Apostolos P. Fournaris has a total of 65 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Reinventing EDHOC for the Post-Quantum Era

    by Lidia Pocero Fraile, Christos Koulamas, Apostolos P. Fournaris

    Several lightweight protocols are being developed to secure communication in resource-constrained environments. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman over COSE (EDHOC) plays a key role in this lightweight protocol family by managing the key establishment process. However, due to the vulnerability of the discrete logarithm problem to Shor’s algorithm, a quantum-resistant replacement for Diffie-Hellman is required. This work examines the quantum-resistant transition of EDHOC, focusing on its multiple authentication methods as a step toward enabling robust post-quantum security for IoT devices. A novel authentication method for EDHOC is introduced, utilizing Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) as a replacement for the static Diffie-Hellman (DH) authentication method, providing a post-quantum signature-free alternative. Among existing post-quantum algorithms for both KEMs and signatures, the NIST-standardized ML-KEM offers the fastest implementation at the lowest memory cost, both of which are crucial for resource-constrained devices. While compatible with various post-quantum KEMs, the method can exploit the computational efficiency of ML-KEM to bring a PQ Signature-free EDHOC to highly constrained devices, providing the same security guarantees as classical EDHOC once the handshake is complete. Additionally, an efficient three-message handshake KEM-based EDHOC Initiator Known Responder (IKR) variant is proposed for environments with pre-established peer awareness.


  • Open Access

    Enabling Quantum-Resistant EDHOC: Design and Performance Evaluation

    by Lidia Pocero Fraile, Georgios Tasopoulos, Christos Koulamas, Raymond K. Zhao, Nazatul Haque Sultan, Francesco Regazzoni, Apostolos P. Fournaris

    The Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman over COSE (EDHOC) is a compact and lightweight key establishment protocol for constrained scenarios that provides end-to-end application layer security context. However, because of the vulnerability of the discrete logarithm problem to Shor’s algorithm, a quantum-resistant replacement for Diffie-Hellman is required. This paper proposes an architecture to transform EDHOC into a quantum-resistant protocol, with an open-source implementation supporting various Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) schemes from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization process. Necessary modifications to EDHOC are analyzed, integrating PQC Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and PQC digital signatures in a complete Post-Quantum (PQ) version of the EDHOC protocol (PQ-EDHOC). PQC operations often involve complex computations and require larger byte sizes, which can challenge resource-constrained devices designed for lightweight operation in constrained network environments. To evaluate the applicability of various PQC schemes in a realistic PQ-EDHOC environment, various PQC KEM and Digital Signature combinations are assessed for execution time, energy consumption, memory usage, and network performance on an nRF52840 ARM Cortex-M4 platform with a 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks) over BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) network. Results indicate that NIST standardized ML-KEM emerges as the only suitable KEM choice for resource-constrained environments, while promising new signature schemes, like HAWK, show significant performance improvement over the NIST standardized ML-DSA and selected for standardization FALCON.


  • Open Access

    CCSW 2024 -- Cloud Computing Security Workshop

    by Apostolos Fournaris, Paolo Palmieri

    The CCSW workshop aims to bring together researchers and practitioners to explore all aspects of security in cloud-centric and outsourced computing. In CCSW 2024, based on the papers that have been accepted, the workshop is focused on applied cryptographic schemes and protocols for the cloud, cloud-based leakage related attacks and their countermeasures, trusted computing technology in clouds, binary analysis of software for cloud protection, network security mechanisms using AI anomaly detection as well as security for emerging cloud programming models (like extended Berkeley Packet Filter, eBPF, programs). Throughout the years, the workshop particularly encourages novel paradigms and controversial ideas not covered by traditional cloud security research, serving as a fertile ground for creative debate and interaction in security-sensitive areas of computing impacted by cloud technologies. The workshop received 20 submissions, 15 of which passed through a thorough review process of at least 3 reviewers, and 7 of them were accepted for publication and presentation.

  • Open Access

    CCSW '23: Cloud Computing Security Workshop

    by Francesco Regazzoni, Apostolos Fournaris

    Clouds and massive-scale computing infrastructures are starting to dominate computing and will likely continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Major cloud operators are now comprising millions of cores hosting substantial fractions of corporate and government IT infrastructure. CCSW is the world's premier forum bringing together researchers and practitioners in all security aspects of cloud-centric and outsourced computing, including: Side channel attacks Cryptographic protocols for cloud security Secure cloud resource virtualization mechanisms Secure data management outsourcing (e.g., database as a service) Privacy and integrity mechanisms for outsourcing Foundations of cloud-centric threat models Secure computation outsourcing Remote attestation mechanisms in clouds Sandboxing and VM-based enforcements Trust and policy management in clouds Secure identity management mechanisms Cloud-aware web service security paradigms and mechanisms Cloud-centric regulatory compliance issues and mechanisms Business and security risk models and clouds Cost and usability models and their interaction with security in clouds Scalability of security in global-size clouds Binary analysis of software for remote attestation and cloud protection Network security (DOS, IDS etc.) mechanisms for cloud contexts Security for emerging cloud programming models Energy/cost/efficiency of security in clouds mOpen hardware for cloud


  • Open Access

    Energy Consumption Evaluation of Post-Quantum TLS 1.3 for Resource-Constrained Embedded Devices

    by George Tasopoulos, Charis Dimopoulos, Apostolos P. Fournaris, Raymond K. Zhao, Amin Sakzad, Ron Steinfeld

    Post-Quantum cryptography (PQC), in the past few years, constitutes the main driving force of the quantum resistance transition for security primitives, protocols and tools. TLS is one of the widely used security protocols that needs to be made quantum safe. However, PQC algorithms integration into TLS introduce various implementation overheads compared to traditional TLS that in battery powered embedded devices with constrained resources, cannot be overlooked. While there exist several works, evaluating the PQ TLS execution time overhead in embedded systems there are only a few that explore the PQ TLS energy consumption cost. In this paper, a thorough power/energy consumption evaluation and analysis of PQ TLS 1.3 on embedded systems has been made. A WolfSSL PQ TLS 1.3 custom implementation is used that integrates all the NIST PQC algorithms selected for standardisation as well as 2 out of 3 of those evaluated in NIST Round 4. Also 1 out of 2 of the BSI recommendations have been included. The PQ TLS 1.3 with the various PQC algorithms is deployed in a STM Nucleo evaluation board under a mutual and a unilateral client-server authentication scenario. The power and energy consumption collected results are analyzed in detail. The performed comparisons and overall analysis provide very interesting results indicating that the choice of the PQC algorithms in TLS 1.3 to be deployed on an embedded system may be very different depending on the device use as an authenticated or not authenticated, client or server. Also, the results indicate that in some cases, PQ TLS 1.3 implementations can be equally or more energy consumption efficient compared to traditional TLS 1.3.


  • Performance Evaluation of Post-Quantum TLS 1.3 on Resource-Constrained Embedded Systems

    by George Tasopoulos, Jinhui Li, Apostolos P. Fournaris, Raymond K. Zhao, Amin Sakzad, Ron Steinfeld


  • Open Access

    CIPSEC-Enhancing Critical Infrastructure Protection with Innovative Security Framework

    by Antonio Álvarez, Rubén Trapero, Denis Guilhot, Ignasi García-Mila, Francisco Hernandez, Eva Marín-Tordera, Jordi Forne, Xavi Masip-Bruin, Neeraj Suri, Markus Heinrich, et al.

    In the recent years, the majority of the world’s Critical Infrastructures (CIs) have evolved to be more flexible, cost efficient and able to offer better services and conditions for business growth. Through this evolution, CIs and companies offering CI services had to adopt many of the recent advances of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) field. This rapid adaptation however, was performed without thorough evaluation of its impact on CIs’ security. It resulted into leaving CIs vulnerable to a new set of threats and vulnerabilities that impose high levels of risk to the public safety, economy and welfare of the population. To this extend, the main approach for protecting CIs includes handling them as comprehensive entities and offer a complete solution for their overall infrastructures and ICT systems (IT&OT departments). However, complete CI security solutions exist, in the form of individual products from IT security companies. These products, integrate only in-house designed and developed tools/solutions, thus offering a limited range of technical solutions.

  • Machine-Learning Assisted Side-Channel Attacks on RNS ECC Implementations Using Hybrid Feature Engineering

    by Naila Mukhtar, Louiza Papachristodoulou, Apostolos P. Fournaris, Lejla Batina, Yinan Kong


  • Open Access

    Post-Quantum Cryptography: Challenges and Opportunities for Robust and Secure HW Design

    by Davide Bellizia, Nadia El Mrabet, Apostolos P. Fournaris, Simon Pontie, Francesco Regazzoni, Francois-Xavier Standaert, Elise Tasso, Emanuele Valea

    Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) will become soon the standard for many systems of the future. With the advent of quantum computers, all encrypted communications based on traditional asymmetric cryptography (e.g., RSA, ECC) will become insecure. The definition the PQC standards is an on going process proceeding at a fast pace, involving new and largely unexplored cryptographic primitives. For this reason, the design of hardware implementations of PQC algorithms is still under study. In this paper, we introduce the fundamentals of PQC, with a focus on lattice-based cryptography and its hardware security issues, namely side-channel and fault-based attacks. Then, we focus on isogeny-based cryptography and the SIKE algorithm. We highlight the importance of fault-tolerant design choices through the presentation of a fault attack, based on the electromagnetic injection of transient faults, targeting this cryptographic primitive. Finally, we show an interesting idea that starts from the observation that some PQC algorithms have an intrinsic probabilistic behavior. We argue that this characteristic is a clear opportunity that paves the way for the application of approximate (or inexact) computing to the implementation of PQC cryptography.