BTBrian Tomlin

Brian Tomlin

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Brian Tomlin has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • 3D Printer Rentals: Technical Service Design and Pricing for Customers of Varying Expertise

    by Yue Zhang, Brian Tomlin

    Problem definition: Businesses with short-term production needs can rent equipment (e.g., 3D printer) from a manufacturer or distributor (hereafter, OEM) or use a manufacturing-services firm (e.g., print farm). Those who rent may vary in their expertise and therefore in their cost of attaining quality. Those who use a print farm benefit from the expertise of print-farm technicians. An OEM that offers rentals has an incentive to provide technical service to improve customer expertise so as to make renting attractive. Methodology/results: We analytically study the rental-and-technical-service-design problem for an OEM, accounting for the heterogeneity in customer expertise and the choice of utility-maximizing customers to rent or to use a print farm. We consider both a setting where the OEM provides the same menu of offerings to all customers (population-based strategy) and a setting where it customizes the offerings to each customer (user-based strategy). We also study an extension where the print farm actively competes and one where the OEM owns the print farm. We characterize the optimal offering for the OEM, the resulting profit, the value of customization (difference in profits under user-based and population-based strategies), and the impact of expertise distribution on these terms. Our problem is related to vertical quality differentiation but leads to several contrasting insights, including that offering a single quality level can be optimal, that the deadweight loss can be lower for a more heterogeneous customer population, and that upward (instead of the classic downward) distortion occurs. Managerial implications: We provide guidance on when technical service should be bundled with the rental and when it should be offered as an optional upgrade. Our findings highlight when rental markets with higher heterogeneity are more or less attractive. Conventional wisdom suggests that higher customer heterogeneity should increase the value of customization. We prove that this wisdom is not always correct. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1563 .


  • Credible Cheap-Talk Communication of Private Demand Information on Both the Forecast Average and Accuracy

    by Tao Lu, Brian Tomlin

    A canonical setting in supply chain research is one in which a retailer sources a product, under a wholesale price contract, from a manufacturer that invests in capacity in advance of the retailer’s order. When the retailer possesses private information about demand, it is well understood that credible cheap-talk communication is not possible absent considerations of trust or the reactive setting of the wholesale price. This understanding is based on the practice of demand information being shared as a point forecast. Motivated by the fact that some firms are now sharing information on forecast uncertainty along with the mean, we revisit the canonical setting but allow the retailer to communicate its average demand and its forecast accuracy and allow the manufacturer to have multiple sources of capacity. We establish that credible and informative communication emerges in equilibrium under very general conditions. Moreover, when the manufacturer has multiple sources of capacity that differ in reservation and execution costs, the communication can be influential, strictly improve the manufacturer’s expected profit, and result in a Pareto improvement of supply chain profits. Our results suggest that both the forecast average and accuracy should be communicated in a supply chain not only because upstream firms benefit from a quantification of uncertainty but because communicating information about forecast accuracy (in addition to average demand) enhances the credibility of communication. We establish that improvements to the manufacturer’s capacity portfolio (e.g., expansion or cost reduction) can hurt the manufacturer because of an associated reduction in information revelation. This negative effect can occur if the improvement alters or impacts the resource that, in isolation, provides the highest optimal service level. This paper was accepted by Victor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02726 .


  • The Manufacturer’s Role in Nanostore-Supermarket Supply Chain Competition

    by Jiwen Ge, Brian Tomlin

    We explore retail supply chains in emerging markets in which a manufacturer can reach consumers by selling its product through very small independent stores (nanostores) and/or through a supermarket. Nanostores offer consumers the advantage of proximity, but supermarkets offer the advantage of bulk buying. We explore the competition between the supermarket and nanostores and examine the manufacturer’s role in shaping the retail market structure for its product through wholesale price contracts. We model and analyze a multi-party supply-chain game in which a manufacturer can sell its product to spatially distributed, utility-maximizing, price-sensitive consumers through nanostores and a supermarket. Consumers can buy in bulk at the supermarket, optimizing their purchase quantity, and hence visit frequency, in an economic order quantity type approach, or they can purchase from a nanostore (frequently due to store storage-space limitations). We fully solve for the equilibrium market structure and the associated retail and wholesale prices, establishing that the manufacturer’s desired channel strategy is governed by three factors: the manufacturer-nanostore supply chain cost, the manufacturer-supermarket supply chain cost, and the supermarket bargaining power. If the supply chain efficiencies are somewhat similar, then the manufacturer should (typically, but not always) use both retail formats to avail of the nanostore advantage in serving proximate consumers and the supermarket advantage in serving distant customers. The specifics of how the manufacturer should use the retail formats will depend on the supermarket power. Among other results, we establish that aggregate nanostore demand and profit can decrease in nanostore density and that the presence of a high-power supermarket can increase consumer surplus because the manufacturer induces strong price competition.


  • Forewarned Is Forearmed? Contingent Sourcing, Shipment Information, and Supplier Competition

    by Tao Lu, Brian Tomlin

    Problem definition: Dual sourcing and contingent sourcing are important risk-mitigation strategies to manage supply chain risks, including transportation-related losses of inbound orders. Contingent sourcing as a means of managing transportation risk is made possible by shipment information realized at in-transit inspection points or through shipment monitoring technologies. We examine the impact of contingent sourcing and shipment information in a setting where a buyer can source from two competing suppliers. One supplier (unreliable) has a long transportation lead time and is prone to in-transit yield loss; the other supplier (reliable) has a short, but nonzero, lead time with no yield loss. Methodology/results: We analyze a multistage game-theoretical model in which the two suppliers compete on wholesale prices and then, the buyer determines initial order quantities. Later, the buyer can place an emergency order with the reliable supplier based on shipment information, which reveals (possibly imperfectly) the status of the in-transit order from the unreliable supplier. We show that the buyer will adopt one of four possible sourcing strategies: (1) initially source only from the unreliable supplier but resort to the reliable supplier contingent on the updated shipment information, (2) diversify its initial order across the two suppliers but resort to the reliable supplier if needed, (3) diversify its initial order and not engage in contingent sourcing, or (4) sole source from the reliable supplier. Interestingly, contingent sourcing may or may not benefit the buyer because it may soften the competition between suppliers. Moreover, the buyer’s profit may not be monotonic in the accuracy of shipment information. Managerial implications: The buyer must design its supply base so that the unreliable supplier is particularly cost efficient if the buyer is to benefit from the possibility of contingent sourcing. The buyer may not always benefit from operational improvements that enhance shipment information accuracy because they may soften supplier competition. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0540 .


  • After-Sales Service Contracting: Condition Monitoring and Data Ownership

    by Cuihong Li, Brian Tomlin

    Problem definition: Condition monitoring (CM) of durable assets, whereby sensors continuously monitor the health of an asset, is heralded as a key application of the Internet of Things. However, questions about ownership of the sensor data are seen as a key barrier to adoption. We model an after-sales supply chain in which the asset manufacturer provides maintenance and repair services to a customer that operates the asset. The asset condition deteriorates in a stochastic fashion and will eventually fail if not repaired. Methodology/results: We analyze a performance-based contracting problem considering manufacturer maintenance effort (the condition at which preventive maintenance is performed) and customer operating effort (which reduces the rate of condition deterioration). With information asymmetry on the customer’s effort cost, we analyze this contracting problem in a principal-agent model with double moral hazard. In the centralized setting, we establish that the benefit of CM increases and then decreases in the asset’s deterioration rate and that CM may increase or decrease the benefit of customer effort depending on the deterioration rate. In the decentralized setting, we prove that CM always benefits the manufacturer and the supply chain, but it may hurt the customer if the asset reliability is sufficiently high. Managerial implications: These results have important implications for the effect of sensor-data ownership. The manufacturer will adopt CM if it owns the data, but the customer may block CM adoption if it owns the data. We show that this CM adoption barrier can be overcome by the manufacturer offering to pay an appropriate data access fee. However, under this arrangement, the manufacturer may not benefit from a more-effective customer operating effort. We discuss the resulting implication on the manufacturer’s product design and the business model between selling and leasing.


  • Sourcing from a Self-Reporting Supplier: Strategic Communication of Social Responsibility in a Supply Chain

    by Tao Lu, Brian Tomlin

    Problem definition: To manage supplier social responsibility (SR), some firms have adopted a self-assessment strategy whereby they ask suppliers to self-report SR capabilities. Self-reported information is difficult to verify, and this leads to an important credibility question: can a buyer expect truthful reporting? We examine whether a supplier’s SR capability can be credibly communicated through free and unverifiable self-reporting. Academic/practical relevance: SR is a strategic focus for firms because consumers care about ethical production. Some firms rely on supplier self-assessment as part of their SR strategy. It is important to understand the value and challenges of this approach. Methodology: We develop a cheap talk model of a supplier and a buyer. The supplier is endowed with a given SR level (privately known to the supplier) that represents the probability of no violation. The buyer sells in a market that is sensitive to publicized SR violations. The supplier first communicates its SR level to the buyer, and then the buyer chooses between two audit stringency levels to conduct on the supplier and also chooses how much to order. Results: Influential truthful communication may emerge in equilibrium if (i) the buyer orders a larger quantity from the high-type supplier but imposes a more stringent audit than the buyer would for the low type and (ii) the high-type supplier opts for this larger order, whereas the low-type, fearing audit failure, does not. The buyer can benefit as the audit becomes more expensive. Managerial implications: Supplier SR self-assessments can be a valuable strategy for buyers but only if the buyer has access to auditing capabilities of different levels and does not precommit to a particular level. It is valuable for firms to engage in an up-front auditing step to ensure a minimum SR capability of approved suppliers because very low-performing suppliers never truthfully report. Implementing supplier self-assessments may or may not help reduce the social damage resulting from potential SR violations; we identify situations when it helps and when it does not.


  • The Internet of Things and Information Fusion: Who Talks to Who?

    by Soroush Saghafian, Brian Tomlin, Stephan Biller

    Problem definition: Autonomous sensors connected through the internet of things (IoT) are deployed by different firms in the same environment. The sensors measure an important operating-condition state variable, but their measurements are noisy, so estimates are imperfect. Sensors can improve their own estimates by soliciting estimates from other sensors. The choice of which sensors to communicate with (target) is challenging because sensors (1) are constrained in the number of sensors they can target and (2) only have partial knowledge of how other sensors operate—that is, they do not know others’ underlying inference algorithms/models. We study the targeting problem, examine the evolution of interfirm sensor communication patterns, and explore what drives the patterns. Academic/practical relevance: Many industries are increasingly using sensors to drive improvements in key performance metrics (e.g., asset uptime) through better information on operating conditions. Sensors will communicate among themselves to improve estimation. This IoT vision will have a major impact on operations management (OM), and OM scholars need to develop and examine models and frameworks to better understand sensor interactions. Methodology: Analytic modeling combining decision-making, estimation, optimization, and learning is used. Results: We show that when selecting its target(s), each sensor needs to consider both the measurement quality of the other sensors and its level of familiarity with their inference models. We establish that the state of the environment plays a key role in mediating quality and familiarity. When sensor qualities are public, we show that each sensor eventually settles on a constant target set, but this long-run target set is sample-path dependent (i.e., dependent on past states) and varies by sensor. The long-run network, however, can be fully defined at time zero as a random directed graph, and hence, one can probabilistically predict it. This prediction can be made perfect (i.e., the network can be identified in a deterministic way) after observing the state values for a limited number of periods. When sensor qualities are private, our results reveal that sensors may not settle on a constant target set but the subset among which it cycles can still be stochastically predicted. Managerial implications: Our work allows managers to predict (and influence) the set of other firms with which their sensors will form information links. Analogous to a manufacturer mapping its supplier base to help manage supply continuity, our work enables a firm to map its sensor-based-information suppliers to help manage information continuity.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Industry 4.0: Opportunities and Challenges for Operations Management

    by Tava Lennon Olsen, Brian Tomlin

    Industry 4.0 connotes a new industrial revolution centered around cyber-physical systems. It posits that the real-time connection of physical and digital systems, along with new enabling technologies, will change the way that work is done and therefore, how work should be managed. It has the potential to break, or at least change, the traditional operations trade-offs among the competitive priorities of cost, flexibility, speed, and quality. This article describes the technologies inherent in Industry 4.0 and the opportunities and challenges for research in this area. The focus is on goods-producing industries, which includes both the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Specific technologies discussed include additive manufacturing, the internet of things, blockchain, advanced robotics, and artificial intelligence.


  • Selling Co‐Products through a Distributor: The Impact on Product Line Design

    by Tao Lu, Ying‐Ju Chen, Brian Tomlin, Yimin Wang

    A vertical co‐product technology simultaneously produces multiple outputs that differ along a rankable quality metric. Co‐product manufacturers often sell products through a distributor. We examine a setting in which a manufacturer sells vertically differentiated co‐products through a self‐interested distributor to quality‐sensitive end customers. The manufacturer determines its production, product line design, and wholesale prices. The distributor determines its purchase quantities and retail prices. In traditional product‐line design, products can be produced independently of each other and higher‐quality products have higher production costs. This literature established that the length of the product line (i.e., difference between highest and lowest qualities) is greater in an indirect channel than in a direct channel. By contrast, co‐products cannot be produced independently of each other. Among other findings, we establish that this interdependency causes the opposite channel effect: for co‐products, the length of the product line is smaller in an indirect channel than in a direct channel. Additionally, we show that there exists a theoretical contract, combining revenue sharing and reverse slotting fees, that eliminates the indirect channel distortions in both product line design and output quantities.


  • Production Chain Disruptions: Inventory, Preparedness, and Insurance

    by Lingxiu Dong, Sammi Yu Tang, Brian Tomlin

    Disruptions that temporarily interrupt production pose a significant risk for manufacturing firms. To manage this risk, firms can purchase interruption insurance and/or deploy operational measures such as storing inventory or taking preparedness actions that reduce the expected interruption length. In this study, we explore inventory, preparedness, and insurance in a two‐stage production chain that can experience disruptions at either the upstream or downstream stage. We analytically characterize an inventory‐only model and a preparedness‐only model in which the firm uses either inventory or preparedness effort to manage disruption risk, and a joint model in which the firm deploys both operational measures. We identify the relationships between the two operational measures within a stage and across the two stages. We also examine how insurance affects a firm's optimal deployment of and preference between the two operational measures. In addition to providing insights into the interaction of these three risk management measures, our results provide insights into the production chain design. For example, the firm can reduce its disruption risk management cost by allocating more production activity downstream (when possible) and this risk management benefit can, at times, outweigh the possible production cost increase associated with allocating more production downstream.