Corey Cusimano
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Corey Cusimano has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Geoffrey Goodwin
3 shared publicationsGeoffrey P. Goodwin
Department of Psychology
2 shared publicationsTania Lombrozo
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, United States of America
2 shared publications- Tania Lombrozo
Department of Psychology, Princeton University
2 shared publications Amit Bhattacharjee
Western Washington Univ, Mkt, 995 Regent Dr,Koelbel Bldg,419 UCB, Boulder, CO 80309 USA
1 shared publication- Cait Lamberton
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 May 2025
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 122 (19)
Achievement (not effort) makes people feel entitled to rewards
It is common to say that people feel entitled to rewards—they think they have earned or deserve them—based on their effort and achievement. However, effort and achievement draw on different principles to justify reward. They can also conflict over when people should feel entitled to rewards. These observations raise the question: In everyday settings, do people feel entitled to rewards because of their effort, achievement, or some combination of the two? To determine how effort and achievement contribute to feelings of entitlement, we hired online workers and varied the feelings of effort and achievement that their work induced. We then let those workers decide how large of a bonus we then paid them. Achievement strongly predicted how much participants paid themselves. Hard work, by contrast, played little-to-no detectable role.
- 8 May 2025
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 122 (19)
Open AccessAchievement (not effort) makes people feel entitled to rewards
It is common to say that people feel entitled to rewards—they think they have earned or deserve them—based on their effort and achievement. However, effort and achievement draw on different principles to justify reward. They can also conflict over when people should feel entitled to rewards. These observations raise the question: In everyday settings, do people feel entitled to rewards because of their effort, achievement, or some combination of the two? To determine how effort and achievement contribute to feelings of entitlement, we hired online workers and varied the feelings of effort and achievement that their work induced. We then let those workers decide how large of a bonus we then paid them. Achievement strongly predicted how much participants paid themselves. Hard work, by contrast, played little-to-no detectable role.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of the Association for Consumer Research
- Vol. 10 (1) , 107-117
Hidden Commitments and Future Opportunities: Implicit Moral Philosophies in Consumer Psychology
- 1 January 2025
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of the Association for Consumer Research
- Vol. 10 (1) , 107-117
Hidden Commitments and Future Opportunities: Implicit Moral Philosophies in Consumer Psychology
- 7 June 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Review
- Vol. 29 (2) , 188-212
The Case for Heterogeneity in Metacognitive Appraisals of Biased Beliefs
Academic Prominent theories of belief and metacognition make different predictions about how people evaluate their biased beliefs. These predictions reflect different assumptions about (a) people’s conscious belief regulation goals and (b) the mechanisms and constraints underlying belief change. I argue that people exhibit heterogeneity in how they evaluate their biased beliefs. Sometimes people are blind to their biases, sometimes people acknowledge and condone them, and sometimes people resent them. The observation that people adopt a variety of “metacognitive positions” toward their beliefs provides insight into people’s belief regulation goals as well as insight into way that belief formation is free and constrained. The way that people relate to their beliefs illuminates why they hold those beliefs. Identifying how someone thinks about their belief is useful for changing their mind. Public The same belief can be alternatively thought of as rational, careful, unfortunate, or an act of faith. These beliefs about one’s beliefs are called “metacognitive positions.” I review evidence that people hold at least four different metacognitive positions. For each position, I discuss what kinds of cognitive processes generated belief and what role people’s values and preferences played in belief formation. We can learn a lot about someone’s belief based on how they relate to that belief. Learning how someone relates to their belief is useful for identifying the best ways to try to change their mind.
- 7 June 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Review
- Vol. 29 (2) , 188-212
The Case for Heterogeneity in Metacognitive Appraisals of Biased Beliefs
Academic Prominent theories of belief and metacognition make different predictions about how people evaluate their biased beliefs. These predictions reflect different assumptions about (a) people’s conscious belief regulation goals and (b) the mechanisms and constraints underlying belief change. I argue that people exhibit heterogeneity in how they evaluate their biased beliefs. Sometimes people are blind to their biases, sometimes people acknowledge and condone them, and sometimes people resent them. The observation that people adopt a variety of “metacognitive positions” toward their beliefs provides insight into people’s belief regulation goals as well as insight into way that belief formation is free and constrained. The way that people relate to their beliefs illuminates why they hold those beliefs. Identifying how someone thinks about their belief is useful for changing their mind. Public The same belief can be alternatively thought of as rational, careful, unfortunate, or an act of faith. These beliefs about one’s beliefs are called “metacognitive positions.” I review evidence that people hold at least four different metacognitive positions. For each position, I discuss what kinds of cognitive processes generated belief and what role people’s values and preferences played in belief formation. We can learn a lot about someone’s belief based on how they relate to that belief. Learning how someone relates to their belief is useful for identifying the best ways to try to change their mind.
- 1 March 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 153 (3) , 837-863
Psychological freedom, rationality, and the naive theory of reasoning.
To make sense of the social world, people reason about others' mental states, including whether and in what ways others can form new mental states. We propose that people's judgments concerning the dynamics of mental state change invoke a "naive theory of reasoning." On this theory, people conceptualize reasoning as a rational, semi-autonomous process that individuals can leverage, but not override, to form new rational mental states. Across six experiments, we show that this account of people's naive theory of reasoning predicts judgments about others' ability to form rational and irrational beliefs, desires, and intentions, as well as others' ability to act rationally and irrationally. This account predicts when, and explains why, people judge others as psychologically constrained by coercion and other forms of situational pressure. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 March 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 153 (3) , 837-863
Psychological freedom, rationality, and the naive theory of reasoning.
To make sense of the social world, people reason about others' mental states, including whether and in what ways others can form new mental states. We propose that people's judgments concerning the dynamics of mental state change invoke a "naive theory of reasoning." On this theory, people conceptualize reasoning as a rational, semi-autonomous process that individuals can leverage, but not override, to form new rational mental states. Across six experiments, we show that this account of people's naive theory of reasoning predicts judgments about others' ability to form rational and irrational beliefs, desires, and intentions, as well as others' ability to act rationally and irrationally. This account predicts when, and explains why, people judge others as psychologically constrained by coercion and other forms of situational pressure. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
People recognize and condone their own morally motivated reasoning
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Bloomsbury Academic
Mental State Control and Responsibility
ExtractCorey Cusimano Geoffrey P. Goodwin On October 13, 1988, at the start of the second presidential debate, Democratic Nominee Michael Dukakis took a question from the moderator challenging his long-held and widely known anti-death penalty stance, “Governor, if Kitty Dukakis were raped and murdered, would you favor an irrevocable death penalty for the killer? ” Dukakis, true to his principles, responded, “I think you know that I’ve opposed the death penalty all of my life. ” As he continued laying out the reasons behind his opposition, he remained practiced, professional, and composed — which was exactly the problem. Potential voters who were watching were outraged at his unemotional reaction to the thought of his wife’s hypothetical rape and murder. Dukakis’ popularity dropped overnight. Outrage at Dukakis did not reflect objections to his principles or even doubts about his perceived commitment to his wife. In the words of a columnist at the...
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Bloomsbury Academic
Mental State Control and Responsibility
ExtractCorey Cusimano Geoffrey P. Goodwin On October 13, 1988, at the start of the second presidential debate, Democratic Nominee Michael Dukakis took a question from the moderator challenging his long-held and widely known anti-death penalty stance, “Governor, if Kitty Dukakis were raped and murdered, would you favor an irrevocable death penalty for the killer? ” Dukakis, true to his principles, responded, “I think you know that I’ve opposed the death penalty all of my life. ” As he continued laying out the reasons behind his opposition, he remained practiced, professional, and composed — which was exactly the problem. Potential voters who were watching were outraged at his unemotional reaction to the thought of his wife’s hypothetical rape and murder. Dukakis’ popularity dropped overnight. Outrage at Dukakis did not reflect objections to his principles or even doubts about his perceived commitment to his wife. In the words of a columnist at the...
- 1 November 2020
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 119 (5) , 999-1029
People judge others to have more voluntary control over beliefs than they themselves do.
People think other individuals have considerable control over what they believe. However, no work to date has investigated how people judge their own belief control, nor whether such judgments diverge from their judgments of others. We addressed this gap in 7 studies and found that people judge others to be more able to voluntarily change what they believe than they themselves are. This occurs when people judge others who disagree with them (Study 1) as well as others who agree with them (Studies 2-5, 7), and it occurs when people judge strangers (Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5) as well as close others (Studies 3 and 7). It appears not to be explained by impression management or self-enhancement motives (Study 3). Rather, there is a discrepancy between the evidentiary constraints on belief change that people access via introspection, and their default assumptions about the ease of voluntary belief revision. That is, people tend spontaneously to think about the evidence that supports their beliefs, which leads them to judge their beliefs as outside their control. But they apparently fail to generalize this sense of constraint to others, and similarly fail to incorporate it into their generic model of beliefs (Studies 4-7). We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of ideology-based conflict, actor-observer biases, naïve realism, and ongoing debates regarding people's actual capacity to voluntarily change what they believe. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 November 2020
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 119 (5) , 999-1029
People judge others to have more voluntary control over beliefs than they themselves do.
People think other individuals have considerable control over what they believe. However, no work to date has investigated how people judge their own belief control, nor whether such judgments diverge from their judgments of others. We addressed this gap in 7 studies and found that people judge others to be more able to voluntarily change what they believe than they themselves are. This occurs when people judge others who disagree with them (Study 1) as well as others who agree with them (Studies 2-5, 7), and it occurs when people judge strangers (Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5) as well as close others (Studies 3 and 7). It appears not to be explained by impression management or self-enhancement motives (Study 3). Rather, there is a discrepancy between the evidentiary constraints on belief change that people access via introspection, and their default assumptions about the ease of voluntary belief revision. That is, people tend spontaneously to think about the evidence that supports their beliefs, which leads them to judge their beliefs as outside their control. But they apparently fail to generalize this sense of constraint to others, and similarly fail to incorporate it into their generic model of beliefs (Studies 4-7). We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of ideology-based conflict, actor-observer biases, naïve realism, and ongoing debates regarding people's actual capacity to voluntarily change what they believe. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 4 August 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
People regulate each other’s emotion regulation
People often observe others struggling with and attempting to regulate their negative emotions. But, rather than always offering sympathy and help, observers sometimes criticize others for feeling upset, thereby making them suffer even more. Why would observers react to suffering others in this way? Across six studies, we show that observers’ use criticism to spur sufferers to regulate their negative emotions away on their own. Consistent with this goal, observers base their supportive or critical reactions on whether they think the sufferer is capable of controlling their negative emotion (i.e., of regulating it away). Observers rely on a variety of cues to determine whether a person has control over their suffering. First, observers rely on their own sense of how much control they have over their own emotions (Study 1). Second, they judge emotions that are miscalibrated to the situation as being more controllable than emotions that are well-calibrated (Studies 2-4). And third, they incorporate information about the sufferer’s general capacity to exert cognitive control over his or her emotions (Study 4). Judgments about others’ emotion control extend to real-life contexts: They predict self-reports of supportive and critical behaviors towards close others (Study 5) and they predict support for university policies aimed at reducing the prevalence of microaggressions (Study 6). Taken together, our findings suggest that people engage in emotion regulation regulation, in which they expect and enforce others to regulate their own emotions if they can, and track features of the person or situation that enable successful emotion regulation.
- 4 August 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessPeople regulate each other’s emotion regulation
People often observe others struggling with and attempting to regulate their negative emotions. But, rather than always offering sympathy and help, observers sometimes criticize others for feeling upset, thereby making them suffer even more. Why would observers react to suffering others in this way? Across six studies, we show that observers’ use criticism to spur sufferers to regulate their negative emotions away on their own. Consistent with this goal, observers base their supportive or critical reactions on whether they think the sufferer is capable of controlling their negative emotion (i.e., of regulating it away). Observers rely on a variety of cues to determine whether a person has control over their suffering. First, observers rely on their own sense of how much control they have over their own emotions (Study 1). Second, they judge emotions that are miscalibrated to the situation as being more controllable than emotions that are well-calibrated (Studies 2-4). And third, they incorporate information about the sufferer’s general capacity to exert cognitive control over his or her emotions (Study 4). Judgments about others’ emotion control extend to real-life contexts: They predict self-reports of supportive and critical behaviors towards close others (Study 5) and they predict support for university policies aimed at reducing the prevalence of microaggressions (Study 6). Taken together, our findings suggest that people engage in emotion regulation regulation, in which they expect and enforce others to regulate their own emotions if they can, and track features of the person or situation that enable successful emotion regulation.
- Open Access
- 20 July 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Morality justifies motivated reasoning in the folk ethics of belief
When faced with a dilemma between believing what is supported by an impartial assessment of the evidence (e.g., that one’s friend is guilty of a crime) and believing what would better fulfill a moral obligation (e.g., that the friend is innocent), people often believe in line with the latter. But is this how people think beliefs ought to be formed? We addressed this question across three studies and found that, across a diverse set of everyday situations, people treat moral considerations as legitimate grounds for believing propositions that are unsupported by objective, evidence-based reasoning. We further document two ways in which moral evaluations affect how people prescribe beliefs to others. First, the moral value of a belief affects the evidential threshold required to believe, such that morally good beliefs demand less evidence than morally bad beliefs. Second, people sometimes treat the moral value of a belief as an independent justification for belief, and so sometimes prescribe evidentially poor beliefs to others. Together these results show that, in the folk ethics of belief, morality can justify and demand motivated reasoning.
- 20 July 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessMorality justifies motivated reasoning in the folk ethics of belief
When faced with a dilemma between believing what is supported by an impartial assessment of the evidence (e.g., that one’s friend is guilty of a crime) and believing what would better fulfill a moral obligation (e.g., that the friend is innocent), people often believe in line with the latter. But is this how people think beliefs ought to be formed? We addressed this question across three studies and found that, across a diverse set of everyday situations, people treat moral considerations as legitimate grounds for believing propositions that are unsupported by objective, evidence-based reasoning. We further document two ways in which moral evaluations affect how people prescribe beliefs to others. First, the moral value of a belief affects the evidential threshold required to believe, such that morally good beliefs demand less evidence than morally bad beliefs. Second, people sometimes treat the moral value of a belief as an independent justification for belief, and so sometimes prescribe evidentially poor beliefs to others. Together these results show that, in the folk ethics of belief, morality can justify and demand motivated reasoning.