Lori Snyder Bennear
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Lori Snyder Bennear has a total of 26 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Frank Asche
3 shared publications- Martin D. Smith
Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, Durham, USA
3 shared publications - Sheila M. Olmstead
Associate Professor of Environmental Economics, School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, 195 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06511, USA. Telephone: 203-432-6247; Fax: 203-436-9150; sheila.olmstead{at}yale.edu; and Visiting Scholar, Resources for the Future
3 shared publications - Alessandro Tarozzi
Delete
2 shared publications Atle Oglend
2 shared publications- Kazi Matin Ahmed
Department of Geology, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 6 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 919-942
Robert N. Stavins (1948–)
- 1 May 2023
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
- Vol. 10 (3) , 787-818
Does Information Disclosure Reduce Drinking Water Violations in the United States?
- 1 May 2023
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
- Vol. 10 (3) , 787-818
Does Information Disclosure Reduce Drinking Water Violations in the United States?
- 26 November 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis
- Vol. 12 (3) , 466-493
Institutional Roles and Goals for Retrospective Regulatory Analysis
Despite repeated calls for retrospective regulatory review by every President since the 1970s, progress on implementing such reviews has been slow. We argue that part of the explanation for the slow progress to date stems from misalignment between the goals of regulatory review and the institutional framework used for the review. We define three distinct goals of regulatory review – the rule relevance goal, the rule improvement goal, and the regulatory learning goal. We then examine the text of the Presidential Executive Orders and major Congressional legislation addressing retrospective review, and document which goals were targeted and which institutions were used to conduct the reviews. We find that the U.S. federal government has almost always sought review of one rule at a time, conducted by the agency that issued or promulgated the rule and that these reviews tend to focus on rule relevance and costs. This institutional framework for retrospective review – one rule, assessed by the promulgating agency, focused on relevance and cost – is only well-suited to a narrow interpretation of the rule improvement goal. We then review alternative institutional structures that could better meet the rule improvement goal and the broader regulatory learning goal across multiple rules and agencies, and we offer recommendations for developing new guidance and institutions to promote multiagency regulatory learning.
- 26 November 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis
- Vol. 12 (3) , 466-493
Institutional Roles and Goals for Retrospective Regulatory Analysis
Despite repeated calls for retrospective regulatory review by every President since the 1970s, progress on implementing such reviews has been slow. We argue that part of the explanation for the slow progress to date stems from misalignment between the goals of regulatory review and the institutional framework used for the review. We define three distinct goals of regulatory review – the rule relevance goal, the rule improvement goal, and the regulatory learning goal. We then examine the text of the Presidential Executive Orders and major Congressional legislation addressing retrospective review, and document which goals were targeted and which institutions were used to conduct the reviews. We find that the U.S. federal government has almost always sought review of one rule at a time, conducted by the agency that issued or promulgated the rule and that these reviews tend to focus on rule relevance and costs. This institutional framework for retrospective review – one rule, assessed by the promulgating agency, focused on relevance and cost – is only well-suited to a narrow interpretation of the rule improvement goal. We then review alternative institutional structures that could better meet the rule improvement goal and the broader regulatory learning goal across multiple rules and agencies, and we offer recommendations for developing new guidance and institutions to promote multiagency regulatory learning.
- 17 March 2016
- Published by University of Wisconsin Press in Land Economics
- Vol. 92 (2) , 344-362
Spillovers in Regional Fisheries Management: Do Catch Shares Cause Leakage?
Regional councils manage U.S. fisheries. Fishermen can participate in fisheries managed by multiple councils, and effort controls in one region could lead to effort leakage into another. Theoretical modeling demonstrates that positive, negative, and no leakage are possible. Using difference-in-differences, we test for leakage across regional boundaries for a catch share program in New England and find evidence that the New England groundfish sector program caused spillover into adjacent Mid-Atlantic fisheries. Aggregate Mid-Atlantic harvest volume increased among sector members after the policy change. We find leakage in individual fisheries with similar gear and high market substitutability with sector species. (JEL Q22, Q28)
- 17 March 2016
- Published by University of Wisconsin Press in Land Economics
- Vol. 92 (2) , 344-362
Spillovers in Regional Fisheries Management: Do Catch Shares Cause Leakage?
Regional councils manage U.S. fisheries. Fishermen can participate in fisheries managed by multiple councils, and effort controls in one region could lead to effort leakage into another. Theoretical modeling demonstrates that positive, negative, and no leakage are possible. Using difference-in-differences, we test for leakage across regional boundaries for a catch share program in New England and find evidence that the New England groundfish sector program caused spillover into adjacent Mid-Atlantic fisheries. Aggregate Mid-Atlantic harvest volume increased among sector members after the policy change. We find leakage in individual fisheries with similar gear and high market substitutability with sector species. (JEL Q22, Q28)
- 1 January 2015
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Review of Environmental Economics and Policy
- Vol. 9 (1) , 2-22
Offshore Oil and Gas Drilling: A Review of Regulatory Regimes in the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway
This article investigates the regulatory regimes for offshore oil and gas in the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (U.K.), and Norway from both a positive and normative perspective. The positive analysis reveals that all three countries are converging on a similar regulatory system that combines strict liability, command-and-control, and management-based regulations for controlling site-specific risks. The timing of the adoption of each element in this regulatory system varies across the three countries and has been driven largely by accidents along the individual country’s continental shelf. In particular, the adoption of the management-based approach occurred after a significant accident revealed the weaknesses of a one-size-fits–all set of prescriptive rules. Although the normative analysis reveals theoretical support for the use of both liability and management-based approaches, the empirical data are limited, and the data that do exist call into question the superiority of the management-based approach over command-and-control. More research is needed that develops and systematically evaluates incentive-compatible regulatory regimes. (JEL: Q38, Q40, Q48, K32)
- 1 January 2015
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Review of Environmental Economics and Policy
- Vol. 9 (1) , 2-22
Offshore Oil and Gas Drilling: A Review of Regulatory Regimes in the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway
This article investigates the regulatory regimes for offshore oil and gas in the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (U.K.), and Norway from both a positive and normative perspective. The positive analysis reveals that all three countries are converging on a similar regulatory system that combines strict liability, command-and-control, and management-based regulations for controlling site-specific risks. The timing of the adoption of each element in this regulatory system varies across the three countries and has been driven largely by accidents along the individual country’s continental shelf. In particular, the adoption of the management-based approach occurred after a significant accident revealed the weaknesses of a one-size-fits–all set of prescriptive rules. Although the normative analysis reveals theoretical support for the use of both liability and management-based approaches, the empirical data are limited, and the data that do exist call into question the superiority of the management-based approach over command-and-control. More research is needed that develops and systematically evaluates incentive-compatible regulatory regimes. (JEL: Q38, Q40, Q48, K32)
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 68 (2) , 357-375
Promoting clean energy investment: An empirical analysis of property assessed clean energy
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 68 (2) , 357-375
Promoting clean energy investment: An empirical analysis of property assessed clean energy
- 1 June 2014
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Marine Resource Economics
- Vol. 29 (2) , 111-131
Spatial-dynamics of Hypoxia and Fisheries: The Case of Gulf of Mexico Brown Shrimp
© 2014 MRE foundation, Inc. All rights reserved.We analyze the Gulf of Mexico brown shrimp fishery and the potential impacts of a large seasonal area of hypoxia (low dissolved oxygen) that coincides with the peak shrimp season. A spatial-dynamic bioeconomic simulation embeds three biological impacts on shrimp: mortality, growth, and aggregation on hypoxic edges. Hypoxia creates feedbacks in the bioeconomic system, altering catch and effort patterns. System changes propagate over space to affect areas that do not experience hypoxia. Areas that might otherwise be considered controls in a natural experiments framework are contaminated by the ecological disturbance through spatial sorting. Aggregate predictions from simulations are similar to empirical fishery data. Average shrimp size and total landings are negatively correlated, as are hypoxic severity and landings. Shrimp size and hypoxic severity are only weakly negatively correlated. Growth overfishing, which varies with recruitment success and ecological disturbances, is a key mediating effect
- 1 June 2014
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Marine Resource Economics
- Vol. 29 (2) , 111-131
Spatial-dynamics of Hypoxia and Fisheries: The Case of Gulf of Mexico Brown Shrimp
© 2014 MRE foundation, Inc. All rights reserved.We analyze the Gulf of Mexico brown shrimp fishery and the potential impacts of a large seasonal area of hypoxia (low dissolved oxygen) that coincides with the peak shrimp season. A spatial-dynamic bioeconomic simulation embeds three biological impacts on shrimp: mortality, growth, and aggregation on hypoxic edges. Hypoxia creates feedbacks in the bioeconomic system, altering catch and effort patterns. System changes propagate over space to affect areas that do not experience hypoxia. Areas that might otherwise be considered controls in a natural experiments framework are contaminated by the ecological disturbance through spatial sorting. Aggregate predictions from simulations are similar to empirical fishery data. Average shrimp size and total landings are negatively correlated, as are hypoxic severity and landings. Shrimp size and hypoxic severity are only weakly negatively correlated. Growth overfishing, which varies with recruitment success and ecological disturbances, is a key mediating effect
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Wiley in Ecological Applications
- Vol. 24 (1) , 15-23
Will a catch share for whales improve social welfare?
We critique a proposal to use catch shares to manage transboundary wildlife resources with potentially high non‐extractive values, and we focus on the case of whales. Because whales are impure public goods, a policy that fails to capture all nonmarket benefits (due to free riding) could lead to a suboptimal outcome. Even if free riding were overcome, whale shares would face four implementation challenges. First, a whale share could legitimize the international trade in whale meat and expand the whale meat market. Second, a legal whale trade creates monitoring and enforcement challenges similar to those of organizations that manage highly migratory species such as tuna. Third, a whale share could create a new political economy of management that changes incentives and increases costs for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to achieve the current level of conservation. Fourth, a whale share program creates new logistical challenges for quota definition and allocation regardless of whether the market for whale products expands or contracts. Each of these issues, if left unaddressed, could result in lower overall welfare for society than under the status quo.
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Wiley in Ecological Applications
- Vol. 24 (1) , 15-23
Will a catch share for whales improve social welfare?
We critique a proposal to use catch shares to manage transboundary wildlife resources with potentially high non‐extractive values, and we focus on the case of whales. Because whales are impure public goods, a policy that fails to capture all nonmarket benefits (due to free riding) could lead to a suboptimal outcome. Even if free riding were overcome, whale shares would face four implementation challenges. First, a whale share could legitimize the international trade in whale meat and expand the whale meat market. Second, a legal whale trade creates monitoring and enforcement challenges similar to those of organizations that manage highly migratory species such as tuna. Third, a whale share could create a new political economy of management that changes incentives and increases costs for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to achieve the current level of conservation. Fourth, a whale share program creates new logistical challenges for quota definition and allocation regardless of whether the market for whale products expands or contracts. Each of these issues, if left unaddressed, could result in lower overall welfare for society than under the status quo.
- 23 December 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Environment and Development Economics
- Vol. 19 (5) , 631-647
Evolution of households' responses to the groundwater arsenic crisis in Bangladesh: information on environmental health risks can have increasing behavioral impact over time
A national campaign of well testing through 2003 enabled households in rural Bangladesh to switch, at least for drinking water, from high-arsenic wells to neighboring lower arsenic wells. We study the well-switching dynamics over time by re-interviewing, in 2008, a randomly selected subset of households in the Araihazar region who had been interviewed in 2005. Contrary to concerns that the impact of arsenic information on switching behavior would erode over time, we find that not only was 2003–2005 switching highly persistent but also new switching by 2008 doubled the share of households at unsafe wells who had switched. The passage of time also had a cost: 22 per cent of households did not recall test results by 2008. The loss of arsenic knowledge led to staying at unsafe wells and switching from safe wells. Our results support ongoing well testing for arsenic to reinforce this beneficial information.
- 23 December 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Environment and Development Economics
- Vol. 19 (5) , 631-647
Evolution of households' responses to the groundwater arsenic crisis in Bangladesh: information on environmental health risks can have increasing behavioral impact over time
A national campaign of well testing through 2003 enabled households in rural Bangladesh to switch, at least for drinking water, from high-arsenic wells to neighboring lower arsenic wells. We study the well-switching dynamics over time by re-interviewing, in 2008, a randomly selected subset of households in the Araihazar region who had been interviewed in 2005. Contrary to concerns that the impact of arsenic information on switching behavior would erode over time, we find that not only was 2003–2005 switching highly persistent but also new switching by 2008 doubled the share of households at unsafe wells who had switched. The passage of time also had a cost: 22 per cent of households did not recall test results by 2008. The loss of arsenic knowledge led to staying at unsafe wells and switching from safe wells. Our results support ongoing well testing for arsenic to reinforce this beneficial information.
- 1 March 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 65 (2) , 225-240
Impact of a randomized controlled trial in arsenic risk communication on household water-source choices in Bangladesh
- 1 March 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 65 (2) , 225-240
Impact of a randomized controlled trial in arsenic risk communication on household water-source choices in Bangladesh