Chad A. Proell
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Chad A. Proell has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Mark W. Nelson
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management
4 shared publicationsStephen J. Sauer
Clarkson University School of Business; Cornell University - Johnson School of Management
4 shared publications- Kathryn Kadous
Emory University
3 shared publications - Shana M. Clor-Proell
Texas Christian University
3 shared publications Matthew S. Rodgers
Ithaca College
2 shared publicationsMelissa C. Thomas-Hunt
University of Virginia - Darden School of Business
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- p. 1-16
Why so Inhibited? The Influence of Cynicism on Auditors’ Performance of Effortful Actions
SUMMARY: Professional cynicism in auditing (PCA) is a negative attitude toward the audit profession that reflects doubt about the integrity of the profession, including auditing work’s orientation toward serving the public’s interests and value in protecting those interests. Across a series of surveys and experiments, we find evidence of PCA among staff and senior auditors, and we find that auditors who are cynical are less willing to take effortful actions to increase audit quality, such as pushing back on client assertions, raising potential issues to supervisors, and making audit procedures more effective. Our results shed light on why auditors are prone to inaction when action is needed and provide initial evidence of how PCA affects audit quality. Thus, our study motivates future research examining the antecedents of PCA and interventions that can curb its effects. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 1 June 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- p. 1-16
Why so Inhibited? The Influence of Cynicism on Auditors’ Performance of Effortful Actions
SUMMARY: Professional cynicism in auditing (PCA) is a negative attitude toward the audit profession that reflects doubt about the integrity of the profession, including auditing work’s orientation toward serving the public’s interests and value in protecting those interests. Across a series of surveys and experiments, we find evidence of PCA among staff and senior auditors, and we find that auditors who are cynical are less willing to take effortful actions to increase audit quality, such as pushing back on client assertions, raising potential issues to supervisors, and making audit procedures more effective. Our results shed light on why auditors are prone to inaction when action is needed and provide initial evidence of how PCA affects audit quality. Thus, our study motivates future research examining the antecedents of PCA and interventions that can curb its effects. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 1 March 2023
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 37 (1) , 15-24
Do as I Say: A Look at the Supervisor Behaviors that Encourage Upward Communication on Audit Teams
SYNOPSIS: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) AS1201 mandates that audit supervisors encourage auditors to raise critical issues and concerns to their attention. However, audit supervisors do not receive specific guidance on how to encourage upward communication. This may contribute to the AS1201 compliance issues suggested by research and PCAOB enforcement actions. We provide specific examples of supervisor behaviors that enhance and harm upward communication, thereby improving audit supervisors’ ability to comply with PCAOB AS1201. To do so, we report qualitative data from audit interns describing instances in which they chose to either speak up or not speak up about potential audit issues they encountered in the field. The instances illustrate the types of issues that interns encounter and reveal the role of supervisor behavior in influencing interns’ decisions to speak up. JEL Classifications: M40.
- 1 March 2023
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 37 (1) , 15-24
Do as I Say: A Look at the Supervisor Behaviors that Encourage Upward Communication on Audit Teams
SYNOPSIS: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) AS1201 mandates that audit supervisors encourage auditors to raise critical issues and concerns to their attention. However, audit supervisors do not receive specific guidance on how to encourage upward communication. This may contribute to the AS1201 compliance issues suggested by research and PCAOB enforcement actions. We provide specific examples of supervisor behaviors that enhance and harm upward communication, thereby improving audit supervisors’ ability to comply with PCAOB AS1201. To do so, we report qualitative data from audit interns describing instances in which they chose to either speak up or not speak up about potential audit issues they encountered in the field. The instances illustrate the types of issues that interns encounter and reveal the role of supervisor behavior in influencing interns’ decisions to speak up. JEL Classifications: M40.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
How Workplace Identities and Team Management Practices Affect Distributed Team Auditors’ Willingness to Speak Up
Distributed, rather than co-located, teams increasingly perform audit work, raising regulator concerns that distributed team communication issues may affect audit quality. We investigate upward communication (i.e., raising issues to supervisors), a key communication dimension related to audit quality (PCAOB, 2010). In Study 1 we survey 69 senior auditors to establish that distributed team upward communication suffers. Further, distributed team auditors identify less with their teams and struggle to know when and how to speak up. Because both are linked to inhibited upward communication, we next experimentally test firm practices with the potential to attenuate these problems. Study 2, an experiment with 128 staff auditors and interns, reveals that making auditors’ professional identities salient improves upward communication on co-located teams with strong team identities but not distributed teams with weak team identities. Study 3, an experiment with 58 staff auditors, replicates a key Study 2 finding with a design that makes no reference to team identity strength. Specifically, in the presence of a salient professional identity, upward communication is significantly higher for co-located relative to distributed team auditors. Study 4, an experiment with 69 staff auditors, focuses solely on distributed teams. It indicates that several distributed team management practices, including one-on-one and standing daily meetings, encourage upward communication. Finally, Study 5, informal interviews with eight audit seniors, corroborates key survey and experimental findings. Combined, our results provide insights into why distributed team communication suffers, refine audit voice theory, and provide regulators, practitioners, and researchers with multiple paths to improve audit quality.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHow Workplace Identities and Team Management Practices Affect Distributed Team Auditors’ Willingness to Speak Up
Distributed, rather than co-located, teams increasingly perform audit work, raising regulator concerns that distributed team communication issues may affect audit quality. We investigate upward communication (i.e., raising issues to supervisors), a key communication dimension related to audit quality (PCAOB, 2010). In Study 1 we survey 69 senior auditors to establish that distributed team upward communication suffers. Further, distributed team auditors identify less with their teams and struggle to know when and how to speak up. Because both are linked to inhibited upward communication, we next experimentally test firm practices with the potential to attenuate these problems. Study 2, an experiment with 128 staff auditors and interns, reveals that making auditors’ professional identities salient improves upward communication on co-located teams with strong team identities but not distributed teams with weak team identities. Study 3, an experiment with 58 staff auditors, replicates a key Study 2 finding with a design that makes no reference to team identity strength. Specifically, in the presence of a salient professional identity, upward communication is significantly higher for co-located relative to distributed team auditors. Study 4, an experiment with 69 staff auditors, focuses solely on distributed teams. It indicates that several distributed team management practices, including one-on-one and standing daily meetings, encourage upward communication. Finally, Study 5, informal interviews with eight audit seniors, corroborates key survey and experimental findings. Combined, our results provide insights into why distributed team communication suffers, refine audit voice theory, and provide regulators, practitioners, and researchers with multiple paths to improve audit quality.
- 23 June 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- Vol. 41 (1) , 75-100
The Sounds of Silence: A Framework, Theory, and Empirical Evidence of Audit Team Voice
SUMMARY: Lower-level auditors are likely to encounter client information that may reflect important audit issues. The audit team cannot address these issues unless they are communicated upward. However, research indicates that lower-level auditors sometimes withhold issues, threatening audit effectiveness. We use a multi-method grounded theory approach to expand our understanding of the factors associated with auditors' decision to speak up about potential audit issues. We use an experiential questionnaire to draw out participants' real-life experiences with the decision to speak up or remain silent in the field (i.e., the “voice” decision). We summarize this work in a framework of audit voice determinants and a theoretical model of audit voice. We then use the determinants framework and the developed theory to conduct an experiment as an exemplar for how our work can be useful in generating future research. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 23 June 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- Vol. 41 (1) , 75-100
The Sounds of Silence: A Framework, Theory, and Empirical Evidence of Audit Team Voice
SUMMARY: Lower-level auditors are likely to encounter client information that may reflect important audit issues. The audit team cannot address these issues unless they are communicated upward. However, research indicates that lower-level auditors sometimes withhold issues, threatening audit effectiveness. We use a multi-method grounded theory approach to expand our understanding of the factors associated with auditors' decision to speak up about potential audit issues. We use an experiential questionnaire to draw out participants' real-life experiences with the decision to speak up or remain silent in the field (i.e., the “voice” decision). We summarize this work in a framework of audit voice determinants and a theoretical model of audit voice. We then use the determinants framework and the developed theory to conduct an experiment as an exemplar for how our work can be useful in generating future research. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 9 April 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 97 (2) , 373-395
It's Not Only What You Say … How Communication Style and Team Culture Affect Audit Issue Follow-Up and Auditor Performance Evaluations
Auditors work in hierarchical teams in which effective upward communication is critical to audit quality. In these teams, subordinates choose both the content, as well as the style, of their communications. We report survey and experimental evidence of the importance of communication style in the context of audit team culture. Our first two studies provide evidence that audit staff perceive assertive upward communication as risky and prefer to communicate passively, especially in less autonomous team cultures. Our third study provides evidence that audit seniors consider more follow-up procedures and rate staff higher when staff communicate assertively, especially in more autonomous team cultures. Combined, these studies indicate a disconnect between audit seniors, who reward and follow up more on assertive communication, and their staff, who prefer passive communication. Our results suggest the potential for audit quality improvements by better alignment of supervisor-subordinate communication-style preferences, especially in more autonomous team cultures. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 9 April 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 97 (2) , 373-395
It's Not Only What You Say … How Communication Style and Team Culture Affect Audit Issue Follow-Up and Auditor Performance Evaluations
Auditors work in hierarchical teams in which effective upward communication is critical to audit quality. In these teams, subordinates choose both the content, as well as the style, of their communications. We report survey and experimental evidence of the importance of communication style in the context of audit team culture. Our first two studies provide evidence that audit staff perceive assertive upward communication as risky and prefer to communicate passively, especially in less autonomous team cultures. Our third study provides evidence that audit seniors consider more follow-up procedures and rate staff higher when staff communicate assertively, especially in more autonomous team cultures. Combined, these studies indicate a disconnect between audit seniors, who reward and follow up more on assertive communication, and their staff, who prefer passive communication. Our results suggest the potential for audit quality improvements by better alignment of supervisor-subordinate communication-style preferences, especially in more autonomous team cultures. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Friends in Low Places: How Peer Advice and Expected Leadership Feedback Affect Staff Auditors’ Willingness to Speak Up
Junior auditors collect the bulk of audit evidence, yet they do not always speak up to communicate potentially important audit issues. Such inappropriate “voice” decisions can endanger audit quality. We examine whether and how staff auditors influence each other in making voice decisions. First, a survey provides descriptive evidence that staff auditors consult their peers for advice on whether to speak up. Next, two experiments provide evidence that voice advice among peers at the staff level can be problematic. We find that staff auditors consistently underestimate the importance of raising issues compared to their supervisors, and they rely on social cues that are not diagnostic of issue importance in giving voice advice to peers. Finally, we predict and find that staff auditors tend to follow peer advice when it confirms their initial stance, and that an expectation of high (versus low) quality supervisor feedback increases their willingness to speak up. Most importantly, we find that contradictory peer advice only influences staff auditors’ willingness to speak up when leadership feedback is not expected to be of high quality. Together these results indicate that staff auditors seek out and follow voice advice from their peers, but appropriate leadership feedback practices can mitigate the negative impact of peer advice on upward communication.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFriends in Low Places: How Peer Advice and Expected Leadership Feedback Affect Staff Auditors’ Willingness to Speak Up
Junior auditors collect the bulk of audit evidence, yet they do not always speak up to communicate potentially important audit issues. Such inappropriate “voice” decisions can endanger audit quality. We examine whether and how staff auditors influence each other in making voice decisions. First, a survey provides descriptive evidence that staff auditors consult their peers for advice on whether to speak up. Next, two experiments provide evidence that voice advice among peers at the staff level can be problematic. We find that staff auditors consistently underestimate the importance of raising issues compared to their supervisors, and they rely on social cues that are not diagnostic of issue importance in giving voice advice to peers. Finally, we predict and find that staff auditors tend to follow peer advice when it confirms their initial stance, and that an expectation of high (versus low) quality supervisor feedback increases their willingness to speak up. Most importantly, we find that contradictory peer advice only influences staff auditors’ willingness to speak up when leadership feedback is not expected to be of high quality. Together these results indicate that staff auditors seek out and follow voice advice from their peers, but appropriate leadership feedback practices can mitigate the negative impact of peer advice on upward communication.
- Open Access
- 16 January 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Is Silence Golden? Audit Team Leader Reactions to Subordinates Who Speak Up 'In the Moment' and at Performance Appraisal
This paper examines audit team leader reactions to auditors who speak up about potentially important audit issues. Study 1 is a survey of interacting audit teams and provides evidence of higher performance evaluations for auditors who speak up. Studies 2, 3, and 4 are experiments examining team leader reactions to speaking up, both at the time speaking up occurs (Study 2) and later during performance evaluation (Studies 2, 3, and 4). Results provide evidence that team leaders react with irritation at the time speaking up occurs, particularly if a team member raises an audit effectiveness issue that could increase audit effort. However, team leaders reward speaking up in performance evaluations, particularly when team members speak up about issues that align with the effectiveness or efficiency focus of the team. While supervisors’ performance evaluations exhibit outcome effects, supervisors also reward speaking up, regardless of outcome.
- 16 January 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessIs Silence Golden? Audit Team Leader Reactions to Subordinates Who Speak Up 'In the Moment' and at Performance Appraisal
This paper examines audit team leader reactions to auditors who speak up about potentially important audit issues. Study 1 is a survey of interacting audit teams and provides evidence of higher performance evaluations for auditors who speak up. Studies 2, 3, and 4 are experiments examining team leader reactions to speaking up, both at the time speaking up occurs (Study 2) and later during performance evaluation (Studies 2, 3, and 4). Results provide evidence that team leaders react with irritation at the time speaking up occurs, particularly if a team member raises an audit effectiveness issue that could increase audit effort. However, team leaders reward speaking up in performance evaluations, particularly when team members speak up about issues that align with the effectiveness or efficiency focus of the team. While supervisors’ performance evaluations exhibit outcome effects, supervisors also reward speaking up, regardless of outcome.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 93 (6) , 281-300
Is Silence Golden? Audit Team Leader Reactions to Subordinates Who Speak Up “In the Moment” and at Performance Appraisal
This paper examines audit team leader reactions to auditors who speak up about potentially important audit issues. Study 1 is a survey of interacting audit teams and provides evidence of higher performance evaluations for auditors who speak up. Studies 2, 3, and 4 are experiments examining team leader reactions to speaking up, both at the time speaking up occurs (Study 2) and later, during performance evaluation (Studies 2, 3, and 4). Results provide evidence that team leaders react with irritation at the time speaking up occurs, particularly if a team member raises an audit effectiveness issue that could increase audit effort. However, team leaders reward speaking up in performance evaluations, particularly when team members speak up about issues that align with the effectiveness or efficiency focus of the team. While supervisors' performance evaluations exhibit outcome effects, supervisors also reward speaking up, regardless of outcome. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 93 (6) , 281-300
Is Silence Golden? Audit Team Leader Reactions to Subordinates Who Speak Up “In the Moment” and at Performance Appraisal
This paper examines audit team leader reactions to auditors who speak up about potentially important audit issues. Study 1 is a survey of interacting audit teams and provides evidence of higher performance evaluations for auditors who speak up. Studies 2, 3, and 4 are experiments examining team leader reactions to speaking up, both at the time speaking up occurs (Study 2) and later, during performance evaluation (Studies 2, 3, and 4). Results provide evidence that team leaders react with irritation at the time speaking up occurs, particularly if a team member raises an audit effectiveness issue that could increase audit effort. However, team leaders reward speaking up in performance evaluations, particularly when team members speak up about issues that align with the effectiveness or efficiency focus of the team. While supervisors' performance evaluations exhibit outcome effects, supervisors also reward speaking up, regardless of outcome. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 91 (6) , 1781-1805
Team-Oriented Leadership and Auditors' Willingness to Raise Audit Issues
This paper reports five studies examining audit team members' willingness to raise audit issues. The first study is a survey of interacting audit teams that provides evidence that team members are more willing to speak up when they view their leader as team-oriented (i.e., emphasizing team success as opposed to the leader's own personal advancement). Experiments 1–3 provide converging evidence that audit seniors are more willing to speak up to a team-oriented leader and about issues that are aligned with that leader's concerns. Experiment 4 provides evidence that the effect of team-oriented leadership on willingness to speak up is mediated by team members' commitment to the team leader and, to a lesser extent, by their identification with their team, but not by concerns about the immediate or eventual repercussions of speaking up. Together, these studies provide evidence that auditors' willingness to raise audit issues is affected by what the auditor has to say and how they think their message will be received, potentially affecting audit effectiveness and audit efficiency. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 91 (6) , 1781-1805
Team-Oriented Leadership and Auditors' Willingness to Raise Audit Issues
This paper reports five studies examining audit team members' willingness to raise audit issues. The first study is a survey of interacting audit teams that provides evidence that team members are more willing to speak up when they view their leader as team-oriented (i.e., emphasizing team success as opposed to the leader's own personal advancement). Experiments 1–3 provide converging evidence that audit seniors are more willing to speak up to a team-oriented leader and about issues that are aligned with that leader's concerns. Experiment 4 provides evidence that the effect of team-oriented leadership on willingness to speak up is mediated by team members' commitment to the team leader and, to a lesser extent, by their identification with their team, but not by concerns about the immediate or eventual repercussions of speaking up. Together, these studies provide evidence that auditors' willingness to raise audit issues is affected by what the auditor has to say and how they think their message will be received, potentially affecting audit effectiveness and audit efficiency. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 22 December 2014
- Published by Wiley in Human Resource Management
- Vol. 55 (2) , 341-355
Credit Where Credit is Due: A Field Survey of the Interactive Effects of Credit Expectations and Leaders’ Credit Allocation on Employee Turnover
- 22 December 2014
- Published by Wiley in Human Resource Management
- Vol. 55 (2) , 341-355
Credit Where Credit is Due: A Field Survey of the Interactive Effects of Credit Expectations and Leaders’ Credit Allocation on Employee Turnover