Yael Perlman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Yael Perlman has a total of 42 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Uri Yechiali
Department of Statistics and Operations Research, School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
5 shared publicationsKonstantin Kogan
4 shared publicationsTal Avinadav
4 shared publications- Tal Avinadav
Department of Management, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel
4 shared publications Tatyana Chernonog
4 shared publicationsAmir Elalouf
Bar-Ilan University, Department of management, Ramar-Gan, Israel
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 358 (3) , 985-1014
The effect of commission scheme in online marketplaces under various information scenarios
The growing prevalence of online retailing has reshaped how marketplaces operate. This paper considers the case where a platform and a seller both receive signals (private information) that correlate with uncertain demand and may choose whether to share this information. The platform can adopt one of two commission schemes: fixed (a given sum for each unit sold) or proportional (a given percentage of the revenue). Specifically, this study deals with pure strategies and focuses on comparing commission schemes under different information scenarios (common information or information superiority of one of the parties). The main findings are: (i) Under the fixed commission scheme and information superiority of the seller, the platform always prefers a more informative signal. (ii) Under the proportional commission scheme, it is in the platform’s interest to share its private information with the seller and offer the seller a constant percentage that does not depend on the platform’s signal. (iii) In contrast to the proportional commission scheme, under fixed commission, the seller will refuse to play in some (private-signal determined) cases.
- 20 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 358 (3) , 985-1014
Open AccessThe effect of commission scheme in online marketplaces under various information scenarios
The growing prevalence of online retailing has reshaped how marketplaces operate. This paper considers the case where a platform and a seller both receive signals (private information) that correlate with uncertain demand and may choose whether to share this information. The platform can adopt one of two commission schemes: fixed (a given sum for each unit sold) or proportional (a given percentage of the revenue). Specifically, this study deals with pure strategies and focuses on comparing commission schemes under different information scenarios (common information or information superiority of one of the parties). The main findings are: (i) Under the fixed commission scheme and information superiority of the seller, the platform always prefers a more informative signal. (ii) Under the proportional commission scheme, it is in the platform’s interest to share its private information with the seller and offer the seller a constant percentage that does not depend on the platform’s signal. (iii) In contrast to the proportional commission scheme, under fixed commission, the seller will refuse to play in some (private-signal determined) cases.
- 9 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Fashion Design, Technology and Education
- Vol. 19 (3) , 419-430
Unveiling the power of social networks in demand prediction for substitutable fashion products
- 9 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Fashion Design, Technology and Education
- Vol. 19 (3) , 419-430
Unveiling the power of social networks in demand prediction for substitutable fashion products
- 9 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 316 (2) , 651-666
Fishing policies in a supply chain with an organic waste-based side stream
- 9 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 316 (2) , 651-666
Fishing policies in a supply chain with an organic waste-based side stream
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (5) , 1984-1998
Queueing with Negative Network Effects
Problem definition: In a Markovian queueing system with strategic customers, a reward is gained from completing service, and a loss is incurred while waiting to be served. The common assumption in the queueing literature is that such loss is a function of the customer’s waiting time. This paper takes a different and novel approach in that it models the customer’s loss incurred because of negative network effects while waiting with others, which increases as the exposure to others increases. Methodology: Waiting time is complemented by two innovative measures that capture negative effects on a tagged customer joining an M/M/c queue: the total number of customers the tagged customer meets and person-time exposure to these customers while waiting to be served. Threshold joining strategies inducing M/M/c/n–type queues are studied in this context. Results: The distributions of exposure size and exposure time of a customer joining the queue at a given position are analytically derived. Equilibria under conditions of no reneging are identified as threshold strategies. If the customer’s loss function is concave (such as an exponential model for the chance of infection during a pandemic), there is an equilibrium threshold strategy under which customers do not renege from the queue, even if reneging is allowed. The price of anarchy caused by lack of coordination among the individuals acting is identified. Unlike the equilibrium threshold built under the restrictive assumption that all potential customers have the same utility function, a novel safe threshold concept is introduced, a queue size at which a customer who joins the facility and stays until completing service has positive expected utility regardless of the actions of the other customers. Managerial implications: The implications of negative network effects caused by congestion in a queueing system are of interest to queue managers and, in particular, affect the optimal size of the waiting area. Safe and equilibrium thresholds are contrasted with the socially optimal threshold set by a regulator, and the safe threshold is suggested as a managerial tool to design the waiting room size. Funding: This work was supported by the Israel Science Foundation [Grants ISF 1898/21 and ISF 852/22]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1223 .
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (5) , 1984-1998
Queueing with Negative Network Effects
Problem definition: In a Markovian queueing system with strategic customers, a reward is gained from completing service, and a loss is incurred while waiting to be served. The common assumption in the queueing literature is that such loss is a function of the customer’s waiting time. This paper takes a different and novel approach in that it models the customer’s loss incurred because of negative network effects while waiting with others, which increases as the exposure to others increases. Methodology: Waiting time is complemented by two innovative measures that capture negative effects on a tagged customer joining an M/M/c queue: the total number of customers the tagged customer meets and person-time exposure to these customers while waiting to be served. Threshold joining strategies inducing M/M/c/n–type queues are studied in this context. Results: The distributions of exposure size and exposure time of a customer joining the queue at a given position are analytically derived. Equilibria under conditions of no reneging are identified as threshold strategies. If the customer’s loss function is concave (such as an exponential model for the chance of infection during a pandemic), there is an equilibrium threshold strategy under which customers do not renege from the queue, even if reneging is allowed. The price of anarchy caused by lack of coordination among the individuals acting is identified. Unlike the equilibrium threshold built under the restrictive assumption that all potential customers have the same utility function, a novel safe threshold concept is introduced, a queue size at which a customer who joins the facility and stays until completing service has positive expected utility regardless of the actions of the other customers. Managerial implications: The implications of negative network effects caused by congestion in a queueing system are of interest to queue managers and, in particular, affect the optimal size of the waiting area. Safe and equilibrium thresholds are contrasted with the socially optimal threshold set by a regulator, and the safe threshold is suggested as a managerial tool to design the waiting room size. Funding: This work was supported by the Israel Science Foundation [Grants ISF 1898/21 and ISF 852/22]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1223 .
- Open Access
- 4 July 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 62 (9) , 3176-3192
Inventory management for stockout-based substitutable products under centralised and competitive settings
- 4 July 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 62 (9) , 3176-3192
Open AccessInventory management for stockout-based substitutable products under centralised and competitive settings
- Open Access
- 10 February 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Applied Sciences
- Vol. 13 (4) , 2314
Software Portfolio Optimization: Access Rejection versus Underutilization
Several types of network and non-network licenses control users’ access to software. The literature on efficient selection of software licenses has mostly addressed queuing models intended to estimate the probability of denial of access for a user. Under that approach, however, the lower one sets the rejection probability, the greater the likelihood that licenses will be underused. We follow the literature in describing demand for software access with an Erlang queuing model and present a general integer program for optimizing mixed-license software portfolios under constraints on two types of risk: access rejection and license underutilization. The program, in which the number of licenses of each type is a decision variable, minimizes the total licensing cost while satisfying constraints on access denial and license underutilization. We evaluate and illustrate the ability of an efficient enumerative algorithm to solve the common problem of selecting an appropriate mix of floating and network named user licenses. Our case-study analysis indicates the potential for reducing the cost of licensing while also limiting problems associated with lack of access and underutilization.
- 10 February 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Applied Sciences
- Vol. 13 (4) , 2314
Open AccessSoftware Portfolio Optimization: Access Rejection versus Underutilization
Several types of network and non-network licenses control users’ access to software. The literature on efficient selection of software licenses has mostly addressed queuing models intended to estimate the probability of denial of access for a user. Under that approach, however, the lower one sets the rejection probability, the greater the likelihood that licenses will be underused. We follow the literature in describing demand for software access with an Erlang queuing model and present a general integer program for optimizing mixed-license software portfolios under constraints on two types of risk: access rejection and license underutilization. The program, in which the number of licenses of each type is a decision variable, minimizes the total licensing cost while satisfying constraints on access denial and license underutilization. We evaluate and illustrate the ability of an efficient enumerative algorithm to solve the common problem of selecting an appropriate mix of floating and network named user licenses. Our case-study analysis indicates the potential for reducing the cost of licensing while also limiting problems associated with lack of access and underutilization.
- Open Access
- 17 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 334 (1-3) , 469-495
Dynamic history-dependent tax and environmental compliance monitoring of risk-averse firms
Firms may misreport income or fail to comply with environmental regulations. This study contributes to the growing literature that analyzes dynamic history-dependent compliance monitoring, under which penalties or monitoring frequency are selected on the basis of recent compliance history. The current study develops methods for evaluating and comparing explicit solutions under given monitoring costs and income distributions, using a commonplace utility-penalty scenario under which firms never comply fully with regulations if statically monitored (regardless of their income distribution), but find it to their benefit, if dynamically monitored, to comply fully when their income is sufficiently high. In most examples tried, dynamic monitoring is superior even when constrained to monitor all firms at rates below the optimal static rate. The model is applied to actual IRS 2010 tax-report monitoring and compliance data partitioned by income bracket. This allows, in particular, to deduce degrees of risk aversion.
- 17 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 334 (1-3) , 469-495
Open AccessDynamic history-dependent tax and environmental compliance monitoring of risk-averse firms
Firms may misreport income or fail to comply with environmental regulations. This study contributes to the growing literature that analyzes dynamic history-dependent compliance monitoring, under which penalties or monitoring frequency are selected on the basis of recent compliance history. The current study develops methods for evaluating and comparing explicit solutions under given monitoring costs and income distributions, using a commonplace utility-penalty scenario under which firms never comply fully with regulations if statically monitored (regardless of their income distribution), but find it to their benefit, if dynamically monitored, to comply fully when their income is sufficiently high. In most examples tried, dynamic monitoring is superior even when constrained to monitor all firms at rates below the optimal static rate. The model is applied to actual IRS 2010 tax-report monitoring and compliance data partitioned by income bracket. This allows, in particular, to deduce degrees of risk aversion.
- 23 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Central European Journal of Operations Research
- Vol. 31 (4) , 1009-1027
What type of contract should e-tailers offer sellers when facing internal competition
This paper investigates whether an e-tailer should act as a platform and offer customers the product of a seller who can reach customers only through the e-tailer, and if so, what type of contract to offer the seller: a proportional commission based on revenue or a fixed fee per unit sold. The e-tailer also chooses the product line design: offer only her own product, offer only the outside seller’s product, or offer both her own product and the seller’s product. Intuitively, when the e-tailer’s product outperforms the seller’s product in terms of value-to-cost ratio, the e-tailer should not offer the seller’s product. However, non-intuitively, we also identify conditions in which the e-tailer remains better off not opening her platform to the seller even though the seller’s value-to-cost ratio is higher than the e-tailer’s and show how these conditions depends also on the consumers valuations. Regarding the type of contract to offer the seller, we find that most of the time, a proportional commission based on revenue is the best contract, guaranteeing the highest e-tailer profit. However, this is not always the case since there are situations when a fixed fee contract reduces the potential of internal competition.
- 23 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Central European Journal of Operations Research
- Vol. 31 (4) , 1009-1027
What type of contract should e-tailers offer sellers when facing internal competition
This paper investigates whether an e-tailer should act as a platform and offer customers the product of a seller who can reach customers only through the e-tailer, and if so, what type of contract to offer the seller: a proportional commission based on revenue or a fixed fee per unit sold. The e-tailer also chooses the product line design: offer only her own product, offer only the outside seller’s product, or offer both her own product and the seller’s product. Intuitively, when the e-tailer’s product outperforms the seller’s product in terms of value-to-cost ratio, the e-tailer should not offer the seller’s product. However, non-intuitively, we also identify conditions in which the e-tailer remains better off not opening her platform to the seller even though the seller’s value-to-cost ratio is higher than the e-tailer’s and show how these conditions depends also on the consumers valuations. Regarding the type of contract to offer the seller, we find that most of the time, a proportional commission based on revenue is the best contract, guaranteeing the highest e-tailer profit. However, this is not always the case since there are situations when a fixed fee contract reduces the potential of internal competition.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Queueing with Negative Network Effects
The usual negative effect of queue size on arrival to an M/M/c service facility is augmented, in this paper, by the negative network effect due to waiting with others, which increases as the exposure to others increases. The reward and cost structure acquires a new meaning, as the cost of exposure to later arrivals needs to be considered, on top of those already in the queue on arrival. Threshold joining strategies inducing M/M/c/n-type queues are studied in this context. The distributions of exposure size and exposure time of a customer joining the queue at a given position, are analytically derived. Equilibria under no reneging for a class of utility functions that grant a reward for completing service and charge a penalty that increases with the exposure to others in the queue in terms of their number or the exposure time, are identified as threshold strategies. If the penalty function is concave (such as an exponential model for the chance of infection during a pandemic), customers should not renege from the queue, even if allowed. The equilibrium threshold is contrasted with the socially-optimal threshold set by a regulator as the queue capacity which maximizes the social welfare in an M/M/c facility without reneging. A comparison between these two thresholds determines the toll imposed on society if customers are allowed into the facility based on their individual utility, with respect to regulated thresholds. We further introduce a novel threshold concept, the safe threshold, a queue size at which a customer joining the M/M/c facility and staying until completing service, has positive expected utility regardless of what other customers do.
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessQueueing with Negative Network Effects
The usual negative effect of queue size on arrival to an M/M/c service facility is augmented, in this paper, by the negative network effect due to waiting with others, which increases as the exposure to others increases. The reward and cost structure acquires a new meaning, as the cost of exposure to later arrivals needs to be considered, on top of those already in the queue on arrival. Threshold joining strategies inducing M/M/c/n-type queues are studied in this context. The distributions of exposure size and exposure time of a customer joining the queue at a given position, are analytically derived. Equilibria under no reneging for a class of utility functions that grant a reward for completing service and charge a penalty that increases with the exposure to others in the queue in terms of their number or the exposure time, are identified as threshold strategies. If the penalty function is concave (such as an exponential model for the chance of infection during a pandemic), customers should not renege from the queue, even if allowed. The equilibrium threshold is contrasted with the socially-optimal threshold set by a regulator as the queue capacity which maximizes the social welfare in an M/M/c facility without reneging. A comparison between these two thresholds determines the toll imposed on society if customers are allowed into the facility based on their individual utility, with respect to regulated thresholds. We further introduce a novel threshold concept, the safe threshold, a queue size at which a customer joining the M/M/c facility and staying until completing service, has positive expected utility regardless of what other customers do.