Ricardo Sousa Silvestre
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ricardo Sousa Silvestre has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alan C. Herbert
Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, Oxford, UK
3 shared publications - Benedikt Paul Göcke
Chair for Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Catholic Theology, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 44780 Bochum, Germany
2 shared publications Jean-Yvez Béziau
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
2 shared publicationsPurushottama Bilimoria
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Vic, Australia
2 shared publicationsAlan Constantine Herbert
1 shared publicationAlan Herbert
Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, Oxford, UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Sophia
- p. 1-25
Paradoxical Grounding Panentheism: Acintya Bhedābheda as a Paradigmatic Instance of Panentheism
Although a number of influential Indian traditions have been understood as panentheistic by contemporary scholars, the Bhedābheda schools have remained largely absent from these discussions. This paper argues that Bhedābheda traditions can be characterized as panentheistic and, more strongly, that they constitute paradigmatic instances of panentheism. It develops this claim through a philosophical reconstruction of the metaphysics of Jīva Gosvāmī (16th century), the principal theologian of the Caitanya Bhedābheda tradition. This tradition is especially significant for three reasons. First, it exemplifies an underexplored variety of panentheism—grounding panentheism—in which the world is ‘in’ God by being grounded in God. Second, by accepting the so-called panentheistic paradox as a metaphysical feature of reality, Jīva’s model of God represents a limiting case of the paradigmatic form of panentheism exemplified by the Bhedābheda traditions, thereby serving as a paradigmatic and ideal exemplar of panentheism itself. Third, as a consequence, it compels us to reconsider the concept of panentheism itself, with important implications for both the demarcation problem and the particular notion of grounding employed in this reconstruction. More broadly, the paper illustrates a model of cross-cultural philosophy of religion in which conceptual categories are not merely applied to a tradition but are themselves refined and transformed through engagement with it.
- 29 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Sophia
- p. 1-25
Open AccessParadoxical Grounding Panentheism: Acintya Bhedābheda as a Paradigmatic Instance of Panentheism
Although a number of influential Indian traditions have been understood as panentheistic by contemporary scholars, the Bhedābheda schools have remained largely absent from these discussions. This paper argues that Bhedābheda traditions can be characterized as panentheistic and, more strongly, that they constitute paradigmatic instances of panentheism. It develops this claim through a philosophical reconstruction of the metaphysics of Jīva Gosvāmī (16th century), the principal theologian of the Caitanya Bhedābheda tradition. This tradition is especially significant for three reasons. First, it exemplifies an underexplored variety of panentheism—grounding panentheism—in which the world is ‘in’ God by being grounded in God. Second, by accepting the so-called panentheistic paradox as a metaphysical feature of reality, Jīva’s model of God represents a limiting case of the paradigmatic form of panentheism exemplified by the Bhedābheda traditions, thereby serving as a paradigmatic and ideal exemplar of panentheism itself. Third, as a consequence, it compels us to reconsider the concept of panentheism itself, with important implications for both the demarcation problem and the particular notion of grounding employed in this reconstruction. More broadly, the paper illustrates a model of cross-cultural philosophy of religion in which conceptual categories are not merely applied to a tradition but are themselves refined and transformed through engagement with it.
- Open Access
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- p. 1-20
Consciousness and Śakti-based Vedānta cosmopsychism: A philosophical reconstruction of Jīva’s Bhedābheda Vedānta
This paper explores the implications of Jīva Gosvāmī’s (sixteenth century) Bhedābheda Vedānta for the contemporary philosophical debate on consciousness, thereby contributing to the broader and growing interest in the insights that Indian traditions may bring to current discussions in the philosophy of mind. More specifically, I develop here a metaphysical, coarse-grained partial reconstruction of Jīva’s thought, arguing that it can be interpreted as a distinctive form of priority cosmopsychism, which I term śakti-based Vedānta cosmopsychism . Needless to say, this involves both a terminological and a taxonomical task, as I seek to clarify how key aspects of Jīva’s thought can be articulated through the conceptual framework and vocabulary of contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of mind. In the final part of the paper, I turn to a more fine-grained analysis, examining the implications of śakti-based Vedānta cosmopsychism for central issues in the philosophy of consciousness, including the causal exclusion problem and the explanatory gap problem, here framed as the individuation problem. I also address some few objections, among them a cosmopsychist formulation of the Vedāntic problem of imperfection.
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- p. 1-20
Open AccessConsciousness and Śakti-based Vedānta cosmopsychism: A philosophical reconstruction of Jīva’s Bhedābheda Vedānta
This paper explores the implications of Jīva Gosvāmī’s (sixteenth century) Bhedābheda Vedānta for the contemporary philosophical debate on consciousness, thereby contributing to the broader and growing interest in the insights that Indian traditions may bring to current discussions in the philosophy of mind. More specifically, I develop here a metaphysical, coarse-grained partial reconstruction of Jīva’s thought, arguing that it can be interpreted as a distinctive form of priority cosmopsychism, which I term śakti-based Vedānta cosmopsychism . Needless to say, this involves both a terminological and a taxonomical task, as I seek to clarify how key aspects of Jīva’s thought can be articulated through the conceptual framework and vocabulary of contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of mind. In the final part of the paper, I turn to a more fine-grained analysis, examining the implications of śakti-based Vedānta cosmopsychism for central issues in the philosophy of consciousness, including the causal exclusion problem and the explanatory gap problem, here framed as the individuation problem. I also address some few objections, among them a cosmopsychist formulation of the Vedāntic problem of imperfection.
- Open Access
- 6 August 2025
- Published by Universite Catholique de Louvain in TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology
- Vol. 10 (2)
Contradiction in Bhedābheda Vedānta
Bhedābheda refers to a family of Vedānta traditions that assert that ultimate reality, Brahman, is both different (bheda) and non-different (abheda) from the world and individual selves. At first glance, this seems like a contradictory statement. However, most Bhedābheda thinkers, such as Bhāskara (8th-9th Century), Nimbārka (13th Century?) and Vijñānabhikṣu (16th Century), attempt to reconcile the contradiction, asserting, for example, that Brahman is different from the world and individual selves in one sense, yet non-different in another, distinct sense of “difference.” A notable exception seems to be Jīva Gosvāmī (16th Century), a leading theologian of the Caitanya (15th-16th Century) Vaiṣṇava school. According to a widely accepted interpretation, Jīva accepts the contradiction, adding that it is inconceivable (acintya). Despite textual evidence supporting this view, evidence from Jīva’s writings and subsequent commentaries suggests his theology might also be reconstructed using the more traditional contradiction-avoiding approach. The purpose of this paper is to offer an integrated interpretation of Jīva’s Acintya Bhedābheda Vedānta, one that synthesizes both interpretations while staying true to the key elements of his ontology. This will be based on a version of Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox (LP), which I refer to as a Logic of Partial Truth (LPT). The result is a paraconsistent and glut-theoretic approach to Jīva’s theology.
- 6 August 2025
- Published by Universite Catholique de Louvain in TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology
- Vol. 10 (2)
Open AccessContradiction in Bhedābheda Vedānta
Bhedābheda refers to a family of Vedānta traditions that assert that ultimate reality, Brahman, is both different (bheda) and non-different (abheda) from the world and individual selves. At first glance, this seems like a contradictory statement. However, most Bhedābheda thinkers, such as Bhāskara (8th-9th Century), Nimbārka (13th Century?) and Vijñānabhikṣu (16th Century), attempt to reconcile the contradiction, asserting, for example, that Brahman is different from the world and individual selves in one sense, yet non-different in another, distinct sense of “difference.” A notable exception seems to be Jīva Gosvāmī (16th Century), a leading theologian of the Caitanya (15th-16th Century) Vaiṣṇava school. According to a widely accepted interpretation, Jīva accepts the contradiction, adding that it is inconceivable (acintya). Despite textual evidence supporting this view, evidence from Jīva’s writings and subsequent commentaries suggests his theology might also be reconstructed using the more traditional contradiction-avoiding approach. The purpose of this paper is to offer an integrated interpretation of Jīva’s Acintya Bhedābheda Vedānta, one that synthesizes both interpretations while staying true to the key elements of his ontology. This will be based on a version of Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox (LP), which I refer to as a Logic of Partial Truth (LPT). The result is a paraconsistent and glut-theoretic approach to Jīva’s theology.
- Open Access
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) in Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia
- Vol. 17 (1) , 369-390
Plausibilidade conceitual e a racionalidade da crença teísta
Neste artigo, apresento uma defesa da plausibilidade conceitual, entendida como uma forma epistêmica de qualificar conceitos que os situa entre o meramente possível e o atual. Para mostrar que existe plausibilidade conceitual, faço referência ao que parece estar no cerne de muitos usos da expressão “conceito plausível”: fecundidade explicativa. Na tentativa de argumentar a favor da afirmação de que a plausibilidade conceitual é de interesse filosófico, apresento um argumento baseado no debate sobre a racionalidade da crença teísta e o conceito de Deus. Para mostrar que a plausibilidade conceitual é filosoficamente viável, primeiro mostro que ela não pode ser reduzida à plausibilidade proposicional. Em seguida, ofereço uma caracterização minimamente precisa da plausibilidade conceitual; eu abordo isso tanto de uma perspectiva qualitativa como comparativa. Por fim, mostro como esses critérios qualitativos e comparativos de plausibilidade conceitual podem ser aplicados ao debate sobre a racionalidade da crença teísta e o conceito de Deus.
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) in Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia
- Vol. 17 (1) , 369-390
Open AccessPlausibilidade conceitual e a racionalidade da crença teísta
Neste artigo, apresento uma defesa da plausibilidade conceitual, entendida como uma forma epistêmica de qualificar conceitos que os situa entre o meramente possível e o atual. Para mostrar que existe plausibilidade conceitual, faço referência ao que parece estar no cerne de muitos usos da expressão “conceito plausível”: fecundidade explicativa. Na tentativa de argumentar a favor da afirmação de que a plausibilidade conceitual é de interesse filosófico, apresento um argumento baseado no debate sobre a racionalidade da crença teísta e o conceito de Deus. Para mostrar que a plausibilidade conceitual é filosoficamente viável, primeiro mostro que ela não pode ser reduzida à plausibilidade proposicional. Em seguida, ofereço uma caracterização minimamente precisa da plausibilidade conceitual; eu abordo isso tanto de uma perspectiva qualitativa como comparativa. Por fim, mostro como esses critérios qualitativos e comparativos de plausibilidade conceitual podem ser aplicados ao debate sobre a racionalidade da crença teísta e o conceito de Deus.
- 31 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 97 (2) , 83-105
The contradictory god thesis and non-dialetheic mystical contradictory theism
- 31 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 97 (2) , 83-105
The contradictory god thesis and non-dialetheic mystical contradictory theism
- Open Access
- 23 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Sophia
- Vol. 63 (3) , 379-387
Concepts of God and the Divine in Indian Traditions
- 23 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Sophia
- Vol. 63 (3) , 379-387
Open AccessConcepts of God and the Divine in Indian Traditions
- 9 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Logica Universalis
- Vol. 18 (4) , 465-488
The Logic of God: A Pluralistic Representational Theory of Concepts
- 9 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Logica Universalis
- Vol. 18 (4) , 465-488
The Logic of God: A Pluralistic Representational Theory of Concepts
- 11 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Sophia
- Vol. 63 (3) , 447-469
Panentheism and Theistic Cosmopsychism: God and the Cosmos in the Bhavagad Gītā
- 11 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Sophia
- Vol. 63 (3) , 447-469
Panentheism and Theistic Cosmopsychism: God and the Cosmos in the Bhavagad Gītā
- Open Access
- 30 April 2024
- Published by EDIPUCRS in Veritas (Porto Alegre)
- Vol. 69 (1) , e45335
Pluralidade Religiosa e o Conceito de Deus
In this article, I address some higher-order issues involving the concept of God that arise within a pluralistic context: the problem of conceptual unity, the problem of unicity of extension and the problem of homogeneity/heterogeneity. My proposal to solve these questions involves a special hybrid theory of concepts, called the theory of ideal concepts. I argue that when associated with a pluralistic vision of concepts, and formalized within a possible world structure, such theory provides a satisfactory answer to these problems. The formalization is based on a specific version of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic (SQML), and its presentation is exclusively semantic, keeping technical details to a minimum. En este artículo, abordo algunas cuestiones de orden superior relacionadas con el concepto de Dios que surgen dentro de un contexto pluralista: el problema de la unidad conceptual, el problema de la unicidad de la extensión y el problema de la homogeneidad/heterogeneidad. Mi propuesta para resolver estas cuestiones implica una teoría híbrida especial de los conceptos, denominada teoría de los conceptos ideales. Sostengo que, cuando se suma a una visión pluralista de los conceptos y se formaliza dentro de un marco de mundos posibles, tal teoría brinda una respuesta satisfactoria a estos problemas. La formalización se basa en una versión específica de Simplest Quantified Modal Logic (SQML), y su presentación es exclusivamente semántica, manteniendo los detalles técnicos al mínimo. Neste artigo, abordo algumas questões de ordem superior envolvendo o conceito de Deus que surgem dentro de um contexto pluralista: o problema da unidade conceitual, o problema da unicidade de extensão e o problema da homogeneidade/heterogeneidade. Minha proposta para resolver essas questões envolve uma teoria especial híbrida de conceitos, chamada de teoria de conceitos ideais. Argumento que, quando adicionada a uma visão pluralista de conceitos, e formalizada dentro de uma estrutura de mundos possíveis, tal teoria fornece uma resposta satisfatória a esses problemas. A formalização é feita a partir de uma versão específica da Lógica Modal Quantificada Mais Simples (SQML, do inglês Simplest Quantified Modal Logic), e sua apresentação é exclusivamente semântica, mantendo detalhes técnicos a um nível mínimo.
- 30 April 2024
- Published by EDIPUCRS in Veritas (Porto Alegre)
- Vol. 69 (1) , e45335
Open AccessPluralidade Religiosa e o Conceito de Deus
In this article, I address some higher-order issues involving the concept of God that arise within a pluralistic context: the problem of conceptual unity, the problem of unicity of extension and the problem of homogeneity/heterogeneity. My proposal to solve these questions involves a special hybrid theory of concepts, called the theory of ideal concepts. I argue that when associated with a pluralistic vision of concepts, and formalized within a possible world structure, such theory provides a satisfactory answer to these problems. The formalization is based on a specific version of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic (SQML), and its presentation is exclusively semantic, keeping technical details to a minimum. En este artículo, abordo algunas cuestiones de orden superior relacionadas con el concepto de Dios que surgen dentro de un contexto pluralista: el problema de la unidad conceptual, el problema de la unicidad de la extensión y el problema de la homogeneidad/heterogeneidad. Mi propuesta para resolver estas cuestiones implica una teoría híbrida especial de los conceptos, denominada teoría de los conceptos ideales. Sostengo que, cuando se suma a una visión pluralista de los conceptos y se formaliza dentro de un marco de mundos posibles, tal teoría brinda una respuesta satisfactoria a estos problemas. La formalización se basa en una versión específica de Simplest Quantified Modal Logic (SQML), y su presentación es exclusivamente semántica, manteniendo los detalles técnicos al mínimo. Neste artigo, abordo algumas questões de ordem superior envolvendo o conceito de Deus que surgem dentro de um contexto pluralista: o problema da unidade conceitual, o problema da unicidade de extensão e o problema da homogeneidade/heterogeneidade. Minha proposta para resolver essas questões envolve uma teoria especial híbrida de conceitos, chamada de teoria de conceitos ideais. Argumento que, quando adicionada a uma visão pluralista de conceitos, e formalizada dentro de uma estrutura de mundos possíveis, tal teoria fornece uma resposta satisfatória a esses problemas. A formalização é feita a partir de uma versão específica da Lógica Modal Quantificada Mais Simples (SQML, do inglês Simplest Quantified Modal Logic), e sua apresentação é exclusivamente semântica, mantendo detalhes técnicos a um nível mínimo.
- 10 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 167-183
On śaktis and their divine possessor
This chapter aims to reconstruct a Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava ontology of śakti. This is an initial step towards unpacking the tradition’s concept of God as expressed as the possessor of unlimited diverse śaktis, or śaktimān. “Śakti” is commonly translated as “power; energy; potency; potentiality; capacity; force; efficacy; or efficacious power”. However, the range of ontologies exhibited by the śaktis described in Gauḍīya theology has neither been fully explained in early modern Gauḍīya texts, nor has their diversity been explored in contemporary Indian Studies. This chapter directly addresses this missing information by reconstructing an overall ontological concept of śakti as it is implicitly outlined in the 16th-century Gauḍīya thinker Jīva Gosvāmī’s seminal treatise Ṣaṭ-Sandarbha. Although the author places the diverse śaktis of God, who he refers to as “Bhagavān”, into three overarching categories—intrinsic, extrinsic, and intermediary (between the other two)—it is observed that the same śaktis that fall under these divisions also act as properties of God, relations of God, semi-autonomous agents, and products. This chapter unpacks these implicit ontological divisions of śakti and their different relations with Bhagavān towards developing an understanding of the Gauḍīya concept of God as the possessor of these śaktis.
- 10 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 167-183
On śaktis and their divine possessor
This chapter aims to reconstruct a Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava ontology of śakti. This is an initial step towards unpacking the tradition’s concept of God as expressed as the possessor of unlimited diverse śaktis, or śaktimān. “Śakti” is commonly translated as “power; energy; potency; potentiality; capacity; force; efficacy; or efficacious power”. However, the range of ontologies exhibited by the śaktis described in Gauḍīya theology has neither been fully explained in early modern Gauḍīya texts, nor has their diversity been explored in contemporary Indian Studies. This chapter directly addresses this missing information by reconstructing an overall ontological concept of śakti as it is implicitly outlined in the 16th-century Gauḍīya thinker Jīva Gosvāmī’s seminal treatise Ṣaṭ-Sandarbha. Although the author places the diverse śaktis of God, who he refers to as “Bhagavān”, into three overarching categories—intrinsic, extrinsic, and intermediary (between the other two)—it is observed that the same śaktis that fall under these divisions also act as properties of God, relations of God, semi-autonomous agents, and products. This chapter unpacks these implicit ontological divisions of śakti and their different relations with Bhagavān towards developing an understanding of the Gauḍīya concept of God as the possessor of these śaktis.