ABAnnika Boldt

Annika Boldt

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Annika Boldt has a total of 769 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Top Cited Papers

    Investigating the analytical robustness of the social and behavioural sciences

    by Balazs Aczel, Barnabas Szaszi, Harry T. Clelland, Marton Kovacs, Felix Holzmeister, Don van Ravenzwaaij, Hannah Schulz-Kümpel, Sabine Hoffmann, Gustav Nilsonne, Livia Kosa, et al.

    The same dataset can be analysed in different justifiable ways to answer the same research question, potentially challenging the robustness of empirical science1-3. In this crowd initiative, we investigated the degree to which research findings in the social and behavioural sciences are contingent on analysts' choices. We examined a stratified random sample of 100 studies published between 2009 and 2018, in which, for one claim per study, at least five reanalysts independently reanalysed the original data. The statistical appropriateness of the reanalyses was assessed in peer evaluations, and the robustness indicators were inspected along a range of research characteristics and study designs. We found that 34% of the independent reanalyses yielded the same result (within a tolerance region of ±0.05 Cohen's d) as the original report; with a four times broader tolerance region, this indicator increased to 57%. Of the reanalyses conducted, 74% reached the same conclusion as the original investigation, 24% yielded no effects or inconclusive results and 2% reported the opposite effect. This exploratory study indicates that the common single-path analyses in social and behavioural research should not be simply assumed to be robust to alternative analyses4. Therefore, we recommend the development and use of practices to explore and communicate this neglected source of uncertainty.


  • Open Access

    Investigating the analytical robustness of the social and behavioural sciences

    by Balazs Aczel, Barnabas Szaszi, Harry T Clelland, Marton Kovacs, Felix Holzmeister, Don van Ravenzwaaij, Hannah Schulz-Kümpel, Sabine Hoffmann, Gustav Nilsonne, Livia Kósa, et al.

    The same dataset can be analysed in different justifiable ways to answer the same research question, potentially challenging the robustness of empirical science1–3. In this crowd initiative, we investigated the degree to which research findings in the social and behavioural sciences are contingent on analysts’ choices. We examined a stratified random sample of 100 studies published between 2009 and 2018, where for one claim per study, at least five re-analysts independently re-analysed the original data. The statistical appropriateness of the re-analyses was assessed in peer evaluations, and the robustness indicators were inspected along a range of research characteristics and study designs. We found that 34% of the independent re-analyses yielded the same result (within a tolerance region of +/- 0.05 Cohen’s d) as the original report; with a four times broader tolerance region, this indicator rose to 57%. Regarding the conclusions drawn, 74% of analyses were reported to arrive at the same conclusion as in the original investigation; 24% to no effects/inconclusive result, and 2% to the opposite effect as in the original investigation. This exploratory study suggests that the common single-path analyses in social and behavioural research should not simply be assumed to be robust to alternative analyses4. Therefore, we recommend the development and use of practices to explore and communicate this neglected source of uncertainty.

  • Open Access

    How disconfirmatory evidence shapes confidence in decision-making

    by Annika Boldt, Yishu Sun, Kobe Desender

    When assessing our decisions, the normative strategy involves giving equal weight to each evidence sample when computing confidence. However, recent findings suggest that the brain tends to overweight decision-congruent information when forming confidence judgements (i.e., positive-evidence bias; PEB). Here, we re-analyzed nine datasets (total N = 176) from human participants who judged the average color of eight shapes and gave their confidence. This task precisely allowed us to disentangle the impact of choice-confirming and choice-conflicting evidence on the formation of confidence. Strikingly, participants overly relied on evidence that conflicts with their choice, contrary to the normative model and the PEB. To explain this response-incongruent evidence effect in the computation of confidence, we fitted an extended log-posterior-ratio for confidence model to our data and show that the same robust averaging principle that influences decisions also accounts for these confidence effects: incongruent evidence receives a stronger weight in the computation of confidence because it lies closer to the category boundary around which there is heightened sensitivity. In a preregistered experiment (N = 32), we then empirically demonstrate that an experimentally induced shift in the category boundary affects the computation of confidence in otherwise identical stimuli. We conclude that confidence depends on dis-confirmatory evidence due to downstream consequences from decision-making mechanisms.

  • Open Access

    How disconfirmatory evidence shapes confidence in decision-making

    by Annika Boldt, Yishu Sun, Kobe Desender

    When assessing our decisions, the normative strategy involves giving equal weight to each evidence sample when computing confidence. However, recent findings suggest that the brain tends to overweight decision-congruent information when forming confidence judgements (i.e., positive-evidence bias; PEB). Here, we re-analyzed nine datasets (total N = 176) from human participants who judged the average color of eight shapes and gave their confidence. This task precisely allowed us to disentangle the impact of choice-confirming and choice-conflicting evidence on the formation of confidence. Strikingly, participants overly relied on evidence that conflicts with their choice, contrary to the normative model and the PEB. To explain this response-incongruent evidence effect in the computation of confidence, we fitted an extended log-posterior-ratio for confidence model to our data and show that the same robust averaging principle that influences decisions also accounts for these confidence effects: incongruent evidence receives a stronger weight in the computation of confidence because it lies closer to the category boundary around which there is heightened sensitivity. In a preregistered experiment ( N = 32), we then empirically demonstrate that an experimentally induced shift in the category boundary affects the computation of confidence in otherwise identical stimuli. We conclude that confidence depends on dis-confirmatory evidence due to downstream consequences from decision-making mechanisms.


  • Open Access

    Transdiagnostic compulsivity is associated with reduced reminder setting, only partially attributable to overconfidence

    by Annika Boldt, Celine Ann Fox, Claire M Gillan, Sam Gilbert

    In the current study, we explored the behavioural and cognitive correlates of the transdiagnostic trait ‘compulsive behaviour and intrusive thought’ (CIT) in humans. CIT is associated with impaired metacognition, which in turn has been associated with cognitive offloading behaviours such as external reminder setting that play a key role in fulfilling cognitive goals. In an online study (N=600), we investigated individual differences in compulsivity, metacognition, and external reminder usage. Compulsive individuals had reduced preference for external reminders. This was partially, but not fully, attributable to their relative overconfidence. In contrast to previous studies, we found no evidence for an impaired confidence-action link: compulsive individuals used their metacognition to guide offloading just as much as their non-compulsive counterparts. Given the compensatory nature of cognitive offloading, our findings imply that compulsive individuals are at increased risk of inadequate external memory support. Along with transdiagnostic variation in the general population, this finding could also have implications for clinical conditions, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).


  • Open Access

    Transdiagnostic compulsivity is associated with reduced reminder setting, only partially attributable to overconfidence

    by Annika Boldt, Celine A Fox, Claire Gillan, Sam Gilbert

    In the current study, we explored the behavioural and cognitive correlates of the transdiagnostic trait ‘compulsive behaviour and intrusive thought’ (CIT). CIT is associated with impaired metacognition, which in turn has been associated with cognitive offloading behaviours such as external reminder-setting that play a key role in fulfilling cognitive goals. In an online study (N=600) we investigated individual differences in compulsivity, metacognition, and external reminder-usage. Compulsive individuals had reduced preference for external reminders. This was partially, but not fully, attributable to their relative overconfidence. In contrast to previous studies, we found no evidence for an impaired confidence-action link: compulsive individuals used their metacognition to guide offloading just as much as their non-compulsive counterparts. Given the compensatory nature of cognitive offloading, our findings imply that compulsive individuals are at increased risk of inadequate external memory support. Along with transdiagnostic variation in the general population, this finding could also have implications for clinical conditions, such as OCD.

  • Open Access

    Transdiagnostic compulsivity is associated with reduced reminder setting, only partially attributable to overconfidence

    by Annika Boldt, Celine A Fox, Claire M Gillan, Sam Gilbert

    In the current study, we explored the behavioural and cognitive correlates of the transdiagnostic trait ‘compulsive behaviour and intrusive thought’ (CIT). CIT is associated with impaired metacognition, which in turn has been associated with cognitive offloading behaviours such as external reminder-setting that play a key role in fulfilling cognitive goals. In an online study (N=600) we investigated individual differences in compulsivity, metacognition, and external reminder-usage. Compulsive individuals had reduced preference for external reminders. This was partially, but not fully, attributable to their relative overconfidence. In contrast to previous studies, we found no evidence for an impaired confidence-action link: compulsive individuals used their metacognition to guide offloading just as much as their non-compulsive counterparts. Given the compensatory nature of cognitive offloading, our findings imply that compulsive individuals are at increased risk of inadequate external memory support. Along with transdiagnostic variation in the general population, this finding could also have implications for clinical conditions, such as OCD.

  • Open Access

    Partially Overlapping Neural Correlates of Metacognitive Monitoring and Metacognitive Control

    by Annika Boldt, Sam J Gilbert

    Metacognition describes the process of monitoring one's own mental states, often for the purpose of cognitive control. Previous research has investigated how metacognitive signals are generated (metacognitive monitoring), for example, when people (both female/male) judge their confidence in their decisions and memories. Research has also investigated how metacognitive signals are used to influence behavior (metacognitive control), for example, setting a reminder (i.e., cognitive offloading) for something you are not confident you will remember. However, the mapping between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control needs further study on a neural level. We used fMRI to investigate a delayed-intentions task with a reminder element, allowing human participants to use their metacognitive insight to engage metacognitive control. Using multivariate pattern analysis, we found that we could separately decode both monitoring and control, and, to a lesser extent, cross-classify between them. Therefore, brain patterns associated with monitoring and control are partially, but not fully, overlapping.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTModels of metacognition commonly distinguish between monitoring (how metacognition is formed) and control (how metacognition is used for behavioral regulation). Research into these facets of metacognition has often happened in isolation. Here, we provide a study which directly investigates the mapping between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control at a neural level. We applied multivariate pattern analysis to fMRI data from a novel task in which participants separately rated their confidence (metacognitive monitoring) and how much they would like to use a reminder (metacognitive control). We find support for the notion that the two aspects of metacognition overlap partially but not fully. We argue that future research should focus on how different metacognitive signals are selected for control.


  • Open Access

    Outsourcing memory to external tools: A review of ‘intention offloading’

    by Sam Gilbert, Annika Boldt, Chhavi Sachdeva, Chiara Scarampi, Pei-Chun Tsai

    How do we remember delayed intentions? Three decades of research into prospective memory have provided insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this form of memory. However, we depend on more than just our brains to remember intentions. We also use external props and tools such as calendars and diaries, strategically-placed objects, and technologies such as smartphone alerts. This is known as ‘intention offloading’. Despite the progress in our understanding of brain-based prospective memory, we know much less about the role of intention offloading in individuals’ ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Here, we review recent research into intention offloading, with a particular focus on how individuals decide between storing intentions in internal memory versus external reminders. We also review studies investigating how intention offloading changes across the lifespan and how it relates to underlying brain mechanisms. We conclude that intention offloading is highly effective, experimentally tractable, and guided by metacognitive processes. Individuals have systematic biases in their offloading strategies which are stable over time. Evidence also suggests that individual differences and developmental changes in offloading strategies are driven at least in part by metacognitive processes. Therefore, metacognitive interventions could play an important role in promoting individuals’ adaptive use of cognitive tools.


  • Open Access

    Partially overlapping neural correlates of metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control

    by Annika Boldt, Sam Gilbert

    Metacognition describes the process of monitoring one’s own mental states, often for the purpose of cognitive control. Previous research has investigated how metacognitive signals are generated (metacognitive monitoring), for example when people (both f/m) judge their confidence in their decisions and memories. Research has also investigated how metacognitive signals are used to influence behavior (metacognitive control), for example setting a reminder (i.e. cognitive offloading) for something you are not confident you will remember. However, the mapping between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control needs further study on a neural level. We used fMRI to investigate a delayed-intentions task with a reminder element, allowing human participants to use their metacognitive insight to engage metacognitive control. Using multivariate pattern analysis, we found that we could separately decode both monitoring and control, and, to a lesser extent, cross-classify between them. Therefore, brain patterns associated with monitoring and control are partially, but not fully, overlapping.