Linda Bushnell
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Linda Bushnell has a total of 40 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Radha Poovendran
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, USA
16 shared publications - Andrew Clark
Washington University in St. Louis
13 shared publications - Basel Alomair
King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology
4 shared publications - Dinuka Sahabandu
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
4 shared publications Radha Poovendran
Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
4 shared publications- Shana Moothedath
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, USA
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 21 May 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 69 (11) , 7824-7831
RL-ARNE: A Reinforcement Learning Algorithm for Computing Average Reward Nash Equilibrium of Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Games
Stochastic games model the strategic interactions between two or more players that occur in a sequence of stages. In this article, we focus on computing the average reward Nash equilibrium (ARNE) of a nonzero-sum stochastic game when the transition probabilities of the game and reward structure of the players are unknown. We note that the current state-of-the-art reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms that compute the ARNE of nonzero-sum stochastic games require solving a matrix game corresponding to each state of the game at every iteration of the algorithm, which is PPAD-complete and incurs a memory complexity that is exponential in the number of players. In this article, we use temporal difference error minimization and stochastic approximation to develop a scalable RL algorithm to compute an ARNE of nonzero-sum stochastic games. We prove the convergence of our algorithm to an ARNE. We evaluate the performance of our algorithm using an attacker–defender game modeled on a real-world ransomware dataset.
- 21 May 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 69 (11) , 7824-7831
RL-ARNE: A Reinforcement Learning Algorithm for Computing Average Reward Nash Equilibrium of Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Games
Stochastic games model the strategic interactions between two or more players that occur in a sequence of stages. In this article, we focus on computing the average reward Nash equilibrium (ARNE) of a nonzero-sum stochastic game when the transition probabilities of the game and reward structure of the players are unknown. We note that the current state-of-the-art reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms that compute the ARNE of nonzero-sum stochastic games require solving a matrix game corresponding to each state of the game at every iteration of the algorithm, which is PPAD-complete and incurs a memory complexity that is exponential in the number of players. In this article, we use temporal difference error minimization and stochastic approximation to develop a scalable RL algorithm to compute an ARNE of nonzero-sum stochastic games. We prove the convergence of our algorithm to an ARNE. We evaluate the performance of our algorithm using an attacker–defender game modeled on a real-world ransomware dataset.
- 21 May 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 69 (10) , 6684-6699
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking for Detection of Advanced Persistent Threats: A Stochastic Game Approach
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are stealthy attacks by intelligent adversaries. This paper studies the detection of APTs that infiltrate cyber systems and compromise specifically targeted data and/or infrastructures. Dynamic information flow tracking is an information trace-based detection mechanism against APTs that tags suspicious information flows in the system and performs security analysis for unauthorized use of tagged data. In this paper, we develop an analytical model for resourceefficient detection of APTs using an information flow tracking game. The game is a nonzero-sum, turn-based, stochastic game with asymmetric information as the defender cannot distinguish whether an incoming flow is malicious or benign. The payoff functions of the game capture the cost for performing security analysis and the rewards and penalties received by the players. We analyze equilibrium of the game and prove that a Nash equilibrium is given by a solution to the minimum capacity cut set problem on a flow-network derived from the system. The edge capacities of the flow-network are obtained from the cost of performing security analysis. Finally, we implement our algorithm on a real-world dataset for a data exfiltration attack augmented with false-negative and false-positive rates and compute an optimal defender strategy.
- 21 May 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 69 (10) , 6684-6699
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking for Detection of Advanced Persistent Threats: A Stochastic Game Approach
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are stealthy attacks by intelligent adversaries. This paper studies the detection of APTs that infiltrate cyber systems and compromise specifically targeted data and/or infrastructures. Dynamic information flow tracking is an information trace-based detection mechanism against APTs that tags suspicious information flows in the system and performs security analysis for unauthorized use of tagged data. In this paper, we develop an analytical model for resourceefficient detection of APTs using an information flow tracking game. The game is a nonzero-sum, turn-based, stochastic game with asymmetric information as the defender cannot distinguish whether an incoming flow is malicious or benign. The payoff functions of the game capture the cost for performing security analysis and the rewards and penalties received by the players. We analyze equilibrium of the game and prove that a Nash equilibrium is given by a solution to the minimum capacity cut set problem on a flow-network derived from the system. The edge capacities of the flow-network are obtained from the cost of performing security analysis. Finally, we implement our algorithm on a real-world dataset for a data exfiltration attack augmented with false-negative and false-positive rates and compute an optimal defender strategy.
- 4 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1423-1429
Networked Control Systems: Architecture and Stability Issues
- 4 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1423-1429
Networked Control Systems: Architecture and Stability Issues
- Open Access
Stochastic Dynamic Information Flow Tracking Game using Supervised Learning for Detecting Advanced Persistent Threats
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are organized prolonged cyberattacks by sophisticated attackers. Although APT activities are stealthy, they interact with the system components and these interactions lead to information flows. Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) has been proposed as one of the effective ways to detect APTs using the information flows. However, wide range security analysis using DIFT results in a significant increase in performance overhead and high rates of false-positives and false-negatives generated by DIFT. In this paper, we model the strategic interaction between APT and DIFT as a non-cooperative stochastic game. The game unfolds on a state space constructed from an information flow graph (IFG) that is extracted from the system log. The objective of the APT in the game is to choose transitions in the IFG to find an optimal path in the IFG from an entry point of the attack to an attack target. On the other hand, the objective of DIFT is to dynamically select nodes in the IFG to perform security analysis for detecting APT. Our game model has imperfect information as the players do not have information about the actions of the opponent. We consider two scenarios of the game (i) when the false-positive and false-negative rates are known to both players and (ii) when the false-positive and false-negative rates are unknown to both players. Case (i) translates to a game model with complete information and we propose a value iteration-based algorithm and prove the convergence. Case (ii) translates to a game with unknown transition probabilities. In this case, we propose Hierarchical Supervised Learning (HSL) algorithm that integrates a neural network, to predict the value vector of the game, with a policy iteration algorithm to compute an approximate equilibrium. We implemented our algorithms on real attack datasets and validated the performance of our approach.
Open AccessStochastic Dynamic Information Flow Tracking Game using Supervised Learning for Detecting Advanced Persistent Threats
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are organized prolonged cyberattacks by sophisticated attackers. Although APT activities are stealthy, they interact with the system components and these interactions lead to information flows. Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) has been proposed as one of the effective ways to detect APTs using the information flows. However, wide range security analysis using DIFT results in a significant increase in performance overhead and high rates of false-positives and false-negatives generated by DIFT. In this paper, we model the strategic interaction between APT and DIFT as a non-cooperative stochastic game. The game unfolds on a state space constructed from an information flow graph (IFG) that is extracted from the system log. The objective of the APT in the game is to choose transitions in the IFG to find an optimal path in the IFG from an entry point of the attack to an attack target. On the other hand, the objective of DIFT is to dynamically select nodes in the IFG to perform security analysis for detecting APT. Our game model has imperfect information as the players do not have information about the actions of the opponent. We consider two scenarios of the game (i) when the false-positive and false-negative rates are known to both players and (ii) when the false-positive and false-negative rates are unknown to both players. Case (i) translates to a game model with complete information and we propose a value iteration-based algorithm and prove the convergence. Case (ii) translates to a game with unknown transition probabilities. In this case, we propose Hierarchical Supervised Learning (HSL) algorithm that integrates a neural network, to predict the value vector of the game, with a policy iteration algorithm to compute an approximate equilibrium. We implemented our algorithms on real attack datasets and validated the performance of our approach.
- 23 March 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 19 (4) , 2665-2679
Covert Channel-Based Transmitter Authentication in Controller Area Networks
In recent years, the security of automotive Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) is facing urgent threats due to the widespread use of legacy in-vehicle communication systems. As a representative legacy bus system, the Controller Area Network (CAN) hosts Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that are crucial for the vehicles functioning. In this scenario, malicious actors can exploit the CAN vulnerabilities, such as the lack of built-in authentication and encryption schemes, to launch CAN bus attacks (e.g., suspension, injection, and masquerade attacks) with life-threatening consequences (e.g., disabling brakes). In this article, we present TACAN (Transmitter Authentication in CAN), which provides secure authentication of ECUs on the legacy CAN bus by exploiting the covert channels , without introducing CAN protocol modifications or traffic overheads (no extra bits or CAN messages are used). TACAN turns upside-down the originally malicious concept of covert channels and exploits it to build an effective defensive technique that facilitates transmitter authentication via a centralized, trusted Monitor Node. TACAN consists of three different covert channels for ECU authentication: 1) the Inter-Arrival Time (IAT)-based, leveraging the IATs of CAN messages; 2) the Least Significant Bit (LSB)-based, concealing authentication messages into the LSBs of normal CAN data; and 3) a hybrid covert channel, exploiting the combination of the first two. In order to validate TACAN, we implement the covert channels on the University of Washington (UW) EcoCAR (Chevrolet Camaro 2016) testbed. We further evaluate the bit error, throughput, and detection performance of TACAN through extensive experiments using the EcoCAR testbed and a publicly available dataset collected from Toyota Camry 2010. We demonstrate the feasibility of TACAN and the effectiveness of detecting CAN bus attacks, highlighting no traffic overheads and attesting the regular functionality of ECUs.
- 23 March 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 19 (4) , 2665-2679
Covert Channel-Based Transmitter Authentication in Controller Area Networks
In recent years, the security of automotive Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) is facing urgent threats due to the widespread use of legacy in-vehicle communication systems. As a representative legacy bus system, the Controller Area Network (CAN) hosts Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that are crucial for the vehicles functioning. In this scenario, malicious actors can exploit the CAN vulnerabilities, such as the lack of built-in authentication and encryption schemes, to launch CAN bus attacks (e.g., suspension, injection, and masquerade attacks) with life-threatening consequences (e.g., disabling brakes). In this article, we present TACAN (Transmitter Authentication in CAN), which provides secure authentication of ECUs on the legacy CAN bus by exploiting the covert channels , without introducing CAN protocol modifications or traffic overheads (no extra bits or CAN messages are used). TACAN turns upside-down the originally malicious concept of covert channels and exploits it to build an effective defensive technique that facilitates transmitter authentication via a centralized, trusted Monitor Node. TACAN consists of three different covert channels for ECU authentication: 1) the Inter-Arrival Time (IAT)-based, leveraging the IATs of CAN messages; 2) the Least Significant Bit (LSB)-based, concealing authentication messages into the LSBs of normal CAN data; and 3) a hybrid covert channel, exploiting the combination of the first two. In order to validate TACAN, we implement the covert channels on the University of Washington (UW) EcoCAR (Chevrolet Camaro 2016) testbed. We further evaluate the bit error, throughput, and detection performance of TACAN through extensive experiments using the EcoCAR testbed and a publicly available dataset collected from Toyota Camry 2010. We demonstrate the feasibility of TACAN and the effectiveness of detecting CAN bus attacks, highlighting no traffic overheads and attesting the regular functionality of ECUs.
- 20 November 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 66 (12) , 5665-5679
Secure Control in Partially Observable Environments to Satisfy LTL Specifications
This paper studies the synthesis of control policies for an agent that has to satisfy a temporal logic specification in a partially observable environment, in the presence of an adversary. The interaction of the agent (defender) with the adversary is modeled as a partially observable stochastic game. The goal is to generate a defender policy to maximize satisfaction of a given temporal logic specification under any adversary policy. The search for policies is limited to the space of finite state controllers, which leads to a tractable approach to determine policies. We relate the satisfaction of the specification to reaching (a subset of) recurrent states of a Markov chain. We present an algorithm to determine a set of defender and adversary finite state controllers of fixed sizes that will satisfy the temporal logic specification, and prove that it is sound. We then propose a value-iteration algorithm to maximize the probability of satisfying the temporal logic specification under finite state controllers of fixed sizes. Lastly, we extend this setting to the scenario where the size of the finite state controller of the defender can be incre
- 20 November 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 66 (12) , 5665-5679
Secure Control in Partially Observable Environments to Satisfy LTL Specifications
This paper studies the synthesis of control policies for an agent that has to satisfy a temporal logic specification in a partially observable environment, in the presence of an adversary. The interaction of the agent (defender) with the adversary is modeled as a partially observable stochastic game. The goal is to generate a defender policy to maximize satisfaction of a given temporal logic specification under any adversary policy. The search for policies is limited to the space of finite state controllers, which leads to a tractable approach to determine policies. We relate the satisfaction of the specification to reaching (a subset of) recurrent states of a Markov chain. We present an algorithm to determine a set of defender and adversary finite state controllers of fixed sizes that will satisfy the temporal logic specification, and prove that it is sound. We then propose a value-iteration algorithm to maximize the probability of satisfying the temporal logic specification under finite state controllers of fixed sizes. Lastly, we extend this setting to the scenario where the size of the finite state controller of the defender can be incre
- 24 February 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 65 (12) , 5248-5263
A Game-Theoretic Approach for Dynamic Information Flow Tracking to Detect Multistage Advanced Persistent Threats
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) infiltrate cyber systems and compromise specifically targeted data and/or resources through a sequence of stealthy attacks consisting of multiple stages. Dynamic information flow tracking has been proposed to detect APTs. In this paper, we develop a dynamic information flow tracking game for resource-efficient detection of APTs via multi-stage dynamic games. The game evolves on an information flow graph, whose nodes are processes and objects (e.g., file, network endpoints) in the system and the edges capture the interaction between different processes and objects. Each stage of the game has pre-specified targets that are characterized by a set of nodes of the graph. The goal of the APT is to evade detection and reach a target node of each stage. The goal of the defender is to maximize the detection probability while minimizing performance overhead on the system. The resource costs of the players are different and the information structure is asymmetric, resulting in a nonzero-sum imperfect information game. We first calculate the best responses of the players and then compute Nash equilibrium for single stage attacks. We then provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a correlated equilibrium for the multi-stage attack case. Finally, we simulate our model and algorithm on real-world nation state attack data obtained from the Refinable Attack INvestigation (RAIN) system.
- 24 February 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 65 (12) , 5248-5263
A Game-Theoretic Approach for Dynamic Information Flow Tracking to Detect Multistage Advanced Persistent Threats
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) infiltrate cyber systems and compromise specifically targeted data and/or resources through a sequence of stealthy attacks consisting of multiple stages. Dynamic information flow tracking has been proposed to detect APTs. In this paper, we develop a dynamic information flow tracking game for resource-efficient detection of APTs via multi-stage dynamic games. The game evolves on an information flow graph, whose nodes are processes and objects (e.g., file, network endpoints) in the system and the edges capture the interaction between different processes and objects. Each stage of the game has pre-specified targets that are characterized by a set of nodes of the graph. The goal of the APT is to evade detection and reach a target node of each stage. The goal of the defender is to maximize the detection probability while minimizing performance overhead on the system. The resource costs of the players are different and the information structure is asymmetric, resulting in a nonzero-sum imperfect information game. We first calculate the best responses of the players and then compute Nash equilibrium for single stage attacks. We then provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a correlated equilibrium for the multi-stage attack case. Finally, we simulate our model and algorithm on real-world nation state attack data obtained from the Refinable Attack INvestigation (RAIN) system.
- Open Access
FRESH: Interactive Reward Shaping in High-Dimensional State Spaces using Human Feedback
Reinforcement learning has been successful in training autonomous agents to accomplish goals in complex environments. Although this has been adapted to multiple settings, including robotics and computer games, human players often find it easier to obtain higher rewards in some environments than reinforcement learning algorithms. This is especially true of high-dimensional state spaces where the reward obtained by the agent is sparse or extremely delayed. In this paper, we seek to effectively integrate feedback signals supplied by a human operator with deep reinforcement learning algorithms in high-dimensional state spaces. We call this FRESH (Feedback-based REward SHaping). During training, a human operator is presented with trajectories from a replay buffer and then provides feedback on states and actions in the trajectory. In order to generalize feedback signals provided by the human operator to previously unseen states and actions at test-time, we use a feedback neural network. We use an ensemble of neural networks with a shared network architecture to represent model uncertainty and the confidence of the neural network in its output. The output of the feedback neural network is converted to a shaping reward that is augmented to the reward provided by the environment. We evaluate our approach on the Bowling and Skiing Atari games in the arcade learning environment. Although human experts have been able to achieve high scores in these environments, state-of-the-art deep learning algorithms perform poorly. We observe that FRESH is able to achieve much higher scores than state-of-the-art deep learning algorithms in both environments. FRESH also achieves a 21.4% higher score than a human expert in Bowling and does as well as a human expert in Skiing.
Open AccessFRESH: Interactive Reward Shaping in High-Dimensional State Spaces using Human Feedback
Reinforcement learning has been successful in training autonomous agents to accomplish goals in complex environments. Although this has been adapted to multiple settings, including robotics and computer games, human players often find it easier to obtain higher rewards in some environments than reinforcement learning algorithms. This is especially true of high-dimensional state spaces where the reward obtained by the agent is sparse or extremely delayed. In this paper, we seek to effectively integrate feedback signals supplied by a human operator with deep reinforcement learning algorithms in high-dimensional state spaces. We call this FRESH (Feedback-based REward SHaping). During training, a human operator is presented with trajectories from a replay buffer and then provides feedback on states and actions in the trajectory. In order to generalize feedback signals provided by the human operator to previously unseen states and actions at test-time, we use a feedback neural network. We use an ensemble of neural networks with a shared network architecture to represent model uncertainty and the confidence of the neural network in its output. The output of the feedback neural network is converted to a shaping reward that is augmented to the reward provided by the environment. We evaluate our approach on the Bowling and Skiing Atari games in the arcade learning environment. Although human experts have been able to achieve high scores in these environments, state-of-the-art deep learning algorithms perform poorly. We observe that FRESH is able to achieve much higher scores than state-of-the-art deep learning algorithms in both environments. FRESH also achieves a 21.4% higher score than a human expert in Bowling and does as well as a human expert in Skiing.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-8
Networked Control Systems: Architecture and Stability Issues
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-8
Networked Control Systems: Architecture and Stability Issues
- 1 July 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Automatica
- Vol. 105, 455
Authors’ Reply to Comments on “Distributed Observers Design for Leader-following Control of Multi-agent Networks”
- 1 July 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Automatica
- Vol. 105, 455
Authors’ Reply to Comments on “Distributed Observers Design for Leader-following Control of Multi-agent Networks”