SWShining Wu

Shining Wu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Shining Wu has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:

  • Zhiwei Tong

    School of Environmental and Chemical Engineering, Jiangsu Ocean University, Lianyungang, China

    3 shared publications
  • Zichun Fan

    School of Chemical Engineering and Technology, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, Jiangsu, People’s Republic of China

    3 shared publications
  • Haoran Wang

    Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Function Control Technology for Advanced Materials, School of Chemical Engineering, Jiangsu Ocean University, Lianyungang 222005, China

    2 shared publications
  • Mengjun Wang

    State Key Laboratory of Physical Chemistry of Solid Surfaces, College of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China

    2 shared publications
  • Xiaobo Zhang

    Huaihai Institute of Technology

    2 shared publications
  • Bianhua Fan

    Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Function Control Technology for Advanced Materials, School of Chemical Engineering, Jiangsu Ocean University, Lianyungang 222005, China

    1 shared publication

Latest Publications

  • Dimensioning On-Demand Vehicle Sharing Systems

    by Saif Benjaafar, Shining Wu, Hanlin Liu, Einar Bjarki Gunnarsson

    We consider the problem of optimal fleet sizing in a vehicle sharing system. Vehicles are available for short-term rental and are accessible from multiple locations. A vehicle rented at one location can be returned to any other location. The size of the fleet must account not only for the nominal load and for the randomness in demand and rental duration but also for the randomness in the number of vehicles that are available at each location because of vehicle roaming (vehicles not returning to the same location from which they were picked up). We model the dynamics of the system using a closed queueing network and obtain explicit and closed form lower and upper bounds on the optimal number of vehicles (the minimum number of vehicles needed to meet a target service level). Specifically, we show that starting with any pair of lower and upper bounds, we can always obtain another pair of lower and upper bounds with gaps between the lower and upper bounds that are independent of demand and bounded by a function that depends only on the prescribed service level. We show that the generated bounds are asymptotically exact under several regimes. We use features of the bounds to construct a simple and closed form approximation that we show to be always within the generated lower and upper bounds and is exact under the asymptotic regimes considered. Extensive numerical experiments show that the approximate and exact values are nearly indistinguishable for a wide range of parameter values. The approximation is highly interpretable with buffer capacity expressed in terms of three explicit terms that can be interpreted as follows: (1) standard buffer capacity that is protection against randomness in demand and rental times, (2) buffer capacity that is protection against vehicle roaming, and (3) a correction term. Our analysis reveals important differences between the optimal sizing of standard queueing systems (where servers always return to the same queue upon service completion) and that of systems where servers, upon service completion, randomly join any one of the queues in the system. We show that the additional capacity needed to buffer against vehicle roaming can be substantial even in systems with vanishingly small demand. This paper was accepted by Baris Ata, stochastic models and simulation.


  • Open Access

    Revisiting the Pricing Benchmarks for Asian Lng — an Equilibrium Analysis

    by Lingge Zhang, Dong Yang, Shining Wu, Meifeng Luo

    As the spot natural gas price in Asia decoupled from the oil price, increasing researchers argued that the oil-indexed pricing mechanism cannot reflect the market fundamentals of Asian liquefied natural gas (LNG). This study investigates if the Japan-Korea-Marker (JKM) price is a feasible pricing benchmark to replace the oil price. For this purpose, we propose an equilibrium pricing model for the LNG long-term contract (LTC) in Asia. Our model incorporates the risk-averse importer and exporter who optimize their risk-profit tradeoffs by deciding their LTC-spot trade portfolios. Using the model, we compare the pricing efficiency and the risk-profit tradeoff of an importer/exporter under different benchmarks (oil price versus JKM price). The results show that the JKM price is more efficient as an LTC pricing benchmark than the oil price. The JKM pricing benchmark is favored for both exporters and importers when they are low risk-aversion. In addition, we compare the performance of the JKM benchmark based on the CIF price term (i.e., the importer pays for freight charges) with that based on the FOB price term (i.e., the exporter pays for freight charges). We find that the freight liability has little effect on the pricing efficiency of the JKM benchmark.

  • A sandwich-structured, layered CoTMPyP/Sr2Nb3O10 nanocomposite for simultaneous voltammetric determination of dopamine and ascorbic acid

    by Shining Wu, Tianxun Sun, Haoran Wang, Zichun Fan, Lingxuan Li, Bianhua Fan, Lin Liu, Juanjuan Ma, Zhiwei Tong


  • A novel nanotube based on self-assembled iron porphyrin/tantalum tungstate composite for electrochemical detection of dopamine

    by Zichun Fan, Mengjun Wang, Shining Wu, Haoran Wang, Jinpeng Li, Lin Liu, Jing Rong, Zhiwei Tong, Xiaobo Zhang


  • Open Access

    Two-Sided Competition Between On-Demand Service Platforms

    by Shining Wu, Shihong Xiao, Saif Benjaafar

    On-demand service platforms compete for both workers and customers, forming a two-sided competition. In this paper, we study the game between two platforms implied by such a two-sided competition and examine how the characteristics of the embedded workers-customers subgame affect outcomes in equilibrium. Specifically, we consider two subgame settings: (i) workers and customers move sequentially and (ii) workers and customers move simultaneously. We find that these two settings yield different subgame outcomes. In the first setting, given any platform strategy profile, there is no subgame equilibrium such that both platforms have a positive market share. In the simultaneous-move setting, such subgame equilibria can exist, though not unique. In the presence of multiple equilibria, we show that under some refinement rules both settings (the sequential and simultaneous subgames) yield the same unique pure-strategy equilibrium. We discuss how these results shed light on the competitive dynamics of on-demand service platforms in practice.


  • Preparation of manganese porphyrin/niobium tungstate nanocomposites for enhanced electrochemical detection of nitrite

    by Zichun Fan, Liuxue Sun, Shining Wu, Chao Liu, Mengjun Wang, Jiasheng Xu, Xiaobo Zhang, Zhiwei Tong


  • Management of a Shared-Spectrum Network in Wireless Communications

    by Shining Wu, Jiheng Zhang, Rachel Q. Zhang

    We consider a band of the electromagnetic spectrum with a finite number of identical channels shared by both licensed and unlicensed users. Such a network differs from most many-server, two-class queues in service systems, including call centers, because of the restrictions imposed on the unlicensed users to limit interference to the licensed users. We first approximate the key performance indicators—namely the throughput rate of the system and the delay probability of the licensed users under the asymptotic regime, which requires the analysis of both scaled and unscaled processes simultaneously using the averaging principle. Our analysis reveals a number of distinctive properties of the system. For example, sharing does not affect the level of service provided to the licensed users in an asymptotic sense even when the system is critically loaded. We then study the optimal sharing decisions of the system to maximize the system throughput rate while maintaining the delay probability of the licensed users below a certain level when the system is overloaded. Finally, we extend our study to systems with time-varying arrival rates and propose a diffusion approximation to complement our fluid one. The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1707 .


  • The Reference Effects on a Retailer’s Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Strategies with Strategic Consumers

    by Shining Wu, Qian Liu, Rachel Q. Zhang

    We consider a retailer that sells the same or different versions of the product season after season. At the beginning of each season (stage 1), the retailer places an order and sells the product at the full price. As the sales unfold, the retailer has an opportunity to mark down the price (stage 2), which creates an incentive for strategic consumers to delay their purchases for price discount. However, consumers do not know the markdown price exactly when they time their purchases; instead, they learn from the retailer’s past prices and form their estimate of the markdown price, called the reference price, to decide if they purchase at the full price or wait for the markdown in the current selling season. We characterize the properties of the optimal ordering and markdown decisions and show that markdowns, if adopted appropriately, do not necessarily destroy the stability of a business even in the presence of strategic consumers. Furthermore, the consumers' reference exhibits a mean reverting pattern under certain conditions; that is, the reference fluctuates around a mean value, reflecting the practice of most stable businesses. We conduct numerical studies to investigate the impact of consumer learning about the reference price and various system parameters on the retailer’s optimal strategies and profitability in the presence of strategic consumers.