Stefano Herzel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Stefano Herzel has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marco Nicolosi
University of Perugia, Perugia, Italy
7 shared publications - Flavio Angelini
Department of Economics, University of Perugia, Perugia, Italy
3 shared publications - Katia Colaneri
Department of Economics and Finance University of Rome Tor Vergata
3 shared publications - Annalisa Fabretti
University of Rome Tor Vergata
2 shared publications Flavio Angelini
2 shared publicationsAnnalisa Fabretti
University of Rome
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Financial Analysis
- Vol. 120
Euro area benchmark rates after the end of LIBOR
- 11 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Financial Analysis
- Vol. 120
Open AccessEuro area benchmark rates after the end of LIBOR
- 13 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Quantitative Finance
- p. 1-10
Sensitivity of the Euro OIS term structure to ECB policy rate surprises
1. Central banks strive to implement transparent and predictable monetary policies, yet expectations about forthcoming decisions are frequently revised as new macroeconomic, financial, or geopoliti...
- 13 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Quantitative Finance
- p. 1-10
Sensitivity of the Euro OIS term structure to ECB policy rate surprises
1. Central banks strive to implement transparent and predictable monetary policies, yet expectations about forthcoming decisions are frequently revised as new macroeconomic, financial, or geopoliti...
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 169-178
Option Hedging Through Reinforcement Learning
- Open Access
- 27 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Computational Management Science
- Vol. 18 (4) , 539-561
Implicit incentives for fund managers with partial information
We study the optimal asset allocation problem for a fund manager whose compensation depends on the performance of her portfolio with respect to a benchmark. The objective of the manager is to maximise the expected utility of her final wealth. The manager observes the prices but not the values of the market price of risk that drives the expected returns. Estimates of the market price of risk get more precise as more observations are available. We formulate the problem as an optimization under partial information. The particular structure of the incentives makes the objective function not concave. Therefore, we solve the problem by combining the martingale method and a concavification procedure and we obtain the optimal wealth and the investment strategy. A numerical example shows the effect of learning on the optimal strategy.
- 27 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Computational Management Science
- Vol. 18 (4) , 539-561
Open AccessImplicit incentives for fund managers with partial information
We study the optimal asset allocation problem for a fund manager whose compensation depends on the performance of her portfolio with respect to a benchmark. The objective of the manager is to maximise the expected utility of her final wealth. The manager observes the prices but not the values of the market price of risk that drives the expected returns. Estimates of the market price of risk get more precise as more observations are available. We formulate the problem as an optimization under partial information. The particular structure of the incentives makes the objective function not concave. Therefore, we solve the problem by combining the martingale method and a concavification procedure and we obtain the optimal wealth and the investment strategy. A numerical example shows the effect of learning on the optimal strategy.
- Open Access
Implicit Incentives for Fund Managers with Partial Information
We study the optimal asset allocation problem for a fund manager whose compensation depends on the performance of her portfolio with respect to a benchmark. The objective of the manager is to maximise the expected utility of her final wealth. The manager observes the prices but not the values of the market price of risk that drives the expected returns. The estimates of the market price of risk get more precise as more observations are available. We formulate the problem as an optimization under partial information. The particular structure of the incentives makes the objective function not concave. We solve the problem via the martingale method and, with a concavification procedure, we obtain the optimal wealth and the investment strategy. A numerical example shows the effect of learning on the optimal strategy.
Open AccessImplicit Incentives for Fund Managers with Partial Information
We study the optimal asset allocation problem for a fund manager whose compensation depends on the performance of her portfolio with respect to a benchmark. The objective of the manager is to maximise the expected utility of her final wealth. The manager observes the prices but not the values of the market price of risk that drives the expected returns. The estimates of the market price of risk get more precise as more observations are available. We formulate the problem as an optimization under partial information. The particular structure of the incentives makes the objective function not concave. We solve the problem via the martingale method and, with a concavification procedure, we obtain the optimal wealth and the investment strategy. A numerical example shows the effect of learning on the optimal strategy.
- 18 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 299 (1-2) , 101-131
The value of knowing the market price of risk
- 18 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 299 (1-2) , 101-131
The value of knowing the market price of risk
- 18 July 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 225-229
The Value of Information for Optimal Portfolio Management
- 18 July 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 225-229
The Value of Information for Optimal Portfolio Management
- 5 October 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Decisions in Economics and Finance
- Vol. 40 (1-2) , 375-395
Convex incentives in financial markets: an agent-based analysis
- 5 October 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Decisions in Economics and Finance
- Vol. 40 (1-2) , 375-395
Convex incentives in financial markets: an agent-based analysis
- 24 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 266 (1-2) , 373-394
Portfolio management with benchmark related incentives under mean reverting processes
- 24 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 266 (1-2) , 373-394
Portfolio management with benchmark related incentives under mean reverting processes
- 1 March 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 42 (2) , 190-195
Delegated portfolio management under ambiguity aversion
- 1 March 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 42 (2) , 190-195
Delegated portfolio management under ambiguity aversion