Antony Eagle
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Antony Eagle has a total of 37 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alice R. Jones
School of Biological Sciences and Environment Institute, University of Adelaide
1 shared publication - Andrew J. Lowe
Environment Institute, Adelaide University, Adelaide, Australia
1 shared publication - Anna M. Kotarba-Morley
Environment Institute, Adelaide University, Adelaide, Australia
1 shared publication - Ariella Helfgott
Environment Institute, Adelaide University, Adelaide, Australia
1 shared publication - Carmel Williams
School of Public Health Adelaide University Adelaide South Australia Australia
1 shared publication Chris Mortensen
The University of Adelaide
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Sustainability
- Vol. 9 (7) , 1-3
Evaluative governance for climate action in Australia
- 11 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Sustainability
- Vol. 9 (7) , 1-3
Evaluative governance for climate action in Australia
- Open Access
- 14 August 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Philosophers' Imprint
- Vol. 25
How much did each of the authors of this paper causally contribute to its writing?
Some philosophers argue that in order to accommodate a range of our practices we must suppose that causation is not an all or nothing matter: it comes in degrees. We argue for two key claims. First, we can accommodate these practices without positing degree theoretic causation, and we can do so by appealing to various things that clearly do admit of degrees. So, positing causation by degree is unnecessary. Second, not only is positing degree theoretic causation unnecessary, but in fact there is no single thing, causation by degree, that could play the role required of it if it is to accommodate these practices. Thus, we conclude, there is no motivation to posit degree theoretic causation that arises from consideration of these practices.
- 14 August 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Philosophers' Imprint
- Vol. 25
Open AccessHow much did each of the authors of this paper causally contribute to its writing?
Some philosophers argue that in order to accommodate a range of our practices we must suppose that causation is not an all or nothing matter: it comes in degrees. We argue for two key claims. First, we can accommodate these practices without positing degree theoretic causation, and we can do so by appealing to various things that clearly do admit of degrees. So, positing causation by degree is unnecessary. Second, not only is positing degree theoretic causation unnecessary, but in fact there is no single thing, causation by degree, that could play the role required of it if it is to accommodate these practices. Thus, we conclude, there is no motivation to posit degree theoretic causation that arises from consideration of these practices.
- 6 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 101 (1) , 249-250
Graham Charles Nerlich (23 November 1929 – 31 March 2022)
Graham Nerlich studied philosophy and English literature at the University of Adelaide, gaining a BA (with joint Honours) in 1954 and an MA (1955). These were halcyon days for philosophy in Adelaid...
- 6 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 101 (1) , 249-250
Graham Charles Nerlich (23 November 1929 – 31 March 2022)
Graham Nerlich studied philosophy and English literature at the University of Adelaide, gaining a BA (with joint Honours) in 1954 and an MA (1955). These were halcyon days for philosophy in Adelaid...
- 19 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 176 (3) , 781-802
Chance, determinism, and unsettledness
- 19 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 176 (3) , 781-802
Chance, determinism, and unsettledness
- 6 February 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Probability and Randomness
Early work on the frequency theory of probability made extensive use of the notion of randomness, conceived of as a property possessed by disorderly collections of outcomes. Growing out of this work, a rich mathematical literature on algorithmic randomness and Kolmogorov complexity developed through the twentieth century, but largely lost contact with the philosophical literature on physical probability. The present chapter begins with a clarification of the notions of randomness and probability, conceiving of the former as a property of a sequence of outcomes, and the latter as a property of the process generating those outcomes. A discussion follows of the nature and limits of the relationship between the two notions, with largely negative verdicts on the prospects for any reduction of one to the other, although the existence of an apparently random sequence of outcomes is good evidence for the involvement of a genuinely chancy process.
- 6 February 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Probability and Randomness
Early work on the frequency theory of probability made extensive use of the notion of randomness, conceived of as a property possessed by disorderly collections of outcomes. Growing out of this work, a rich mathematical literature on algorithmic randomness and Kolmogorov complexity developed through the twentieth century, but largely lost contact with the philosophical literature on physical probability. The present chapter begins with a clarification of the notions of randomness and probability, conceiving of the former as a property of a sequence of outcomes, and the latter as a property of the process generating those outcomes. A discussion follows of the nature and limits of the relationship between the two notions, with largely negative verdicts on the prospects for any reduction of one to the other, although the existence of an apparently random sequence of outcomes is good evidence for the involvement of a genuinely chancy process.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 113 (10) , 507-532
Persistence, Vagueness, and Location
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 113 (10) , 507-532
Persistence, Vagueness, and Location
- 26 November 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 173 (8) , 2215-2231
Multiple location defended
- 26 November 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 173 (8) , 2215-2231
Multiple location defended
- 5 October 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Probability
Rather than entailing that a particular outcome will occur, many scientific theories only entail that an outcome will occur with a certain probability. Because scientific evidence inevitably falls short of conclusive proof, when choosing between different theories it is standard to make reference to how probable the various options are in light of the evidence. A full understanding of probability in science needs to address both the role of probabilities in theories, or chances, as well as the role of probabilistic judgment in theory choice. In this chapter, the author introduces and distinguishes the two sorts of probability from one another and attempt to offer a satisfactory characterization of how the different uses for probability in science are to be understood. A closing section turns to the question of how views about the chance of some outcome should guide our confidence in that outcome.
- 5 October 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Probability
Rather than entailing that a particular outcome will occur, many scientific theories only entail that an outcome will occur with a certain probability. Because scientific evidence inevitably falls short of conclusive proof, when choosing between different theories it is standard to make reference to how probable the various options are in light of the evidence. A full understanding of probability in science needs to address both the role of probabilities in theories, or chances, as well as the role of probabilistic judgment in theory choice. In this chapter, the author introduces and distinguishes the two sorts of probability from one another and attempt to offer a satisfactory characterization of how the different uses for probability in science are to be understood. A closing section turns to the question of how views about the chance of some outcome should guide our confidence in that outcome.
- 13 April 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 94 (1) , 1-3
Composition as Identity, edited by A.J. Cotnoir and Donald L.M. Baxter
- 13 April 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 94 (1) , 1-3
Composition as Identity, edited by A.J. Cotnoir and Donald L.M. Baxter
- 4 September 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 126-158
Is the Past a Matter of Chance?
This chapter is a defence of the thesis that at every time t, the only outcomes which are a matter of chance (i.e. have non-trivial chances, strictly between zero and one), are future outcomes: those which occur later than t. Two arguments are offered; one from the expert role of chance, the other from the pragmatics of ability ascriptions and their connection with chances. Responses are also made to some objections.
- 4 September 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 126-158
Is the Past a Matter of Chance?
This chapter is a defence of the thesis that at every time t, the only outcomes which are a matter of chance (i.e. have non-trivial chances, strictly between zero and one), are future outcomes: those which occur later than t. Two arguments are offered; one from the expert role of chance, the other from the pragmatics of ability ascriptions and their connection with chances. Responses are also made to some objections.