HVHans-Joachim Voth

Hans-Joachim Voth

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Hans-Joachim Voth has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Peter Temin (1937–)

    by Hans-Joachim Voth

  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Collective Remembrance and Private Choice: German–Greek Conflict and Behavior in Times of Crisis

    by Vasiliki Fouka, Hans-Joachim Voth

    When does collective memory influence behavior? We highlight two conditions under which the memory of past events comes to matter for the present: the associative nature of memory and institutionalized acts of commemoration by the state. During World War II, German troops occupying Greece perpetrated numerous massacres. Memories of those events resurfaced during the 2009 Greek debt crisis, leading to a drop in German car sales in Greece, especially in areas affected by German reprisals. Differential economic performance did not drive this divergence. Multiple pieces of evidence suggest that current events reactivated past memories, creating a backlash against Germany. This backlash also manifested in political behavior, with vote shares of anti-German parties increasing in reprisal areas after the start of the debt crisis. Using quasi-random variation in public recognition of victim status, we show that institutionalized collective memory amplifies the effects of political conflict on economic and political behavior.


  • Top Cited Papers

    New Deal, New Patriots: How 1930s Government Spending Boosted Patriotism During World War II

    by Bruno Caprettini, Hans-Joachim Voth

    We demonstrate an important complementarity between patriotism and public-good provision. After 1933, the New Deal led to an unprecedented expansion of the U.S. federal government’s role. Those who benefited from social spending were markedly more patriotic during World War II: they bought more war bonds, volunteered more, and, as soldiers, won more medals. This pattern was new—World War I volunteering did not show the same geography of patriotism. We match military service records with the 1940 census to show that this pattern holds at the individual level. Using geographical variation, we exploit two instruments to suggest that the effect is causal: droughts and congressional committee representation predict more New Deal agricultural support, as well as bond buying, volunteering, and medals.


  • Serial Defaults, Serial Profits

    by Mauricio Drelichman, Hans-Joachim Voth

    This chapter looks at the profitability of banking families. Lending to the king of Spain made good business sense; it was hugely profitable on average, despite periodic defaults and restructurings. Defaults and reschedulings reduced the rate of return, but profitability net of these losses was still high—and markedly higher than the return on alternative investments. The same conclusion emerges from analyzing the profitability of loans by the banking dynasty. Of the sixty families that lent to Philip, only five failed to earn their likely opportunity cost of capital—and these bankers provided only a negligible proportion of the short-term loans taken out by the king. As a consequence, few financiers ever stopped lending to Philip II.

  • Philip’s Empire

    by Mauricio Drelichman, Hans-Joachim Voth

    This chapter provides a brief history of Castilian ascendancy from the late Middle Ages through the end of Philip II's reign. After the marriage of Prince Ferdinand of Aragon and Princess Isabella of Castile, a series of agreements—both tacit and explicit—recognized Castile's exclusive sovereignty over all territories conquered in the future. Ferdinand and Isabella shed many of the medieval structures of administration, modernizing the apparatus of the state and preparing it for the coming expansion. At the dawn of the early modern age, Ferdinand and Isabella had succeeded in giving their kingdoms a relatively strong monarchy and streamlined state institutions. Castile, where reforms were particularly deep and the peace dividend sizable, flourished economically.

  • Lending to the Borrower from Hell

    by Mauricio Drelichman, Hans-Joachim Voth

    Why do lenders time and again loan money to sovereign borrowers who promptly go bankrupt? When can this type of lending work? As the United States and many European nations struggle with mountains of debt, historical precedents can offer valuable insights. This book looks at one famous case—the debts and defaults of Philip II of Spain. Ruling over one of the largest and most powerful empires in history, King Philip defaulted four times. Yet he never lost access to capital markets and could borrow again within a year or two of each default. Exploring the shrewd reasoning of the lenders who continued to offer money, the book analyzes the lessons from this historical example. Using detailed new evidence collected from sixteenth-century archives, the book examines the incentives and returns of lenders. It provides powerful evidence that in the right situations, lenders not only survive despite defaults—they thrive. It also demonstrates that debt markets cope well, despite massive fluctuations in expenditure and revenue, when lending functions like insurance. The book unearths unique sixteenth-century loan contracts that offered highly effective risk sharing between the king and his lenders, with payment obligations reduced in bad times. A fascinating story of finance and empire, this book offers an intelligent model for keeping economies safe in times of sovereign debt crises and defaults.


  • Prologue

    by Mauricio Drelichman, Hans-Joachim Voth

    This prologue provides an overview of state debts and sovereign default in the sixteenth century, looking in particular at Philip II's defaults. The debts and defaults of Philip II suggest that there is another way for financing government borrowing: prearranged reduction in what a government owes and has to pay to creditors in bad times. Indeed, lenders agreed to forego interest or extend the maturity of loans if the king experienced a bad shock. This system exhibited remarkable stability, bringing essentially the same banking dynasties together with the monarch for over half a century, providing financing and insurance. Another remarkable feature of the debt issuance system evolved by Philip II and his financiers is the stability of the banking institutions, the main innovation of which was an effective “risk transfer” mechanism.


  • Risk Sharing with the Monarch

    by Mauricio Drelichman, Hans-Joachim Voth

    This chapter analyzes the role of contingent scenarios and nature of the defaults. Over the last 800 years, many periods of debt accumulation have been followed by default. Despite these disruptions, the market for sovereign debt did not disappear. At least, in the case of asiento lending to Philip II, excusable defaults were an important factor. Studying the loan documents directly, the chapter shows that a significant share of short-term loans contained contingency clauses. It then explores the different types of loan modifications along with their impact on cash flows and loan maturity. These modifications allowed effective risk sharing between king and bankers—an institutional solution that offered many of the desirable properties that contingent debt would have today.

  • Tax, Empire, and the Logic of Spanish Decline

    by Mauricio Drelichman, Hans-Joachim Voth

    This chapter examines the impact of debt leveraging on the long-run development of Castile. Compared to the other great European powers after 1500, Spain's fiscal policy showed no signs of imperial overstretch. Its finances were no worse—and better in a variety of ways—than those of other countries at the height of their power. According to several criteria, Castilian finances were managed with greater probity than even those of Britain, with primary surpluses being maintained during wartime and rapid improvements in the budget position when debts accumulated. There is also no evidence of the supposedly deleterious effects of serial default; after each payment stop, the Crown's revenues increased, suggesting no decline in fiscal capacity.

  • Lending to the Borrower from Hell

    by Mauricio Drelichman, Hans-Joachim Voth

    This chapter focuses on repayment incentives. The question of why sovereign lending can exist can be divided into two broad approaches: sanctions and reputation. Papers in the reputation tradition argue that the need to smooth consumption is key: if a borrower fails to honor their contract, credit will dry up. The borrower will be markedly worse off, being unable to borrow in hard times. In contrast, the sanctions literature argues that without penalties above and beyond the mere exclusion from future borrowing, sovereign lending cannot exist. Sanctions range from trade embargoes to military intervention. Over the last 200 years, there are examples of both trade sanctions and armed intervention—but they are exceedingly rare.