YYYimin Yu

Yimin Yu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Yimin Yu has a total of 44 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Endogenous Alignment in Team Incentives Under Minimax Regret

    by Zhaolin Li, Yimin Yu

    We study robust incentive design for independently acting agents when the principal lacks knowledge of both their feasible actions and the resulting output distributions. The principal observes one reference action per agent and its coarse information, then minimizes worstcase regret relative to the contract she would choose under full knowledge of the technology. Every continuous deterministic contract is weakly regret-dominated by its endpoint linearization in gross-utility space. An optimal deterministic contract can therefore be chosen to align agents' rankings without imposing alignment, while monetary compensation may remain nonlinear. We derive an exact finite-dimensional r egret c haracterization a nd identify the trade-off between unnecessary compensation and missed productive opportunities. For symmetric two-agent teams, an optimum can be chosen either symmetric or fully concentrated. In a separate characterized multi-agent region, minimax regret motivates every member, whereas max-min appoints one lead agent.

  • Open Access

    Endogenous Alignment in Team Incentives Under Minimax Regret

    by Zhaolin Li, Yimin Yu

    We study robust incentive design for independently acting agents when the principal lacks knowledge of both their feasible actions and the resulting output distributions. The principal observes one reference action per agent and its coarse information, then minimizes worstcase regret relative to the contract she would choose under full knowledge of the technology. Every continuous deterministic contract is weakly regret-dominated by its endpoint linearization in gross-utility space. An optimal deterministic contract can therefore be chosen to align agents' rankings without imposing alignment, while monetary compensation may remain nonlinear. We derive an exact finite-dimensional regret characterization and identify the trade-off between unnecessary compensation and missed productive opportunities. For symmetric two-agent teams, an optimum can be chosen either symmetric or fully concentrated. In a separate characterized multi-agent region, minimax regret motivates every member, whereas max-min appoints one lead agent.

  • Pricing Under Consumer Habituation: The Optimality of a Familiarity-Based Threshold Policy

    by Binghan Kou, Yimin Yu, Yihang Yang

    Empirical evidence indicates that consumers experience a relative loss of excitement over time and miss their habits when refraining from consumption under repeated purchases. Despite the practices of first-time trials and welcome-back offers, how to exploit this habituation behavior through customized dynamic pricing is overlooked in the existing literature. In this article, we analyze the long-run optimal customized dynamic pricing strategy in the presence of consumer habituation for time/frequency-based consumption. The consumer’s willingness to pay is determined by past consumption via the habitual level of consumption. We formulate the seller’s continuous-time profit maximization problem over an infinite horizon as an optimal control problem and derive the closed-form value function and optimal pricing strategy. We identify a key condition on the willingness-to-pay function that captures both the magnitude of the habituation effect and the saturated willingness to pay, which plays a central role in determining the seller’s optimal pricing policy. When consumers retain interest even at high levels of habitual consumption, always selling by pricing at their current willingness to pay is optimal. In contrast, if consumers lose interest when saturated, the optimal policy becomes a cutoff strategy, where the seller offers the product only when consumption remains below a critical threshold and prices out consumers beyond it. We further examine the resulting pricing and consumption dynamics and characterize an equilibrium habitual level of consumption at which randomized promotions can be optimal. Furthermore, our key findings qualitatively hold under random consumer valuation, but with richer patterns. Our work provides a tractable, closed-form characterization of the optimal dynamic pricing policy under consumer habituation, offering a more nuanced understanding of the strategic implications of an inverted U-shaped willingness-to-pay.

  • Fleet Repositioning for Vehicle Sharing Systems: Asymptotic Optimality of the Balanced Myopic Policy

    by Yihang Yang, Yimin Yu, Qian Wang, Junming Liu

    We investigate the fleet repositioning problem aimed at dynamically optimizing vehicle distributions to maximize long-run average social welfare in a vehicle-sharing system. We model the problem as a Markov decision process under the ex ante committed decision scheme, characterizing the balanced myopic policy as optimal for the average reward setting. This policy efficiently aligns vehicle supply with trip demand and mitigates the curse of dimensionality, enhancing computational efficiency significantly. Our analysis demonstrates that although the balanced myopic policy operates with less information, potentially leading to performance losses, the maximum performance gap relative to the ex post decision scheme asymptotically converges to zero as the system size increases. This finding underscores the asymptotic optimality of the balanced myopic policy, particularly in large systems, making it a robust and effective solution for fleet repositioning. Moreover, we extend our investigation to settings with seasonal demand, confirming that a generalized balanced myopic policy remains optimal. Through comprehensive numerical experiments and a counterfactual case study of a real-world vehicle-sharing system, we quantify the operational value of our approach. This study not only validates the balanced myopic policy against more information-intensive solutions but also illuminates effective heuristic design strategies for improving the efficiency of fleet repositioning in vehicle sharing systems.


  • Dynamic Multi-product Procurement With Joint and Individual Setup Costs: Theory and Insights

    by Xiangyin Kong, Yimin Yu, Huihui Wang

    In practice, it is common, especially for online retailers, to bundle different products together during procurement to save transportation and handling costs. It is important to understand and theorize how to manage dynamic procurement by taking advantage of joint ordering in the presence of joint and individual setup costs. In this article, we characterize the structure of optimal policy for a periodic review multiproduct inventory system with multiple setup costs, including a joint setup cost and an individual setup cost for each product. By proposing the notion of [ ]-quasi-convexity, we show that an optimal procurement policy for such a system follows the so-called ([ ]) policy when demands increase stochastically over time: order up to [ ] for states in the region [ ], do not order for states in the region [ ], and order certain quantities for states in neither [ ] nor [ ]. To better understand the optimal policy, we provide the bounds for the optimal order-up-to levels and the boundary sets of the optimal policy. Under the convex single-period inventory costs, we also provide a lower bound deterministic system which can be asymptotically optimal as the coefficient of variations decreases to zero. Leveraging these operational insights, we propose five simple heuristic policies: the independent ([ ]) policy, vector ([ ]) policy, linear interpolation ([ ]) policy, the deterministic approximation, and the weighted deterministic approximation policy. Extensive numerical experiments indicate that the last three heuristics perform well. In particular, the weighted deterministic approximation policy, whose average performance gap is < 1%, dominates the others in almost all our numerical experiments. Finally, we show that how our results can be extended to systems with more complex setup cost functions, such as time-varying, set-based, and quantity-dependent setup costs.


  • Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem with Service Time Target and Expediting

    by Xiaobei Shen, Yimin Yu, Jing-Sheng Song

    Problem definition: We study the optimal inventory ordering, expediting, and allocation decisions in a multiechelon supply chain over a finite horizon, in which customer orders are quoted with a fixed fulfillment time window, termed the service time target (STT). Academic/practical relevance: Service time target is commonly used as a marketing strategy to increase customer satisfaction and strengthen firms’ competitive edge. However, how to efficiently manage a multistage supply chain to meet the target has received relatively scant attention in the literature. Our study fills this gap. Methodology: We use dynamic programming to characterize the optimal policy. Results: We show that an echelon base stock policy and a rationing policy are optimal for inventory ordering and inventory allocation/expediting, respectively. We also develop a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal policy. To derive these results, we uncover a new functional property named the decomposable of degree 2 property, which is a nontrivial generalization of the celebrated Clark-Scarf decomposition. This property further allows us to derive induced penalty and compensation to coordinate a decentralized serial system with STT and expediting. Managerial implications: Our result provides an efficient decision tool for managing centralized and decentralized serial supply chains with STT and expediting. Our model can be used to quantify the tradeoff between marketing and operational decisions, such as the impact of a marginal reduction in STT on system cost and expedition frequency, as explored in our numerical studies.


  • Offering Free Upgrades Even Before Stocks Run Out: The Value of Proactive Upgrades

    by David Chen, Christopher S. Tang, Huihui Wang, Rowan Wang, Yimin Yu

    Problem definition: When selling multiple products with different feature combinations over a short selling season, a seller often adopts a “reactive” upgrade policy by offering a free upgrade to the next-price-level product only after a customer’s preferred product is out of stock. However, when customers’ preferences are heterogeneous for different feature combinations, some unyielding customers may reject free upgrades. In this paper, we consider a new “proactive” upgrade policy under which the seller may offer free upgrades even before a product is out of stock. Academic/practical relevance: The proactive upgrade policy enables the seller to strategically keep some units of a product in reserve to secure future sales of this product for those unyielding customers. However, the value of the proactive upgrade policy over the traditional reactive upgrade policy remains unclear. Methodology: Given the product choice probability the “upgrade acceptance probability” of each arriving customer, we formulate the problem of how to offer proactive upgrades as a finite horizon dynamic program with an embedded Markov decision process, and we determine the optimal proactive upgrade policy. Results: By exploiting the underlying mathematical structure, we prove that the optimal value function possesses the “anti-multimodularity” property such that the optimal upgrade strategy under the proactive upgrade policy is governed by two state-dependent thresholds: one threshold dictates when to offer proactive upgrades, and the other threshold dictates when to offer reactive upgrades. We also show that the proactive upgrade policy can create significant value over the reactive upgrade policy when the next-price-level product has similar consumer utility or when the price sensitivity is intermediate. Managerial implications: We identify the conditions under which the proactive upgrade policy provides significant value over the traditional reactive upgrade policy. These results can be useful for sellers who sell variants of similar products with different feature combinations to customers with heterogeneous feature preferences.


  • Incentives for Shared Services: Multiserver Queueing Systems with Priorities

    by Hanlin Liu, Yimin Yu

    Problem definition: We study shared service whereby multiple independent service providers collaborate by pooling their resources into a shared service center (SSC). The SSC deploys an optimal priority scheduling policy for their customers collectively by accounting for their individual waiting costs and service-level requirements. We model the SSC as a multiclass [ ] queueing system subject to service-level constraints. Academic/practical relevance: Shared services are increasingly popular among firms for saving operational costs and improving service quality. One key issue in fostering collaboration is the allocation of costs among different firms. Methodology: To incentivize collaboration, we investigate cost allocation rules for the SSC by applying concepts from cooperative game theory. Results: To empower our analysis, we show that a cooperative game with polymatroid optimization can be analyzed via simple auxiliary games. By exploiting the polymatroidal structures of the multiclass queueing systems, we show when the games possess a core allocation. We explore the extent to which our results remain valid for some general cases. Managerial implications: We provide operational insights and guidelines on how to allocate costs for the SSC under the multiserver queueing context with priorities.