Rudra Chaudhuri

The India–Pakistan War of September 1965 has attracted little attention in the larger body of work on South Asia. Further, almost nothing has been written on the earlier skirmish, in April 1965, between Indian and Pakistani security forces in the Rann-of-Kutch, an uninhabited salt marsh. This article argues that the limited conflict in the Rann, its immediate consequences, and its impact on Pakistani military and civilian leaders were central to Pakistan’s consideration of a military solution to the ongoing dispute in Kashmir, which then led to Indian retaliation and the outbreak of war.

This Special Issue looks at the importance of institutions and the role played by international actors in crucial episodes of India’s strategic history. The contributions trace India’s tryst with war and peace from immediately before the foundation of the contemporary Indian state to the last military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999. The focus of the articles is as much on India as it is on Pakistan and China, its opponents in war. The articles offer a fresh take on the creation of India as a regional military power, and her approach to War and Peace in the post-independence period.

The period known as the “Emergency” in India—June 1975 to March 1977—is widely recognised as one of the darkest episodes in the nation’s 70-year history. Fundamental rights were suspended, whilst the courts had little or no authority. The security services received emergency powers to make arrests without explanation. Although the political, social, and economic history of the Emergency remains well known, there is nothing on the international history of this period. This analysis provides the first contribution to its diplomatic history. Examining the role played by the United States and Britain, in particular, finds basis largely on declassified papers available in the Indian, American, and British national archives as well as a survey of over 300 newspaper articles on and around the Indian Emergency.

China and Pakistan share what is widely known as an 'all weather friendship'. The historical roots of this friendship can be traced to 1963, when the two countries entered into a border agreement that divided territory in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Since then, China has provided missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan. It has limited the potential for escalation in the time of war between India and Pakistan and is the largest economic investor in Pakistan. The benefits of this friendship for Pakistan are clear. Yet, there is little detail on what led to the making of the 'all weather friendship'. This article provides a detailed account of Sino-Pakistani relations between 1949 and 1963. It argues that whilst the 1963 agreement led to a turning point, the Pakistani establishment - military and civilian - sought to engage China since 1949. They did so to create strategic options for themselves in the event that the US and the UK - Pakistan's main allies following independence - limited or worse, ended their support for Pakistan in its troubled relations with India. This article is based on primary sources available in the US, Britain, as well as recently declassified and hitherto unused papers in India.

Political scientists and analysts have long argued that Indian strategic restraint is informed primarily by Indian political leaders’ aversion to the use of force. For some scholars, India’s apparent fixation with restraint can be traced to the very foundation of the modern Indian state. This article contests what it considers to be a reductionist position on strategic restraint. Instead, it argues that Indian strategic restraint has in fact been shaped more by structural issues such as the limited availability of logistics and capabilities, the impact of domestic political contest, the effect of international attention to a crisis and the need for international legitimacy, and the political, economic, and military cost-benefit analysis associated with the use of force and the potential for escalation. In sum, it contributes a historically grounded understanding of strategic restraint. The article looks closely at India’s decision-making process in one major experiment with the use of force against Pakistan in 1965. The case clearly shows that political leaders were hardly uncomfortable or unsure about the use of force. It was the military leadership at the time that sought to temper the ambitious and potentially escalatory policies considered by the then prime minister.

A. Vinod Kumar, India and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime: The Perennial Outlier. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. 2014. 233 pages. ₹795.

This chapter argues that military competition between India and Pakistan can best be understood arising from the friction caused by the partition of Kashmir. The desire for and acquisition of arms did not in itself cause war. To test this hypothesis, this chapter looks at the period between 1953 and 1965. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it argues that an arms race alone cannot be said to have led to the outbreak of war in 1965. While there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that Pakistani strategic priorities were centred on and around the fear of India’s military potential, there is less clear evidence to suggest concerns about Pakistan determined India’s arms procurement objectives. If anything, Indian elites trained their eyes on China. An arms build-up can hardly be said to have spun into a race towards war.