end/back-end disparity, with back-ends showing fewer issues and higher improvement ratios under incentives, highlighting heterogeneous effects across stack layers. Notably, these gains were not the byproduct of inflated code volume, as lines of code increased similarly across groups over time. The measurement pipeline and toolchain proved feasible for scripting and automation, supporting scalable adoption in practice. Our results suggest that aligning rewards with automated security metrics can measurably improve code security and merit follow-up in professional contexts and longer development lifecycles.

  • Open Access

    Plausible Deniability in Fully Homomorphic Computation

    by Shahzad Ahmad, Stefan Rass, Zahra Seyedi

    We introduce \emph{Plausible Deniability in Fully Homomorphic Computation} (PD-FHC), a framework enabling users to outsource Boolean computations to an untrusted cloud while maintaining both computational privacy against honest-but-curious providers and plausible deniability against coercive adversaries. We define the notion of a \emph{Deniable Computation Medium} (DCM) and a \emph{Deniable Computation Scheme} (DCS) as medium-independent abstractions, then instantiate them using RGB images with Fredkin-gate circuits. Multiple computation scenarios (one real, several decoys) are embedded at secret positions within cover images; the cloud applies identical operations to every pixel, processing all scenarios uniformly. Under coercion, the user reveals a decoy computation with verifiable results while the real computation remains hidden. We formalize multi-round coercion games with existence and intent distinguishing advantages, proving computational privacy with advantage $Θ(1/(n-1)!)$ and negligible existence-hiding advantage for the image instantiation. Our Python implementation, benchmarked across circuit sizes (5--289 gates) and image dimensions ($128^2$ to $512^2$), demonstrates competitive performance with TFHE for Boolean circuits while providing deniability that FHE fundamentally cannot offer.