Michael T. Hartney
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Michael T. Hartney has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Leslie K. Finger
University of North Texas Denton Texas USA
2 shared publications - Adam Michael Dynes
Brigham Young University
1 shared publication Sam D. Hayes
Boston College
1 shared publication- Sam D. Hayes
Trinity College, Hartford, CT, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 59-84
Teachers’ Unions and School Board Elections: A Reassessment
- 16 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 59-84
Teachers’ Unions and School Board Elections: A Reassessment
- 21 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Interest Groups & Advocacy
- Vol. 11 (2) , 237-262
Teachers’ unions and school board elections: a reassessment
Drawing on an original data set of over 4000 teacher-union endorsements in local school board elections, I make three contributions to the literature on un
- 21 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Interest Groups & Advocacy
- Vol. 11 (2) , 237-262
Teachers’ unions and school board elections: a reassessment
Drawing on an original data set of over 4000 teacher-union endorsements in local school board elections, I make three contributions to the literature on un
- Top Cited Papers
- 14 June 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 20 (2) , 457-473
Politics, Markets, and Pandemics: Public Education’s Response to COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity to examine how local governments respond to a public health crisis amid high levels of partisan polarization. As an arena that has historically been relatively insulated from national partisan cleavages, public schools provide a useful window into understanding the growing nationalization of local politics. Leveraging the fact that all school districts had to adopt a reopening plan in fall 2020, we assess the factors that influenced school district reopening decisions. We find that mass partisanship and vested interests best explain the degree to which schools reopened. Republican (Democratic) districts were far more (less) likely to reopen in person, while districts with stronger unions relied more on remote learning. Notably, we find little connection between reopening decisions and indicators measuring the severity of the virus. Finally, public schools were sensitive to the threat of student exit. Districts located in counties with more Catholic schools were somewhat more likely to reopen in person. We assess the implications of these findings for U.S. education policy and the study of local government more generally.
- 14 June 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 20 (2) , 457-473
Top Cited PapersPolitics, Markets, and Pandemics: Public Education’s Response to COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity to examine how local governments respond to a public health crisis amid high levels of partisan polarization. As an arena that has historically been relatively insulated from national partisan cleavages, public schools provide a useful window into understanding the growing nationalization of local politics. Leveraging the fact that all school districts had to adopt a reopening plan in fall 2020, we assess the factors that influenced school district reopening decisions. We find that mass partisanship and vested interests best explain the degree to which schools reopened. Republican (Democratic) districts were far more (less) likely to reopen in person, while districts with stronger unions relied more on remote learning. Notably, we find little connection between reopening decisions and indicators measuring the severity of the virus. Finally, public schools were sensitive to the threat of student exit. Districts located in counties with more Catholic schools were somewhat more likely to reopen in person. We assess the implications of these findings for U.S. education policy and the study of local government more generally.
- 20 May 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 115 (3) , 1097-1103
Off-Cycle and Off Center: Election Timing and Representation in Municipal Government
Who governs America’s cities: organized interests or mass publics? Though recent scholarship finds that local governments enact policies that align with citizens’ preferences, others argue that it is organized interests, not mass publics that are influential. To reconcile these perspectives, we show that election timing can help shed light on when voters or groups will be pivotal in city politics. Examining 1,600 large US cities, we find that off-cycle elections affect city policy responsiveness asymmetrically, weakening responsiveness on those issues where there is an active and organized interest whose policy objectives deviate from the preferences of the median resident. Here, we focus on public employees’ interests and find that local governments that are elected off cycle spend more on city workers than would be preferred by citizens in more conservative cities. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the study of interest groups and representation in local politics.
- 20 May 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 115 (3) , 1097-1103
Off-Cycle and Off Center: Election Timing and Representation in Municipal Government
Who governs America’s cities: organized interests or mass publics? Though recent scholarship finds that local governments enact policies that align with citizens’ preferences, others argue that it is organized interests, not mass publics that are influential. To reconcile these perspectives, we show that election timing can help shed light on when voters or groups will be pivotal in city politics. Examining 1,600 large US cities, we find that off-cycle elections affect city policy responsiveness asymmetrically, weakening responsiveness on those issues where there is an active and organized interest whose policy objectives deviate from the preferences of the median resident. Here, we focus on public employees’ interests and find that local governments that are elected off cycle spend more on city workers than would be preferred by citizens in more conservative cities. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the study of interest groups and representation in local politics.
- 30 March 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in State Politics & Policy Quarterly
- Vol. 21 (4) , 335-354
Off-Cycle and Out of Sync: How Election Timing Influences Political Representation
States exert significant control over many different types of electoral institutions that influence the tone and direction of political representation in American democracy. Yet almost nothing is known about the consequences of the institution that has the greatest singular impact on the turnout and composition of the electorate: election timing. We argue that off-cycle elections will tend to produce governments that are not well-aligned with the political preferences of their median constituent. To empirically test this expectation, we examine the relationship between election timing and mass–elite congruence across local school district governments. Leveraging variation in election timing across districts within the same state, we find that board members are more likely to hold political preferences that are aligned with their constituents when boards are elected in on- versus off-cycle races. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the study of representation and election timing, suggesting some possible avenues for future research.
- 30 March 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in State Politics & Policy Quarterly
- Vol. 21 (4) , 335-354
Off-Cycle and Out of Sync: How Election Timing Influences Political Representation
States exert significant control over many different types of electoral institutions that influence the tone and direction of political representation in American democracy. Yet almost nothing is known about the consequences of the institution that has the greatest singular impact on the turnout and composition of the electorate: election timing. We argue that off-cycle elections will tend to produce governments that are not well-aligned with the political preferences of their median constituent. To empirically test this expectation, we examine the relationship between election timing and mass–elite congruence across local school district governments. Leveraging variation in election timing across districts within the same state, we find that board members are more likely to hold political preferences that are aligned with their constituents when boards are elected in on- versus off-cycle races. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the study of representation and election timing, suggesting some possible avenues for future research.
- 26 February 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 19 (1) , 285-286
A Collective Pursuit: Teachers’ Unions and Education Reform. By Lesley Lavery. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2020. 238p. $89.50 cloth, $27.95 paper.
- 26 February 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 19 (1) , 285-286
A Collective Pursuit: Teachers’ Unions and Education Reform. By Lesley Lavery. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2020. 238p. $89.50 cloth, $27.95 paper.
- 21 October 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 19 (1) , 19-35
Financial Solidarity: The Future of Unions in the post-JanusEra
In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a “right-to-work” (RTW) legal regime for the entire government workforce (Janus v. AFSCME). While many predict lower union membership, few have considered howJanuswill challenge the overall cost-sharing strategy that unions use to ensure their affiliates’ organizational maintenance and survival. Using the National Education Association (NEA) as our empirical example, we develop and test a theory we call “financial solidarity,” which posits that union organizational maintenance hinges on the transfer of resources from affiliates in strong labor states to those in weaker labor states. We demonstrate that this system is in effect by showing that most NEA revenue originates from dues and fees paid by teachers in strong labor states and then by examining the causal effect of labor law retrenchment on affiliates’ reliance on their national union between 2005–2018. We find that the NEA transfers an additional $6–10 per member and is significantly more likely to make a political contribution in an affiliate’s state in the aftermath of retrenchment. These findings highlight that unions are maintained on an organizational model that relies on a balance of strong and weak state labor laws. By upending that equilibrium,Janusthreatens to undermine the power of labor in American politics.
- 21 October 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 19 (1) , 19-35
Financial Solidarity: The Future of Unions in the post-JanusEra
In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a “right-to-work” (RTW) legal regime for the entire government workforce (Janus v. AFSCME). While many predict lower union membership, few have considered howJanuswill challenge the overall cost-sharing strategy that unions use to ensure their affiliates’ organizational maintenance and survival. Using the National Education Association (NEA) as our empirical example, we develop and test a theory we call “financial solidarity,” which posits that union organizational maintenance hinges on the transfer of resources from affiliates in strong labor states to those in weaker labor states. We demonstrate that this system is in effect by showing that most NEA revenue originates from dues and fees paid by teachers in strong labor states and then by examining the causal effect of labor law retrenchment on affiliates’ reliance on their national union between 2005–2018. We find that the NEA transfers an additional $6–10 per member and is significantly more likely to make a political contribution in an affiliate’s state in the aftermath of retrenchment. These findings highlight that unions are maintained on an organizational model that relies on a balance of strong and weak state labor laws. By upending that equilibrium,Janusthreatens to undermine the power of labor in American politics.