Vladimir Turetsky
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Vladimir Turetsky has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Valery Y. Glizer
Department of Mathematics, Braude College of Engineering, Karmiel 2161002, Israel
14 shared publications - Tal Shima
Technion - Israel institute of Technology
5 shared publications - Emil Bashkansky
Ort Braude College of Engineering
3 shared publications - Bhargav Jha
Indian Institute of Technology
2 shared publications David M. Steinberg
Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Raymond & Beverly Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv Israel
2 shared publicationsJosef Shinar
Technion - Israel institute of Technology
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 211 (1) , 14
Approximate State-Feedback Solution of a Nash Differential Game: Artificial Parameter Approach
A finite-horizon two-player non-zero-sum differential game with linear dynamics is considered. For each player, there is its own quadratic cost functional to be minimized. The game is analyzed with respect to the state-feedback Nash equilibrium. Due to the well-known classical results [2, 20], the solution of such a game is reduced to the solution of the terminal-value problem for the set of two coupled non-linear (Riccati-type) matrix differential equations in the entire time interval of the game’s duration. Unfortunately, this problem may have a conjugate point, meaning the non-existence of its solution in the entire time interval of the game’s duration. By a proper version of the artificial parameter method, a sufficient condition for the existence of the solution to this terminal-value problem in the entire time interval is derived. Directly based on the game’s data, the established condition is easily verifiable. The fulfillment of this condition yields the upper bound of the length of the aforementioned time interval which can be, in general, sufficiently small depending on the data of the game. Using this condition, an approximate analytical solution to the aforementioned terminal-value problem is obtained as a partial sum of some infinite series of functions arising in the method of artificial parameter. Obtaining each addend of this partial sum requires only an integration of a known matrix-valued function of time. This approximate solution is further used to design an approximate Nash equilibrium component of each player and to design an approximate Nash equilibrium pair of the players’ controls in the considered game. The theoretical results of the paper are applied to approximate the solution of a problem of pursuit-evasion engagement between two flying vehicles.
- 13 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 211 (1) , 14
Open AccessApproximate State-Feedback Solution of a Nash Differential Game: Artificial Parameter Approach
A finite-horizon two-player non-zero-sum differential game with linear dynamics is considered. For each player, there is its own quadratic cost functional to be minimized. The game is analyzed with respect to the state-feedback Nash equilibrium. Due to the well-known classical results [2, 20], the solution of such a game is reduced to the solution of the terminal-value problem for the set of two coupled non-linear (Riccati-type) matrix differential equations in the entire time interval of the game’s duration. Unfortunately, this problem may have a conjugate point, meaning the non-existence of its solution in the entire time interval of the game’s duration. By a proper version of the artificial parameter method, a sufficient condition for the existence of the solution to this terminal-value problem in the entire time interval is derived. Directly based on the game’s data, the established condition is easily verifiable. The fulfillment of this condition yields the upper bound of the length of the aforementioned time interval which can be, in general, sufficiently small depending on the data of the game. Using this condition, an approximate analytical solution to the aforementioned terminal-value problem is obtained as a partial sum of some infinite series of functions arising in the method of artificial parameter. Obtaining each addend of this partial sum requires only an integration of a known matrix-valued function of time. This approximate solution is further used to design an approximate Nash equilibrium component of each player and to design an approximate Nash equilibrium pair of the players’ controls in the considered game. The theoretical results of the paper are applied to approximate the solution of a problem of pursuit-evasion engagement between two flying vehicles.
- 26 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 47-107
Suboptimal Solution of the General Type Zero-Sum Linear-Quadratic Differential Game by the Artificial Parameter Method
- 26 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 47-107
Suboptimal Solution of the General Type Zero-Sum Linear-Quadratic Differential Game by the Artificial Parameter Method
- Open Access
- 13 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 208 (3) , 97
Tracking Error/Control Effort Trade-Off in the Presence of Disturbance
A bi-objective control problem for a linear system in the presence of a disturbance is considered. The first cost functional is a generalized tracking error defined as a Lebesgue-Stieltjes discrepancy integral comprising both continuous and discrete discrepancies. The second cost is the control effort. The relaxed Pareto control, which guarantees a balance between two costs, is defined for an unknown disturbance and controls from $$L_2$$ -bounded sets. The solution is constructed based on the auxiliary generalized linear-quadratic differential game formulated in open-loop controls. It is shown that by a proper choice of the cost penalty coefficients, the game-optimal control strategy solves the bi-objective control problem. As a by-product, a novel solvability condition for the game in open-loop controls is derived. Illustrative examples are presented.- 13 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 208 (3) , 97
Open AccessTracking Error/Control Effort Trade-Off in the Presence of Disturbance
A bi-objective control problem for a linear system in the presence of a disturbance is considered. The first cost functional is a generalized tracking error defined as a Lebesgue-Stieltjes discrepancy integral comprising both continuous and discrete discrepancies. The second cost is the control effort. The relaxed Pareto control, which guarantees a balance between two costs, is defined for an unknown disturbance and controls from $$L_2$$ -bounded sets. The solution is constructed based on the auxiliary generalized linear-quadratic differential game formulated in open-loop controls. It is shown that by a proper choice of the cost penalty coefficients, the game-optimal control strategy solves the bi-objective control problem. As a by-product, a novel solvability condition for the game in open-loop controls is derived. Illustrative examples are presented. - Open Access
- 3 February 2026
- Published by Wiley in Optimal Control Applications and Methods
- Vol. 47 (2) , 643-657
Applying Dynamics/Cost Parameter Continuation to the Optimal Guidance of Variable‐Speed Unicycle
The problem of a variable‐speed unicycle guidance to the stationary target is considered. The vehicle should be guided to the origin while minimizing the energy loss due to the induced drag. The problem is formulated as a nonlinear optimal control problem with a known velocity profile and, consequently, a known drag coefficient profile. Since no analytical solution is available, a numerical parameter continuation procedure is employed. The parameter continuation algorithm comprises the parameterization of both the system dynamics and the cost by a single parameter. The system dynamics equation is parameterized in such a way that if the parameter is equal to zero, the dynamics equation is that of a quadratic‐kinematic approximation of the original system, whereas if the parameter is equal to one, it is the original nonlinear one. In the cost parametrization, the values of zero and one correspond to the cost with constant and variable speed, respectively. A numerical algorithm based on Davidenko's equation is derived. By an extensive simulation, it is shown that the proposed method converges from a wider set of initial and terminal conditions than the classical parameter continuation method and a state‐of‐the‐art alternative solver. This improvement is due to both the dynamics/cost parameterization and choosing an initial guess from the quadratic‐kinematic approximation.
- 3 February 2026
- Published by Wiley in Optimal Control Applications and Methods
- Vol. 47 (2) , 643-657
Open AccessApplying Dynamics/Cost Parameter Continuation to the Optimal Guidance of Variable‐Speed Unicycle
The problem of a variable‐speed unicycle guidance to the stationary target is considered. The vehicle should be guided to the origin while minimizing the energy loss due to the induced drag. The problem is formulated as a nonlinear optimal control problem with a known velocity profile and, consequently, a known drag coefficient profile. Since no analytical solution is available, a numerical parameter continuation procedure is employed. The parameter continuation algorithm comprises the parameterization of both the system dynamics and the cost by a single parameter. The system dynamics equation is parameterized in such a way that if the parameter is equal to zero, the dynamics equation is that of a quadratic‐kinematic approximation of the original system, whereas if the parameter is equal to one, it is the original nonlinear one. In the cost parametrization, the values of zero and one correspond to the cost with constant and variable speed, respectively. A numerical algorithm based on Davidenko's equation is derived. By an extensive simulation, it is shown that the proposed method converges from a wider set of initial and terminal conditions than the classical parameter continuation method and a state‐of‐the‐art alternative solver. This improvement is due to both the dynamics/cost parameterization and choosing an initial guess from the quadratic‐kinematic approximation.
- Open Access
One Class of H∞ Cheap Control Problems: Asymptotic Solution
An infinite-horizon linear-quadratic control problem is considered. This problem has the following features: (i) the control cost in the cost functional has a positive small coefficient (small parameter), meaning that the control cost is much smaller than the state cost; (ii) the current cost of the fast state variable in the cost functional is a non-zero positive semi-definite quadratic form. These features require developing a significantly novel approach to asymptotic analysis of the matrix Riccati algebraic equation appearing in the solvability conditions of the considered problem. Using this solution, an asymptotic analysis of the problem is carried out. This analysis yields parameter-free solvability conditions for this problem and a simplified controller solving this problem. An example illustrating the theoretical results is presented.Open AccessOne Class of H∞ Cheap Control Problems: Asymptotic Solution
An infinite-horizon linear-quadratic control problem is considered. This problem has the following features: (i) the control cost in the cost functional has a positive small coefficient (small parameter), meaning that the control cost is much smaller than the state cost; (ii) the current cost of the fast state variable in the cost functional is a non-zero positive semi-definite quadratic form. These features require developing a significantly novel approach to asymptotic analysis of the matrix Riccati algebraic equation appearing in the solvability conditions of the considered problem. Using this solution, an asymptotic analysis of the problem is carried out. This analysis yields parameter-free solvability conditions for this problem and a simplified controller solving this problem. An example illustrating the theoretical results is presented. - 2 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-31
Robust Capture Pursuit Based on Differential Games
- Open Access
- 16 December 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Preprints.org
One Class of H∞ Cheap Control Problems: Asymptotic Solution
An infinite-horizon H∞ linear-quadratic control problem is considered. This problem has the following features: (i) the quadratic form of the control in the integrand of the cost functional is with a positive small multiplier (small parameter), meaning that the control cost is much smaller than the state cost; (ii) the current cost of the fast state variable in the cost functional is a positive semi-definite (but non-zero) quadratic form. These features require developing a significantly novel approach to asymptotic solution of the matrix Riccati algebraic equation associated with the considered H∞ problem by solvability conditions. Using this solution, an asymptotic analysis of the H∞ problem is carried out. This analysis yields parameter-free solvability conditions for this problem and a simplified controller solving this problem. An illustrative example is presented.
- 16 December 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Preprints.org
Open AccessOne Class of H∞ Cheap Control Problems: Asymptotic Solution
An infinite-horizon H∞ linear-quadratic control problem is considered. This problem has the following features: (i) the quadratic form of the control in the integrand of the cost functional is with a positive small multiplier (small parameter), meaning that the control cost is much smaller than the state cost; (ii) the current cost of the fast state variable in the cost functional is a positive semi-definite (but non-zero) quadratic form. These features require developing a significantly novel approach to asymptotic solution of the matrix Riccati algebraic equation associated with the considered H∞ problem by solvability conditions. Using this solution, an asymptotic analysis of the H∞ problem is carried out. This analysis yields parameter-free solvability conditions for this problem and a simplified controller solving this problem. An illustrative example is presented.
- Open Access
The Effect of the Cost Functional on Asymptotic Solution to One Class of Zero-Sum Linear-Quadratic Cheap Control Differential Games
A finite-horizon zero-sum linear-quadratic differential game with non-homogeneous dynamics is considered. The key feature of this game is as follows. The cost of the control of the minimizing player (the minimizer) in the game’s cost functional is much smaller than the cost of the control of the maximizing player (the maximizer) and the cost of the state variable. This smallness is due to a positive small multiplier (a small parameter) for the quadratic form of the minimizer’s control in the integrand of the cost functional. Two cases of the game’s cost functional are studied: (i) the current state cost in the integrand of the cost functional is a positive definite quadratic form; (ii) the current state cost in the integrand of the cost functional is a positive semi-definite (but non-zero) quadratic form. The latter case has not yet been considered in the literature devoted to the analysis of cheap control differential games. For each of the aforementioned cases, an asymptotic approximation (by the small parameter) of the solution to the considered game is derived. It is established that the property of the aforementioned state cost (positive definiteness/positive semi-definiteness) has an essential effect on the asymptotic analysis and solution of the differential equations (Riccati-type, linear, and trivial), appearing in the solvability conditions of the considered game. The cases (i) and (ii) require considerably different approaches to the derivation of the asymptotic solutions to these differential equations. Moreover, the case (ii) requires developing a significantly novel approach. The asymptotic solutions of the aforementioned differential equations considerably differ from each other in cases (i) and (ii). This difference yields essentially different asymptotic solutions (saddle point and value) of the considered game in these cases, meaning it is of crucial importance to distinguish cases (i) and (ii) in the study of various theoretical and real-life cheap control zero-sum linear-quadratic differential games. The asymptotic solutions of the considered game in cases (i) and (ii) are compared with each other. An academic illustrative example is presented.
Open AccessThe Effect of the Cost Functional on Asymptotic Solution to One Class of Zero-Sum Linear-Quadratic Cheap Control Differential Games
A finite-horizon zero-sum linear-quadratic differential game with non-homogeneous dynamics is considered. The key feature of this game is as follows. The cost of the control of the minimizing player (the minimizer) in the game’s cost functional is much smaller than the cost of the control of the maximizing player (the maximizer) and the cost of the state variable. This smallness is due to a positive small multiplier (a small parameter) for the quadratic form of the minimizer’s control in the integrand of the cost functional. Two cases of the game’s cost functional are studied: (i) the current state cost in the integrand of the cost functional is a positive definite quadratic form; (ii) the current state cost in the integrand of the cost functional is a positive semi-definite (but non-zero) quadratic form. The latter case has not yet been considered in the literature devoted to the analysis of cheap control differential games. For each of the aforementioned cases, an asymptotic approximation (by the small parameter) of the solution to the considered game is derived. It is established that the property of the aforementioned state cost (positive definiteness/positive semi-definiteness) has an essential effect on the asymptotic analysis and solution of the differential equations (Riccati-type, linear, and trivial), appearing in the solvability conditions of the considered game. The cases (i) and (ii) require considerably different approaches to the derivation of the asymptotic solutions to these differential equations. Moreover, the case (ii) requires developing a significantly novel approach. The asymptotic solutions of the aforementioned differential equations considerably differ from each other in cases (i) and (ii). This difference yields essentially different asymptotic solutions (saddle point and value) of the considered game in these cases, meaning it is of crucial importance to distinguish cases (i) and (ii) in the study of various theoretical and real-life cheap control zero-sum linear-quadratic differential games. The asymptotic solutions of the considered game in cases (i) and (ii) are compared with each other. An academic illustrative example is presented.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Preprints.org
The Effect of the Cost Functional on Asymptotic Solution to One Class of Zero-Sum Linear-Quadratic Cheap Control Differential Games
A finite-horizon zero-sum linear-quadratic differential game is considered. The feature of this game is that the cost of the control of the minimizing player (the minimizer) in the game’s cost functional is much smaller than the cost of the control of the maximizing player (the maximizer) and the cost of the state variable. This smallness is due to a positive small multiplier (a small parameter) for the quadratic form of the minimizer’s control in the integrand of the cost functional. Two cases of the game's cost functional are studied: (i) the current state cost in the integrand of the cost functional is a positive definite quadratic form; (ii) the current state cost in the integrand of the cost functional is a positive semidefinite (but non-zero) quadratic form. For each of these cases, an asymptotic solution with respect to the small parameter of the considered game is formally constructed and justified. These solutions are compared with each other. Illustrative example is presented.
- 3 July 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Preprints.org
Open AccessThe Effect of the Cost Functional on Asymptotic Solution to One Class of Zero-Sum Linear-Quadratic Cheap Control Differential Games
A finite-horizon zero-sum linear-quadratic differential game is considered. The feature of this game is that the cost of the control of the minimizing player (the minimizer) in the game’s cost functional is much smaller than the cost of the control of the maximizing player (the maximizer) and the cost of the state variable. This smallness is due to a positive small multiplier (a small parameter) for the quadratic form of the minimizer’s control in the integrand of the cost functional. Two cases of the game's cost functional are studied: (i) the current state cost in the integrand of the cost functional is a positive definite quadratic form; (ii) the current state cost in the integrand of the cost functional is a positive semidefinite (but non-zero) quadratic form. For each of these cases, an asymptotic solution with respect to the small parameter of the considered game is formally constructed and justified. These solutions are compared with each other. Illustrative example is presented.
- Open Access
One Class of Stackelberg Linear–Quadratic Differential Games with Cheap Control of a Leader: Asymptotic Analysis of an Open-Loop Solution
We consider a two-player finite horizon linear–quadratic Stackelberg differential game. For this game, we study the case where the control cost of a leader in the cost functionals of both players is small, which means that the game under consideration is a cheap control game. We look for open-loop optimal players’ controls of this game. Using the game’s solvability conditions, the obtaining such controls is reduced to the solution to a proper boundary-value problem. Due to the smallness of the leader’s control cost, this boundary-value problem is singularly perturbed. Asymptotic behavior of the solution to this problem is analyzed. Based on this analysis, the asymptotic behavior of the open-loop optimal players’ controls and the optimal values of the cost functionals is studied. Using these results, asymptotically suboptimal players’ controls are designed. An illustrative example is presented.
Open AccessOne Class of Stackelberg Linear–Quadratic Differential Games with Cheap Control of a Leader: Asymptotic Analysis of an Open-Loop Solution
We consider a two-player finite horizon linear–quadratic Stackelberg differential game. For this game, we study the case where the control cost of a leader in the cost functionals of both players is small, which means that the game under consideration is a cheap control game. We look for open-loop optimal players’ controls of this game. Using the game’s solvability conditions, the obtaining such controls is reduced to the solution to a proper boundary-value problem. Due to the smallness of the leader’s control cost, this boundary-value problem is singularly perturbed. Asymptotic behavior of the solution to this problem is analyzed. Based on this analysis, the asymptotic behavior of the open-loop optimal players’ controls and the optimal values of the cost functionals is studied. Using these results, asymptotically suboptimal players’ controls are designed. An illustrative example is presented.