Yue Ma

This study examines the role of competitive peer influence in shaping firms’ cross-listing decisions. Using a comprehensive dataset of U.S. public firms, we find that companies are more likely to cross-list following a competitor’s recent cross-listing. The peer effect is more salient among firms facing intense competitive pressure, revealing greater financial reporting transparency, and exhibiting stronger corporate governance. Our analysis reveals that follower firms capitalize on the information spillovers generated by pioneering cross-listed firms, thereby gaining a competitive advantage in areas such as R&D investment, tangible asset accumulation, and cash holdings. To address potential endogeneity concerns, we employ quasi-natural experimental designs that provide robust empirical evidence in support of our findings.

This paper examines how investment and input-output networks interact in transmitting U.S. monetary policy shocks to sectoral stock returns. We develop a theoretical multisector model featuring an adjusted-investment network, capturing investment-linkage transmission amplified by input-output linkages. Using a heterogeneous panel spatial autoregressive model with orthogonalized monetary policy shocks, we find that the adjusted-investment network accounts for 38% of the total stock-return response. Moreover, indirect spillovers through adjusted-investment linkages account for 33% of the total effect, comparable to 41% through input-output linkages. Therefore, the interplay between the two networks is an important channel of monetary transmission.

This study examines the role of competitive peer influence in shaping firms' cross-listing decisions. Using a comprehensive dataset of U.S. public firms, we find that companies are more likely to cross-list following a competitor' s recent cross-listing. The peer effect is more salient among firms facing intense competitive pressure, exhibiting low levels of financial reporting opacity, and characterized by strong corporate governance. Our analysis reveals that follower firms capitalize on the information spillovers generated by pioneering cross-listed firms, thereby gaining a competitive advantage in areas such as R&D investment, tangible asset accumulation, and cash holdings. To address potential endogeneity concerns, we employ quasi-natural experimental designs that provide robust empirical evidence in support of our findings.

Extreme precipitation events have become increasingly frequent and intense due to climate change, posing significant but still poorly understood risks to firms, particularly within the context of global supply chains. This study investigates how downstream shocks propagate upstream. Using a global panel of firm-level supply-chain links, we find that extreme precipitation affecting customers reduces suppliers’ accounts receivable, consistent with a demand-driven contraction. The decline in trade credit is smaller for suppliers with weaker bargaining power, shorter-tenure relationships, or lower leverage, indicating that these firms absorb part of their customers’ liquidity risk. Our evidence uncovers a previously overlooked demand channel for climate risk, enriching the supply-chain finance literature and offering concrete guidance for firms and regulators seeking to fortify global production networks against environmental risks.

Climate change has been increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme precipitation, yet how these shocks transmit through global supply chains remains unclear. This study documents the downstream-to-upstream transmission of climate risk. Leveraging a global panel of firm-level supply chain links, we show that extreme precipitation at customers' locations reduces suppliers' accounts receivable, indicating a demand-driven contraction in trade credit. The contraction is attenuated for suppliers with weaker bargaining power, shorter customer relationship tenure, and lower leverage. Our evidence indicates that suppliers are absorbing customers' liquidity shocks. These findings highlight a demand-side pathway for the transmission of climate shocks in supply chains, delineate the conditions under which trade credit shifts liquidity shocks, and offer a network perspective guidance for firms and regulators seeking to strengthen global production supply chains.

Tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon across the globe and even an important factor in the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. We show that firms in countries with better credit information–sharing systems and higher branch penetration evade taxes to a lesser degree. This effect is stronger for smaller firms, firms in smaller cities and towns, firms in industries relying more on external financing, and firms in industries and countries with greater growth potential. This effect is robust to instrumental variable analysis, controlling for firm fixed effects in a smaller panel data set of countries, and many other robustness tests.

This paper analyzes whether the political connections of listed firms in the United States affect the cost and terms of loan contracts. Using a hand‐collected data set of the political connections of S&P 500 companies over the 2003–2008 time period, we find that the cost of bank loans is significantly lower for companies that have board members with political ties. We consider two possible explanations for these findings: a Borrower Channel in which lenders charge lower rates because they recognize that connections enhance the borrower's credit worthiness and a Bank Channel in which banks assign greater value to connected loans to enhance their own relationships with key politicians. After employing a series of tests to distinguish between these two channels, we find strong support for the Borrower Channel but no direct evidence supporting the Bank Channel. Finally, we demonstrate that political connections reduce the likelihood of a capital expenditure restriction or liquidity requirement commanded by banks at the origination of the loan. Taken together, our results suggest that political connections increase the value of U.S. companies and reduce monitoring costs and credit risk faced by banks, which, in turn, reduces the borrower's cost of debt.