Peter M. Jones
Research Subjects
Peter M. Jones has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
John M. Pearce
School of Psychology, Cardiff University
6 shared publications- Mark Haselgrove
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham
6 shared publications - Anthony McGregor
Psychology, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom, UK
4 shared publications Chris J. Mitchell
School of Psychology, University of Plymouth
4 shared publicationsMark A. Good
4 shared publications- Andy Wills
School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Plymouth PL4 8AA, UK
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 48 (1) , 1-16
Theory protection: Do humans protect existing associative links?
Theories of associative learning often propose that learning is proportional to prediction error, or the difference between expected events and those that occur. Spicer et al. (2020) suggested an alternative, that humans might instead selectively attribute surprising outcomes to cues that they are not confident about, to maintain cue-outcome associations about which they are more confident. Spicer et al. reported three predictive learning experiments, the results of which were consistent with their proposal ("theory protection") rather than a prediction error account (Rescorla, 2001). The four experiments reported here further test theory protection against a prediction error account. Experiments 3 and 4 also test the proposals of Holmes et al. (2019), who suggested a function mapping learning to performance that can explain Spicer et al.'s results using a prediction-error framework. In contrast to the previous study, these experiments were based on inhibition rather than excitation. Participants were trained with a set of cues (represented by letters), each of which was followed by the presence or absence of an outcome (represented by + or -). Following this, a cue that previously caused the outcome (A+) was placed in compound with another cue (B) with an ambiguous causal status (e.g., a novel cue in Experiment 1). This compound (AB-) did not cause the outcome. Participants always learned more about B in the second training phase, despite A always having the greater prediction error. In Experiments 3 and 4, a cue with no apparent prediction error was learned about more than a cue with a large prediction error. Experiment 4 tested participants' relative confidence about the causal status of cues A and B prior to the AB- stage, producing findings that are consistent with theory protection and inconsistent with the predictions of Rescorla, and Holmes et al. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 January 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 48 (1) , 1-16
Theory protection: Do humans protect existing associative links?
Theories of associative learning often propose that learning is proportional to prediction error, or the difference between expected events and those that occur. Spicer et al. (2020) suggested an alternative, that humans might instead selectively attribute surprising outcomes to cues that they are not confident about, to maintain cue-outcome associations about which they are more confident. Spicer et al. reported three predictive learning experiments, the results of which were consistent with their proposal ("theory protection") rather than a prediction error account (Rescorla, 2001). The four experiments reported here further test theory protection against a prediction error account. Experiments 3 and 4 also test the proposals of Holmes et al. (2019), who suggested a function mapping learning to performance that can explain Spicer et al.'s results using a prediction-error framework. In contrast to the previous study, these experiments were based on inhibition rather than excitation. Participants were trained with a set of cues (represented by letters), each of which was followed by the presence or absence of an outcome (represented by + or -). Following this, a cue that previously caused the outcome (A+) was placed in compound with another cue (B) with an ambiguous causal status (e.g., a novel cue in Experiment 1). This compound (AB-) did not cause the outcome. Participants always learned more about B in the second training phase, despite A always having the greater prediction error. In Experiments 3 and 4, a cue with no apparent prediction error was learned about more than a cue with a large prediction error. Experiment 4 tested participants' relative confidence about the causal status of cues A and B prior to the AB- stage, producing findings that are consistent with theory protection and inconsistent with the predictions of Rescorla, and Holmes et al. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 April 2021
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 47 (2) , 216-217
Similarities and differences: Comment on Chan et al. (2021).
Spicer et al. (2020) reported a series of causal learning experiments in which participants appeared to learn most readily about cues when they were not certain of their causal status and proposed that their results were a consequence of participants' use of theory protection. In the present issue, Chan et al. (2021) present an alternative view, using a modification of Rescorla and Wagner's (1972) influential model of learning. Although the explanation offered by Chan et al. appears very different from that suggested by Spicer et al., there are conceptual commonalities. Here we briefly discuss the similarities and differences of the 2 approaches and agree with Chan et al.'s proposal that the best way to advance the debate will be to test situations in which the 2 theories make differing predictions.
- 1 April 2021
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 47 (2) , 216-217
Similarities and differences: Comment on Chan et al. (2021).
Spicer et al. (2020) reported a series of causal learning experiments in which participants appeared to learn most readily about cues when they were not certain of their causal status and proposed that their results were a consequence of participants' use of theory protection. In the present issue, Chan et al. (2021) present an alternative view, using a modification of Rescorla and Wagner's (1972) influential model of learning. Although the explanation offered by Chan et al. appears very different from that suggested by Spicer et al., there are conceptual commonalities. Here we briefly discuss the similarities and differences of the 2 approaches and agree with Chan et al.'s proposal that the best way to advance the debate will be to test situations in which the 2 theories make differing predictions.
- 1 April 2020
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 46 (2) , 151-161
Theory protection in associative learning: Humans maintain certain beliefs in a manner that violates prediction error.
Three experiments were conducted to investigate a possible role for certainty in human causal learning. In these experiments, human participants were initially trained with a set of cues, each of which was followed by the presence or absence of an outcome. In a subsequent training stage, 2 of these cues were trained in a causal compound, and the change in associative strength for each of the cues was compared, using a procedure based on Rescorla (2001). In each experiment, the cues differed in both their causal certainty (on the part of participants) and size of their prediction error (with respect to the outcome). The cue with the larger prediction error was always the cue with the more certain causal status. According to established prediction error models (Bush & Mosteller, 1951; Rescorla, 2001; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), a larger prediction error should result in a greater updating of associative strength. However, the opposite was observed, as participants always learned more about the cue with the smaller prediction error. A plausible explanation is that participants engaged in a form of theory protection, in which they were resistant to updating their existing beliefs about cues with a certain causal status. Instead, participants appeared to attribute outcomes to cues with a comparatively uncertain causal status, in an apparent violation of prediction error. The potential role of attentional processes (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980) in explaining these results is also discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 April 2020
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 46 (2) , 151-161
Theory protection in associative learning: Humans maintain certain beliefs in a manner that violates prediction error.
Three experiments were conducted to investigate a possible role for certainty in human causal learning. In these experiments, human participants were initially trained with a set of cues, each of which was followed by the presence or absence of an outcome. In a subsequent training stage, 2 of these cues were trained in a causal compound, and the change in associative strength for each of the cues was compared, using a procedure based on Rescorla (2001). In each experiment, the cues differed in both their causal certainty (on the part of participants) and size of their prediction error (with respect to the outcome). The cue with the larger prediction error was always the cue with the more certain causal status. According to established prediction error models (Bush & Mosteller, 1951; Rescorla, 2001; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), a larger prediction error should result in a greater updating of associative strength. However, the opposite was observed, as participants always learned more about the cue with the smaller prediction error. A plausible explanation is that participants engaged in a form of theory protection, in which they were resistant to updating their existing beliefs about cues with a certain causal status. Instead, participants appeared to attribute outcomes to cues with a comparatively uncertain causal status, in an apparent violation of prediction error. The potential role of attentional processes (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980) in explaining these results is also discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 January 2019
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 45 (1) , 111-124
Uncertainty and blocking in human causal learning.
The blocking phenomenon is one of the most enduring issues in the study of learning. Numerous explanations have been proposed, which fall into two main categories. An associative analysis states that. following A+/AX+ training, Cue A prevents an associative link from forming between X and the outcome. In contrast, an inferential explanation is that A+/AX+ training does not permit an inference that X causes the outcome. More specifically, the trials on which X is presented (AX+) are often argued to be uninformative with respect to the causal status of X because the outcome would have resulted on AX trials whether X was causal or not. If participants are uncertain about X, their ratings on test might be particularly sensitive to the overall base rate of the outcome. That is, a blocked cue, about which one is uncertain, should be rated as a more likely cause when most cues lead to the outcome than when most cues do not. This hypothesis was supported in 2 experiments. Experiment 1 used an overshadowing control and Experiment 2 used an uncorrelated control (to demonstrate a redundancy effect). Variations in the ratings of the blocked cue as a result of manipulating the outcome base rate can be explained if participants are uncertain about the status of the blocked cue. Experiment 3 showed that participants are uncertain about blocked cues by using a direct self-report measure of certainty. These data are consistent with the inferential account, but are more challenging for the associative analysis.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 45 (1) , 111-124
Uncertainty and blocking in human causal learning.
The blocking phenomenon is one of the most enduring issues in the study of learning. Numerous explanations have been proposed, which fall into two main categories. An associative analysis states that. following A+/AX+ training, Cue A prevents an associative link from forming between X and the outcome. In contrast, an inferential explanation is that A+/AX+ training does not permit an inference that X causes the outcome. More specifically, the trials on which X is presented (AX+) are often argued to be uninformative with respect to the causal status of X because the outcome would have resulted on AX trials whether X was causal or not. If participants are uncertain about X, their ratings on test might be particularly sensitive to the overall base rate of the outcome. That is, a blocked cue, about which one is uncertain, should be rated as a more likely cause when most cues lead to the outcome than when most cues do not. This hypothesis was supported in 2 experiments. Experiment 1 used an overshadowing control and Experiment 2 used an uncorrelated control (to demonstrate a redundancy effect). Variations in the ratings of the blocked cue as a result of manipulating the outcome base rate can be explained if participants are uncertain about the status of the blocked cue. Experiment 3 showed that participants are uncertain about blocked cues by using a direct self-report measure of certainty. These data are consistent with the inferential account, but are more challenging for the associative analysis.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
- Vol. 71 (8) , 1748-1760
The redundancy effect in human causal learning: No evidence for changes in selective attention
Several recent papers have reported a difference in associative learning for two kinds of redundant cues, such that a blocked cue (e.g., X in A+ AX+) apparently forms a stronger association with the outcome than an uncorrelated cue (e.g., Y in BY+ CY-). This difference is referred to as the redundancy effect, and is of interest because it is contrary to the predictions of a number of popular learning models. One way of reconciling these models with the redundancy effect is to assume that the amount of attention paid to redundant cues changes as a result of experience, and that these changes in attention influence subsequent learning. Here, we present two experiments designed to evaluate this idea, in which we measured overt attention using an eye tracker while participants completed a learning task that elicited the redundancy effect. In both experiments, gaze duration was longer for uncorrelated cues than for blocked cues, but this difference disappeared when we divided gaze durations by trial durations. In Experiment 2, we failed to observe any difference in gaze duration when blocked and uncorrelated cues were subsequently presented together. While the observed difference in gaze duration for the two types of redundant cue may contribute to differences in learning during initial training, we suggest that the principal causes of the redundancy effect are likely to lie elsewhere.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
- Vol. 71 (8) , 1748-1760
Open AccessThe redundancy effect in human causal learning: No evidence for changes in selective attention
Several recent papers have reported a difference in associative learning for two kinds of redundant cues, such that a blocked cue (e.g., X in A+ AX+) apparently forms a stronger association with the outcome than an uncorrelated cue (e.g., Y in BY+ CY-). This difference is referred to as the redundancy effect, and is of interest because it is contrary to the predictions of a number of popular learning models. One way of reconciling these models with the redundancy effect is to assume that the amount of attention paid to redundant cues changes as a result of experience, and that these changes in attention influence subsequent learning. Here, we present two experiments designed to evaluate this idea, in which we measured overt attention using an eye tracker while participants completed a learning task that elicited the redundancy effect. In both experiments, gaze duration was longer for uncorrelated cues than for blocked cues, but this difference disappeared when we divided gaze durations by trial durations. In Experiment 2, we failed to observe any difference in gaze duration when blocked and uncorrelated cues were subsequently presented together. While the observed difference in gaze duration for the two types of redundant cue may contribute to differences in learning during initial training, we suggest that the principal causes of the redundancy effect are likely to lie elsewhere.
- Open Access
- 21 November 2017
- Published by Projekt Avant in AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard
- Vol. VIII (Special) , 135-146
Creativity and Blocking: No Evidence for an Association
- 21 November 2017
- Published by Projekt Avant in AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard
- Vol. VIII (Special) , 135-146
Open AccessCreativity and Blocking: No Evidence for an Association
- Open Access
- 1 April 2017
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 43 (2) , 159-170
Familiarity-based stimulus generalization of conditioned suppression.
We report that stimulus novelty/familiarity is able to modulate stimulus generalization and discuss the theoretical implications of novelty/familiarity coding. Rats in Skinner boxes received clicker → shock pairings before generalization testing to a tone. Before clicker training, different groups of rats received preexposure treatments designed to systematically modulate the clicker and the tone's novelty and familiarity. Rats whose preexposure matched novelty/familiarity (i.e., either both or neither clicker and tone were preexposed) showed enhanced suppression to the tone relative to rats whose preexposure mixed novelty/familiarity (i.e., only clicker or tone was preexposed). This was not the result of sensory preconditioning to clicker and tone. (PsycINFO Database Record
- 1 April 2017
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 43 (2) , 159-170
Open AccessFamiliarity-based stimulus generalization of conditioned suppression.
We report that stimulus novelty/familiarity is able to modulate stimulus generalization and discuss the theoretical implications of novelty/familiarity coding. Rats in Skinner boxes received clicker → shock pairings before generalization testing to a tone. Before clicker training, different groups of rats received preexposure treatments designed to systematically modulate the clicker and the tone's novelty and familiarity. Rats whose preexposure matched novelty/familiarity (i.e., either both or neither clicker and tone were preexposed) showed enhanced suppression to the tone relative to rats whose preexposure mixed novelty/familiarity (i.e., only clicker or tone was preexposed). This was not the result of sensory preconditioning to clicker and tone. (PsycINFO Database Record
- Open Access
- 1 January 2015
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 41 (1) , 91-104
Evidence for concrete but not abstract representation of length during spatial learning in rats.
In 4 experiments, rats had to discriminate between the lengths of 2 objects of the same color, black or white, before a test trial with the same objects but of opposite color. The experiments took place in a pool from which rats had to escape by swimming to 1 of 2 submerged platforms. For Experiments 1 and 2, the platforms were situated near the centers of panels of 1 length, but not another, that were pasted onto the gray walls of a square arena. The acquired preference for the correct length was eliminated by changing the color of the panels. In Experiment 3, the platforms were situated near the middle of the long walls of a rectangular pool, and in Experiment 4 they were situated in 1 pair of diagonally opposite corners of the same pool. Changing the color of the walls markedly disrupted the effects of the original training in both experiments. The results indicate that rats represent the length of objects not by their abstract, geometric attributes but in a more concrete fashion such as by a mental snapshot or by the amount of color stimulation they provide.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 41 (1) , 91-104
Open AccessEvidence for concrete but not abstract representation of length during spatial learning in rats.
In 4 experiments, rats had to discriminate between the lengths of 2 objects of the same color, black or white, before a test trial with the same objects but of opposite color. The experiments took place in a pool from which rats had to escape by swimming to 1 of 2 submerged platforms. For Experiments 1 and 2, the platforms were situated near the centers of panels of 1 length, but not another, that were pasted onto the gray walls of a square arena. The acquired preference for the correct length was eliminated by changing the color of the panels. In Experiment 3, the platforms were situated near the middle of the long walls of a rectangular pool, and in Experiment 4 they were situated in 1 pair of diagonally opposite corners of the same pool. Changing the color of the walls markedly disrupted the effects of the original training in both experiments. The results indicate that rats represent the length of objects not by their abstract, geometric attributes but in a more concrete fashion such as by a mental snapshot or by the amount of color stimulation they provide.
- Open Access
- 24 December 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Learning & Behavior
- Vol. 43 (1) , 72-82
The fate of redundant cues: Further analysis of the redundancy effect
Pearce, Dopson, Haselgrove, and Esber (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 38, 167–179, 2012) conducted a series of experiments with rats and pigeons in which the conditioned responding elicited by two types of redundant cue was compared. One of these redundant cues was a blocked cue X from A+ AX+ training, whereas the other was cue Y from a simple discrimination BY+ CY–. Greater conditioned responding was elicited by X than by Y; we refer to this difference as the redundancy effect. To test an explanation of this effect in terms of comparator theory (Denniston, Savastano, & Miller, 2001), a single group of rats in Experiment 1 received training of the form A+ AX+ BY+ CY–, followed by an A– Y+ discrimination. Responding to the individual cues was tested both before and after the latter discrimination. In addition to a replication of the redundancy effect during the earlier test, we observed stronger responding to B than to X, both during the earlier test and, in contradiction of the theory, after the A– Y+ discrimination. In Experiment 2, a blocking group received A+ AX+, a continuous group received AX+ BX–, and a partial group received AX± BX± training. Subsequent tests with X again demonstrated the redundancy effect, but also revealed a stronger response in the partial than in the continuous group. This pattern of results is difficult to explain with error-correction theories that assume that stimuli compete for associative strength during conditioning. We suggest, instead, that the influence of a redundant cue is determined by its relationship with the event with which it is paired, and by the attention it is paid.
- 24 December 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Learning & Behavior
- Vol. 43 (1) , 72-82
Open AccessThe fate of redundant cues: Further analysis of the redundancy effect
Pearce, Dopson, Haselgrove, and Esber (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 38, 167–179, 2012) conducted a series of experiments with rats and pigeons in which the conditioned responding elicited by two types of redundant cue was compared. One of these redundant cues was a blocked cue X from A+ AX+ training, whereas the other was cue Y from a simple discrimination BY+ CY–. Greater conditioned responding was elicited by X than by Y; we refer to this difference as the redundancy effect. To test an explanation of this effect in terms of comparator theory (Denniston, Savastano, & Miller, 2001), a single group of rats in Experiment 1 received training of the form A+ AX+ BY+ CY–, followed by an A– Y+ discrimination. Responding to the individual cues was tested both before and after the latter discrimination. In addition to a replication of the redundancy effect during the earlier test, we observed stronger responding to B than to X, both during the earlier test and, in contradiction of the theory, after the A– Y+ discrimination. In Experiment 2, a blocking group received A+ AX+, a continuous group received AX+ BX–, and a partial group received AX± BX± training. Subsequent tests with X again demonstrated the redundancy effect, but also revealed a stronger response in the partial than in the continuous group. This pattern of results is difficult to explain with error-correction theories that assume that stimuli compete for associative strength during conditioning. We suggest, instead, that the influence of a redundant cue is determined by its relationship with the event with which it is paired, and by the attention it is paid.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2013
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes
- Vol. 39 (4) , 342-356
Asymmetry in the discrimination of length during spatial learning.
The ability of rats to solve a discrimination between two objects that differ in length was investigated in five experiments. Using a rectangular swimming pool, Experiment 1 revealed it is easier to locate a submerged platform when it is near the center of a long rather than a short wall. For Experiments 2-4, the objects were black or white panels pasted onto the gray walls of a square pool, with two long panels pasted to two opposing walls and two short panels pasted to the remaining walls. The platform was easier to locate when it was placed near the middle of a long rather than a short panel. This effect was found when the long panels were twice (Experiments 2-4) or four times the length of the short panels (Experiment 4). Experiment 5 demonstrated that rats can solve a discrimination between panels of length 15 and 45 cm more readily than when they are 70 and 100 cm. The results are consistent with the claim that generalization gradients based on stimulus magnitude are steeper for stimuli that are weaker rather than stronger than the stimulus used for the original training.
- 1 October 2013
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes
- Vol. 39 (4) , 342-356
Open AccessAsymmetry in the discrimination of length during spatial learning.
The ability of rats to solve a discrimination between two objects that differ in length was investigated in five experiments. Using a rectangular swimming pool, Experiment 1 revealed it is easier to locate a submerged platform when it is near the center of a long rather than a short wall. For Experiments 2-4, the objects were black or white panels pasted onto the gray walls of a square pool, with two long panels pasted to two opposing walls and two short panels pasted to the remaining walls. The platform was easier to locate when it was placed near the middle of a long rather than a short panel. This effect was found when the long panels were twice (Experiments 2-4) or four times the length of the short panels (Experiment 4). Experiment 5 demonstrated that rats can solve a discrimination between panels of length 15 and 45 cm more readily than when they are 70 and 100 cm. The results are consistent with the claim that generalization gradients based on stimulus magnitude are steeper for stimuli that are weaker rather than stronger than the stimulus used for the original training.