Bradley Harding
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Bradley Harding has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Denis Cousineau
School of Psychology, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada
13 shared publications Christophe Tremblay
4 shared publications- Marc-André Goulet
School of Psychology, University of Ottawa
3 shared publications - Guillaume Durand
Department of Psychiatry and Neuropsychology, Faculty of Health, Medicine, and Life Sciences, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
2 shared publications - Sylvain Chartier
University of Ottawa
2 shared publications Jean-Philippe Thivierge
École de psychologie
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology / Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale
- Vol. 77 (2) , 115-129
Analyses of response time data in the same–different task.
The Same-Different task presents two stimuli in close succession and participants must indicate whether they are completely identical or if there are any attributes that differ. While the task is simple, its results have proven difficult to explain. Notably, response times are characterized by a fast-same effect whereby Same responses are faster than Different responses even though identical stimuli should be exhaustively processed to be accurate. Herein, we examine a little more than a quarter million response times (N = 255,744) obtained from 327 participants who participated in one of 14 variants of the task involving minor changes in the stimuli or their durations. We performed distribution fitting and analyzed estimated parameters stemming from the ex-Gaussian, lognormal, and Weibull distributions to infer the cognitive processing characteristics underlying this task. The results exclude serial processing of the stimuli and do not support dual-route processing. The fast-same effect appears only through a shift of the entire response time distributions, a feature impossible to detect solely with mean response time analyses. An attention-modulated process driven by entropy may be the most adequate model of the fast-same effect. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 June 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology / Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale
- Vol. 77 (2) , 115-129
Analyses of response time data in the same–different task.
The Same-Different task presents two stimuli in close succession and participants must indicate whether they are completely identical or if there are any attributes that differ. While the task is simple, its results have proven difficult to explain. Notably, response times are characterized by a fast-same effect whereby Same responses are faster than Different responses even though identical stimuli should be exhaustively processed to be accurate. Herein, we examine a little more than a quarter million response times (N = 255,744) obtained from 327 participants who participated in one of 14 variants of the task involving minor changes in the stimuli or their durations. We performed distribution fitting and analyzed estimated parameters stemming from the ex-Gaussian, lognormal, and Weibull distributions to infer the cognitive processing characteristics underlying this task. The results exclude serial processing of the stimuli and do not support dual-route processing. The fast-same effect appears only through a shift of the entire response time distributions, a feature impossible to detect solely with mean response time analyses. An attention-modulated process driven by entropy may be the most adequate model of the fast-same effect. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 April 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Vol. 48 (4) , 520-546
Is the fast-same phenomenon that fast? An investigation of identity priming in the same-different task.
The same-different task is a classic paradigm that requires participants to judge whether two successively presented stimuli are the same or different. While this task is simple, with results that have been replicated many times, response times (RTs) and accuracy for both same and different decisions remain difficult to model. The biggest obstacle in modeling the task lies within its effect referred to as the fast-same phenomenon whereby participants are much faster at responding "same" than "different," while most standard cognitive models predict the opposite. In this study, we investigated whether this effect is the result of identity priming activated by the first stimulus. We ran four variants of the same-different task in which identity priming is intended to be attenuated or cancelled in half of the trials. Results for all four variants show that a complete visual match between both stimuli is necessary to observe a fast-same effect and that hampering this relation attenuates same RTs while different RTs remained relatively unchanged.
- 1 April 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Vol. 48 (4) , 520-546
Is the fast-same phenomenon that fast? An investigation of identity priming in the same-different task.
The same-different task is a classic paradigm that requires participants to judge whether two successively presented stimuli are the same or different. While this task is simple, with results that have been replicated many times, response times (RTs) and accuracy for both same and different decisions remain difficult to model. The biggest obstacle in modeling the task lies within its effect referred to as the fast-same phenomenon whereby participants are much faster at responding "same" than "different," while most standard cognitive models predict the opposite. In this study, we investigated whether this effect is the result of identity priming activated by the first stimulus. We ran four variants of the same-different task in which identity priming is intended to be attenuated or cancelled in half of the trials. Results for all four variants show that a complete visual match between both stimuli is necessary to observe a fast-same effect and that hampering this relation attenuates same RTs while different RTs remained relatively unchanged.
- 30 November 2017
- Published by Consortium Erudit in Revue de Psychoeducation
- Vol. 46 (2) , 397-419
Pourquoi les statistiques sont-elles difficiles à enseigner et à comprendre? Quelques réflexions
Les statistiques sont une matière notoirement difficile à enseigner aux étudiants des sciences humaines. L’anxiété statistique, une forme d’anxiété bien documentée chez ces étudiants, est présente dès le début du cours et explique donc une partie des difficultés rencontrées par ces étudiants. Cependant, nous croyons que l’anxiété statistique est la conséquence plutôt que la source de ces difficultés. Pour enclencher une discussion qui, à terme, pourrait bonifier la façon d’enseigner les statistiques dans les sciences humaines, nous examinons ici trois causes qui pourraient expliquer cet anxiété. D’une part, les humains ont très peu d’intuition du hasard (comme le montrent les études sur les jeux d’argent dans lesquels des conceptions erronées sont dévoilées), et donc, les notions de distribution et d’échantillonnage restent des concepts opaques pour plusieurs. De plus, certains concepts statistiques reposent sur des raisonnements « méta-statistiques » dans lesquels il faut concevoir des statistiques sur des statistiques. Finalement, la notion de prise de décision dans un contexte où l’information est partielle et incertaine est souvent mal comprise. Dans ce texte, nous précisons ces trois difficultés et suggérons des recommandations pour en amoindrir les conséquences. Cependant, les pistes présentées ici nécessitent d’être validées par des études formelles; ce texte se veut avant tout un catalyseur de discussions visant l’amélioration de l’état de nos classes de méthodes quantitatives.
- 30 November 2017
- Published by Consortium Erudit in Revue de Psychoeducation
- Vol. 46 (2) , 397-419
Pourquoi les statistiques sont-elles difficiles à enseigner et à comprendre? Quelques réflexions
Les statistiques sont une matière notoirement difficile à enseigner aux étudiants des sciences humaines. L’anxiété statistique, une forme d’anxiété bien documentée chez ces étudiants, est présente dès le début du cours et explique donc une partie des difficultés rencontrées par ces étudiants. Cependant, nous croyons que l’anxiété statistique est la conséquence plutôt que la source de ces difficultés. Pour enclencher une discussion qui, à terme, pourrait bonifier la façon d’enseigner les statistiques dans les sciences humaines, nous examinons ici trois causes qui pourraient expliquer cet anxiété. D’une part, les humains ont très peu d’intuition du hasard (comme le montrent les études sur les jeux d’argent dans lesquels des conceptions erronées sont dévoilées), et donc, les notions de distribution et d’échantillonnage restent des concepts opaques pour plusieurs. De plus, certains concepts statistiques reposent sur des raisonnements « méta-statistiques » dans lesquels il faut concevoir des statistiques sur des statistiques. Finalement, la notion de prise de décision dans un contexte où l’information est partielle et incertaine est souvent mal comprise. Dans ce texte, nous précisons ces trois difficultés et suggérons des recommandations pour en amoindrir les conséquences. Cependant, les pistes présentées ici nécessitent d’être validées par des études formelles; ce texte se veut avant tout un catalyseur de discussions visant l’amélioration de l’état de nos classes de méthodes quantitatives.
- 1 May 2017
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 2621-2628
Are recurrent associative memories good models of decision making? Modelling discrimination decisions from different perspectives
Discrimination decisions are at the forefront of human cognition. For this reason, many different types of models aim to predict how they are made. In this research, we compared the discrimination capabilities of a Recurrent Associative Memory (RAM) with the predictions of an accumulator model to show that, although the discrimination processes of both model classes differs, both make similar predictions regarding trends in the results. We did this by measuring the performances of a RAM within the context of a discrimination task using different stimuli (i. e., letters and randomly generated stimuli) and fitting the obtained results with an accumulator model possessing a coactive architecture. The experimental conditions varied with regard to the correlation between the tested stimuli, the amount of redundancy of the stimuli used in a trial, and the number of total stimuli presented to the network in the learning phase. Results showed that high inter-stimulus correlation led to slower recall speed, and that low redundancy also resulted in slower recall speed. Results also indicated that an increased number of exemplars contained in the network's memory increased recall speed for the letter stimuli but randomly generated stimuli received no apparent benefits. Ultimately, exploring neural networks and accumulator models jointly provides a broader and deeper understanding of the cognitive processes behind discrimination decisions.
- 1 May 2017
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 2621-2628
Are recurrent associative memories good models of decision making? Modelling discrimination decisions from different perspectives
Discrimination decisions are at the forefront of human cognition. For this reason, many different types of models aim to predict how they are made. In this research, we compared the discrimination capabilities of a Recurrent Associative Memory (RAM) with the predictions of an accumulator model to show that, although the discrimination processes of both model classes differs, both make similar predictions regarding trends in the results. We did this by measuring the performances of a RAM within the context of a discrimination task using different stimuli (i. e., letters and randomly generated stimuli) and fitting the obtained results with an accumulator model possessing a coactive architecture. The experimental conditions varied with regard to the correlation between the tested stimuli, the amount of redundancy of the stimuli used in a trial, and the number of total stimuli presented to the network in the learning phase. Results showed that high inter-stimulus correlation led to slower recall speed, and that low redundancy also resulted in slower recall speed. Results also indicated that an increased number of exemplars contained in the network's memory increased recall speed for the letter stimuli but randomly generated stimuli received no apparent benefits. Ultimately, exploring neural networks and accumulator models jointly provides a broader and deeper understanding of the cognitive processes behind discrimination decisions.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Elsevier
- p. 271-290
Applying Systems Factorial Technology to Accumulators with Varying Thresholds
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Elsevier
- p. 271-290
Applying Systems Factorial Technology to Accumulators with Varying Thresholds
- 1 September 2016
- Published by The Quantitative Methods for Psychology in The Quantitative Methods for Psychology
- Vol. 12 (2) , 138-146
GSD: An SPSS extension command for sub-sampling and bootstrapping datasets
- 1 September 2016
- Published by The Quantitative Methods for Psychology in The Quantitative Methods for Psychology
- Vol. 12 (2) , 138-146
GSD: An SPSS extension command for sub-sampling and bootstrapping datasets
- 1 September 2016
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology / Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale
- Vol. 70 (3) , 253-277
Constructing a group distribution from individual distributions.
A group distribution is a synthesis of a set of individual distributions. To be adequate, a method for creating group distributions should not introduce characteristics that are not present in the individual distributions and preserve those that are present. A method occasionally used is quantile averaging (sometimes called vincentizations), applied generally to response time distributions. However, it is shown here using quantile-quantile plots on empirical response times that this method is inadequate. As shown by Thomas and Ross (1980, Journal of Mathematical Psychology), to solve this problem, quantile averaging can be generalised using an appropriate nonlinear transformation of the data. Here we argue that the correct transformation is the log transform of response times to which the base response time has been removed. Equivalently, the geometric mean of the quantiles can be used. We first propose 4 estimates of the base response times. We next examine empirical data in a same-different task, in a redundant-attribute target detection task and in a visual search task. The results show that this approach is appropriate to construct group distributions. It can be used to aggregate distributions over multiple participants, over multiple sessions of training for a given participant, or both. (PsycINFO Database Record
- 1 September 2016
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology / Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale
- Vol. 70 (3) , 253-277
Constructing a group distribution from individual distributions.
A group distribution is a synthesis of a set of individual distributions. To be adequate, a method for creating group distributions should not introduce characteristics that are not present in the individual distributions and preserve those that are present. A method occasionally used is quantile averaging (sometimes called vincentizations), applied generally to response time distributions. However, it is shown here using quantile-quantile plots on empirical response times that this method is inadequate. As shown by Thomas and Ross (1980, Journal of Mathematical Psychology), to solve this problem, quantile averaging can be generalised using an appropriate nonlinear transformation of the data. Here we argue that the correct transformation is the log transform of response times to which the base response time has been removed. Equivalently, the geometric mean of the quantiles can be used. We first propose 4 estimates of the base response times. We next examine empirical data in a same-different task, in a redundant-attribute target detection task and in a visual search task. The results show that this approach is appropriate to construct group distributions. It can be used to aggregate distributions over multiple participants, over multiple sessions of training for a given participant, or both. (PsycINFO Database Record
- 1 January 2016
- Published by The Quantitative Methods for Psychology in The Quantitative Methods for Psychology
- Vol. 12 (1) , 39-56
Systems Factorial Technology Explained to Humans
- 1 January 2016
- Published by The Quantitative Methods for Psychology in The Quantitative Methods for Psychology
- Vol. 12 (1) , 39-56
Systems Factorial Technology Explained to Humans
- 1 October 2015
- Published by The Quantitative Methods for Psychology in The Quantitative Methods for Psychology
- Vol. 11 (3) , 127-138
An extended SPSS extension command for generating random data
- 1 October 2015
- Published by The Quantitative Methods for Psychology in The Quantitative Methods for Psychology
- Vol. 11 (3) , 127-138
An extended SPSS extension command for generating random data
- 1 February 2015
- Published by The Quantitative Methods for Psychology in The Quantitative Methods for Psychology
- Vol. 11 (1) , 32-36
The standard error of the Pearson skew
- 1 February 2015
- Published by The Quantitative Methods for Psychology in The Quantitative Methods for Psychology
- Vol. 11 (1) , 32-36
The standard error of the Pearson skew