John Hacker-Wright
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The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
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John Hacker-Wright has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Tpm: The Philosophers' Magazine
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 29 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 43 (3) , 849-856
The Practical Unity of Practical Wisdom
- 29 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 43 (3) , 849-856
The Practical Unity of Practical Wisdom
- Open Access
- 16 April 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 8 (2) , 39
Practical Wisdom, Extended Rationality, and Human Agency
This paper defends a neo-Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom as a virtue that enables human agents to reflect on and direct their lives toward virtuous ends over time. This view is sometimes assumed to require a commitment to an intellectualist Grand End or blueprint view. On that view, practical wisdom would require philosophical insight and an implausibly well worked out set of weighted preferences. In this paper, I aim to show that particularists can and should take on much of what was thought to belong to the Grand End view. I argue for a conception of practical wisdom as a virtue of extended action that accounts for overarching ends without the need to appeal to an unrealistic, intellectualized blueprint for life. Further, on the view advocated here, as in Aristotle, practical wisdom is a virtue of substantial rationality and a different capacity from instrumental rationality in that it requires reflection on what constitutes a good human life. This is not high-minded philosophical reflection and is, in fact, something rather mundane that draws on the same rational capacities we deploy to assess the goodness of actions.
- 16 April 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 8 (2) , 39
Open AccessPractical Wisdom, Extended Rationality, and Human Agency
This paper defends a neo-Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom as a virtue that enables human agents to reflect on and direct their lives toward virtuous ends over time. This view is sometimes assumed to require a commitment to an intellectualist Grand End or blueprint view. On that view, practical wisdom would require philosophical insight and an implausibly well worked out set of weighted preferences. In this paper, I aim to show that particularists can and should take on much of what was thought to belong to the Grand End view. I argue for a conception of practical wisdom as a virtue of extended action that accounts for overarching ends without the need to appeal to an unrealistic, intellectualized blueprint for life. Further, on the view advocated here, as in Aristotle, practical wisdom is a virtue of substantial rationality and a different capacity from instrumental rationality in that it requires reflection on what constitutes a good human life. This is not high-minded philosophical reflection and is, in fact, something rather mundane that draws on the same rational capacities we deploy to assess the goodness of actions.
- 15 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 220-232
National Identity and the Human Good
National Identity and the Human Good - 1
- 15 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 220-232
National Identity and the Human Good
National Identity and the Human Good - 1
- Open Access
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Dialogue
- Vol. 60 (3) , 475-482
Phronēsisand Contemplation
An appealing interpretation of Aristotle's moral psychology argues that character virtue sets the goal of the good life. On that view, practical wisdom or phronēsis supplies only the means toward the end that is grasped by the character virtues. Yet, this view has trouble accounting for the supremacy of the contemplative life, which is clearly the best life in the paradigmatic or strict sense for Aristotle. In this paper, I argue that the intellect plays a role for Aristotle in realizing the priority of the contemplative life and integrating it into our practical lives as a whole. Résumé Une interprétation attrayante de la psychologie morale d'Aristote soutient que la vertu de caractère fixe la fin de la bonne vie. De ce point de vue, la sagesse pratique ou phronēsis ne fournit que les moyens vers la fin qui est saisie par les vertus de caractère. Pourtant, cette vision a du mal à rendre compte de la suprématie de la vie contemplative, qui est clairement la meilleure vie au sens paradigmatique ou strict pour Aristote. Dans cet article, je soutiens que l'intellect joue un rôle pour Aristote dans la réalisation de la priorité de la vie contemplative et son intégration dans la totalité de notre vie pratique
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Dialogue
- Vol. 60 (3) , 475-482
Open AccessPhronēsisand Contemplation
An appealing interpretation of Aristotle's moral psychology argues that character virtue sets the goal of the good life. On that view, practical wisdom or phronēsis supplies only the means toward the end that is grasped by the character virtues. Yet, this view has trouble accounting for the supremacy of the contemplative life, which is clearly the best life in the paradigmatic or strict sense for Aristotle. In this paper, I argue that the intellect plays a role for Aristotle in realizing the priority of the contemplative life and integrating it into our practical lives as a whole. Résumé Une interprétation attrayante de la psychologie morale d'Aristote soutient que la vertu de caractère fixe la fin de la bonne vie. De ce point de vue, la sagesse pratique ou phronēsis ne fournit que les moyens vers la fin qui est saisie par les vertus de caractère. Pourtant, cette vision a du mal à rendre compte de la suprématie de la vie contemplative, qui est clairement la meilleure vie au sens paradigmatique ou strict pour Aristote. Dans cet article, je soutiens que l'intellect joue un rôle pour Aristote dans la réalisation de la priorité de la vie contemplative et son intégration dans la totalité de notre vie pratique
- 1 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (3) , 397-398
Introduction to Special Forum on "Politics and Virtue"
- 1 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (3) , 397-398
Introduction to Special Forum on "Politics and Virtue"
- 2 June 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
- Vol. 87, 127-149
Virtues as Perfections of Human Powers: On the Metaphysics of Goodness in Aristotelian Naturalism
The central idea of Philippa Foot’s Natural Goodness is that moral judgments belong to the same logical kind of judgments as those that attribute natural goodness and defect to plants and animals. But moral judgments focus on a subset of human powers that play a special role in our lives as rational animals, namely, reason, will, and desire. These powers play a central role in properly human actions: those actions in which we go for something that we see and understand as good. Many readers of Foot resolutely ignore what she says about the human good being sui generis and obstinately continue to read her as advocating a version of naturalism grounded in empirical study of human nature. One might wonder how else it could count as a naturalistic view unless we could square the view with nature as studied by the empirical sciences. In this paper, I propose a metaphysical response to this question: help can come from turning to recent defenses of Aristotelian essentialism. Foot’s naturalism can square with nature as interpreted through the lens of Aristotelian essentialism. On such a view, the virtues are perfections of human powers including reason, will, and desire.
- 2 June 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
- Vol. 87, 127-149
Virtues as Perfections of Human Powers: On the Metaphysics of Goodness in Aristotelian Naturalism
The central idea of Philippa Foot’s Natural Goodness is that moral judgments belong to the same logical kind of judgments as those that attribute natural goodness and defect to plants and animals. But moral judgments focus on a subset of human powers that play a special role in our lives as rational animals, namely, reason, will, and desire. These powers play a central role in properly human actions: those actions in which we go for something that we see and understand as good. Many readers of Foot resolutely ignore what she says about the human good being sui generis and obstinately continue to read her as advocating a version of naturalism grounded in empirical study of human nature. One might wonder how else it could count as a naturalistic view unless we could square the view with nature as studied by the empirical sciences. In this paper, I propose a metaphysical response to this question: help can come from turning to recent defenses of Aristotelian essentialism. Foot’s naturalism can square with nature as interpreted through the lens of Aristotelian essentialism. On such a view, the virtues are perfections of human powers including reason, will, and desire.
- 7 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 279-282
Interpreting the Human Form of Life: A Response to Brüllmann
- 7 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 279-282
Interpreting the Human Form of Life: A Response to Brüllmann
- 6 February 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 18 (5) , 983-993
Skill, Practical Wisdom, and Ethical Naturalism
- 6 February 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 18 (5) , 983-993
Skill, Practical Wisdom, and Ethical Naturalism
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Philosophers' Magazine
- No. 66,p. 67-69
Philippa Foot
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Philosophers' Magazine
- No. 66,p. 67-69
Philippa Foot