DSDaniel Ricardo dos Santos

Daniel Ricardo dos Santos

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Daniel Ricardo dos Santos has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Poster: A Multi-step Approach for Classification of Malware Samples

    by Arnaldo Sgueglia, Rocco Addabbo, Andrea Di Sorbo, Stanislav Dashevskyi, Daniel dos Santos, Corrado Aaron Visaggio

    The rapid spread of unknown malware has prompted many companies and researchers to improve their detection and classification systems. Cyber security companies must deal with the newest malware samples captured by their honeypots, aiming to analyze and classify them to develop several countermeasures. This process could only be feasible with a strong ground truth baseline; companies could only securely store the samples, waiting for further developments. This paper proposes a multi-step approach to support the classification process of unknown malware samples. Specifically, our approach first leverages well-known classification techniques and third-party services to collect as much information as possible about the samples and combines them with Machine Learning (ML)-based techniques to classify the remaining samples. Our case study, conducted on industrial data, shows how the combination offers superior performance than using each method individually.

  • Open Access

    Using DNS Patterns for Automated Cyber Threat Attribution

    by Cristoffer Leite, Jerry Den Hartog, Daniel Ricardo dos Santos

    Linking attacks to the actors responsible is a critical part of threat analysis. Threat attribution, however, is challenging. Attackers try to avoid detection and avert attention to mislead investigations. The trend of attackers using malicious services provided by third parties also makes it difficult to discern between attackers and providers. Besides that, having a security team doing manual-only analysis might overwhelm analysts. As a result, the effective use of any trustworthy information for attribution is paramount, and automating this process is valuable. For this purpose, we propose an approach to perform automated attribution with a source of reliable information currently underutilised, the DNS patterns used by attackers. Our method creates recommendations based on similar patterns observed between a new incident and already attributed attacks and then generates a list of the most similar attacks. We show that our approach can, at ten recommendations, achieve 0.8438 precision and 0.7378 accuracy. We also show that DNS patterns have a short lifespan, allowing their utility even in more recent knowledge bases.


  • Open Access

    Access Control Vulnerabilities in Network Protocol Implementations: How Attackers Exploit Them and What To Do About It

    by Daniel Ricardo dos Santos

    Authentication and access control mechanisms should verify the identity of users of a system and ensure that these users only act within their intended permissions. These mechanisms, alongside audit or intrusion detection, have been called the "foundation for information and system security'' [8]. There has been a large amount of research proposing authentication and authorization mechanisms for network protocols and devices used in Operational Technology (OT) and the Internet of Things (IoT) [7]. Although these devices run our critical infrastructure, most of them still rely on simple password-based mechanisms to prevent unauthorized operations [1]. More worryingly, even these simple mechanisms often have flawed implementations, allowing malicious actors to bypass them [6]. this talk, I will discuss several findings from our research into vulnerabilities in network protocol implementations of IoT, OT and IT systems, giving special attention to those stemming from flawed authentication and access control implementations. Examples include buffer overflows when processing user credentials, use of weak cryptography, credentials transmitted in plaintext, hardcoded credentials, authentication bypasses via MAC or IP spoofing, client-side authentication, missing critical steps in authentication, insufficient session expiration and message parsing before establishing a peer's identity. These issues were identified in implementations as diverse as embedded TCP/IP stacks [2,3], routing suites and engineering protocols for OT devices from major vendors [9]. This type of vulnerability enables attackers to take devices offline, manipulate their operational parameters, and in many cases execute arbitrary code. I will also present statistics from a set of OT- and IoT-specific honeypots about attacks exploiting authentication bypasses, brute forcing passwords and leaking credentials. These statistics show that the most common initial access technique for these systems consist of the exploitation of remote management protocols by guessing or leaking either generic or application-specific credentials [4]. Finally, I will discuss the importance of collaborative threat intelligence and modern network access control as methods to prevent, detect and respond to such attacks [5].


  • Open Access

    Insecure by Design in the Backbone of Critical Infrastructure

    by Jos Wetzels, Daniel Dos Santos, Mohammad Ghafari

    We inspected 45 actively deployed Operational Technology (OT) product families from ten major vendors and found that every system suffers from at least one trivial vulnerability. We reported a total of 53 weaknesses, stemming from insecure by design practices or basic security design failures. They enable attackers to take a device offline, manipulate its operational parameters, and execute arbitrary code without any constraint. We discuss why vulnerable products are often security certified and appear to be more secure than they actually are, and we explain complicating factors of OT risk management.


  • TestREx: a framework for repeatable exploits

    by Stanislav Dashevskyi, Daniel Ricardo dos Santos, Fabio Massacci, Antonino Sabetta


  • Automatically finding execution scenarios to deploy security-sensitive workflows

    by Daniel Ricardo dos Santos, Silvio Ranise, Luca Compagna, Serena Elisa Ponta

    We introduce a new class of analysis problems, called Scenario Finding Problems (SFPs), for security-sensitive business processes that – besides execution constraints on tasks – define access control policies (constraining which users can execute which tasks) and authorization constraints (such as Separation of Duty). The solutions to SFPs are concrete execution scenarios that assist customers in the reuse and deployment of security-sensitive workflows. We study the relationship of SFPs to well-known properties of security-sensitive processes such as Workflow Satisfiability and Resiliency together with their complexity. Finally, we present a symbolic approach to solving SFPs and describe our experience with a prototype implementation on real-world business process models taken from an on-line library.


  • A framework and risk assessment approaches for risk-based access control in the cloud

    by Daniel Ricardo dos Santos, Roberto Marinho, Gustavo Roecker Schmitt, Carla Merkle Westphall, Carlos Becker Westphall


  • Open Access

    Modular Synthesis of Enforcement Mechanisms for the Workflow Satisfiability Problem

    by Daniel R. dos Santos, Serena Elisa Ponta, Silvio Ranise

    Modularity is an important concept in the design and enactment of workflows. However, supporting the specification and enforcement of authorization in this setting is not straightforward. In this paper, we introduce a notion of component and a combination mechanism for security-sensitive workflows. These are business processes in which execution constraints on the tasks are complemented with authorization constraints (e.g., Separation of Duty) and authorization policies (specifying which users can execute which tasks). We show how authorization constraints can also be imposed across components and demonstrate the usefulness of our notion of component by showing (i) the scalability of a technique for the synthesis of run-time monitors for security-sensitive workflows; and (ii) the design of a plug-in for the reuse of workflows and related run-time monitors inside an editor for security-sensitive workflows.


  • Cerberus: Automated Synthesis of Enforcement Mechanisms for Security-Sensitive Business Processes

    by Luca Compagna, Daniel Ricardo dos Santos, Serena Elisa Ponta, Silvio Ranise


  • Open Access

    Assisting the Deployment of Security-Sensitive Workflows by Finding Execution Scenarios

    by Daniel R. dos Santos, Silvio Ranise, Luca Compagna, Serena E. Ponta