Hieu V. Phan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Hieu V. Phan has a total of 30 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Nam Nguyen
4 shared publicationsSteven Freund
3 shared publicationsHien Thu Nguyen
Vietnam National University - Ho Chi Minh City (VNU-HCM)
2 shared publicationsNam H. Nguyen
2 shared publicationsShantaram P. Hegde
University of Connecticut - School of Business
2 shared publications- Viet Anh Dang
Alliance Manchester Business School
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Regulation as a Financial Stabilizer: Environmental Policy Stringency and Corporate Default Risk
We examine how environmental regulatory stringency affects corporate default risk. Using cross-country and time-series variation in environmental policy stringency, we document a negative relation between policy stringency and corporate default risk. Quasi-natural experiments based on emissions trading systems and carbon tax adoption, together with corroborative evidence from the 2015 Paris Agreement, support a causal interpretation. Mechanism analysis evidence suggests that tighter regulation encourages firm responses that enhance financial resilience, including higher environmental engagement and environmental innovation, more conservative financial policies, and stronger internal environmental governance. Overall, the findings suggest that although stricter regulation may impose near-term compliance costs, it can promote corporate adjustments that improve longer-run financial stability and reduce default risk.
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessRegulation as a Financial Stabilizer: Environmental Policy Stringency and Corporate Default Risk
We examine how environmental regulatory stringency affects corporate default risk. Using cross-country and time-series variation in environmental policy stringency, we document a negative relation between policy stringency and corporate default risk. Quasi-natural experiments based on emissions trading systems and carbon tax adoption, together with corroborative evidence from the 2015 Paris Agreement, support a causal interpretation. Mechanism analysis evidence suggests that tighter regulation encourages firm responses that enhance financial resilience, including higher environmental engagement and environmental innovation, more conservative financial policies, and stronger internal environmental governance. Overall, the findings suggest that although stricter regulation may impose near-term compliance costs, it can promote corporate adjustments that improve longer-run financial stability and reduce default risk.
- 16 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 69
Over-hedging in the shadow of weaker litigation threat
- 16 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 69
Over-hedging in the shadow of weaker litigation threat
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 60
Building a sustainable future: The role of corporate social responsibility in climate policy uncertainty management
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 60
Building a sustainable future: The role of corporate social responsibility in climate policy uncertainty management
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Data Breach Disclosures and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Data Breach Notification Laws
Exploiting the staggered adoption of data breach notification (DBN) laws, which obligate firms to disclose data breaches when they occur, as an exogenous shock to data breach disclosures, we find that the adoption of these laws leads to higher future stock price crash risk. The positive relation between DBN laws and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance, higher financial constraints, and higher information asymmetry. Our findings suggest that investors’ concerns about the consequences of data breaches and the vulnerability of breached firms’ data security heighten stock price crash risk.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessData Breach Disclosures and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Data Breach Notification Laws
Exploiting the staggered adoption of data breach notification (DBN) laws, which obligate firms to disclose data breaches when they occur, as an exogenous shock to data breach disclosures, we find that the adoption of these laws leads to higher future stock price crash risk. The positive relation between DBN laws and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance, higher financial constraints, and higher information asymmetry. Our findings suggest that investors’ concerns about the consequences of data breaches and the vulnerability of breached firms’ data security heighten stock price crash risk.
- 14 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 184 (1) , 93-113
Political Corruption and Corporate Risk-Taking
- 14 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 184 (1) , 93-113
Political Corruption and Corporate Risk-Taking
- Top Cited Papers
- 8 April 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 58 (2) , 512-542
Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Social Responsibility
This research examines the relation between shareholder litigation and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Exploiting exogenous changes in shareholder litigation rights following the staggered adoption of universal demand laws by U.S. states and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling on securities class action lawsuits, we show that weaker shareholder litigation rights lead to lower CSR scores. Moreover, the relation is stronger for firms facing higher litigation risk, and a decreased CSR score enhances firm value. Our evidence suggests that firms engage in CSR activities partly to reduce shareholder litigation risk ex ante and mitigate its consequences ex post.
- 8 April 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 58 (2) , 512-542
Top Cited PapersShareholder Litigation and Corporate Social Responsibility
This research examines the relation between shareholder litigation and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Exploiting exogenous changes in shareholder litigation rights following the staggered adoption of universal demand laws by U.S. states and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling on securities class action lawsuits, we show that weaker shareholder litigation rights lead to lower CSR scores. Moreover, the relation is stronger for firms facing higher litigation risk, and a decreased CSR score enhances firm value. Our evidence suggests that firms engage in CSR activities partly to reduce shareholder litigation risk ex ante and mitigate its consequences ex post.
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 69, 102036
Employment protection and share repurchases: Evidence from wrongful discharge laws
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 69, 102036
Employment protection and share repurchases: Evidence from wrongful discharge laws
- Open Access
- 11 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Midair Refueling for Sensation Seeking? Pilot CEOs and Corporate Debt Contracting
We examine the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) sensation seeking, which captures the desire for varied, novel, and complex personal sensations and experiences, and corporate debt contracting. Using pilot certificates as a proxy for the personality trait of sensation seeking, we find that firms with pilot CEOs use longer maturity debt financing even when long-term debt is more costly than short-term debt. Our findings are robust to controlling for the endogenous matching between firms and CEOs. Our evidence indicates that CEOs with sensation-seeking personality traits prefer long-term debt financing to avoid the liquidity risk associated with short-term debt financing that may hamper other corporate activities motivated by their sensation seeking.
- 11 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMidair Refueling for Sensation Seeking? Pilot CEOs and Corporate Debt Contracting
We examine the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) sensation seeking, which captures the desire for varied, novel, and complex personal sensations and experiences, and corporate debt contracting. Using pilot certificates as a proxy for the personality trait of sensation seeking, we find that firms with pilot CEOs use longer maturity debt financing even when long-term debt is more costly than short-term debt. Our findings are robust to controlling for the endogenous matching between firms and CEOs. Our evidence indicates that CEOs with sensation-seeking personality traits prefer long-term debt financing to avoid the liquidity risk associated with short-term debt financing that may hamper other corporate activities motivated by their sensation seeking.
- Open Access
- 24 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Shareholder Litigation Rights and Capital Structure
We exploit the staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws across U.S. states, which impedes shareholder rights to initiate derivative lawsuits, as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the relation between shareholder litigation rights and firm capital structures. We find that weaker shareholder litigation rights due to the UD law adoption lead to higher financial leverage. Furthermore, the positive relation between the UD law adoption and financial leverage is more pronounced for financially constrained firms or firms exposed to higher shareholder litigation risk ex ante. Our evidence is consistent with lower shareholder litigation threats motivating firms to increase financial leverage.
- 24 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessShareholder Litigation Rights and Capital Structure
We exploit the staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws across U.S. states, which impedes shareholder rights to initiate derivative lawsuits, as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the relation between shareholder litigation rights and firm capital structures. We find that weaker shareholder litigation rights due to the UD law adoption lead to higher financial leverage. Furthermore, the positive relation between the UD law adoption and financial leverage is more pronounced for financially constrained firms or firms exposed to higher shareholder litigation risk ex ante. Our evidence is consistent with lower shareholder litigation threats motivating firms to increase financial leverage.
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Business Research
- Vol. 95, 71-82
Policy uncertainty and firm cash holdings
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Business Research
- Vol. 95, 71-82
Policy uncertainty and firm cash holdings