MKMichael Klenk

Michael Klenk

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Michael Klenk has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    What you say and why you say it: Indifference and perceptions of manipulation

    by Michael Klenk, Matthias Uhl

    Manipulation is an important topic in moral, social, and applied philosophy, and it is increasingly salient in debates about digital technologies, political communication, and regulation. Yet despite sustained disagreement about what distinguishes manipulation from other forms of influence, there is little experimental work on the folk concept of manipulation itself. We address this gap by testing a central contrast between the Mistake Account and the Indifference Account. In a fivecondition vignette experiment spanning five domains (N = 1,752), we varied argument quality, outcome quality, and the influencer's attitude toward argument quality. Holding argument and outcome fixed, indifference substantially increased judgments of manipulation, coercion, and moral problematicity, while leaving persuasion judgments unchanged. Bad arguments and bad outcomes produced smaller additional increases in manipulation judgments. The findings suggest that ordinary classifications of manipulation are sensitive not only to attempted mistakes or defective outcomes, but also to the stance from which an influencer acts.

  • Open Access

    Recent Work on Manipulation

    by Michael Klenk, Robert Noggle

  • Open Access

    The Risk of Manipulation and Deception in sXAI

    by Suzana Alpsancar, Michael Klenk

    XAI can minimize the risks of being manipulated and deceived by AI but in turn entails other specific risks. This also applies to sXAI, and the specifically social character of sXAI harbors particular risks that designers and developers should be aware of. In this chapter, we shall discuss the potential opportunities and risks of sXAI. We see a particularly positive potential in the social character of sXAI, which lies in the fact that skillful users, including those with “healthy distrust,” can use the adaptivity of sXAI to produce an explanation that is actually relevant and adequate for them. However, this requires a high level of skills on the part of the user and is thus in contrast to the general promise of efficiency in the use of AI. A potential risk of XAI is that it can be (even more) persuasive, as the interactive involvement and the anthropomorphism strengthen a trustworthy appearance/performance (independent of the adequacy of the sXAI performance).

  • Open Access

    The Ethics of Generative AI

    by Michael Klenk

    This chapter discusses the ethics of generative AI. It provides a technical primer to show how generative AI affords experiencing technology as if it were human, and this affordance provides a fruitful focus for the philosophical ethics of generative AI. It then shows how generative AI can both aggravate and alleviate familiar ethical concerns in AI ethics, including responsibility, privacy, bias and fairness, and forms of alienation and exploitation. Finally, the chapter examines ethical questions that arise specifically from generative AI's mimetic generativity, such as debates about authorship and credit, the emergence of as-if social relationships with machines, and new forms of influence, persuasion, and manipulation.

  • Open Access

    Liberty, Manipulation, and Algorithmic Transparency: Reply to Franke

    by Michael Klenk

    Franke, in Philosophy & Technology, 37(1), 1–6, (2024), connects the recent debate about manipulative algorithmic transparency with the concerns about problematic pursuits of positive liberty. I argue that the indifference view of manipulative transparency is not aligned with positive liberty, contrary to Franke’s claim, and even if it is, it is not aligned with the risk that many have attributed to pursuits of positive liberty. Moreover, I suggest that Franke’s worry may generalise beyond the manipulative transparency debate to AI ethics in general.


  • Open Access

    Ethics of generative AI and manipulation: a design-oriented research agenda

    by Michael Klenk

    Generative AI enables automated, effective manipulation at scale. Despite the growing general ethical discussion around generative AI, the specific manipulation risks remain inadequately investigated. This article outlines essential inquiries encompassing conceptual, empirical, and design dimensions of manipulation, pivotal for comprehending and curbing manipulation risks. By highlighting these questions, the article underscores the necessity of an appropriate conceptualisation of manipulation to ensure the responsible development of Generative AI technologies.


  • Open Access

    Algorithmic Transparency and Manipulation

    by Michael Klenk

    A series of recent papers raises worries about the manipulative potential of algorithmic transparency. But while the concern is apt and relevant, it is based on a fraught understanding of manipulation. Therefore, this paper draws attention to the indifference view of manipulation, which explains better than the vulnerability view why algorithmic transparency has manipulative potential. The paper also raises pertinent research questions for future studies of manipulation in the context of algorithmic transparency.

  • Open Access

    Not a Good Fix: Constitutivism on Value Change and Disagreement

    by Michael Klenk, Ibo van de Poel

    We examine whether Thomsonian constitutivism, a metaethical view that analyses value in terms of ‘goodness-fixing kinds,’ i.e. kinds that themselves set the standards for being a good instance of the respective kind, offers a satisfactory explanation of value change and disagreement. While value disagreement has long been considered an important explanandum, we introduce value change as a closely related but distinct phenomenon of metaethical interest. We argue that constitutivism fails to explain both phenomena because of its commitment to goodness-fixing kinds. Constitutivism explains away disagreement and at best explains the emergence of new values, not genuine change. Therefore, Thomsonian constitutivism is not a good fix for realist problems with explaining value disagreement, and value change.

  • Open Access

    6. Conceptual Disruption and the Ethics of Technology

    by Jeroen Hopster, Philip Brey, Michael Klenk, Guido Löhr, Samuela Marchiori, Björn Lundgren, Kevin Scharp

    This chapter provides a theoretical lens on conceptual disruption. It offers a typology of conceptual disruption, discusses its relation to conceptual engineering, and sketches a programmatic view of the implications of conceptual disruption for the ethics of technology. We begin by distinguishing between three different kinds of conceptual disruptions: conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments. Subsequently, we distinguish between different mechanisms of conceptual disruption, and two modes of conceptual change. We point out that disruptions may be induced by technology, but can also be triggered by intercultural exchanges. Conceptual disruptions frequently yield conceptual uncertainty and may call for conceptual and ethical inquiry. We argue that a useful approach to address conceptual disruptions is to engage in conceptual engineering. We outline what conceptual engineering involves and argue that discussions on conceptual disruption and conceptual engineering can benefit from closer integration. In closing, we discuss the relevance of studying conceptual disruption for technology ethics, and point to the promise of this line of research to innovate practical philosophy at large.