Roberto Bonfatti
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Roberto Bonfatti has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Steven Poelhekke
VU University Amsterdam; De Nederlandsche Bank
2 shared publications - Emanuele Bracco
Department of Economics, University of Verona, Verona
1 shared publication - Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke
All Souls College
1 shared publication Luigi Pisano
1 shared publicationLuis A. Bryce Campodonico
1 shared publication- Maitreesh Ghatak
London School of Economics, London, UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The League of (No) Sanctions
Economic sanctions imposed at the international level can reverberate within sanctioning countries, shaping domestic politics. We examine how the EU’s sanctions against Russia, imposed after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the resulting counter-sanctions influenced voting in Italy. Using a shift-share design, we assign sector-level export losses to municipalities based on their pre-sanctions employment structure. A €1,000 per capita drop in exports to Russia increased support for the League—the main pro-Russian party—by between 4.6 and 13.9 percentage points in the 2022 general election, coming mainly at the expense of formerly pro-Russian parties that fell in line with EU sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine, with no detectable effect on turnout. This large effect on votes appears to reflect the economic hardship associated with weaker local employment growth in more exposed municipalities. Because Italian exports to Russia were small in absolute terms, however, the actual political impact of the sanctions remained modest, underscoring the EU's strong economic position in imposing sanctions on Russia (at least in terms of the domestic cost of forgone exports).
- 4 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe League of (No) Sanctions
Economic sanctions imposed at the international level can reverberate within sanctioning countries, shaping domestic politics. We examine how the EU’s sanctions against Russia, imposed after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the resulting counter-sanctions influenced voting in Italy. Using a shift-share design, we assign sector-level export losses to municipalities based on their pre-sanctions employment structure. A €1,000 per capita drop in exports to Russia increased support for the League—the main pro-Russian party—by between 4.6 and 13.9 percentage points in the 2022 general election, coming mainly at the expense of formerly pro-Russian parties that fell in line with EU sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine, with no detectable effect on turnout. This large effect on votes appears to reflect the economic hardship associated with weaker local employment growth in more exposed municipalities. Because Italian exports to Russia were small in absolute terms, however, the actual political impact of the sanctions remained modest, underscoring the EU's strong economic position in imposing sanctions on Russia (at least in terms of the domestic cost of forgone exports).
- Open Access
- 22 November 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 128 (614) , 2222-2257
Growth, Import Dependence, and War
Theories of war predict that the leader may launch a war on a follower who is catching up, since the follower cannot commit to not use their increased power in the future. But it was Japan who attacked the West in 1941: both leaders and followers start wars. Similarly, many have argued that trade makes war less likely, yet the First World War erupted at a time of unprecedented globalisation. We develop a model of trade and war that can explain both observations. Dependence on imports can lead followers to attack leaders or resource-rich regions when they are subject to blockade.
- 22 November 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 128 (614) , 2222-2257
Open AccessGrowth, Import Dependence, and War
Theories of war predict that the leader may launch a war on a follower who is catching up, since the follower cannot commit to not use their increased power in the future. But it was Japan who attacked the West in 1941: both leaders and followers start wars. Similarly, many have argued that trade makes war less likely, yet the First World War erupted at a time of unprecedented globalisation. We develop a model of trade and war that can explain both observations. Dependence on imports can lead followers to attack leaders or resource-rich regions when they are subject to blockade.
- 1 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 108, 137-156
The sustainability of empire in a global perspective: The role of international trade patterns
- 1 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 108, 137-156
The sustainability of empire in a global perspective: The role of international trade patterns
- 1 July 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 127, 91-108
From mine to coast: Transport infrastructure and the direction of trade in developing countries
- 1 July 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 127, 91-108
From mine to coast: Transport infrastructure and the direction of trade in developing countries
- 20 February 2017
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 50 (1) , 306-339
An economic theory of foreign interventions and regime change
- 20 February 2017
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 50 (1) , 306-339
An economic theory of foreign interventions and regime change
- 1 March 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 135, 32-46
Tax policy and the financing of innovation
- 1 March 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 135, 32-46
Tax policy and the financing of innovation
- Open Access
- 2 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
From Mine to Coast: Transport Infrastructure and the Direction of Trade in Developing Countries
Mine-related transport infrastructure specializes in connecting mines to the coast, and not so much to neighboring countries. This is most clearly seen in devel
- 2 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFrom Mine to Coast: Transport Infrastructure and the Direction of Trade in Developing Countries
Mine-related transport infrastructure specializes in connecting mines to the coast, and not so much to neighboring countries. This is most clearly seen in devel
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 89 (1) , 187-201
Trade and the allocation of talent with capital market imperfections
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 89 (1) , 187-201
Trade and the allocation of talent with capital market imperfections
- Open Access
- 29 June 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Sustainability of Empire in Global Perspective: The Role of International Trade Patterns
European empires had two key economic aspects: the extraction of colonial wealth by colonizers, and the relevance of trade for the colonial economies. I build a simple model of decolonization that puts these two elements at centre stage. By controlling policy in the colony, the mother country can appropriate part of her wealth; the colony, however, can stage a successful revolution at a stochastic cost. I incorporate this mechanism in a three-country, two-good trade model where countries (the mother country, the colony and a third independent country) can decide whether to trade with each other, and revolution is expected to generate trade frictions between the mother country and the rebel colony. Thus, the attractiveness of revolution and the sustainability of empire come to depend on the capacity of the rebel colony to access international markets, which, in turn, depends on the economic fundamentals that shape the pattern of trade as well as the optimal trade policy of the third country. I present detailed historical evidence showing how to use this model to put a few important cases of decolonization in global perspective. My results have important implications for the debate on the economic legacy of colonial empires.
- 29 June 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Sustainability of Empire in Global Perspective: The Role of International Trade Patterns
European empires had two key economic aspects: the extraction of colonial wealth by colonizers, and the relevance of trade for the colonial economies. I build a simple model of decolonization that puts these two elements at centre stage. By controlling policy in the colony, the mother country can appropriate part of her wealth; the colony, however, can stage a successful revolution at a stochastic cost. I incorporate this mechanism in a three-country, two-good trade model where countries (the mother country, the colony and a third independent country) can decide whether to trade with each other, and revolution is expected to generate trade frictions between the mother country and the rebel colony. Thus, the attractiveness of revolution and the sustainability of empire come to depend on the capacity of the rebel colony to access international markets, which, in turn, depends on the economic fundamentals that shape the pattern of trade as well as the optimal trade policy of the third country. I present detailed historical evidence showing how to use this model to put a few important cases of decolonization in global perspective. My results have important implications for the debate on the economic legacy of colonial empires.
- Open Access
- 31 May 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
An Economic Theory of Foreign Interventions and Regime Change
I construct a theory of foreign interventions in which the preferences of the foreign country over alternative local groups are determined by each group's international economic ties. In equilibrium, the foreign country supports the group with which it has the strongest ties, since this is most influenceable from the outside. However, this is counter weighted by the tendency of the domestic political system to favor the least influenceable group. I allow for a non-economic dimension of policy (geopolitics), and study how the saliency of this dimension may play in favor of the incumbent group. My results help interpret the economic rationale for many Western interventions in developing countries in the 20th century, and the role of economic nationalism in motivating the struggle for regime change. Furthermore, they help explain why the Cold War strengthened the West's preference for specific local groups. I provide detailed historical evidence in favor of my arguments.
- 31 May 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAn Economic Theory of Foreign Interventions and Regime Change
I construct a theory of foreign interventions in which the preferences of the foreign country over alternative local groups are determined by each group's international economic ties. In equilibrium, the foreign country supports the group with which it has the strongest ties, since this is most influenceable from the outside. However, this is counter weighted by the tendency of the domestic political system to favor the least influenceable group. I allow for a non-economic dimension of policy (geopolitics), and study how the saliency of this dimension may play in favor of the incumbent group. My results help interpret the economic rationale for many Western interventions in developing countries in the 20th century, and the role of economic nationalism in motivating the struggle for regime change. Furthermore, they help explain why the Cold War strengthened the West's preference for specific local groups. I provide detailed historical evidence in favor of my arguments.